Amarillo vs. People of the Philippines

A judge who has acted as counsel de oficio exclusively for the purpose of apprising the accused of the consequences of a plea during arraignment is not disqualified under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court from subsequently presiding over the trial of the same case, as the limited participation does not amount to having been “counsel” within the meaning of the compulsory disqualification rule. Further, the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility is entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a showing that material facts or circumstances were overlooked or misapplied, and positive identification by credible prosecution witnesses prevails over the accused’s bare denial.

On September 3, 1994, at the Amihan Disco and Restaurant in Baler, Aurora, an altercation arose between the group of petitioner Fidel V. Amarillo, Jr. and the group of private respondent Raul Hermo over the use of an electric stand fan. The confrontation escalated until a gunshot was fired, striking Hermo in the forehead. Hermo survived due to prompt medical intervention. Two Informations were subsequently filed charging Amarillo with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under Presidential Decree No. 1866, and with frustrated homicide. Amarillo entered a plea of not guilty at arraignment, where the trial judge served as counsel de oficio because Amarillo’s retained counsel was absent. The judge thereafter presided over the joint trial.

• Nature of the Charges: On November 15, 1994, two Informations were filed against Fidel V. Amarillo, Jr. Criminal Case No. 1932 charged illegal possession of a .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver and four live rounds under P.D. No. 1866. Criminal Case No. 1933 charged frustrated homicide for shooting Raul Hermo in the forehead, the wound being potentially fatal but for timely medical assistance.

• The Incident According to the Prosecution: On the evening of September 3, 1994, private respondent Raul Hermo and his companions (Herminio Ade, Leoncio Ade, Ricky Ramirez, Danilo Palmero, and Edgardo Soriano) were at the Amihan Disco and Restaurant celebrating Ade’s birthday. Petitioner’s group was already present. A waitress directed a stand fan toward Hermo’s table; petitioner stood up and redirected the fan toward his own group. Soriano asked a companion to switch off the fan. The fan was turned off, but petitioner switched it on again. Petitioner then shifted a gun tucked on the left side of his waist to the right side. Hermo approached and spoke to petitioner. Without warning, petitioner shot Hermo in the forehead, causing him to fall. Hermo’s companions rushed petitioner and wrestled the gun away.

• The Incident According to the Defense: Petitioner claimed that his group was already using the fan when Hermo’s group arrived. Ramirez took the fan and directed it toward his own group. Feeling warm, petitioner pressed the fan’s button to make it swivel. Ramirez began throwing peanuts at petitioner. When petitioner’s companion Bihasa approached Hermo’s group, he was pushed back. As petitioner stood up, Soriano pointed a gun at him; petitioner parried it, and the gun suddenly fired. Petitioner tried to check if anyone was hit but was struck on the head and lost consciousness, regaining awareness only inside a police vehicle en route to the hospital.

• The Trial Court’s Findings: The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both illegal possession of firearm and frustrated homicide. It credited the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ramirez, Ade, Soriano, and Hermo himself, who positively identified petitioner as the shooter from a distance of three to five meters. The trial court noted the absence of improper motive on the part of the witnesses, found minor inconsistencies insufficient to impair credibility, and appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance.

• The Court of Appeals’ Modification: The Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings but held that, under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294 (amending P.D. No. 1866), the use of an unlicensed firearm should be considered merely an aggravating circumstance in the frustrated homicide case rather than a separate offense. The separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm was set aside, and the penalty for frustrated homicide was modified accordingly, with the aggravating circumstance offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

• Disqualification of the Trial Judge: Petitioner argued that the trial judge was legally disqualified under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court because he had acted as counsel de oficio during petitioner’s arraignment, thereby violating the right to a fair and impartial tribunal.

• Bias and Partiality: Petitioner maintained that the proceedings before the trial judge constituted a mistrial and a gross miscarriage of justice, asserting that the judge demonstrated manifest bias, failed to act with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, and was guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Petitioner cited the judge’s failure to treat the unlicensed firearm as a mere aggravating circumstance, the cancellation of bail pending appeal, and an order of commitment to the National Penitentiary as indicative of partiality.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner contended that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, pointing to alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses and asserting that the witnesses were biased due to their relationship with the victim.

• Non-Disqualification of the Judge: The People maintained that the trial judge’s limited role as counsel de oficio solely for the arraignment did not constitute grounds for compulsory disqualification, as he did not act as counsel in the case proper and petitioner was represented by counsel de parte at all other stages.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Respondents countered that the prosecution’s positive identification of petitioner as the malefactor, given by multiple credible eyewitnesses from close range, established guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and that minor inconsistencies in testimony did not undermine the central fact of the shooting.

• Disqualification of the Trial Judge: Whether the trial judge was disqualified under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court from hearing and deciding the case after having acted as counsel de oficio during petitioner’s arraignment.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Whether the prosecution proved petitioner’s guilt of frustrated homicide beyond reasonable doubt in light of alleged inconsistencies and the relationship of witnesses to the victim.

