Abrenica vs. Gonda

An objection to parol evidence of an oral contract falling within the Statute of Frauds is waived if not interposed at the time the evidence is offered. A motion to strike out after the testimony has been completed comes too late, and cross-examination on the same subject matter constitutes a tacit waiver of any prior objection. Further, Act No. 2041 validly authorizes justices of the peace, when assigned, to exercise the jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance without constitutional infirmity.

Plaintiff Galo Abrenica claimed that on February 21, 1906, he sold two parcels of land to defendant Manuel Gonda under a right of repurchase (pacto de retro) for P75, with a seven-year term. After the period lapsed, Abrenica tendered the redemption price but Gonda refused to return the lands. Gonda had meanwhile sold the parcels to co-defendant Marcelo de Garcia. Gonda asserted that he had bought the lands outright from Abrenica and his mother approximately nineteen years earlier and had been the sole owner since.

• Nature of the Action: Plaintiff Galo Abrenica sought to compel defendants Manuel Gonda and Marcelo de Garcia to return two parcels of land, alleging an oral sale with right of repurchase (pacto de retro) executed on February 21, 1906, for P75 with a seven-year redemption period.

• The Alleged Pacto de Retro: Abrenica testified that the contract was purely verbal, made in the house of Domingo Tamayo. He stated he borrowed P75 from Gonda and pledged (or mortgaged) the lands as security, using the term “pledge” informally to refer to the pacto de retro. The arrangement was that Abrenica could recover the lands within seven years upon paying back the P75.

• Defendants’ Version: Defendant Gonda contended he had acquired the parcels through an absolute sale from Abrenica and his mother, Mamerta Bonio, about nineteen years prior, for the same amount of P75. He claimed a written instrument of sale had existed but was lost, though no proof of its execution was presented. Gonda exhibited a tax declaration he filed on May 26, 1906, to support his claim of ownership.

• Subsequent Transfer to Co-Defendant: Gonda later sold the same parcels to co-defendant Marcelo de Garcia. De Garcia’s right therefore depended entirely on Gonda’s title.

• Redemption Tender and Deposit: At the expiration of the seven years, Abrenica tendered P75 to Gonda to redeem, but Gonda refused to deliver the land. Abrenica subsequently deposited the P75 redemption price with the clerk of court.

• Trial and Evidence: At trial, Abrenica was the first witness. His direct examination elicited detailed testimony about the oral contract, the persons present, and the circumstances of its making, filling six pages of the record. Defendants’ counsel objected only to one question as leading and another as irrelevant, but did not object on the ground that the contract was oral until the end of the direct examination. The court sustained a belated motion to strike out the entire testimony, but later reversed its own ruling in evaluating the evidence. During cross-examination, defendants’ counsel asked several questions delving into the specifics of the oral pledge arrangement, including whether Abrenica had spoken to Gonda’s wife about it and the distance Gonda traveled to deliver the money. Additional witnesses for plaintiff—Juan Carandang, Domingo Tamayo, and Pedro Mendoza—testified about ownership, the payment transaction, and the absence of a written contract. Motions to strike their testimony were likewise made late or after partial cross-examination on the same points.

• Jurisdiction: Whether Act No. 2041, authorizing justices of the peace to try Court of First Instance cases by assignment, is unconstitutional, and whether the assigned justice of the peace lacked jurisdiction over the case.

• Admissibility of Parol Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in considering the plaintiff’s oral testimony regarding the pacto de retro after having sustained a motion to strike it out, given the Statute of Frauds requirement for written proof of contracts involving land and exceeding one year.

• Jurisdiction: Act No. 2041 had already been declared valid in Calampiano vs. Tolentino and did not contravene the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. A justice of the peace acting under assignment functions as a judge of the Court of First Instance, not as a justice of the peace per se. The objection grounded on Barrameda vs. Moir was inapposite because that case did not involve a justice acting under the statutory assignment as a CFI judge. The jurisdictional challenge was therefore denied.

• Admissibility of Parol Evidence: The parol evidence was properly considered notwithstanding the court’s initial contrary ruling. The objection came only after the plaintiff had already testified extensively on the oral contract, and defendants’ counsel had in the meantime interposed only limited objections on grounds of leading and irrelevance. A motion to strike out made after testimony is given is generally ineffective. More critically, appellants waived any objection when their counsel proceeded to cross-examine Abrenica and other witnesses on the exact subject matter of the oral contract—whether they called it a “pledge” or a “mortgage.” Such cross-examination tacitly recognized the evidence and forfeited any right to have it excluded. Any stipulation by counsel that the cross-examination would not prejudice their motion could not undo the waiver; cross-examination presupposes the admission of the direct testimony it seeks to test. Because the parol evidence was validly before the court, it established that a sale with right of repurchase for seven years was concluded on February 21, 1906, that the price was P75, and that redemption was timely tendered. Defendant Gonda’s contrary claim of an absolute sale nineteen years earlier was unsupported; his tax declaration of May 1906 was consistent with the pacto de retro having been made only months before. The plaintiff was entitled to reconveyance upon payment of the redemption price, even against co-defendant de Garcia, whose rights derived from Gonda’s limited title.

• Timeliness of Objections and Waiver of the Statute of Frauds — An objection to the admission of parol evidence must be interposed at the moment the question is asked or the inadmissibility becomes apparent. Failure to object at the proper time constitutes a waiver of the Statute of Frauds. A motion to strike out after the testimony has been fully given is ineffective, and cross-examination on the same subject matter operates as a tacit waiver of any prior objection, regardless of a reservation of rights.

• Validity of Act No. 2041 (Assignment of Justices of the Peace) — A justice of the peace assigned under Act No. 2041 to try a case within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance acts as a judge of that court, not as a justice of the peace, and the statute does not violate the Philippine Bill of 1902.

• “It has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, and that if not so made it will be understood to have been waived.”

• “A motion to strike out parol or documentary evidence from the record is useless and ineffective if made without timely protest, objection, or opposition on the part of the party against whom it was presented.”

• “A failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute, is a waiver of the provisions of the law.” (citing Conlu vs. Araneta and Guanko)

• “As no timely objection or protest was made to the admission of the testimony … and … the defendants themselves, by the cross-questions put … in respect to said contract, tacitly waived their right to have it stricken out, that evidence, therefore, cannot be considered either inadmissible or illegal.”

• Calampiano vs. Tolentino, 29 Phil. 116 — Followed; previously upheld the constitutionality of Act No. 2041, confirming that the assigned justice acts as a Court of First Instance judge.
• Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. 44 — Distinguished; cited by appellants but held inapplicable as it did not concern a justice assigned under Act No. 2041.
• De Dios Chua Soco vs. Veloso, 2 Phil. 658 — Followed; established that a motion to strike an answer ordinarily comes too late if no timely objection was made before the answer.
• Conlu vs. Araneta and Guanko, 15 Phil. 387 — Followed; held that failure to object to parol evidence of a contract within the Statute of Frauds is a waiver of the statute’s protection.

• Section 335, Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) — The Statute of Frauds provision requiring certain contracts, including those for the sale of real property or those not to be performed within one year, to be in writing. Applied, but found waived by appellants’ failure to object timely and their cross-examination on the oral contract.
• Act No. 2041, Philippine Legislature — Authorized the assignment of justices of the peace to try cases within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. Upheld as valid and binding.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concurred. Moreland, J., took no part.