Carbonell vs. People

The designation of an offense in the Information is determined by the actual facts alleged, not by the caption or the statutory provision cited; an adult who commits lascivious conduct upon a child under 18 through coercion or intimidation may be convicted under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 even if the Information mentions only Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. The element of “other sexual abuse” is satisfied when a child engages in lascivious conduct through the coercion, influence, or intimidation of an adult, and intimidation is assessed from the victim’s perception given her age, size, and strength.

On the evening of November 28, 2015, CCC held a birthday party at her residence. AAA, her 15-year-old daughter, stayed in her room throughout the festivities. Petitioner, then the boyfriend of AAA’s older sister BBB, attended the party.

• The Incident: During the birthday celebration, petitioner entered AAA’s room, locked the door, and confided that he might have impregnated AAA’s sister. AAA gave him contraceptive pills and asked him to pass them to her sister. Petitioner then demanded that AAA remove her shirt, threatening to tell her friends she possessed contraceptive pills. Concerned for her reputation, AAA complied. Petitioner mashed her breast, prompting AAA to push him out of the room.

• The Complaint: Nearly a month later, after learning petitioner had been spreading false rumors about her, AAA disclosed the incident to her mother CCC, who assisted in filing the criminal complaint.

• The Defense: Petitioner denied the accusation, claiming he remained in BBB’s room with friends for a movie marathon and never spoke with AAA alone. He asserted that CCC instigated the complaint because BBB had moved in with him and refused to return home at CCC’s behest.

• Trial and Appellate Findings: The RTC found AAA’s testimony clear, definite, and straightforward, rejecting petitioner’s uncorroborated denial. The CA upheld the credibility assessment, noting AAA was a child witness whose testimony deserved full weight. The CA further determined that the elements of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 were satisfied and that the Information adequately alleged those facts, even absent an express citation of the statute.

• Inconsistent Testimony: Petitioner contended that AAA’s sworn affidavit stated he touched her breast several times, whereas her court testimony described only a single touch of the left breast with his right hand, amounting to material inconsistency that undermined credibility.

• Improbability of the Incident: Petitioner argued that the presence of numerous guests made it impossible for the alleged molestation to occur unnoticed, and that AAA’s failure to shout or flee rendered the accusation unfathomable.

• Exculpatory Denial: Petitioner maintained that his uncorroborated denial should have been credited, emphasizing the absence of independent witnesses and attributing the complaint to CCC’s animosity.

• Credibility of the Victim: Respondent relied on the trial court’s assessment that AAA’s testimony was straightforward, consistent, and credible, entitled to great respect and finality on appeal.

• Sufficiency of the Evidence: Respondent asserted that the prosecution had proven all elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt through AAA’s positive identification of petitioner and her unshaken account of the intimidation and lascivious act.

• Proper Characterization of the Offense: Respondent maintained that the factual allegations in the Information described the offense under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, justifying the CA’s modification of the conviction even in the absence of an explicit statutory reference.

• Credibility of Victim: Whether the CA gravely erred in affirming the conviction despite purported inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Defense of Denial: Whether the CA gravely erred in disregarding petitioner’s defense of denial.

• Proper Offense Designation: Whether petitioner could be validly convicted under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 when the Information charged only Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Credibility of Victim: The factual findings of the trial court, particularly its calibration of testimonies, were binding and conclusive, having been affirmed by the CA. No substantial reason existed to overturn the congruent conclusions on AAA’s credibility, especially given the recognized principle that the youth and immaturity of child witnesses are badges of truth.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: All elements of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 were established. AAA positively identified petitioner, testified to the intentional mashing of her breast with lewd intent, and proved her minority through a Certificate of Live Birth. The element of “other sexual abuse” was satisfied because petitioner, an adult, employed intimidation by threatening to expose AAA’s contraceptive pills, effectively coercing her into submitting to the lascivious act. The intimidation was assessed from the perspective of a 15-year-old who regarded petitioner as an older sibling figure, and “consent” was immaterial in this malum prohibitum offense.

• Defense of Denial: Petitioner’s uncorroborated denial, unsupported by any affirmative evidence, could not overcome AAA’s positive, straightforward testimony, which was entitled to full faith and credit.

