Cruz-Arevalo vs. Querubin-Layosa

A judge’s procedural and evidentiary rulings, even if claimed to be erroneous, do not constitute bias, partiality, or gross ignorance of the law absent a clear showing of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. Mere suspicion and bare allegations of partiality are insufficient to overcome the presumption that judicial duties were performed regularly and without improper motive.

Complainant Josefina Cruz-Arevalo and her co-plaintiff Conrado R. Cruz filed Civil Case No. Q-03-50379 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City, presided over by respondent Judge Lydia Querubin-Layosa. Cruz was undergoing medical treatment in the United States and executed an authorization letter and a special power of attorney in Arevalo’s favor. During the pre-trial, Cruz did not personally appear. Respondent judge examined the authorization documents, found them insufficient to validly excuse his absence, and declared Cruz non-suited, dismissing the complaint as to him. At a subsequent hearing, the judge allowed opposing counsel to object to the affidavit adopted as the direct testimony of Arevalo’s witness and struck out portions deemed incompetent, irrelevant, or improper, ruling orally. The judge also declined to act on Arevalo’s motions for subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum because the required legal fees had not been paid. Convinced of judicial bias and ignorance, Arevalo filed the present administrative complaint.

• Parties and Underlying Case: Complainant Josefina Cruz-Arevalo and Conrado R. Cruz were plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-03-50379 against Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG) and Federico S. Quimbo, pending before respondent Judge Lydia Querubin-Layosa, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 217, Quezon City.

• Authorization to Represent Cruz: Conrado R. Cruz was receiving medical treatment in the United States. He executed an authorization letter and a special power of attorney (SPA) in favor of Arevalo, intending to authorize her to represent him in the civil case.

• Pre-Trial and Non-Suit of Cruz: At pre-trial, Cruz did not personally appear. Arevalo presented the authorization letter and SPA. The authorization letter was not notarized or authenticated. The SPA authorized Arevalo to receive Cruz’s Pag-IBIG Provident Fund contribution, not to represent him at pre-trial. Respondent judge found Cruz’s absence inexcusable and without proper representation, and consequently declared him non-suited, dismissing the complaint insofar as he was concerned.

• Exclusion of Portions of Affidavit: During trial, the affidavit of complainant’s witness Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. was adopted as his direct testimony. Respondent judge allowed opposing counsel to go over the affidavit and interpose objections, after which she ordered the striking out of several paragraphs she found incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. The rulings were made orally in open court and were recorded in the transcript of stenographic notes. No separate written order was issued.

• Motions for Subpoena: Complainant filed Motions for Writs of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum. Respondent judge did not act upon them because the corresponding legal fees had not been paid. The judge subsequently issued the subpoenas after complainant paid the required fees.

• Administrative Complaint: Complainant charged respondent judge with manifest bias and partiality and ignorance of the law. She contended that the judge erred in declaring Cruz non-suited, refused to issue a written order on the excluded affidavit portions (thereby preventing a petition for certiorari), showed inaction or collusion by not acting on the subpoena motions, and generally displayed partiality. Respondent judge voluntarily inhibited herself from the civil case on November 14, 2004, stating that while the grounds were unfounded, she would inhibit herself to assuage complainant’s fears and because she had entertained doubt about complainant’s objectivity.

• Validity of Non-Suit: Respondent judge countered that the authorization letter was defective because it was not notarized or authenticated. The SPA pertained only to the receipt of Pag-IBIG contributions and not to representation at pre-trial. Cruz’s absence was therefore unexcused, and the dismissal as to him was proper under the Rules of Court.

• Oral Rulings on Evidentiary Objections: Respondent judge explained that she gave the opposing party an opportunity to object, and her rulings striking out portions of the affidavit were made in open court during trial and are reflected in the stenographic notes. No written order was necessary under the circumstances, and the excluded evidence could be preserved through an offer of proof for appeal.

• Unpaid Legal Fees for Subpoena Motions: Respondent judge asserted that the motions for subpoenas were not given due course because the legal fees prescribed by the Rules of Court had not been paid. The Rules mandate full payment of fees upon filing, and the judge was not obliged to remind complainant or her counsel of this requirement.

• Absence of Bias: Respondent judge emphasized that complainant’s allegations were unfounded and that her judicial acts, even if viewed as erroneous, were not tainted with fraud, dishonesty, or corruption.

• Non-Suit of Cruz: Whether respondent judge erred or acted with bias or ignorance of the law in declaring plaintiff Cruz non-suited for failure to appear at pre-trial despite the presentation of an authorization letter and special power of attorney.

• Exclusion of Affidavit Portions: Whether respondent judge’s exclusion of portions of the witness’s affidavit without issuing a written order constitutes manifest bias, partiality, or ignorance of the law.

• Motions for Subpoena: Whether respondent judge’s failure to act on the motions for subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum due to unpaid legal fees demonstrates inaction, indifference, or collusion amounting to bias or gross ignorance.

• Proof of Bias and Partiality: Whether complainant adduced sufficient evidence to prove manifest bias, partiality, or ignorance of the law warranting administrative discipline.

• Non-Suit of Cruz: The non-suit was proper. Under Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, parties and their counsel must personally appear at pre-trial; non-appearance may be excused only if a duly authorized representative appears in behalf of a party. Here, the authorization letter was not notarized or authenticated, and the SPA authorized Arevalo merely to receive Cruz’s Pag-IBIG contribution, not to represent him at pre-trial. Consequently, Cruz failed to validly constitute a duly authorized representative, and his absence was unexcused. Respondent judge correctly dismissed the complaint as to him, in accordance with Agulto v. Tecson.

