Dinglasan vs. Court of Appeals

A motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence must be filed before the appellate court’s judgment convicting the accused becomes final; evidence that was already presented and judicially considered in previous proceedings is not newly discovered and cannot warrant a new trial. The filing of a prohibited second motion for reconsideration does not suspend the finality of a decision.

In August 1985, Elmyra Trading Corporation, represented by its president A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr., obtained credit accommodations from Antrom, Inc. For partial payment of an indebtedness of ₱1,476,000.58, Dinglasan issued a postdated Commercial Bank check for ₱515,000.00. The check was dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. Dinglasan was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati in 1991. His appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in 1998, and his subsequent petition for review to the Supreme Court was denied in 1999. After the judgment became final and executory, and the trial court issued a warrant of arrest and a hold-departure order, Dinglasan brought the present petition for new trial, claiming he had discovered evidence that would negate an essential element of the offence.

• The Check and Criminal Case: Elmyra Trading Corporation, represented by President A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr., obtained credit accommodations from Antrom, Inc. The outstanding obligation reached ₱1,476,000.58. As initial payment, Dinglasan issued Commercial Bank Check No. HO270451 dated 3 October 1985 for ₱515,000.00. Upon presentment, the drawee bank dishonoured the check for insufficiency of funds. On 16 December 1985, an Information for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed against Dinglasan.

• Proceedings Resulting in Final Conviction: The RTC convicted Dinglasan on 16 December 1991 and sentenced him to one year imprisonment, a fine of ₱200,000.00, and indemnity of ₱515,000.00. His motion for reconsideration was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in toto on 26 October 1998. The Supreme Court denied his Petition for Review (G.R. No. 137800) on 28 June 1999; his motion for reconsideration was denied with finality, and a second motion for reconsideration was merely noted without action. The resolution became final and executory on 14 October 1999.

• Alleged Newly Discovered Evidence: Dinglasan anchored his petition on the affidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan (Executive Vice-President and Treasurer of Elmyra) and Ma. Encarnacion Vda. De Dinglasan, together with a transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 and Solidbank Manager’s Check No. 002969 dated 3 October 1985 for ₱150,000.00. Ma. Elena Dinglasan averred that upon notice of dishonour, she caused the issuance of the Solidbank manager’s check to cover part of the bounced check and sent it with the transmittal letter stating its purpose. She claimed unawareness of the letter’s significance until 2000. Ma. Encarnacion attested that she found the same transmittal letter among her late husband’s documents in 2000 and turned it over to Dinglasan. The evidence was proffered to prove that Dinglasan had made good the dishonoured check within five banking days, thereby negating an essential element of B.P. 22.

• Opposition by Respondents: Antrom, Inc. and the Solicitor General opposed the petition, arguing that (a) it was filed a year after the judgment became final and thus time-barred; (b) the transmittal letter was not newly discovered because it had been submitted as evidence in Dinglasan’s 1986 petition for review before the Ministry of Justice and in the Court of Appeals proceedings; (c) the letter did not establish payment but merely proposed a dacion en pago; and (d) even if admitted, it would not alter the judgment, as the gravamen of B.P. 22 is the act of issuing a worthless check with knowledge of insufficient funds.

• Timeliness: Petitioner maintained that the judgment in G.R. No. 137800 became final only upon his receipt of the resolution denying his second motion for reconsideration; thus, the petition for new trial was filed within the reglementary period.

• Newly Discovered Evidence: Petitioner contended that the transmittal letter of 8 October 1985 and the accompanying affidavits were discovered only in 2000 and could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at trial or during the appeal. He claimed that the evidence was material and, if admitted, would probably change the judgment because it showed that the dishonoured check was partially paid within five banking days, thereby negating an essential element of the offence.

• Substantial Justice: Petitioner invoked substantial justice, urging the Court to suspend procedural rules on the ground that the newly discovered evidence was of such weight as to warrant a new trial.

• Prescription: Respondents argued that under Section 14, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court, a motion for new trial must be filed before the appellate court’s judgment becomes final; since the judgment attained finality on 14 October 1999, the petition filed on 30 October 2000 was time-barred.

• Not Newly Discovered Evidence: Respondents pointed out that the transmittal letter had already been introduced as evidence in Dinglasan’s petition for review before the Ministry of Justice in 1986 and again before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14138; the appellate court had considered and weighed it. Hence, the evidence could not qualify as newly discovered.

• Lack of Materiality: Respondents maintained that the letter did not prove payment; it merely contained a proposal for dacion en pago and did not refer to the specific bounced check. Even if admitted, the evidence would not alter the conviction because the offence is consummated by the mere issuance of a worthless check with knowledge of insufficiency of funds, not by subsequent non-payment.

