Arquiza vs. People of the Philippines

A defamatory statement made in the course of a quasi‑judicial proceeding, or in a step necessarily preliminary to such a proceeding, is absolutely privileged and cannot give rise to criminal liability for libel, so long as (1) the document containing the statement was filed as a necessarily preliminary step to or during a quasi‑judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding affords procedural protections similar to those of the judicial process; (3) the statement is relevant and pertinent to the proceeding; and (4) the document was communicated by the author only to persons who have a duty to perform with respect to it and to those legally required to be served a copy.

Petitioner Godofredo V. Arquiza and private complainant Francisco G. Datol, Jr. were both nominees of the Senior Citizen Party‑List for the 2013 elections. On September 11, 2012, Arquiza filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel the Certificate of Nomination of Party List Nominees. The petition contained statements describing Datol as having “a string of criminal cases showing his propensity and predisposition to commit illegal and unlawful acts” and as “a fugitive from justice.” Datol learned of the petition when another nominee, Santos, showed him a copy; he then complained that the imputations caused him worry, cast dishonor upon him, and led Santos to doubt his integrity. An Information for libel was subsequently filed against Arquiza in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

• Nature of the case: Petitioner, a party‑list nominee, was charged with libel under Article 353 in relation to Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly defamatory statements contained in a petition he filed before the COMELEC.

• The Petition to Deny Due Course: On September 11, 2012, petitioner filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel the Certificate of Nomination of Party List Nominees against several nominees, including Francisco G. Datol, Jr., the third nominee of the Senior Citizen Party‑List. The petition was filed with the Office of the Clerk of the COMELEC pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 9366.

• Allegedly defamatory statements: The petition stated: (a) “As indications of his criminal bent, Datol, Jr had a string of criminal cases showing his propensity and predisposition to commit illegal and unlawful acts”; and (b) “Moreover, Datol, Jr. is a fugitive from justice and cannot be allowed to participate in any election as provided under the Omnibus Election Code.” Petitioner attached NBI records of a person bearing the same name as Datol to support the allegations.

• Publication: A copy of the petition was furnished to Datol and to the other respondents named in the petition, as required by COMELEC Resolution No. 9366. Datol learned of the petition when a fellow nominee, Efren T. Santos, showed him a copy. Datol claimed that Santos doubted his integrity after reading the petition.

• Proceedings before COMELEC: The petition called for the exercise of COMELEC’s quasi‑judicial function of denying due course or cancelling a certificate of nomination. COMELEC rules provide for summary proceedings, with notice to respondents, opportunity to file an answer and submit evidence, and the possibility of cross‑examination.

• RTC findings: The trial court found all elements of libel present—imputation of a crime or defect, publication, identifiability of the complainant, and malice. It ruled that the statements were not privileged because they were made not to fulfill a legal, moral, or social duty but to injure Datol’s reputation.

• CA ruling: The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto. It held that the statements were clear, unambiguous, and defamatory; that petitioner failed to verify the criminal records and thus did not rebut the presumption of malice; and that publication occurred because the petition was furnished not only to the COMELEC but also to other parties, one of whom disclosed it to Datol. The CA further held that no hearing or judicial proceeding was ongoing when the petition was filed, thus the statements could not be privileged.

• Death of private complainant: Datol passed away while the appeal was pending before the CA.

• Truth and burden of proof: Petitioner argued that the criminal cases referred to in the petition were not Datol’s but those of a namesake; thus, the allegation that Datol was a fugitive from justice was “legally true.” He maintained that Datol bore the burden of proving the criminal cases were not his.

• Absence of publication: Petitioner contended that only the parties to the petition were furnished copies, and that Datol himself admitted this on cross‑examination. Therefore, no publication to the public had occurred.

• Legal, moral, and social duty: Petitioner asserted he had a duty to protect his party‑list association and his seat in Congress, and that his statements were made in good faith to discharge that duty.