• Exclusion of Affidavit Portions: No misconduct attended the exclusion. The Rules of Court require that a ruling on an objection be given immediately after the objection is made, unless the court desires a reasonable time to inform itself, but the ruling must always be made during the trial. Respondent judge allowed objections in open court and ordered the striking out of incompetent, irrelevant, or improper matter, consistent with Rule 132, Section 39. Her oral rulings were recorded in the transcript of stenographic notes, and no separate written order was required. The proper remedy for the complainant was to avail of the offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence under Rule 130, Section 23, and assign the exclusion as error on appeal. The acts of a judge in her judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action absent fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, which complainant failed to prove.

• Motions for Subpoena: The inaction was legally justified. Rule 141, Section 1 of the Rules of Court mandates that fees prescribed for filing pleadings or applications initiating an action or proceeding be paid in full. The subpoena motions remained unacted upon because complainant had not paid the required legal fees. Respondent judge had no obligation to remind counsel of this duty. The issue became moot after complainant paid the fees and the subpoenas were subsequently issued.

• Proof of Bias and Partiality: No sufficient evidence of bias was presented. Mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. Bare allegations cannot overcome the presumption that a judge dispenses justice without fear or favor, nor can an appreciation or misappreciation of the sufficiency of evidence, or the correctness of a judge’s rulings on objections, without proof of malice, sustain a charge of bias or partiality. Complainant failed to show any fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. The administrative complaint was therefore without merit.

• Judicial Acts Not Subject to Administrative Discipline Absent Fraud, Dishonesty, or Corruption — A judge’s judicial rulings, even if erroneous, cannot form the basis of disciplinary action unless there is proof of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. The remedy against erroneous orders is judicial, not administrative. Here, no such proof was adduced; complainant merely disagreed with the procedural rulings.

• Presumption of Regularity and Bare Allegations of Partiality — There is a presumption that a judge dispenses justice without fear or favor. Mere suspicion or bare allegations of partiality are insufficient to overcome this presumption. A clear and convincing showing of malice or improper motive is required. Complainant’s allegations did not meet this threshold.

• Oral Rulings on Objections Made in Open Court — Rulings on objections to evidence must be given immediately unless the court takes time to inform itself, but the ruling shall always be made during the trial. Oral orders made in open court and reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes are sufficient; no separate written order is necessary, especially when the ruling merely excludes evidence that can be preserved through an offer of proof. (Citing Echaus v. CA.)

• Payment of Legal Fees as a Prerequisite for Acting on Motions — Under Rule 141, Section 1, legal fees prescribed for filing pleadings or applications that initiate an action or proceeding must be paid in full. A court is not obliged to act on a motion until the required fees are paid, and the judge has no duty to remind the party or counsel of the deficiency.

• “[T]he acts of a judge in his/her judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though erroneous in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption which complainant failed to prove in the instant case.”

• “[M]ere suspicion that a judge was partial is not enough. Bare allegations of partiality will not suffice in an absence of a clear showing that will overcome the presumption that the judge dispensed justice without fear or favor.”

• “[A] judge’s appreciation or misappreciation of the sufficiency of evidence adduced by the parties, or the correctness of a judge’s orders or rulings on the objections of counsels during the hearing, without proof of malice on the part of respondent judge, is not sufficient to show bias or partiality.”

• “The ruling on an objection must be given immediately after an objection is made, as what respondent judge did, unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented; but the ruling shall always be made during the trial and at such time as will give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situations presented by the ruling.”

• Agulto v. Tecson, G.R. No. 145276, November 29, 2005 — Applied; this case affirmed that a plaintiff who fails to appear at pre-trial without valid cause may be non-suited. Relied upon to uphold respondent judge’s dismissal of the complaint as to Cruz.

• Echaus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57343, July 23, 1990 (187 SCRA 672) — Followed; stands for the rule that orders resolving motions made in the presence of the adverse party or in the course of a hearing or trial may properly be made orally. Used to justify the judge’s oral ruling on the exclusion of affidavit portions.

• Barcena v. Gingoyon, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1794, October 25, 2005 (474 SCRA 65) — Followed; cited for the principle that mere suspicion of partiality is not enough to overcome the presumption of judicial regularity.

• Republic of the Philippines v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 156015, August 11, 2005 (466 SCRA 544) — Followed; applied for the doctrine that a judge’s misappreciation of evidence, without proof of malice, does not prove bias or partiality.

• Rule 18, Section 4, Rules of Court — Mandates the personal appearance of parties at pre-trial and allows non-appearance only if a duly authorized representative appears. The defective authorization letter and SPA meant Cruz had no valid representative, making his absence unexcused and his non-suit proper.

• Rule 132, Section 38, Rules of Court — Requires that a ruling on an objection be given immediately unless the court takes time to inform itself, but the ruling shall always be made during trial. Respondent judge complied by ruling in open court, with the rulings recorded in the TSN.

• Rule 132, Section 39, paragraph 2 — Allows the court to strike out incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper matter from a deposition or affidavit. Justified the judge’s order excluding certain paragraphs.

• Rule 130, Section 23, Rules of Court — Governs offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence, which is the remedy when oral or documentary evidence is excluded. Complainant should have resorted to this procedure rather than demand a written order or file an administrative case.

• Rule 141, Section 1, Rules of Court — Prescribes that fees for pleadings or applications initiating an action or proceeding be paid in full. The non-payment of legal fees justified the judge’s inaction on the subpoena motions.

Chief Justice Panganiban, Justices Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario concurred.