Barrameda vs. Gontang

A purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale who consolidates ownership is entitled to a writ of possession, which may be issued ex parte against the mortgagor who remains in possession, without the necessity of a separate independent action.
A preliminary injunction is an appropriate remedy to restrain a former owner’s repeated intrusions upon foreclosed property where the intermittent nature of the acts and the probability of recurrence render an ordinary action to try title inadequate.

Leoncio Barrameda owned three parcels of land in Camarines Sur covered by TCT 1414, which he mortgaged to the Development Bank of the Philippines to secure a P22,000 agricultural loan. Upon default, the DBP extrajudicially foreclosed and acquired the property as the highest bidder at the auction sale on April 23, 1962. Barrameda failed to redeem within the one-year redemption period. The DBP consolidated its ownership, obtained TCT 5003, and subsequently sold the land to Carmen Gontang and Rodolfo General.

• The Mortgage and Foreclosure: Leoncio Barrameda was the registered owner of three parcels of land in Camarines Sur under TCT 1414, which he mortgaged to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as security for an agricultural loan of P22,000. He defaulted on the loan, prompting the DBP to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage. At the auction sale on April 23, 1962, the DBP was the highest bidder. Barrameda did not redeem the property within the one-year redemption period.
• Consolidation and Sale to Private Respondents: The DBP consolidated its ownership over the land and obtained TCT 5003. Soon thereafter, the DBP sold the property to Carmen Gontang and Rodolfo General, and the sale was annotated on TCT 5003.
• Writ of Possession: The DBP filed an ex parte petition (Special Proceeding 1917) in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, alleging that it had acquired the land as mortgagee and highest bidder, that the redemption period had expired without redemption, and that it had executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership. The DBP prayed for a writ of possession. The court issued the writ to install the DBP in possession and to eject all adverse occupants, including “LEONCIO BARRAMEDA and FIDELA TERRERO.” The original writ was not served because of non-payment of sheriff’s fees. An alias writ was subsequently issued and served. By virtue of the alias writ, the DBP, represented by its successors-in-interest Gontang and General, took possession of the property.
• Repeated Intrusions and the Injunction: Despite the respondents’ possession, Barrameda repeatedly attempted to re-enter the land. Using armed men, he forcibly took the landowner’s share of the harvest and threatened to re-enter the property and take the landowner’s share of the coming harvest. Gontang and General filed a complaint (Civil Case 5700) in the same court, seeking a preliminary injunction to enjoin Barrameda and his men from disturbing their possession. After hearing, the trial court found the allegations well-founded and, upon the posting of a bond by Gontang and General, issued a preliminary injunction against Barrameda. Barrameda’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

• Invalidity of the Underlying Writs: Petitioner maintained that the trial judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the preliminary injunction because the injunction was predicated on a writ of possession and an alias writ in which he was not made a party. He argued that, not having been impleaded in the ex parte proceeding, the writs were void and could not lawfully support the injunctive order.

• Party Status in the Writ of Possession: Private respondents contended that Barrameda was expressly named in the alias writ as an adverse occupant to be ejected, and the writ was served upon him; consequently, he was effectively a party and could not assert lack of party status to invalidate the writs.
• Propriety of the Injunction: Respondents argued that as lawful owners in possession, they were entitled to injunctive relief against Barrameda’s repeated forcible entries and threats, which could not be adequately redressed by a mere action for damages; the equity court properly intervened to prevent irreparable injury.

• Validity of the Writ of Possession as Basis for Injunction: Whether the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the preliminary injunction on the ground that the underlying writ of possession and alias writ were void because Barrameda was not made a party to the ex parte proceeding.
• Propriety of the Preliminary Injunction: Whether the trial court properly issued a preliminary injunction to restrain Barrameda from disturbing the respondents’ possession of the foreclosed property.