• Absolute privilege: Petitioner claimed his statements were absolutely privileged because they were made in the course of proceedings before the COMELEC, a quasi‑judicial body.

• Procedural defects: The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that the petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact instead of law, failing to indicate material dates, and failing to attach a certified true copy of the assailed Resolution.

• All elements of libel proven: The prosecution maintained that all elements of libel were established beyond reasonable doubt: petitioner imputed crimes and a defect to Datol; the imputation was published by filing the petition and furnishing copies to several persons, including Santos; Datol was clearly identifiable; and petitioner failed to prove lack of malice.

• Publication satisfied: The CA correctly found that publication occurred because the petition was received not only by the COMELEC but also by other parties, and one of them informed Datol of its contents.

• Malice not rebutted: Petitioner’s failure to verify the criminal records demonstrated intent to injure Datol’s reputation, and he did not dispute the presumption of malice.

• No absolute privilege: The petition was not filed in response to any duty but solely to damage Datol’s reputation. Moreover, no hearing or judicial proceeding was pending before the COMELEC at the time of filing, so the statements could not be considered privileged.

• Absolute Privilege in Quasi‑Judicial Proceedings: Whether defamatory statements contained in a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of nomination filed before the COMELEC are absolutely privileged.

• Application of the Four‑Fold Test: Whether the petition satisfied the requirements for absolute privilege in quasi‑judicial proceedings.

• Publication: Whether the act of furnishing copies of the petition to the respondent and other parties named in the petition constituted publication for purposes of libel.

• Absolute Privilege in Quasi‑Judicial Proceedings: Absolute immunity from suit for defamatory statements extends to quasi‑judicial proceedings, including steps necessarily preliminary to such proceedings. The privilege attaches provided the proceeding is quasi‑judicial in nature, the statement is relevant, the proceeding affords judicial‑type procedural protections, and the communication is made only to those with a duty or legal right to receive it. A petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of nomination is a quasi‑judicial matter, and the preliminary step of filing the petition is necessarily preliminary to the COMELEC’s adjudicatory function.

• Application of the Four‑Fold Test: The petition satisfied all four requirements. First, the filing of the petition was a necessarily preliminary step to a quasi‑judicial proceeding (the COMELEC’s determination of whether to deny due course or cancel the nomination). Second, COMELEC proceedings, though summary, afford adequate procedural safeguards: notice and hearing, opportunity to controvert charges and submit evidence, and the possibility of cross‑examination. Third, the statements that Datol had a string of criminal cases and was a fugitive from justice were the very grounds relied upon to cancel his nomination and were thus relevant and pertinent. Doubts as to relevancy are resolved in favor of the writer. Fourth, the petition was filed only with the Office of the Clerk of the COMELEC as required by Resolution No. 9366, and copies were furnished only to the respondents as mandated by the same resolution. The fact that co‑respondent Santos received a copy did not constitute publication because Santos was impleaded and legally entitled to service.

• Publication: Communication of the petition to the COMELEC and to the respondents named in the petition did not amount to publication within the meaning of libel. Under established doctrine, a communication to an office or officer having a duty to perform with respect to its subject matter is not a publication. Likewise, furnishing a copy to the respondent as required by COMELEC rules is not a publication. Because the non‑publication test was satisfied, no publication occurred that could support a libel charge.

• Absolute Privilege for Statements in Quasi‑Judicial Proceedings — A defamatory statement made during a quasi‑judicial proceeding, or in a step necessarily preliminary to such a proceeding, is absolutely privileged and cannot be the basis of a criminal or civil action for libel. The privilege applies even if the statement is false and malicious, provided it satisfies the four‑fold test:

  1. Quasi‑judicial powers test: The document was filed as a necessarily preliminary step to or during a proceeding in which the body exercises quasi‑judicial functions.
  2. Safeguards test: The proceeding affords procedural protections similar to those in judicial proceedings—notice, opportunity to be heard, right to present and controvert evidence, cross‑examination, and decision by an objective decision‑maker.
  3. Relevancy test: The defamatory statement is relevant or pertinent to the subject of the proceeding; doubts are resolved in favor of relevancy.
  4. Non‑publication test: The document was communicated only to persons having a duty to perform with respect to it and to those legally required to be served a copy.

