De Vera vs. Manzanero

An action for recovery of possession and an action for partition serve distinct purposes; one is not a condition precedent to the other. Under Article 487 of the Civil Code, any co-owner may file an action in ejectment—whether accion interdictal, accion publiciana, or accion reivindicatoria—against a third person or a co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership. The court in which the recovery action is filed may rule on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties; a separate action for partition is not required to make that determination. If co-ownership is recognized, the remedy is limited to obtaining recognition of the co-ownership and restoring equal possessory rights; physical division of the property requires a subsequent action for partition.

Bernardo A. De Vera, Sr. acquired from the National Housing Authority (NHA) a property designated as Block 1-C, Lot 13, Avocado corner Durian Street, CAA, Las Piñas City. He died in 1993 without completing payment for the property. He was survived by his wife, Emelie Moreno Vda. De Vera, and their children—petitioners Purisima De Vera Estrada, Rosalinda De Vera Pascua, Teresita T. De Vera, and Mario T. De Vera. In the morning of September 9, 1995, respondent Virgilio Manzanero, then Barangay Chairman of Barangay CAA, Las Piñas City, together with approximately twenty men, forcibly entered the property, destroyed the structures and house standing on it, and divested petitioners of possession. Virgilio acted on the strength of an alleged waiver of rights executed by petitioners' mother, Emelie. Petitioners initially endured the occupation and filed several complaints—for destruction to property with the police in 2000, for harassment and forgery with the Commission on Human Rights in 2001, and before the barangay in 2009. On December 26, 2013, petitioners paid the outstanding balance to the NHA, and on June 19, 2014, they filed a complaint for recovery of possession against respondents before the Regional Trial Court.

• Acquisition of the Property: During his lifetime, Bernardo A. De Vera, Sr. acquired from the National Housing Authority (NHA) a property designated as Block 1-C, Lot 13, Avocado corner Durian Street, CAA, Las Piñas City, under a Contract to Sell/Deed of Sale with Mortgage.

• Death of Bernardo and Succession: Bernardo died on August 27, 1993, without completing payment for the property. He was survived by his wife, Emelie Moreno Vda. De Vera, and his children—petitioners Purisima De Vera Estrada, Rosalinda De Vera Pascua, Teresita T. De Vera, and Mario T. De Vera. Upon his death, his title and rights to the property passed to his heirs, making petitioners and Emelie co-owners pro indiviso.

• Forcible Entry by Respondents: On the morning of September 9, 1995, respondent Virgilio Manzanero, then Barangay Chairman of Barangay CAA, Las Piñas City, together with approximately twenty other men, forcibly took possession of the property. They destroyed the structures and house standing on the property and divested petitioners of possession. Virgilio acted on the strength of an alleged waiver of rights executed by petitioners' mother, Emelie.

• Petitioners' Initial Responses: Petitioners initially endured the occupation due to threats and intimidation. Their subsequent actions included: (a) a complaint for destruction to property filed on January 6, 2000, with the District-Intelligence and Investigation Division, Southern Police District; (b) a complaint for harassment, forgery, and destruction to private property filed by Rosalinda before the Commission on Human Rights on May 13, 2001; and (c) charges brought by Rosalinda before Barangay CAA, Las Piñas City in May 2009.

• Final Payment and Complaint: On August 28, 2012, petitioners received a Final Demand of Settlement of Account from the NHA addressed to Bernardo. On December 26, 2013, petitioners, through Rosalinda, paid the outstanding balance. The NHA issued a certification stating that Bernardo's account had been paid in full. On June 19, 2014, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of possession against respondents before the RTC, alleging that several demands to vacate were made but went unheeded.

• Respondents' Claim: In their Answer, respondents claimed that the entire property was sold to them by Emelie on April 20, 1994. They attached an "Affidavit of Waiver" executed by Emelie, purportedly transferring a residential house erected on the property to a certain Florentino A. Manzanero, described as the nearest kin/relative of Emelie. Petitioners challenged the validity of this document, citing: (a) a Certification from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines stating that no notarial commission was granted in Las Piñas City in 1994; and (b) Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992), which prohibits the sale or alienation of land for socialized housing by beneficiaries.

• Trial Proceedings: After petitioners filed their Formal Offer of Evidence, respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, which the RTC denied. The RTC ruled that respondents' presentation of evidence was considered not availed of. The Affidavit of Waiver was merely attached to respondents' Answer and was never formally offered in evidence.