• Proper Offense Designation: The Information’s caption and statutory designation were not controlling. The body alleged that petitioner committed lascivious conduct on a 15-year-old child through force, threat, or intimidation—facts that clearly constituted the offense defined in Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. Under the rule in Flordeliz v. People, an Information is not vitiated by failure to specify the precise law violated if the recital of ultimate facts sufficiently describes the crime charged. The proper nomenclature is “Lascivious Conduct.”

• Finality of Trial Court’s Credibility Assessment — The trial court’s evaluation of witness credibility is entitled to the highest respect, if not finality, because it is uniquely positioned to observe demeanor during testimony. This principle applies with greater force when the witness is a child, whose youth and immaturity are traditionally regarded as indicia of sincerity.

• Elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336, RPC — (1) The offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) it is done through force, threat, or intimidation, or when the offended party is deprived of reason or unconscious, or by fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority, or when the offended party is under 12 or demented; and (3) the offended party is another person of either sex.

• Elements of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III, R.A. No. 7610 — (1) The accused commits sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child is below 18 years of age.

• “Other Sexual Abuse” Defined — The phrase covers not only children abused for profit but also those who engage in lascivious conduct through the coercion, influence, or intimidation of an adult. “Influence” means the use of power or trust that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another’s objective; “coercion” is the improper use of power to compel submission. Intimidation is gauged by the victim’s perception and judgment, considering age, size, and strength. It need not be irresistible; it suffices that compulsion equivalent to intimidation subjugates the will of the offended party.

• Intimidation of a Child — In evaluating intimidation, courts view the circumstances from the victim’s standpoint, recognizing that young, innocent, and immature girls cannot be expected to react with the equanimity of disposition or courage of an adult under identical conditions.

• Information Governed by Facts, Not Caption — The character of the crime charged is determined by the recital of ultimate facts and circumstances in the Information, not by its caption, preamble, or the statutory provision cited. An erroneous specification of the law or failure to designate the offense by statute does not vitiate the Information if the facts alleged clearly constitute the crime.

• Consent Immaterial in R.A. No. 7610 Offenses — The offense under Section 5(b) is malum prohibitum; the mere act of committing lascivious conduct with a child subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense, rendering consent irrelevant.

• “Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime, taking into consideration the age, size and strength of the parties.”

• “Section 5 of [R.A.] No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in which a child is coerced to engage in lascivious conduct. To repeat, intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party.”

• “While the Information against petitioner made no particular mention of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, this omission is not fatal to petitioner's right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. What controls are the actual facts recited in the Information as constituting the offense charged, not its caption or designation.”

• “The law being malum prohibitum, the mere act of committing lascivious conduct with a child subjected to sexual abuse already constitute[s] the offense.”

• Flordeliz v. People, 628 Phil. 124 (2010) — Followed: Established that failure to cite R.A. No. 7610 in the Information does not vitiate it if the factual recitals describe the offense; the Court applied this rule directly to uphold petitioner’s conviction under the special law.

• People v. Leonardo, 638 Phil. 161 (2010) — Applied: Defined “other sexual abuse” broadly to cover coercion and intimidation, and underscored that intimidation is measured from the victim’s perception, especially for youthful, innocent girls.

• Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 421 (2005) — Cited: Enumerated the requisites of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 and defined “other sexual abuse” as extending beyond profit-driven exploitation to include coercion or influence by an adult.

• Quimvel v. People, 808 Phil. 889 (2017) — Cited: Reiterated the elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 and clarified that the concepts of “force and intimidation” under the RPC are subsumed within the broader “coercion and influence” under R.A. No. 7610.

• Caballo v. People, 710 Phil. 792 (2013) — Applied: Affirmed that consent is immaterial in prosecutions under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 because the law is malum prohibitum.

• Article 336, Revised Penal Code — Defined and penalized Acts of Lasciviousness, serving as the offense originally charged; its elements include committing lascivious acts through force, threat, or intimidation. The provision was applied as the baseline offense, but the Court found the acts also fell squarely under R.A. No. 7610.

• Section 5(b), Article III, Republic Act No. 7610 — Penalizes those who commit sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, with the penalty of reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua. Applied to the proven fact that petitioner committed lascivious conduct on AAA, a 15-year-old, through intimidation and influence.

• Section 2(h), Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7610 — Defines “lascivious conduct” as the intentional touching, directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, with intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify sexual desire. The mashing of AAA’s breast fell within this definition.

Hernando, Inting, and Zalameda, JJ., concurred. Leonen (Chairperson), J., issued a separate concurring opinion.