Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections

The crime of fencing under Presidential Decree No. 1612 involves moral turpitude because the offender’s knowledge that the property was stolen exhibits baseness and a deliberate invasion of another’s dominion for gain, contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals. A grant of probation suspends only the execution of the sentence and leaves the judgment of conviction—and its consequent disqualifications—intact.

Rolando P. Dela Torre filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections. Private respondent Marcial Villanueva sought his disqualification before the Commission on Elections on the ground that Dela Torre had been convicted by final judgment for fencing, an offense allegedly involving moral turpitude, and was thus barred by Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code. Dela Torre had been granted probation after his conviction became final. The COMELEC disqualified him, prompting the present petition for certiorari.

• The Conviction: Petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 14723 before the Municipal Trial Court for violation of P.D. No. 1612, the Anti-Fencing Law. The MTC rendered a judgment of conviction on June 1, 1990. Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court, which affirmed the conviction on November 14, 1990. The judgment of conviction became final on January 18, 1991.
• Grant of Probation: On December 21, 1994, the MTC granted petitioner’s application for probation, suspending the execution of his sentence.
• Candidacy and Disqualification: Petitioner filed his candidacy for Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna for the May 8, 1995 elections. Private respondent Marcial Villanueva filed a disqualification case under Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, asserting that petitioner’s conviction for fencing involved moral turpitude and that probation did not negate the disqualification. The COMELEC agreed, finding that fencing involved moral turpitude and that the conviction stood despite probation.

• Fencing Does Not Involve Moral Turpitude: Petitioner argued that there was a dearth of jurisprudence classifying fencing as a crime of moral turpitude and that the nature of the offense under P.D. No. 1612 did not necessarily involve moral turpitude.
• Effect of Probation: Petitioner maintained that the probation granted on December 21, 1994 suspended not only the execution of the sentence but all legal consequences flowing from the judgment of conviction, thereby rendering Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code inapplicable.

• Moral Turpitude: Respondent COMELEC maintained that the elements of fencing, particularly the offender’s knowledge that the property was derived from robbery or theft, rendered the crime one involving moral turpitude.
• Finality of Conviction: Respondent argued that the conviction had become final prior to the grant of probation and that probation merely suspended the execution of the penalty, not the fact of conviction nor the attached disqualifications.

• Moral Turpitude: Whether the crime of fencing under Presidential Decree No. 1612 involves moral turpitude.
• Effect of Probation: Whether the grant of probation affects the applicability of the disqualification under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code.

• Moral Turpitude: The classification of fencing as a crime involving moral turpitude was upheld. Moral turpitude was defined as “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” The general rule that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while mala prohibita do not is not absolute; the ultimate determination is a question of fact depending on the circumstances. Since petitioner did not assail his conviction, the Court analyzed the elements alone. The third element of fencing—that the accused knows or should have known that the article was derived from robbery or theft—evinces moral turpitude. Actual knowledge demonstrates the same malicious deprivation that marks robbery or theft, both crimes of moral turpitude. The fence, like the thief, invades another’s peaceful dominion for gain, deliberately breaching private duties to fellowmen in a manner contrary to justice and honesty. This duty is reflected in Articles 19, 20, 21, 22, and 2154 of the Civil Code. Even constructive knowledge (“should have known”) suffices, as it connotes that a person of reasonable prudence would have ascertained the fact, given circumstances like the time, place, nature, and condition of the sale. This is reinforced by Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612, which makes mere possession of stolen goods prima facie evidence of fencing.
• Effect of Probation: Probation does not render Section 40(a) inapplicable. Under Section 4 of the Probation Law, probation merely suspends the execution of the sentence. The conviction itself subsists and remains unaffected. In fact, a judgment of conviction attains finality ipso facto upon the accused’s application for probation, even if its execution is suspended. The prior conviction for fencing, a crime of moral turpitude, thus squarely fell within the disqualification.

• Definition of Moral Turpitude — “An act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” The Court applies this definition from Black’s Law Dictionary to determine whether a crime falls under the disqualification in Section 40(a).
• Mala in Se / Mala Prohibita as Guide, Not Absolute Rule — Generally, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while mala prohibita do not. However, some mala in se may rarely involve moral turpitude, and some mala prohibita may nonetheless involve moral turpitude. The ultimate determination is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of the violation.
• Moral Turpitude in Fencing — Fencing under P.D. No. 1612 involves moral turpitude because the element that the accused knew or should have known the goods were stolen manifests the same baseness as the underlying crimes of robbery or theft. Knowledge, whether actual or constructive, evinces a deliberate invasion of another’s dominion for gain, contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals.
• Effect of Probation on Final Conviction — Probation suspends only the execution of the sentence. The judgment of conviction becomes final upon the accused’s application for probation, and all legal consequences of the conviction—including electoral disqualifications—remain operative.

• “Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the ‘fence’ of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude.”
• “The words ‘should know’ denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in the performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists.”
• “[T]he legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioner’s conviction… subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.”

• Zari v. Flores, 94 SCRA 317 — Sourced the definition of “moral turpitude” from Black’s Law Dictionary and articulated the distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita in the context of moral turpitude.
• International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, 221 SCRA 760 — Held that whether a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact; the mala in se/mala prohibita classification is not conclusive.
• Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, 234 SCRA 63 — Enumerated the elements of fencing and interpreted the phrase “should know” as importing a reasonable-person standard.
• Heirs of the Late Francisco Abueg v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 82; Palo v. Militante, 184 SCRA 395 — Established that a judgment of conviction attains finality when the accused applies for probation.

• Section 40(a), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Disqualifies from elective local office those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude, or for an offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment, within two years after serving sentence. Applied to petitioner’s final conviction for fencing, a crime involving moral turpitude.
• Section 2(a), Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) — Defines fencing as the act of any person who, with intent to gain, deals in property known or which should be known to be derived from robbery or theft. The elements of this provision formed the basis for the Court’s analysis of moral turpitude.
• Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 1612 — Establishes that mere possession of stolen goods is prima facie evidence of fencing. This presumption supported the inference of knowledge and moral turpitude.
• Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law) — Provides that the court may suspend the execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation. Construed to mean that probation affects only the execution of the sentence, not the finality or legal consequences of the conviction.
• Articles 19, 20, 21, 22, and 2154, Civil Code — Cited to illustrate the foundational legal duty not to appropriate or to return property acquired by mistake or malice, reinforcing the baseness inherent in fencing.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ.