Alfiler vs. Cayabyab

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be entertained despite the availability of appeal when the broader interests of justice require it, such as when lower court decisions fail to express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which they are based, violating the Constitution. Furthermore, a deed of sale executed by an agent after the principal's death and without a written special power of attorney is void ab initio, barring the buyer from maintaining an unlawful detainer suit.

The case involves a dispute over a parcel of land in Quezon City originally owned by Quintin Santiago, Jr. Quintin entered an amicable settlement with petitioner's predecessors to sell the land, but they only made partial payments. Quintin died in 1997. Respondents bought the land in 1997 via a DOAS executed by Quintin's alleged attorney-in-fact, Norman Santiago. Respondents then sued for ejectment.

• Original Filing: Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43, Civil Case No. 40058 (Complaint for Ejectment)
• Lower Court Decision: January 3, 2011 — MeTC ruled for respondents, ordering petitioners to vacate and pay monthly rentals, attorney's fees, and costs.
• Appeal: Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 97 (Rule 40)
• RTC Decision: January 9, 2013 — Affirmed the MeTC Decision in toto. Motion for Reconsideration denied on October 17, 2013.
• CA Action: Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 (wrong remedy). CA dismissed it on December 13, 2013, and denied MR on February 17, 2015.
• SC Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner.

• The Subject Property: A 266.9-square meter parcel of land in Quezon City, registered in the name of Quintin Santiago, Jr.
• The 1985 Amicable Settlement: Quintin filed an ejectment/squatting complaint against petitioner's mother, Linglingay. They settled: Linglingay would buy the land for P146,000. She only paid P72,425, with the last payment in June 1986.
• Quintin's Death: Quintin died on March 12, 1997.
• The 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale (DOAS): On August 20, 1997, respondents bought the property via a DOAS purportedly executed by Quintin through his attorney-in-fact, Norman Santiago.
• The Ejectment Suit: On March 18, 2010, respondents filed an unlawful detainer case against petitioner and other occupants, claiming illegal possession since 1997. They issued a final demand to vacate on May 8, 2009.
• Petitioner's Defense: Petitioner argued the DOAS was void because Quintin was already dead when it was executed, and Norman had no written SPA. She also claimed a better right to possess based on the 1985 amicable settlement.

• The CA deviated from jurisprudence by dismissing the certiorari petition on strict technical grounds despite compelling reasons to apply liberal construction in the interest of substantial justice.
• The DOAS is null and void because Quintin died five months prior to its execution; a dead person has no contractual capacity.
• No Special Power of Attorney (SPA) was presented for Norman. Even if one existed, Quintin's death extinguished the agency (Art. 1919, Civil Code).
• The MeTC lacks jurisdiction because the one-year period to file an ejectment suit had lapsed; the proper action should be accion publiciana.
• The lower courts erred in not considering Arts. 1317 and 1874 of the Civil Code.

• The CA decision should stand; the MeTC and RTC already found no merit in petitioner's defenses.
• Petitioner's continued occupation without paying rent justifies ejectment.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the Rule 65 petition for certiorari on the ground of wrong mode of appeal, despite arguments for substantial justice.
• Substantive Issues: Whether respondents established a better right of possession to maintain an unlawful detainer suit given the alleged void DOAS.

• Procedural: The SC held that while petitioner used the wrong remedy (Rule 65 instead of Rule 42), exceptions to the strict application of rules apply. The broader interests of justice and the oppressive exercise of judicial authority justify relaxing the rules. The MeTC and RTC decisions violated Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution by failing to clearly and distinctly state the facts and law on which they are based—they completely ignored the validity of the DOAS and the SPA despite these being the core issues raised.
• Substantive: The SC ruled for petitioner on the ejectment issue. The DOAS is void ab initio. First, Quintin died 5 months before the DOAS execution, terminating his contractual capacity and extinguishing any agency (Art. 1919, Civil Code). Second, no written SPA was presented; Art. 1874 explicitly requires the authority of an agent to sell land to be in writing, otherwise the sale is void. Without a valid DOAS, respondents have no right of ownership or possession, even provisionally, and thus failed to meet their burden of proof in the ejectment case.

• Mutually Exclusive Remedies Rule — Certiorari and appeal are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. A special civil action for certiorari cannot substitute for an appeal lost through fault or negligence.
• Exceptions to the Mutually Exclusive Rule — Certiorari may be allowed despite appeal availability when: (a) public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; (b) the broader interests of justice so require; (c) the writs issued are null and void; or (d) the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. The SC applied the second and fourth exceptions here due to the lower courts' void decisions.
• Constitutional Mandate on Decisions (Art. VIII, Sec. 14) — No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Failure to do so leaves parties in the dark and violates due process.
• Burden of Proof in Ejectment (Actori incumbit onus probandi) — The plaintiff in an ejectment suit has the burden to prove by preponderance of evidence their right to de facto possession. If they fail, the defendant prevails.
• Agency Extinguished by Death — Agency is extinguished by the death of the principal (Art. 1919[3], Civil Code). Any act of an agent after the principal's death is void ab initio, unless exceptions apply (agency coupled with interest under Art. 1930, or agent acted without knowledge of death and third party in good faith under Art. 1931).
• Written SPA for Sale of Land — Under Art. 1874, authority of an agent to sell land must be in writing; otherwise, the sale is void. Under Art. 1878(5), a special power of attorney is necessary to enter into a contract transmitting ownership of an immovable. Mere reference to an SPA in a deed of sale is insufficient; it must be offered in evidence.

• Art. VIII, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution — Mandates that courts must express facts and law in decisions. The SC struck down the MeTC and RTC decisions for violating this provision.
• Rule 42, Sec. 1, Rules of Court — Proper remedy to appeal RTC decisions exercised in appellate jurisdiction. Petitioner failed to use this.
• Rule 65, Sec. 1, Rules of Court — Special civil action for certiorari. Improperly used by petitioner as a substitute for appeal.
• Rule 70, Sec. 1, Rules of Court — Governs unlawful detainer. Requires plaintiff to be a person against whom possession is unlawfully withheld after termination of right. Applied to dismiss the case since respondents had no right to possess.
• Art. 1874, Civil Code — Requires written authority for sale of land through an agent; otherwise void. Applied to render the DOAS void for lack of a written SPA.
• Art. 1878(5), Civil Code — Requires a special power of attorney to convey immovables. Applied to demand a written SPA.
• Art. 1919(3), Civil Code — Agency is extinguished by death of principal. Applied to terminate Norman's authority upon Quintin's death.