De Los Reyes vs. Sandiganbayan

The minutes of a local legislative assembly are the official repository of its proceedings and may be relied upon to determine whether a resolution was validly passed; the local chief executive’s approval of a resolution is not a ministerial act but involves the exercise of discretion by virtue of the veto power under Article 109(b) of the Local Government Code. A prima facie case for falsification of a public document exists when the minutes contain no reference to the approval of the contested resolution and the chief executive, having attended the session, is charged with knowledge that the resolution was never taken up or passed.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Mariveles, Bataan, supposedly enacted Resolution No. 57-S-92 on July 27, 1992, appropriating P8,500.00 for the terminal leave pay of two municipal employees. Two members of the Sangguniang Bayan later filed a complaint alleging that the resolution had not in fact been approved by the council, because the minutes of that day’s session made no mention of its consideration or passage. Petitioner Mayor Oscar de los Reyes, SB Member Jesse Concepcion, and SB Secretary Antonio Zurita were accused of falsifying the resolution.

• The Charge: An Information for Falsification of Public Document accused petitioner Mayor Oscar delos Reyes and SB Member Jesse Concepcion of making it appear that the Sangguniang Bayan had passed and approved Resolution No. 57-S-92 appropriating P8,500.00 for terminal leave pay, when in truth the resolution had not been approved by the council. The information alleged that both accused knew the resolution was false. SB Secretary Antonio Zurita, originally included, died before the information was filed.

• The Motion for Reinvestigation: Prior to arraignment, petitioner moved for reinvestigation. He argued that the Ombudsman had previously dismissed a similar complaint involving the same factual setting, and he adduced a joint affidavit executed by other members of the Sangguniang Bayan attesting to the actual passage and approval of Resolution No. 57-S-92.

• The Sandiganbayan’s Denial: In a resolution dated December 29, 1994, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion. It found that the prosecution had established a prima facie case, and ruled that the allegations of fact and the arguments of counsel were best taken up at a trial on the merits. A motion for reconsideration suffered the same fate.

• Petition for Certiorari: Petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, assailing the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. A temporary restraining order was issued on September 18, 1995.

• Nature of the Approval: Petitioner argued that the final step in the approval of a resolution—where the local chief executive affixes his signature—is a purely ministerial act. As mayor, he did not have official custody of the resolution nor the duty to prepare it, and thus he could not have taken advantage of his official position in committing falsification as required under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Prior Dismissal by the Ombudsman: Petitioner maintained that the Ombudsman should have dismissed the present case in view of a previous dismissal of a similar complaint involving the same factual context.

• Evidentiary Value of the Minutes: Petitioner regarded the minutes of the July 27, 1992 session of the Sangguniang Bayan as inconclusive evidence of what actually transpired, especially because other council members had executed affidavits swearing to the resolution’s passage.

• Joint Affidavit of SB Members: Petitioner relied on the joint affidavit of some members of the Sangguniang Bayan attesting to the actual passage and approval of the resolution, which he claimed should have warranted reinvestigation and dismissal of the charge.

• Separate and Distinct Cases: Respondent countered that the prior case relied upon by petitioner was the subject of a separate complaint and preliminary investigation; its findings and records could not be made part of the present case, and there was no bar to the filing of the information.

• Minutes as the Official Record: Respondent stressed that the Ombudsman correctly relied on the minutes of the July 27, 1992 session, which constitute the official repository of what transpired. Since the minutes contained no reference to the deliberation or passage of Resolution No. 57-S-92, a prima facie case for falsification was properly found.

• Belated Affidavit: Respondent argued that the joint affidavit of the other Sangguniang Bayan members was belatedly submitted as a last-minute attempt to bolster petitioner’s position and could not aid his cause at the reinvestigation stage.

• Weight of the Minutes: Whether the minutes of the Sangguniang Bayan session, which were silent as to the passage of the disputed resolution, suffice to support a prima facie case of falsification, thereby justifying the denial of the motion for reinvestigation.

• Prior Dismissal: Whether the Ombudsman’s earlier dismissal of a separate complaint involving similar facts barred the filing of the information and required the dismissal of the present charge.

• Nature of the Chief Executive’s Approval: Whether the local chief executive’s act of signing a resolution is a purely ministerial act that negates the element of “taking advantage of official position” under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, and consequently, whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in allowing the case to proceed.

