Bachelor Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

A common carrier is presumed negligent in case of death or injury to passengers and, when invoking a fortuitous event, must prove not only that the incident was exclusively caused by force majeure but also that it exercised extraordinary diligence as required under Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code; the carrier’s failure to equip the bus with sufficient doors and its employee’s reckless act of opening the door while the bus was moving constitute negligence that defeats the defense. The mere occurrence of an unforeseen criminal act does not absolve the carrier when its own lack of extraordinary diligence contributes to the resulting harm.

On August 1, 1980, Bus No. 800 owned by Bachelor Express, Inc. and driven by Cresencio Rivera was traveling from Davao City to Cagayan de Oro City, passing through Butuan City. While the bus was at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, a male passenger near the rear suddenly stabbed a PC soldier, causing commotion and panic. When the bus stopped, passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were found on the road; Beter died from head injuries and Rautraut from severe injuries sustained in the fall. The heirs of the two deceased passengers subsequently filed a complaint for a sum of money against Bachelor Express, Inc., its alleged owner Samson Yasay, and driver Rivera.

• The Incident: Bus No. 800, owned by Bachelor Express, Inc. and driven by Cresencio Rivera, was en route from Davao City to Cagayan de Oro City with stopovers. At Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, after picking up a passenger, a male passenger at the rear of the bus suddenly stabbed a PC soldier. Commotion and panic ensued as passengers shouted and pushed one another toward the front door. The bus was moving at a speed not less than 30 to 40 miles per hour (48–65 km/h) at the time. When the bus stopped, Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were found on the road with fatal injuries.

• The Complaint: The parents of Ornominio Beter (Ricardo Beter and Sergia Beter) and Narcisa Rautraut (Teofilo Rautraut and Zoetera Rautraut) filed a complaint for a sum of money against Bachelor Express, Inc., its alleged owner Samson Yasay, and driver Rivera, anchored on breach of contract of carriage.

• Defense and Trial: Petitioners denied liability, alleging that the victims jumped off the bus without the knowledge or consent of the driver and conductor; that the corporation exercised due diligence in the selection of employees; and that the incident was an act of a third person beyond their control. Witness Leonila Cullano, for the defense, testified that the conductor opened the front door when passengers began shouting in panic. Conductor Pedro Collango testified that the bus was traveling at 30-40 miles per hour, that passengers jumped out of the window, and that the door was locked. Plaintiffs’ witness Sergia Beter testified that she saw her son fall from the bus as the door was forced open by the onrushing passengers.

• Trial Court Findings: The RTC found that the two deceased passengers, in a state of shock and fear, jumped from the bus through the window; that the door was locked; and that the defendants’ personnel were not negligent. The complaint was dismissed.

• Appellate Court Findings: The Court of Appeals identified material facts ignored by the trial court. It found that the conductor opened the bus door upon the passengers’ shouts; that at a speed of 48 to 65 kilometers per hour, the driver’s stop was belated; that victims fell through the door, not the window; that the conductor panicked and blew his whistle only after people had fallen; and that the bus had only one door, violating the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. 4136, as amended). The appellate court concluded that petitioners failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers.

• Proximate Cause as Fortuitous Event: Petitioners argued that the proximate cause of the deaths was the act of the passenger who ran amuck and stabbed another, a fortuitous event beyond their control. They maintained that without that criminal act, the victims would not have been compelled by fear to jump off the bus.

• Absence of Negligence: Petitioners contended that the bus driver drove cautiously and that the incident was attributable entirely to a third person over whom they had no supervision or control, thus they exercised due diligence.

• Non-Insurer Status: Petitioners asserted that common carriers are not insurers of their passengers, echoing the trial court’s ruling.

• Insufficiency of Plaintiffs' Evidence on Filiation: Petitioners claimed that private respondents failed to adduce sufficient proof that they were the parents of the deceased, and thus lacked legal personality to sue.

• Failure to Overcome Presumption of Negligence: Private respondents maintained that petitioners failed to rebut the statutory presumption of negligence under Article 1756. They pointed to the driver’s failure to stop immediately, the opening of the door while the bus was moving at considerable speed, and the conductor’s panicked response as evidence of lack of extraordinary diligence.

• Violation of Safety Requirements: They underscored that the bus had only a single door in contravention of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which contributed to the fatal outcome.

• Damages Properly Awarded: They contended that the appellate court’s computation of damages, including loss of earnings, death indemnity, moral damages, and attorney’s fees, was supported by evidence and prevailing jurisprudence.

• Presumption of Negligence: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of negligence under Article 1756 of the Civil Code.

• Fortuitous Event: Whether the death of the passengers was exclusively attributable to a fortuitous event, thereby exonerating petitioners from liability.

• Legal Personality: Whether private respondents adequately proved their filiation and hence their legal personality to sue.

• Damages: Whether the Court of Appeals properly determined and awarded the amounts of damages.

• Presumption of Negligence: The appellate court correctly found that petitioners did not present evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence. The driver did not immediately stop the bus; the conductor opened the door while the bus was moving at an appreciably fast speed; the conductor panicked and failed to manage the passengers; and the bus was equipped with only one door, violating the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. These circumstances showed that the carrier failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence mandated by Articles 1733 and 1755.

