Aguilar vs. Aguilar

Actual knowledge by a co-owner of the sale of another co-owner’s share to a third person dispenses with the written-notice requirement under Article 1623 of the Civil Code, and the thirty-day redemption period runs from such knowledge. An unexplained delay of seven years in asserting the right to redeem constitutes laches and bars the action, especially where a subsequent purchaser in good faith has acquired the property following a court-ordered partition and sale.

Senen B. Aguilar and Virgilio B. Aguilar, brothers, purchased a house and lot in Parañaque City for the benefit of their father, Maximiano Aguilar. On February 23, 1970, they executed a written agreement declaring equal shares in the property and stipulating that Senen would live with their father on condition that Senen pay the remaining Social Security System loan obligation of the previous owners. Their father died in 1974. Virgilio then demanded that Senen vacate and that the property be sold, with the proceeds divided equally. Senen refused.

• The Co-ownership and the Father’s Death: Brothers Senen B. Aguilar and Virgilio B. Aguilar purchased a house and lot in Parañaque City for the benefit of their father, Maximiano Aguilar. In a written agreement dated February 23, 1970, they stipulated equal shares and that Senen would reside with their father provided Senen assumed the outstanding SSS loan of the former owners. Maximiano died in 1974. Virgilio then demanded that Senen vacate and that the property be sold to divide the proceeds equally; Senen refused.

• The First Case and the Final Supreme Court Decision: Virgilio sued for specific performance in 1979. After Senen’s default, the trial court ordered the sale of the property and equal division of proceeds, plus Senen’s eviction and payment of rentals. The Court of Appeals reversed, but in G.R. No. 76351 (October 29, 1993) the Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s ruling with modifications and declared the decision final and executory. The property was subsequently sold at public auction on November 27, 1995 to Alejandro C. Sangalang, the intervenor-respondent, and the proceeds were distributed.

• The Sale to Angel and the Redemption Suit: Unknown to Senen, Virgilio had sold his one-half share to their brother Angel in January 1989. Senen admitted he had actual knowledge of this sale. On March 27, 1995 — over six years after the sale and nearly two years after the Supreme Court’s final decision — Senen filed a complaint for legal redemption against Virgilio and Angel, alleging he never received written notice of the sale and thus his thirty-day redemption period had not lapsed. Virgilio, who had moved to California, moved to dismiss on grounds of lack of cause of action and forum shopping. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of laches, a ruling the Court of Appeals sustained.

• Absence of Written Notice: Petitioner Senen B. Aguilar argued that Article 1623 requires a written notice from either the vendor or the vendee before the thirty-day redemption period begins to run. Because he never received such written notice, his right to redeem never prescribed.

• Timeliness of the Filing: Petitioner maintained that his complaint for legal redemption was filed within the allowable period, as the lack of written notice prevented the commencement of the redemption period.

• Laches and Actual Knowledge: Respondents Virgilio and Angel Aguilar, together with intervenor Alejandro C. Sangalang, argued that petitioner had actual knowledge of the 1989 sale to Angel yet waited approximately seven years before instituting the redemption suit. This unexplained and unreasonable delay constituted laches, barring the action.

• Extinguishment of the Right: Respondents further asserted that with the final Supreme Court decision in G.R. No. 76351, the co-ownership had been dissolved and the property had been sold at public auction to a third-party purchaser in good faith, thereby extinguishing any right of legal redemption.

• Laches and Legal Redemption: Whether petitioner’s complaint for legal redemption was barred by laches despite the absence of a written notice of the sale as required under Article 1623 of the Civil Code.

• Laches and Legal Redemption: The petition was denied. The written-notice requirement under Article 1623 was relaxed in light of petitioner’s admitted actual knowledge of the 1989 sale. A written notice would have been superfluous; the thirty-day redemption period began to run from the time of actual knowledge. Petitioner’s failure to act for seven years constituted laches — an unreasonable and unexplained delay in asserting his right. The elements of laches were all present: (1) the sale to Angel gave rise to the need for redress; (2) petitioner delayed suit despite knowledge; (3) respondents and intervenor had no notice petitioner would still assert the right; and (4) allowing redemption would cause injury to intervenor Sangalang, a purchaser in good faith and for value who acquired the property at a court-ordered auction. Additionally, by the time the redemption suit was filed, the co-ownership had been terminated through judicial partition and public sale; after a property has been subdivided and distributed among co-owners, no right of pre-emption or redemption survives.

• Relaxation of the Written-Notice Requirement in Legal Redemption — The strict requirement of written notice under Article 1623 of the Civil Code is deemed satisfied when the co-owner seeking redemption has actual knowledge of the sale. A written notice under such circumstances is superfluous; the law does not demand what is unnecessary. The thirty-day period to exercise the right of legal redemption runs from the time of actual knowledge.

• Laches — Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which could or should have been done earlier through the exercise of due diligence; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption of abandonment or declination of that right. The elements are:

  1. Conduct on the part of the defendant (or one under whom he claims) giving rise to the situation for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
  2. Delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit;
  3. Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which the suit is based; and

  4. Injury or prejudice to the defendant if relief is accorded, or the suit is not held barred.

  5. Right of Redemption After Termination of Co-ownership — After a property owned in common has been subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the community is terminated, and any right of legal pre-emption or redemption ceases to exist.

• “The old rule is that a written notice of the sale by the vendor to his co-owners is indispensable for the latter to exercise their retracto legal de comuneros. More recently, however, we have relaxed the written notice requirement. Thus, in Si v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that a co-owner with actual notice of the sale is not entitled to a written notice for such would be superfluous. The law does not demand what is unnecessary.”

• “Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which could or should have been done earlier through the exercise of due diligence. Otherwise stated, laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it.”

• “We have held that after a property has been subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the community has terminated and there is no reason to sustain any right of pre-emption or redemption.”

• Si v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122047, October 12, 2000, 342 SCRA 463 — Followed. Established the relaxation of the written-notice requirement in legal redemption when the co-owner has actual knowledge of the sale.

• Villasor v. Medel, 81 Phil. 546 (1948) — Cited for the principle that legal redemption (retracto legal de comuneros) is a privilege created by law partly for public policy and partly for the benefit of the redemptioner.

• Estrada v. Reyes, 33 Phil. 31 (1915) — Cited for the purpose of Article 1620: to provide a method for terminating co-ownership and consolidating dominion in one sole owner.

• Del Rosario v. Bansil, G.R. No. 51665, November 29, 1989, 179 SCRA 662 — Followed. Held that after partition and distribution among co-owners, the right of redemption ceases.

• Felix Gochan & Sons Realty Corp. v. Heirs of Raymundo Baba, G.R. No. 138945, August 19, 2003, 409 SCRA 306 — Cited for the elements of laches.

• Article 1620, Civil Code — Grants a co-owner the right of redemption when the shares of other co-owners are sold to a third person. Applied as the governing substantive basis for petitioner’s claimed right.

• Article 1623, Civil Code — Requires that the right of legal pre-emption or redemption be exercised within thirty days from written notice by the prospective vendee or vendor. The written-notice requirement was held satisfied by petitioner’s actual knowledge, and the thirty-day period was deemed to have lapsed due to inaction.

• Article 498, Civil Code — Mentioned in the dispositive portion of the earlier Supreme Court Decision (G.R. No. 76351) directing the trial court to implement the partition. Served as the basis for the eventual termination of the co-ownership through judicial sale.

Justice Artemio V. Panganiban (Chairman), Justice Renato C. Corona, Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, and Justice Cancio C. Garcia concurred.