• Weight of the Minutes: The Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion. The minutes of a local legislative assembly are the official repository of what actually transpired in the proceeding. In a long line of cases, conflicting claims had been resolved by referring to the minutes or stenographic notes. The minutes of the July 27, 1992 session, which petitioner attended, did not mention the consideration or approval of Resolution No. 57-S-92. It was therefore evident that petitioner approved the resolution knowing that the subject matter had neither been taken up, discussed, nor passed upon by the Sangguniang Bayan. The joint affidavit of other members, submitted belatedly, could not overcome the official record at that stage.

• Prior Dismissal: The prior dismissal did not bar the present charge. The other case was the subject of a different complaint and preliminary investigation, and its findings and records were not automatically part of the case under consideration. The Ombudsman correctly determined that no relation existed between the two matters.

• Nature of the Chief Executive’s Approval: The approval of a resolution by a local chief executive is not a purely ministerial act. Article 109(b) of the Local Government Code vests the local chief executive with the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance or a resolution directing the payment of money or creating liability. This veto power confers authority beyond a simple mechanical signing; it requires the application of judgment, as the executive may choose to sustain or veto the measure. Consequently, a mayor who signs a resolution knowing it was never validly enacted may be held accountable for falsification. Petitioner’s attendance at the session and his knowledge of the irregularity negated his claim that the act was merely ministerial.

• Minutes as Official Repository — The minutes of a legislative body’s session are the official record of what actually transpired in the proceeding. When there is a conflict between the minutes and extraneous affidavits, the minutes prevail at the preliminary investigation stage. A resolution that does not appear in the minutes is presumptively not passed, giving rise to a prima facie finding of falsification. Subsequent corrections to the minutes, if any, are made precisely to preserve accuracy, which further justifies according the minutes great weight.

• Veto Power and Non-Ministerial Approval — Under Article 109(b) of the Local Government Code, the local chief executive possesses the power to veto an appropriations ordinance or a resolution directing the payment of money. This power implies that the executive’s act of approving such a measure is not ministerial but discretionary; it entails the application of judgment after analysis. Therefore, a chief executive who signs a resolution knowing it was not enacted takes advantage of his official position and may be held liable for falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

• “the Court accords full recognition to the minutes as the official repository of what actually transpires in every proceeding.” — This excerpt establishes the conclusive weight given to legislative minutes.

• “the minutes of the session reveal that petitioner attended the session of the Sangguniang Bayan on July 27, 1992. It is evident, therefore, that petitioner approved the subject resolution knowing fully well that ‘the subject matter treated therein was neither taken up and discussed nor passed upon by the Sangguniang Bayan during the legislative session.’” — This passage ties the petitioner’s attendance and knowledge to the prima facie case for falsification.

• “Contrary to petitioner’s belief, the grant of the veto power confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act of signing an ordinance or resolution, as a requisite to its enforceability. Such power accords the local chief executive the discretion to sustain a resolution or ordinance in the first instance or to veto it and return it with his objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same.” — This passage explains why the chief executive’s approval is a conscious, discretionary act.

• Malinao v. Reyes, 255 SCRA 616 (1996) — Cited to illustrate that the minutes only showed a vote was taken, not that a decision was rendered, supporting the principle that the minutes control what occurred.

• Pimentel v. Garchitorena, 208 SCRA 122 (1992) — Cited as a case with a similar factual context where the accused were charged with falsifying excerpts of the minutes, underscoring the importance of the minutes in falsification charges.

• Drilon v. Lin, 235 SCRA 135 (1994) — Cited to show that the absence of minutes to prove that obligatory public hearings were held led to the invalidity of a revenue code, reinforcing the rule that minutes are evidence of compliance with procedural requirements.

• Subido v. City of Manila, et al., 108 Phil. 462 (1960) — Cited to demonstrate that minutes can reveal how members voted and who participated in deliberations, confirming their reliability as a record of proceedings.

• Dizon v. Tizon, 22 SCRA 1317 (1968) — Cited to show that the minutes of voting were given greater weight than the precinct book in determining the number of voters who cast ballots.

• Velarma v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 406 (1996) — Cited to affirm that the trial court correctly relied on the minutes of a meeting, which did not mention the execution of a deed, leading to a finding that no agreement was perfected.

• Article 171, Revised Penal Code — Defines and punishes falsification by a public officer who takes advantage of his official position. The provision enumerated the acts constituting falsification, and the Sandiganbayan found a prima facie case under this article based on the minutes.

• Article 109(b), Local Government Code — Grants the local chief executive the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance or a resolution directing the payment of money or creating liability. The provision was interpreted to mean that the executive’s approval is not ministerial but requires the exercise of judgment and discretion, thereby supporting a charge of falsification when the resolution was not validly enacted.

Justices Jose C. Melo, Ricardo J. Francisco, and Artemio V. Panganiban concurred. Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa was on leave.