• Timeliness of Petition: Whether the petition for new trial was filed within the period allowed by the Rules of Court.

• Newly Discovered Evidence: Whether the transmittal letter and accompanying affidavits constitute newly discovered evidence that would justify a new trial or reopening of the case.

• Timeliness of Petition: The petition was filed out of time. Under Section 14, Rule 124, a motion for new trial must be filed before the judgment of the appellate court convicting the accused becomes final. The resolution in G.R. No. 137800 became final and executory on 14 October 1999, as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment. The filing of a prohibited second motion for reconsideration did not suspend the finality of the decision; to hold otherwise would allow a party to forestall finality through a pleading that the rules expressly proscribe. The petition, lodged on 30 October 2000, was therefore filed long after the prescriptive period.

• Newly Discovered Evidence: The claim failed. The records showed that the transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 had already been offered and considered by the Court of Appeals in its 26 October 1998 decision and was even annexed to the petition for review in that court. The appellate court examined the letter and found that it did not establish payment. Consequently, the evidence was not newly discovered; it was an attempt to resurrect a defence already weighed and rejected. The affidavits could not alter the character of the evidence. Even assuming the evidence had been newly discovered, petitioner failed to exercise reasonable diligence, as it was contrary to human experience to overlook a document previously used in judicial proceedings. The requisites under Section 2, Rule 121 and the “Berry Rule” were not met.

• Doctrine of Finality of Judgments — Once a decision becomes final and executory, it is immutable and unalterable; it may no longer be modified in any respect, even for the purpose of correcting erroneous conclusions of fact or law. The finality of a judgment is a jurisdictional event that cannot be made to depend on a party’s convenience. The filing of a prohibited second motion for reconsideration does not toll the running of the period for finality.

• Prohibition against Second Motion for Reconsideration — Under Section 2, Rule 52 of the Revised Rules of Court, and the En Banc Resolution of 7 April 1999, no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained; such a pleading is a nullity and cannot affect the finality of the decision.

• Requisites for New Trial on Newly Discovered Evidence (Berry Rule) — For a new trial to be granted on this ground, the evidence must be: (a) discovered after trial; (b) such that it could not have been discovered and produced at trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment. The applicant bears the burden of proving compliance with these requisites.

• “The finality of decision is a jurisdictional event which cannot be made to depend on the convenience of the party. To rule otherwise would completely negate the purpose of the rule on completeness of service, which is to place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgment and processes beyond the power of the party being served to determine at his pleasure.” — Emphasising the objective character of finality.

• “A decision that acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and it may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.” — Articulating the doctrine of immutability.

• “Verily, the claim of Dinglasan that the alleged evidence sought to be presented in this case was recently discovered is a falsity. It is a desperate attempt to mislead this Court to give due course to a cause that has long been lost.” — Regarding the feigned character of the proffered evidence.

• “Irrefragably, the letter dated 8 October 1985 is not newly discovered. It is an attempt to raise again a defense which was already weighed by the appellate court. A contrary ruling may open the floodgates to an endless review of decisions, where losing litigants, in delaying the disposition of cases, invoke evidence already presented, whether through a motion for reconsideration or for a new trial, in guise of newly discovered evidence.” — The core ratio on the inapplicability of the new-trial remedy to evidence previously considered.

• Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 163 (1997) — Cited for the public policy that judgments must become final at some definitive date despite the risk of occasional errors.

• Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128967, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 586 — Relied upon for the principle that after entry of judgment, a case is “laid to rest” and the decision becomes immutable and unalterable.

• Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 655 (1999) — Invoked to underscore that finality is a jurisdictional event that cannot depend on a party’s convenience.

• Lumanog v. Salazar, Jr., 417 Phil. 209 (2001) — Cited for the requisites of newly discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule 121.

• Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 96027-28, 8 March 2005, 453 SCRA 24 — Followed as the controlling authority on the “Berry Rule” and the burden of proof in motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

• Section 14, Rule 124, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence must be filed “at any time after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected and before the judgment of the Court of Appeals convicting the accused becomes final.” Applied to hold the petition time-barred.

• Section 2, Rule 52, Revised Rules of Court — Expressly prohibits a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party. The Court relied on this prohibition to rule that the filing of such a prohibited pleading did not affect finality.

• Section 10, Rule 51, Revised Rules of Court — Governs entry of judgments and final resolutions; provides that the date when the judgment becomes executory is deemed the date of its entry. The Entry of Judgment on 14 October 1999 was based on this rule.

• Section 2, Rule 121, Revised Rules of Court — Enumerates the grounds for a new trial, including newly discovered evidence. The requirements of this section, juxtaposed with the “Berry Rule,” were not satisfied by petitioner.

Justices Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr. concurred.