• Validity of the Writ of Possession as Basis for Injunction: The writ of possession was validly issued and could properly serve as the foundation for the challenged injunction. Upon confirmation of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, ownership passed to the purchaser, who was entitled to possession and to the aid of the court in effecting its delivery. A writ of possession may issue in favor of the purchaser at a foreclosure sale without need of an independent action where the mortgagor remains in possession after confirmation; Section 257 of the Code of Civil Procedure divests all parties of their rights and vests them in the purchaser, making the issuance of the writ a ministerial duty. Moreover, the ex parte petition described Barrameda as the person in possession, and the alias writ specifically commanded the sheriff to eject “LEONCIO BARRAMEDA and FIDELA TERRERO.” The writ was served on him. He was thus effectively a party, and his argument of lack of party status was untenable.
• Propriety of the Preliminary Injunction: The issuance of the preliminary injunction was proper. The complaint for injunction alleged that despite the respondents’ possession, Barrameda repeatedly intruded into the premises, forcibly took the landowner’s share of the harvest with armed men, and threatened to re-enter for the coming harvest. The trial court found these allegations well-founded and issued the injunction upon the filing of a bond. Under the principle enunciated in Rustia v. Franco, 41 Phil. 280, an injunction is a legitimate equitable remedy to protect an owner in possession from repeated intrusions by a stranger, where the intermittent nature of the acts and the probability of recurrence render an independent action to try title inadequate.

• Writ of Possession in Foreclosure Sales — Under Section 257 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the confirmation of a foreclosure sale by judicial decree operates to divest all parties to the action of their respective rights and vests them in the purchaser. Accordingly, it is the duty of the court to issue a writ of possession to place the purchaser in possession without the necessity of an independent action when the mortgagor continues in possession after confirmation. This rule applies equally to extrajudicial foreclosure sales where the purchaser consolidates ownership; the ex parte petition suffices, and the mortgagor remaining in possession may be ejected by naming him in the writ.
• Injunction Against Repeated Trespass — An injunction is a perfectly legitimate remedy to protect an owner of land who is in possession from illegitimate acts of repeated intrusion by a stranger. The intermittent nature of the acts, combined with the probability of future repetition, makes the legal remedy by an independent action to try title inadequate and justifies the granting of equitable relief. The doctrine rests on the inadequacy of a purely legal remedy when trespasses are recurrent and threaten irreparable harm.

• “In a foreclosure suit, where no third person not a party thereto intervenes and the debtor continues in the possession of the real property mortgaged, a writ of possession is a necessary remedy to put an end to the litigation, inasmuch as section 257 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the confirmation of the sale by a judicial decree operates to divest all the parties to the action of their respective right and vests them in the purchaser. According to this legal provision, it is the duty of the competent court to issue a writ so that the purchaser may be placed in the possession of the property which he purchased at the public auction sale and became his by virtue of the final decree confirming the sale.” (quoting Rivera v. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, 61 Phil. 201) — This passage establishes the mandatory and ministerial character of the writ of possession after foreclosure.
• “In the American system of procedure, from which provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, relative to injunction are taken, the injunction is recognized as a perfectly legitimate remedy to protect the owner of the land, being in possession, from illegitimate acts of repeated intrusion by a stranger, as where a person who has no right to enter from time to time, cut wood, or carry other products. The intermittent nature of such acts, and the probability, not to say certainty, of repetition in the future, makes the legal remedy by an independent action to try title inadequate and justifies the granting of the equitable remedy.” (quoting Rustia v. Franco, 41 Phil. 280) — This excerpt articulates the rationale for using injunction to prevent repeated trespass against a possessor.

• Rivera v. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, et al., 61 Phil. 201 — Followed; established that a court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession in favor of a foreclosure purchaser without a separate independent action when the mortgagor remains in possession, because the confirmation of sale divests rights and vests them in the purchaser.
• Rustia v. Franco, 41 Phil. 280 — Followed; held that injunction is a legitimate remedy to protect a landowner in possession from repeated intrusions by a stranger, where the intermittent nature and probability of repetition make an action for title inadequate.

• Section 257, Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) — Applied as the statutory basis for the rule that confirmation of a foreclosure sale divests all parties of their rights and vests them in the purchaser, thereby entitling the purchaser to a writ of possession without the need for an independent action.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ.