Bermejo vs. Barrios

A petition for habeas corpus duly subscribed, sworn to, and filed in court forms part of the court records and constitutes a public or official document within the scope of Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, so its falsification can give rise to criminal liability. Where a municipal or city court takes cognizance of a criminal case within its concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance, any petition for certiorari or prohibition against the city court’s orders must be filed directly with the Court of Appeals, not with the Court of First Instance, because the latter exercises no supervisory jurisdiction over a court of concurrent jurisdiction.

Pedro M. Bermejo and Jovita Carmorin were named as petitioners in an amended petition for habeas corpus filed before the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The petition bore the thumbmark of a woman purporting to be Carmorin. Subsequently, the City Fiscal of Roxas City charged Bermejo and an unknown woman, Julia “Doe,” with falsification of a public document, alleging that Doe had placed her thumbmark over Carmorin’s name without Carmorin’s knowledge. Carmorin was separately charged with perjury for having sworn that she herself had signed the petition. Both accused moved to quash the informations, arguing, among other grounds, that the habeas corpus petition was not a public document and that the warrants of arrest were issued without the personal examination of witnesses. The City Judge denied the motions, prompting Bermejo and Carmorin to file petitions for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of First Instance.

• The Criminal Charges: The City Fiscal of Roxas City filed an information charging Pedro M. Bermejo and an unknown woman, Julia “Doe,” with falsification of a public or official document. It was alleged that on or about 25 February 1963, the two accused, conspiring together, prepared and executed an amended petition for habeas corpus entitled “Pedro M. Bermejo and Jovita Carmorin vs. Jose M. Bernales and Wilfredo Bernales,” which Bermejo signed and Julia “Doe” signed with a thumbmark over the name “Jovita Carmorin.” The information averred that the accused made it appear that Jovita Carmorin had signed and sworn to the petition when in fact she never did so. Separately, Jovita Carmorin was charged with perjury for having subscribed and sworn to an affidavit stating that she was the one who placed her thumbmark on the amended petition, an act she allegedly knew to be false.

• Motions to Quash: Upon arraignment, Bermejo moved to quash the information, raising two principal objections: (1) the petition for habeas corpus was not a document contemplated under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and a prior CFI judgment in the habeas corpus proceeding had already declared the thumbmark to be Carmorin’s; (2) the city court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because the warrant of arrest was issued without the judge personally examining witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers as required by Republic Act No. 3828. Carmorin filed a substantially identical motion. The City Fiscal opposed, contending that the petition for habeas corpus is a public document, that Republic Act No. 3828’s examination requirement does not apply to city judges, and that res judicata was unavailable. The City Judge denied both motions to quash and the subsequent motions for reconsideration.

• Proceedings in the CFI: Bermejo and Carmorin then filed separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition with the CFI of Capiz, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the City Fiscal for filing the informations without a proper preliminary investigation and to the City Judge for denying their motions to quash. The respondent City Fiscal answered, asserting that the CFI had no jurisdiction over the petitions because the city court exercised concurrent jurisdiction with the CFI over the offenses charged, making certiorari reviewable only by the Court of Appeals under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 3828. The CFI initially ruled it had jurisdiction, set the cases for joint hearing, and eventually dismissed both petitions for lack of merit.

• Preliminary Investigation Facts: A subpoena directed to Atty. Pedro Bermejo required him to appear at the fiscal’s office on 14 March 1963 for an investigation. Bermejo acknowledged receipt on 12 March 1963 and, the same day, wrote to the fiscal requesting postponement to 19 March 1963 due to a conflicting hearing. The fiscal granted the request but did not separately notify Bermejo of the new date. Bermejo did not appear on 19 March 1963, and the preliminary investigation proceeded in his absence. Five months later, on 22 August 1963, the fiscal filed the information upon finding a prima facie case. Bermejo did not inquire about the status of his case during those five months.

• Nature of the Document: Petitioner Bermejo maintained that the amended petition for habeas corpus was not a public or official document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and therefore its alleged falsification did not constitute a crime. Consequently, the city fiscal had no basis to conduct a preliminary investigation or file the information.

• Validity of Preliminary Investigation: Petitioner Bermejo argued that the preliminary investigation was conducted in his absence and without due notice, which denied him his day in court and rendered the resulting information void.

• Legality of Arrest Warrants: Both petitioners contended that the warrants for their arrest were illegally issued because the City Judge relied solely on the affidavits of witnesses instead of conducting the personal examination under oath by searching questions and answers mandated by Republic Act No. 3828.

• Conclusiveness of Prior Judgment: Both petitioners invoked the CFI’s pronouncement in the habeas corpus proceeding (Special Proceedings No. V-2669) that the thumbmark appearing on the amended petition was the genuine thumbmark of Jovita Carmorin. They argued that this judicial declaration was conclusive and barred their prosecution for falsification or perjury.

• Admission of Illegality: Petitioners asserted that respondents, in their answers to the certiorari petitions, had admitted acting illegally, capriciously, or in excess of jurisdiction.

• Power of Fiscal to Initiate Investigation: Initially, petitioners argued that the city fiscal could not initiate an investigation without a complaint from an offended party, but they subsequently abandoned this contention in their brief, conceding the fiscal’s power to commence an investigation de oficio.

• Jurisdiction over the Certiorari Petitions: Respondents argued that the CFI of Capiz had no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions for certiorari and prohibition. Because the criminal cases fell within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the CFI under Republic Act No. 3828, the city court acted with “like jurisdiction,” and any petition challenging its orders had to be filed directly with the Court of Appeals.

• Nature of the Document: Respondents maintained that a petition for habeas corpus subscribed, sworn to, and filed in court is a public document, and its falsification falls squarely within Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code.

• No Violation of Due Process: Respondents argued that Bermejo was not denied due process because he himself requested the 19 March 1963 date for investigation but failed to appear, and he demonstrated gross negligence by not following up on his case for five months thereafter. In any event, a preliminary investigation is not a matter of right, and its ex parte conduct did not infringe any constitutional guarantee.

• Waiver of Arrest Warrant Irregularity: Respondents took the position that even if the warrants of arrest were irregularly issued, petitioners waived the defect by posting bail and voluntarily submitting to the court’s jurisdiction.

• Res Judicata Not Applicable: Respondents contended that the principle of res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment could not be invoked at the motion-to-quash stage; the matter required a full trial.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari and prohibition against a city court exercising concurrent jurisdiction over criminal offenses.

• Nature of the Document: Whether an amended petition for habeas corpus subscribed, sworn to, and filed in court constitutes a public or official document under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, such that its falsification may be criminally prosecuted.

• Due Process in Preliminary Investigation: Whether petitioner Bermejo was denied due process when the preliminary investigation was conducted in his absence on a date he himself requested.

• Validity of Arrest Warrants: Whether the warrants of arrest were illegally issued due to the City Judge’s failure to personally examine witnesses under oath and through searching questions and answers as required by Section 87 of the Judiciary Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828.

• Waiver: Whether the petitioners’ posting of bail and subsequent voluntary appearances waived any irregularity in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.

• Res Judicata: Whether the prior declaration of the CFI in the habeas corpus proceeding that the thumbmark was Carmorin’s barred the criminal prosecutions for falsification and perjury.

• Admission of Illegality: Whether the respondents admitted acting illegally, capriciously, or in excess of jurisdiction in their answers to the petitions.

• Jurisdiction: The CFI of Capiz was without jurisdiction to entertain the petitions for certiorari and prohibition. The offenses charged — falsification of a public document, punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, and perjury, punishable by arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum — fell within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the CFI. Under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 3828, when a city court takes cognizance of a case in the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction, its decisions and orders are appealable directly to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and any special civil action for certiorari must be filed with the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The CFI exercises no supervisory control over a city court that acts with “like jurisdiction.” The CFI decision in Special Civil Cases Nos. 2721 and 2723 was thus null and void. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court resolved the substantive issues in the interest of ending litigation that had already lasted more than six years.

• Nature of the Document: The amended petition for habeas corpus was a public or official document. A “document” is “a deed, instrument or other duly authorized paper by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth.” Any instrument authorized by a notary public or competent public official with the solemnities required by law is a public document. Because the petition for habeas corpus alleged illegal confinement, was subscribed and sworn to before the Clerk of Court, and was filed with the CFI, it formed part of the court records and thus fell squarely within the definition of public writings. Its falsification could therefore be prosecuted under Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Due Process in Preliminary Investigation: No denial of due process occurred. Bermejo himself requested the 19 March 1963 date for the investigation, and the city fiscal merely acceded to that request. Bermejo did not appear on the date he fixed, nor did he contact the fiscal’s office at any time before or after that date to ascertain the status of his case. The information was filed five months later, yet Bermejo remained silent. His conduct fell below the standard of care reasonably expected; his absence and indifference amounted to gross negligence. Due process safeguards against the denial of an opportunity to be heard, not against lack of previous notice. Having been afforded that opportunity and having failed to take advantage of it, Bermejo could not complain. Additionally, even if the preliminary investigation had been held ex parte, it would not have violated due process because, under the law prevailing at the time, an accused was not entitled as of right to a preliminary investigation.

• Validity of Arrest Warrants: The warrants of arrest were irregularly issued because the City Judge did not personally examine the witnesses under oath by searching questions and answers reduced to writing, relying instead on affidavits. However, the irregularity did not render the proceedings void, because the accused voluntarily posted bail and made subsequent personal appearances before the court, thereby submitting to its jurisdiction. The absence of a proper preliminary examination became moot once jurisdiction over the person was acquired.

• Waiver: By posting bail and entering personal appearances, both petitioners voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the city court and waived any irregularity attending the issuance of the warrants of arrest. The court thereby validly acquired jurisdiction over their persons and could proceed with the trial.

• Res Judicata: Whether the CFI’s declaration in the habeas corpus proceeding that the thumbmark was Jovita Carmorin’s should bar the criminal prosecutions was a matter properly left to the trial court. The record of the habeas corpus proceeding was not before the Supreme Court, and the question required a detailed inquiry into the principle of estoppel by judgment, necessitating the presentation of evidence.

• Admission of Illegality: The respondents did not admit acting illegally. The answers to the petitions admitted only the fact that the petitioners had filed certain pleadings; they did not concede the truth of the allegations contained in those pleadings. The respondents consistently defended the legality of their actions.

• Definition of a Public Document — An instrument is a public document if it is authorized by a notary public or a competent public official with the solemnities required by law. Pleadings and papers filed in court and forming part of the court records, including a verified petition for habeas corpus, are public or official documents within the scope of Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code. Falsification of such documents is criminally punishable. The Court applied this by holding that the amended petition for habeas corpus, having been subscribed and sworn to before the Clerk of Court and filed with the CFI, could be the subject of a falsification prosecution.

• _Concurrent Jurisdiction and Supervisory _Certiorari__ — Where a municipal or city court exercises concurrent original jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance over a criminal case, its orders and decisions are appealable directly to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. The CFI exercises no supervisory jurisdiction over such a court, because the city court acts with “like jurisdiction” as the CFI itself. Consequently, a petition for certiorari or prohibition to annul an order of the city court in a case within its concurrent jurisdiction must be filed with the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, not with the CFI. The CFI’s decision entertaining the petitions in this case was declared null and void for want of jurisdiction.

• Waiver of Arrest Warrant Irregularity by Posting Bail — An irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest — including the failure to conduct the required personal examination of witnesses — is waived when the accused posts bail and thereafter voluntarily appears and submits to the court’s jurisdiction. Once jurisdiction over the person is acquired, the defect in the preliminary examination becomes moot. Applying this, the Court held that any defect in the warrants of arrest was cured by the petitioners’ posting of bail and their appearances before the city court and the CFI.

• Due Process in Preliminary Investigation — Due process in a preliminary investigation does not demand strict adherence to notice requirements where the accused is afforded an opportunity to be heard and, through his own negligence, fails to avail himself of it. An accused who requests a specific investigation date but fails to appear, and who subsequently makes no inquiry for several months, is guilty of gross negligence and cannot claim denial of due process. The rule applies even if the preliminary investigation proceeds ex parte, as the right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right but a statutory one, and its absence does not per se nullify an information.

