Dumasug vs. Modelo

Consent given by mistake as to the substance of the contract — where a party believes the instrument to be a different kind of obligation than it truly is — is null and void under Articles 1265 and 1266 of the Civil Code. The error must go to the very essence of the thing that is the subject matter of the contract; had the party understood its true contents, she would not have signed.

Andrea Dumasug, unable to write, owned two parcels of land in Katang, Argao, Cebu, and a plow carabao she rented out for her livelihood. In 1910 she successfully sued to recover a small parcel of land (two gantas with bamboo) in the justice of the peace court. The defeated parties later filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu seeking annulment of the judgment, naming Dumasug as defendant. Felix Modelo, who was neither a lawyer nor a judicial agent, assisted Dumasug by engaging Attorney Andres Jayme to file a demurrer. The CFI case was dismissed on the plaintiffs’ own motion before the demurrer was resolved and without any trial. Modelo thereafter claimed Dumasug owed him P333.49 for advances he had made for attorney’s fees, travel, and witness expenses.

• Nature of the action: Dumasug sought to annul a notarized document (Exhibit 1) purporting to be an absolute sale of her lands and carabao to Modelo, alleging that her consent was obtained through fraud and deceit.
• The document (Exhibit 1): Dated November 3, 1911, the instrument stated that Dumasug, for consideration of P333.49 received from Modelo, sold and conveyed to him outright the two parcels of land and the plow carabao, with warranty of title. The document bore Dumasug’s mark between her Christian name and surname, witnessed by Mariano Abear and Apolina Minosa, and was notarized by Anselmo S. Legaspi on the same date.
• Plaintiff’s account: Dumasug testified that one day in November 1911, Modelo summoned her to his house and told her to sign a document acknowledging that she owed him P101 for his help in the two lawsuits. She agreed and placed her mark on the document while they were alone, without attesting witnesses. Later, Modelo took her to the notary’s house; the notary said nothing about a sale. She never sold her lands or carabao, neither offered them nor received an offer. Three months afterward, Modelo took possession of her property by intimidation and force and had since been harvesting the products and using the carabao. She had earlier received an offer of P120 for the carabao but refused to sell because she rented it out at fifty centavos a day, her sole means of support.
• Defendant’s account: Modelo claimed that the sale was in payment of a debt of P333.49 Dumasug owed him for money he advanced in small sums — P101.87, P184.85, and P46.77 — for attorney’s fees, travel, and witness expenses in the two cases. Witness Mariano Abear corroborated that Dumasug signed the document before the notary after the notary explained it was an absolute sale. Justice of the peace Antonio Minosa (Dumasug’s co-defendant in case No. 1211) testified regarding expenses, claiming Dumasug paid for his trips to Cebu, including restaurant meals and cinematograph entertainment over four-day stays — testimony the trial court and Supreme Court found incredible given that the case never went beyond a demurrer.
• Trial court findings: The CFI found Dumasug’s testimony credible. The only substantial expense she incurred was the P80 or P90 paid to Attorney Andres Jayme for filing a demurrer, plus minor travel costs for her two one-day trips to Cebu. The alleged debt of P333.49 was grossly disproportionate and unsupported. The trial court concluded that the only document Dumasug signed in November 1911 was an acknowledgment of debt for P101, not a deed of sale of all her property.

• Validity of notarized sale: Petitioner maintained that the property was conveyed to him by a public instrument duly executed and signed by respondent in the presence of witnesses, constituting a valid and binding absolute sale.
• Bona fide debt: Petitioner argued that the sale served to extinguish a legitimate debt of P333.49 that respondent owed him for sums he had advanced to cover her litigation expenses, and that the document truthfully reflected their agreement.

• Fraud and deceit: Respondent contended that petitioner falsely and maliciously represented the document as an acknowledgment of debt for litigation expenses, and that her consent was thus obtained by fraud.
• Lack of true intent to sell: Respondent asserted she never intended to dispose of her only property, that the document did not reflect her will, and that petitioner subsequently took possession by force.

• Validity of Consent: Whether the notarized deed of sale (Exhibit 1) was null and void because respondent’s consent was vitiated by mistake as to the substance of the contract.

• Validity of Consent: The deed of sale was declared null and void. Respondent’s consent was given by mistake within the meaning of Articles 1265 and 1266 of the Civil Code, because she believed she was signing an acknowledgment of debt and not an absolute sale of all her property. The error went to the very substance of the contract, since had she understood its true contents, she would never have affixed her mark. The evidence showed either that Exhibit 1 was not the debt acknowledgment she intended to sign, or that its contents were not duly and faithfully explained to her at the time of execution. In either case, valid consent was lacking, and the contract was void.

• Vitiation of consent by mistake (error) as to substance: Under Articles 1265 and 1266 of the Civil Code, consent given by mistake is null and void when the error refers to the substance of the thing that is the object of the contract. A party’s mistaken belief that the instrument is a mere acknowledgment of debt, when it is in truth a deed of absolute sale, constitutes error in substance that invalidates consent and renders the contract void.
• Restitution upon declaration of nullity: Under Article 1303, once a contract is declared void, the contracting parties shall restore to each other the things received with their fruits, and the value with interest. If the specific thing has perished while in the possession of the party obligated to return it, Article 1307 requires payment of its value with interest as an indemnity for the loss.

• “[T]he consent said to have been given by Andrea Dumasug in said document Exhibit 1 is null and void, as it was given by mistake (arts. 1265 and 1266, Civil Code). This error invalidates the contract, because it goes to the very substance of the thing which was the subject matter of said contract, for, had the maker thereof truly understood the contents of said document, she would neither have accepted nor authenticated it by her mark.” — The ratio decidendi equating an error as to the character of the instrument with error in substance.

N/A — The decision did not cite or discuss prior case law; it rested its holding on the applicable Civil Code provisions and the trial court’s assessment of the evidence.

• Articles 1265, 1266, Old Civil Code — Applied to hold that consent given by mistake as to the substance of the contract is null and void; the error must affect the substance of the thing that is the object of the contract.
• Articles 1303, 1307, Old Civil Code — Applied to order restitution: return of the lands with fruits (or their value, estimated at P75), and payment of P120 as the value of the carabao that died while in defendant’s possession, with interest as indemnity.
• Sections 95-97, Code of Civil Procedure — Mentioned but not applied, as defendant made no claim for reimbursement of sums paid to the attorney; the Court declined to rule on any right to reimbursement in the present action.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Moreland, Trent, and Araullo, JJ.

None.