• RTC Ruling: The RTC dismissed the complaint, reasoning that: (a) petitioners and Emelie are co-owners pro indiviso of the property; (b) the sale by a co-owner without the consent of other co-owners is not necessarily void—the selling co-owner merely transfers his right to the buyer, who substitutes him in enjoyment; (c) Emelie did not join the complaint, creating a presumption she sold her undivided aliquot share; (d) petitioners' seeming inaction from 1995 to 2000 suggested acquiescence to the sale; and (e) without actual partition, no heir could assert a claim to a specific portion, making recovery of possession an improper remedy.

• Proper Remedy: Petitioners argued that an action for recovery of possession was proper to determine whether respondents' possession was valid. An action for judicial partition under Rule 69 is a judicial controversy among co-owners seeking division, whereas an action for recovery of the right to possess is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession independently of title. Since petitioners maintained that no co-ownership existed between them and respondents, requiring a prior action for partition would be paradoxical to their claim of sole ownership.

• Invalidity of the Affidavit of Waiver: Petitioners contended that the Affidavit of Waiver executed by Emelie was null and void for violating Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7279, which prohibits the sale, alienation, conveyance, encumbrance, and lease of land for socialized housing by beneficiaries. The Affidavit was also unenforceable for improper verification—the IBP Certification established that no notarial commission existed in Las Piñas City in 1994. Under Article 1358 of the Civil Code, the lack of notarization rendered it a private document unenforceable against petitioners as third parties.

• Alternative Argument on Ejectment Among Co-owners: Even assuming co-ownership existed between petitioners and respondents, a co-owner may bring an action for ejectment against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership. Since respondents asserted exclusive ownership, the action for recovery of possession was proper under Article 487 of the Civil Code.

• Lack of Established Ownership: Respondents countered that petitioners must first establish their rightful ownership over the property before their right to possess can be validly interposed. The case for recovery of possession put in issue the ownership of the property and the concomitant right to possess as an attribute of ownership.

• Partition as Proper Remedy: Respondents cited Domingo v. Sps. Molina, where the Court held that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent was not secured in a sale of the entire property, as well as in a sale merely of undivided shares of some co-owners, is an action for partition.

• Proper Remedy: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in ruling that the proper remedy for petitioners was to file an action for partition rather than an action for recovery of possession.

• Validity of Possession: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in ruling that respondents validly possessed the subject property.

• Proper Remedy: The dismissal of the complaint was erroneous; an action for partition was not a prerequisite for the recovery of possession. Under Article 487 of the Civil Code, any co-owner may bring an action in ejectment, which covers all kinds of actions for recovery of possession—forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion reivindicatoria). This right is not subject to the requirement that partition be effected first. An action for recovery of possession and an action for partition serve different purposes; one is not a condition precedent for the other, nor does one preclude the other. The CA could have ruled on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership within the recovery action, as held in De Guia v. Court of Appeals, where the Court declared that a co-owner may file a recovery action against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession and the court may determine co-ownership in that proceeding. The CA's reliance on Domingo v. Sps. Molina was misplaced because in Domingo, the validity of the sale and the existence of co-ownership were already established before the Court declared partition as the proper recourse. Here, no categorical finding was made on whether the Affidavit of Waiver validly transferred Emelie's share. Requiring partition preempted petitioners' choice on whether to divide the common property or maintain the co-ownership, effectively denying them an available remedy.

• Validity of Possession: Petitioners established their ownership, and respondents presented no admissible evidence of any right to possess. The complaint was an accion reivindicatoria—an action to recover a parcel of land as an element of ownership. Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title. Petitioners proved their ownership through: (a) the NHA Contract to Sell/Deed of Sale with Mortgage in Bernardo's name; (b) succession upon Bernardo's 1993 death, transmitting rights to petitioners and Emelie as co-owners; (c) full payment of the outstanding balance by Rosalinda; and (d) an NHA certification confirming Bernardo as awardee and full payment. The property was adequately identified. Respondents' Affidavit of Waiver was merely attached to their Answer and never formally offered in evidence. Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, no evidence not formally offered shall be considered. Respondents' presentation of evidence was deemed waived by the RTC.

• Co-owner's Right to Bring Ejectment (Article 487, Civil Code): Any co-owner may bring an action in ejectment covering all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession—forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion reivindicatoria). This right may be exercised against a third person or against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the latter case, the purpose is limited to obtaining recognition of the co-ownership; the plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant because as co-owner the defendant has a right of possession, and no material or determinate part of the property can be recovered prior to partition. Applied here, even assuming co-ownership existed between petitioners and respondents, petitioners were not precluded from filing an action to recover possession; the court could determine the existence of co-ownership in that proceeding without requiring a prior or separate partition action.

• Distinction Between Recovery of Possession and Partition: An action for recovery of possession and an action for partition serve different purposes. One is not a prerequisite for the other, nor does one preclude the other. Both remedies are available depending on the circumstances. An action for partition under Rule 69 is a special civil action among co-owners seeking to secure division of common property. A recovery action is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession or ownership. The court in a recovery action may rule on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership; if co-ownership is recognized, the court cannot proceed to physically divide the property—that requires a separate partition action.

• Requisites for Accion Reivindicatoria (Article 434, Civil Code): In an action to recover ownership, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title—not on the weakness of the defendant's claim. The party prosecuting the action must fully prove both ownership of the thing claimed and its identity. Where a plaintiff proves ownership over a tract of land and the defendant occupies without right any part of it, it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to establish the precise location and extent of the portions occupied by the defendant.

• Formal Offer of Evidence (Section 34, Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence): The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. A document merely attached to a party's answer is not admissible and cannot be considered by the court.

• "Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, '[a]ny one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.' This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion)."

• "When the issue of co-ownership is involved, an action to recover possession of a property and an action for partition serve different purposes. One is not a pre-requisite for the other, nor does one preclude the other. Both remedies are available to the parties, depending on the circumstances of each case."

• "Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the latter case, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property."

• "The CA could have, in the action for recovery of possession, ruled on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership, and decide thereafter whether an action for partition is the proper recourse for petitioners. Verily, if the CA found that no co-ownership exists, an action for partition would be unnecessary."

• De Guia v. Court of Appeals, 459 Phil. 447 (2003): Followed and controlling. Established that a co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession of the entire co-owned property; the purpose is recognition of co-ownership; judicial or extrajudicial partition is necessary only to effect physical division after co-ownership is recognized; and the court in a recovery action may determine the existence of co-ownership without a separate partition action.

• Domingo v. Sps. Molina, 785 Phil. 506 (2016): Distinguished. The Court clarified that in Domingo, the validity of the sale and the resulting co-ownership between the transferees and the other co-owners were already undisputed; thus, the declaration that partition was the proper recourse was made after co-ownership was recognized.

• Bautista, et al. v. Bautista, 807 Phil. 85 (2017): Cited for the definition and object of a special civil action for judicial partition under Rule 69.

• Catedrilla v. Sps. Lauron, 709 Phil. 335 (2013): Cited for the principle that Article 487 covers all kinds of actions for recovery of possession.

• Heirs of Alfonso Yusingco v. Busilak, et al., 824 Phil. 454 (2018): Cited for the definitions and distinctions among accion interdictal, accion publiciana, and accion reivindicatoria.

• Article 487, Civil Code: "Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment." Applied to hold that petitioners could file an action for recovery of possession without prior partition, as this article covers all types of recovery actions and is not subject to a requirement of prior partition.

• Article 486, Civil Code: "Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interests of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights." Cited to support that co-owners need not partition before they can use and enjoy common property.

• Article 494, Civil Code: "An agreement to keep the thing undivided for a period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid." Cited to support that co-owners may validly choose to maintain co-ownership rather than partition.

• Article 434, Civil Code: "In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of defendant's claim." Applied as the standard for accion reivindicatoria; petitioners satisfied this by proving their ownership through inheritance and NHA documentation.

• Article 777, Civil Code: "The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent." Applied to establish that Bernardo's title and rights to the property immediately passed to petitioners and Emelie upon his death in 1993.

• Article 1078, Civil Code: "Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs." Applied to establish that petitioners and Emelie were co-owners pro indiviso before partition.

• Section 34, Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence: "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." Applied to exclude the Affidavit of Waiver, which was merely attached to respondents' Answer and never formally offered.

• Rule 69, Rules of Court: Discussed as the procedural vehicle for judicial partition; clarified that it is not the exclusive avenue for determining the existence of co-ownership.

Leonen (Chairperson), Hernando, Inting, and Rosario (designated additional member per Special Order No. 2833), JJ., concurred.

N/A — The decision was unanimous.