• “A ‘document’ is defined as a deed, instrument or other duly authorized paper by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth. … [A]ny instrument authorized by a notary public or a competent public official, with the solemnities required by law, is a public document.”

• “Considering that the petition for habeas corpus … was duly subscribed and sworn to before Clerk of Court … and filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz, forming, therefore, a part of the court records in said proceedings, it cannot be disputed that said petition is a public or official document as contemplated in Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code.”

• “Where the municipal court … has taken cognizance of a criminal case in its concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance, appeal must be taken direct to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court; and where the Court of First Instance has taken cognizance of such appeal in its appellate jurisdiction and refused to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals, said Court of First Instance acted without jurisdiction.”

• “The giving of bail bond by petitioner constitutes a waiver of the irregularity attending her arrest. Besides, by her other personal appearances … petitioner voluntarily submitted herself to the court’s jurisdiction. Hence, the absence of preliminary examination becomes moot already, the court having acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.”

• “In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of opportunity to be heard.”

• U.S. v. Asensi, 34 Phil. 750 — Followed; established that any instrument authorized by a notary public or a competent public official, with the solemnities required by law, is a public document.

• Andico v. Roan, 23 SCRA 93 (1968) — Followed; applied the rule that where a municipal court takes cognizance of a case within its concurrent jurisdiction, any appeal must go directly to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and the CFI lacks appellate jurisdiction.

• Pinza v. Aldovino, 25 SCRA 220 (1968) — Followed; reinforced the principle that the CFI exercises no supervisory jurisdiction over a city court exercising concurrent jurisdiction.

• Esperat v. Avila, 20 SCRA 296 (1967) — Cited in support of the same rule on concurrent jurisdiction.

• Doce v. Branch II, Court of First Instance of Quezon, 22 SCRA 1028 (1968) — Followed; held that the posting of bail and voluntary appearance waive irregularities in the warrant of arrest and that an accused’s rights are amply protected at trial.

• Luna v. Plaza, L-27511, 29 November 1968 — Followed; reiterated the waiver doctrine.

• Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Castillo, 21 SCRA 1071 (1967) — Cited for the proposition that due process safeguards the opportunity to be heard, not the lack of previous notice.

• Articles 171 and 172, Revised Penal Code — Define and penalize falsification of public, official, and commercial documents by private individuals. Applied to hold that a petition for habeas corpus filed in court is a public document whose falsification falls within the scope of these provisions.

• Article 183, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes perjury. Referenced as the law under which petitioner Carmorin was charged.

• Section 87, paragraph (c), Republic Act No. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948), as amended by Section 6, Republic Act No. 3828 — Grants municipal and city courts concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance over offenses punishable by prision correccional or imprisonment not exceeding six years; mandates that decisions in such cases be appealable directly to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court; and requires the judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest, to personally examine witnesses under oath by searching questions and answers reduced to writing. The concurrent jurisdiction provision was used to declare the CFI without jurisdiction over the certiorari petitions; the personal examination requirement was found violated, but the violation was waived by the posting of bail.

• Section 38, Rule 123, old Rules of Court (now Section 20, Rule 132, new Rules of Court) — Enumerates public writings, including written acts or records of the acts of sovereign authority, official bodies, tribunals, and public officers, as well as public records of private writings. Applied to support the classification of a court-filed habeas corpus petition as a public document.

• Section 14, Rule 112, new Rules of Court — Invoked by petitioners but found inapplicable because the new Rules took effect on 1 January 1964, after the 1963 preliminary investigations. Cited to illustrate that rules of procedure do not have retroactive effect.

Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, Associate Justices Jose B.L. Reyes, Jesus G. Dizon, Felix Q. Makalintal, Fred Ruiz Castro, Enrique M. Fernando, Claudio Teehankee, Antonio Barredo, and Juan Ponce Villamor concurred.