• Fortuitous Event: The passenger’s sudden assault was indeed a fortuitous event within the meaning of Article 1174. However, for a common carrier to be absolved from liability on that ground, it must prove not only that the accident was caused by force majeure but also that it was not negligent. Petitioners failed to establish that the deaths were due exclusively to the fortuitous event without any human intervention, as their own lack of extraordinary diligence contributed to the injuries. The doctrine of Tan Chiong Sian v. Inchausti & Co. and Batangas Laguna Tayabas Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court — requiring that the fortuitous event be the sole and exclusive cause — was controlling.

• Legal Personality: The belated objection to the private respondents’ legal capacity to sue lacked merit. Witnesses identified them as parents of the deceased during trial, and the trial court had recognized them as such in dismissing the complaint solely on the ground of absence of negligence.

• Damages: The Court of Appeals’ award was sustained. The computation for Ornominio Beter’s heirs — loss of earning capacity over a reduced life expectancy of 25 years, based on net earnings as a carpenter, plus straight death indemnity of P30,000, moral damages of P10,000, and attorney’s fees of P5,000 — followed the formula in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and People v. Daniel. For Narcisa Rautraut’s heirs, in the absence of proof of earnings, the same death indemnity, moral damages, and attorney’s fees were properly awarded, totaling P45,000.

• Caso Fortuito / Force Majeure Defined — An unforeseen or unavoidable event independent of the human will that renders normal fulfillment of an obligation impossible. Its essential characteristics are: (1) the cause must be independent of the obligor’s will; (2) the event must be impossible to foresee, or if foreseeable, impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must render it impossible for the obligor to perform in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in aggravating the injury. The Court applied these elements, as articulated in Lasam v. Smith, to find that the stabbing was a fortuitous event but that petitioners had not shown they were free from participation.

• Extraordinary Diligence of Common Carriers — Under Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is presumed to be at fault in case of death or injury to passengers. To overcome the presumption, the carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence — i.e., the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all circumstances — and that the accident was not due to its own negligence. In this case, the carrier’s failure to stop the bus promptly, the opening of the door while the bus was moving, and the inadequate door safety feature prevented exoneration.

• Fortuitous Event Defense Requires Proof of No Negligence — A common carrier cannot be absolved from liability simply by showing that a fortuitous event occurred; it must also prove that it was free from any negligence that contributed to the injury. The rule from Tan Chiong Sian v. Inchausti & Co. and Batangas Laguna Tayabas Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court states that the accident must be due exclusively to natural causes without human intervention. Here, the carrier’s own omissions constituted human intervention that precluded absolution.

• “… in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident.” — This reiterates the dual requirement for the fortuitous event defense.

• “From all the foregoing, it is concluded that the defendant is not liable for the loss and damage of the goods … inasmuch as such loss and damage were the result of a fortuitous event or force majeure, and there was no negligence or lack of care and diligence on the part of the defendant company or its agents.” (Tan Chiong Sian v. Inchausti & Co.) — The Court quoted this to emphasize that absence of negligence is a prerequisite.

• “… [F]or their defense of force majeure or act of God to prosper the accident must be due to natural causes and exclusively without human intervention.” (Batangas Laguna Tayabas Co. v. IAC) — Applied to hold that the carrier’s own acts constituted human intervention.

• The Court of Appeals’ factual findings, accepted by the Supreme Court, included: “the negligence of the common carrier, through its employees, consisted of … the driver's belated stop and the reckless opening of the doors of the bus while the same was travelling at an appreciably fast speed” and that the bus “was commissioned to travel … while equipped with only a solitary door for a bus its size and loading capacity, in contravention of rules and regulations provided for under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.”

• Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657 (1924) — Defined the term “caso fortuito” and enumerated its essential characteristics; relied on to analyze whether the stabbing was a fortuitous event.

• Tan Chiong Sian v. Inchausti & Co., 22 Phil. 152 (1912) — Established the rule that exoneration based on force majeure requires proof that there was no negligence on the part of the carrier or its agents; followed and applied.

• Batangas Laguna Tayabas Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 379 (1988) — Reiterated that the defense of force majeure requires the accident to be exclusively without human intervention; applied to reject petitioners’ exoneration.

• People v. Daniel, 136 SCRA 92 (1985) and Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 511 — Cited as authority for the formula in computing loss of earning capacity and the award of damages; followed in sustaining the appellate court’s monetary awards.

• Article 1732, Civil Code — Defines a common carrier; applied to classify Bachelor Express, Inc. as a common carrier.

• Article 1733, Civil Code — Requires common carriers to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of passengers; used as the standard against which petitioners’ conduct was measured.

• Article 1755, Civil Code — Mandates that a common carrier carry passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons; served as the benchmark for the finding of negligence.

• Article 1756, Civil Code — Establishes the presumption of fault or negligence in case of death or injury to passengers; the dispositive legal presumption that petitioners failed to overcome.

• Article 1174, Civil Code — Defines fortuitous events; the Court applied its requisites to determine that the stabbing was a fortuitous event but insufficient to exonerate.

• Article 2206, Civil Code — Governs indemnity for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict; used as basis for the straight death indemnity of P30,000.

• Republic Act No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code) — Cited with respect to the requirement that a bus of a given size must have more than one door; the violation supported the finding of lack of extraordinary diligence.

Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concurred.