• Disqualification of the Trial Judge: The trial judge was not disqualified. Section 1, Rule 137 provides two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Compulsory disqualification applies when the judge has been “counsel” in the case. The judge a quo was designated counsel de oficio solely for the purpose of arraignment, his participation being limited to apprising petitioner of the consequences of his plea. Both prior to and subsequent to arraignment, petitioner was represented by counsel de parte. Such limited participation does not make the judge a former “counsel” within the intendment of the rule. Further, the alleged acts of bias — failure to apply R.A. No. 8294 correctly, cancellation of bail, and issuance of a commitment order — pertained to erroneous application of law or administrative actions made without full knowledge of pending motions, and did not evince partiality warranting a finding of grave injustice.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: The conviction for frustrated homicide was amply supported by evidence. The trial court’s evaluation of witness credibility is entitled to the highest degree of respect. The prosecution witnesses positively identified petitioner as the person who shot Hermo from a distance of three to five meters under clear viewing conditions. They knew petitioner before the incident, and no improper motive for testifying against him was shown. The relationship of witnesses to the victim does not automatically impair credibility where no improper motive exists. Discrepancies on minor matters — which hand petitioner used, the number of beer bottles consumed — did not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution’s evidence; rather, they negated the suspicion of rehearsed testimony. What was crucial was that the witnesses corroborated one another on the essential fact that petitioner shot Hermo. Petitioner’s denial could not prevail over positive identification by credible witnesses.

• Disqualification of Judges under Section 1, Rule 137 — The rule establishes two modes of inhibition: (1) compulsory disqualification, which conclusively presumes that a judge cannot sit with the requisite impartiality for any of the enumerated grounds, including having been “counsel” in the case; and (2) voluntary inhibition, which leaves it to the judge’s sound discretion to desist from sitting for other just and valid reasons. Acting as counsel de oficio exclusively for the purpose of arraignment, where counsel de parte subsequently represents the accused, is not a ground for compulsory disqualification because the judge’s participation is too limited to constitute having been “counsel” in the case.

• Credibility of Witnesses — Trial Court’s Assessment — The trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses are accorded the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that facts or circumstances of weight and substance were overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied. Positive identification by credible witnesses prevails over the accused’s denial. Minor inconsistencies in testimony, rather than impairing credibility, tend to strengthen it by removing suspicion of rehearsed testimony. The relationship of witnesses to the victim does not automatically impair credibility where no improper motive is attributed to them.

• Unlicensed Firearm as Aggravating Circumstance under R.A. No. 8294 — Following the amendment of P.D. No. 1866 by R.A. No. 8294, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide or murder is treated as an aggravating circumstance rather than a separate offense, precluding a distinct conviction for illegal possession of firearm.

• “The rule contemplates two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. In the first paragraph, compulsory disqualification conclusively assumes that a judge cannot actively or impartially sit on a case for the reasons therein stated. The second paragraph, concerning voluntary inhibition, leaves to the judge’s discretion whether he should desist from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons with only his conscience to guide him.”

• “[H]is participation was limited to appraising Amarillo of the consequences of his plea. Prior to and subsequent to the arraignment, Amarillo had a counsel de parte. Accordingly, there is no basis for the judge a quo to compulsorily inhibit himself.”

• “The unbending jurisprudence is that the trial court’s findings on the matter of credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected the result of the case.”

• “Amarillo’s denial cannot prevail over the positive identification by credible witnesses.”

• Chin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144618, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 206 — Cited as controlling authority on the distinction between compulsory and voluntary inhibition of judges under Section 1, Rule 137.

• People v. Marquez, G.R. Nos. 138972-73, September 13, 2001, 365 SCRA 200; People v. Marquez, G.R. No. 136736, April 11, 2002, 380 SCRA 561 — Cited in support of the principle that denial cannot overcome positive identification.

• Arceño v. People, G.R. No. 116098, April 26, 1996, 256 SCRA 569; People v. Velasco, G.R. No. 125016, May 28, 1999, 307 SCRA 684; People v. Palomar, G.R. Nos. 108183-85, August 21, 1997, 278 SCRA 114 — Cited for the doctrine that the trial court’s assessment of credibility is entitled to the highest degree of respect on appeal.

• Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court — Defines the grounds for compulsory and voluntary disqualification of judges. Applied to hold that a judge who acted as counsel de oficio only for arraignment is not thereby disqualified as former “counsel” in the case.

• Section 1, Republic Act No. 8294 — Amended Presidential Decree No. 1866 by providing that the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide or murder shall be considered an aggravating circumstance rather than a separate offense. The Court of Appeals applied this provision to set aside the separate illegal possession conviction and treat the unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in the frustrated homicide case.

Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, and Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. concurred.