In this case, the petition to deny due course was filed as a step preliminary to a COMELEC quasi‑judicial proceeding; COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 provides for notice, answer, evidence, and cross‑examination; the allegations of criminal propensity and fugitive status were the grounds for cancellation and thus relevant; and the petition was furnished only to the COMELEC and the respondents as mandated.

• Definition of Quasi‑Judicial Proceeding — A quasi‑judicial proceeding is one that involves: (a) taking and evaluating evidence; (b) determining facts based on the evidence; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. It entails determining what the law is, what the legal rights and obligations of the parties are, and adjudicating those rights and obligations based on the facts.

• Privilege Applies Liberally; Relevancy Construed Broadly — The doctrine of privileged communication is applied liberally to promote the free and unfettered administration of justice. The test of relevancy is likewise construed liberally in favor of the writer; the words are not scrutinized with microscopic intensity.

• “Absolute immunity from suit applies to defamatory statements made not only in judicial proceedings but also in quasi‑judicial proceedings, which includes steps necessarily preliminary thereto, provided that such proceedings afford procedural protections similar to those in judicial proceedings, and that the statement is relevant thereto and is communicated by the author only to those who have a duty to perform with respect to the document containing the statement and to those legally required to be served a copy thereof.”

• “The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of criminal prosecution or an action for damages.”

• “The true doctrine of absolute immunity is that, in the public interest, it is not desirable to inquire whether utterances on certain occasions are malicious or not. It is not that there is any privilege to be malicious, but that, so far as it is a privilege of the individual, the privilege is to be exempt from all inquiry as to malice.”

• Alcantara v. Ponce, 545 Phil. 677 (2007) — Extended absolute privilege to statements made during preliminary investigations, a preliminary step leading to judicial action; relied on the U.S. case Borg v. Boas and held that the privilege applies even where the proceeding is not strictly quasi‑judicial.

• Belen v. People, 805 Phil. 628 (2017) — Reaffirmed the application of absolute privilege to statements in preliminary investigations or other proceedings preparatory to trial, following Alcantara.

• Navarrete v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 427 (2000) — Articulated the test of relevancy for absolute privilege in judicial proceedings; held that the privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor and presence of malice if the statement is relevant, pertinent, or material to the cause.

• Borg v. Boas, 231 F.2d 788 (1956) — U.S. precedent holding that a written charge or information filed with a prosecutor or court is protected by absolute privilege; adopted by the Supreme Court in Alcantara as persuasive.

• Webster v. Byrd, 494 So. 2d 31 (1986) — U.S. case cited for the requirements of a quasi‑judicial proceeding to afford absolute privilege, including procedural protections similar to judicial processes.

• Malit v. People, 199 Phil. 532 (1982) — Held that utterances made in judicial or administrative proceedings are absolutely privileged.

• Articles 353 and 355, Revised Penal Code — Define libel as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, vice, or defect, and prescribe the penalty. The Court acquitted petitioner because the statements were absolutely privileged, thus not actionable under these provisions.

• COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, Rule 5, Sections 3, 5(2), 5(6), 5(7), 5(9), 5(10), and Rule 17, Section 3 — Govern petitions to deny due course or cancel a certificate of nomination. These rules require filing with the Office of the Clerk of the COMELEC, service of a copy on respondents, notice and hearing, opportunity to file an answer and controvert charges, submission of evidence, and cross‑examination. The Court interpreted these safeguards as satisfying the “safeguards test” and the filing and service limitations as satisfying the “non‑publication test.”

Gesmundo, C.J. (Chairperson), Zalameda, and Marquez, JJ., concur. Hernando, J., on official business.