Duque vs. Spouses Yu

A party is not deemed to have impliedly admitted the genuineness of documents under Rule 26, Section 2 of the Rules of Court when the same matters have already been specifically denied in a prior pleading. A request for admission that merely reiterates what has been controverted is redundant, and the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response or invoke the implied admission rule.

Spouses Mateo and Lilia Duque were the lawful owners of a 7,000-square-meter lot in Badian, Cebu, covered by Tax Declaration No. 05616. On August 28, 1995, a Deed of Donation purportedly executed by the spouses in favor of their daughter, Delia Capacio, served as the basis for Capacio’s subsequent sale of a 2,745-square-meter portion to Spouses Bartolome and Juliet Yu. The Duques asserted that the signature on the Deed of Donation was forged and instituted an action to nullify both deeds and cancel the tax declarations issued in favor of the transferees.

• Nature: Spouses Mateo and Lilia Duque filed a Verified Complaint seeking the declaration of non-existence and nullity of a Deed of Donation and a Deed of Absolute Sale, cancellation of tax declarations, and revival of the original tax declaration in their names.
• Ownership and Alleged Donation: The spouses owned a 7,000-square-meter lot in Lambug, Badian, Cebu, covered by Tax Declaration No. 05616. On August 28, 1995, a Deed of Donation over the entire property was allegedly executed in favor of their daughter, respondent Delia Capacio.
• Subsequent Sale: Capacio sold a 2,745-square-meter portion to co-respondents Spouses Bartolome and Juliet Yu, resulting in the issuance of tax declarations in the buyers’ names.
• Claim of Forgery: The Complaint categorically alleged that the signature on the Deed of Donation was forged, rendering the deed invalid and without legal effect.
• Respondents’ Answers: Capacio admitted the forgery but disclaimed knowledge of the forger. Spouses Yu denied the Duques’ personality to question the Deed of Absolute Sale and averred that the action was barred by prescription.
• Request for Admission: Spouses Yu filed a Motion for Admission by Adverse Party under Rule 26, requesting admission of the genuineness of (1) a Real Estate Mortgage, (2) the Deed of Donation, (3) a Contract of Lease, (4) Tax Declaration No. 07-05616, (5) Tax Declaration No. 14002-A, (6) the Deed of Absolute Sale, and (7) Tax Declaration No. 01-07-05886.
• Procedural Default: The RTC ordered Spouses Duque to comment; they failed to do so despite the order. The RTC subsequently issued an order declaring the documents deemed admitted.
• Criminal Case for Estafa: Spouses Yu had earlier filed an estafa case against Capacio upon receiving summons in the civil suit. In that criminal action, they relied on a PNP Crime Laboratory report certifying the signature on the Deed of Donation as a forgery, thereby treating the same deed they sought to have admitted in the civil case as falsified.
• Demurrer and Evidence: Instead of presenting their own evidence, Spouses Yu moved for demurrer to evidence, citing the implied admission. The trial court granted the demurrer, holding that Spouses Duque had nothing more to prove or disprove. The trial court acknowledged that the handwriting expert’s testimony and Capacio’s Answer confirmed forgery, but disregarded these because of the implied admission.

• No Implied Admission: Petitioners argued that their failure to reply to the request for admission was not an implied admission of the genuineness and authenticity of the documents because the forgery had already been expressly denied in their Verified Complaint. The request for admission was a mere redundant reiteration of matters already controverted.
• Improper Dismissal: Petitioners maintained that the dismissal of the Complaint based on an erroneous application of the implied admission rule resulted in unjust enrichment at their expense and should be reversed.

• Implied Admission Was Proper: Respondents Spouses Yu contended that petitioners’ failure to respond to the request for admission within the period fixed by the court validly triggered the implied admission rule under Section 2, Rule 26, rendering the genuineness and authenticity of the Deed of Donation and other documents undisputed.
• Prescription and Personality: In their Answer before the trial court, respondents Spouses Yu further argued that the action was barred by prescription and that petitioners lacked the personality to question the genuineness of the Deed of Absolute Sale because the forgery was attributable to their own daughter.

• Implied Admission: Whether petitioners’ failure to respond to the request for admission under Rule 26 constituted an implied admission of the genuineness and authenticity of the Deed of Donation and the other submitted documents.
• Demurrer to Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in granting the demurrer to evidence on the sole basis of the alleged implied admission.
• Nullity of the Deeds: Whether the Complaint for nullity of the Deed of Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale should be granted based on petitioners’ evidence.

• Implied Admission: No implied admission arose from petitioners’ failure to respond. Section 2, Rule 26 provides that matters are deemed admitted if no sworn statement is filed within the required period, but this rule admits an exception when the matters requested have already been admitted or denied in previous pleadings. The forgery alleged in the Complaint was the very basis of the action; the genuineness of the Deed of Donation had thus been squarely controverted. A request for admission that merely reiterates what has already been pleaded is a useless, pointless process that a party is not required to answer. Moreover, respondents Spouses Yu themselves, in their criminal complaint for estafa against Capacio, treated the same Deed of Donation as falsified and relied on a PNP report confirming forgery, revealing their request for admission in the civil case as a sham.
• Demurrer to Evidence: The demurrer to evidence was erroneously granted because it was anchored entirely on an invalid implied admission. Having determined that no implied admission existed, the demurrer must be denied and the orders granting it are void. Under Section 1, Rule 33, when an order granting a demurrer is reversed on appeal, the defendant is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence, and the appellate court shall decide the case on the merits solely on the basis of the plaintiff’s evidence.
• Nullity of the Deeds: The Complaint was granted on the strength of petitioners’ evidence, which consisted of the handwriting expert’s testimony and respondent Capacio’s Answer — both confirming that the signature on the Deed of Donation was falsified. A falsified document is void and inexistent; it cannot be a source of rights. Applying the principle of nemo dat quod non habet (one cannot give what one does not have), Capacio acquired no transferable right over the property, and the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Spouses Yu is likewise void. Consequently, the tax declarations in the names of Capacio and Juliet Yu were ordered cancelled and the original tax declaration in the name of Mateo Duque restored.

• Implied Admission under Rule 26, Section 2 — Exception for Matters Already Pleaded — The failure to respond to a request for admission results in deemed admission by default. However, if the matters of which admission is requested have already been expressly admitted or denied in a prior pleading, the rule does not apply. A request that merely reiterates previously controverted matters constitutes redundancy; the party to whom it is directed cannot be compelled to answer it anew, and no implied admission arises from silence. (Citing Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp. v. Toledo, G.R. No. 190818, June 5, 2013; CIR v. Manila Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 153204, August 31, 2005; Concrete Aggregates Corporation v. CA, 334 Phil. 77 (1997)).
• Consequences of Reversed Demurrer to Evidence (Rule 33, Section 1) — When a trial court grants a demurrer to evidence and the order of dismissal is subsequently reversed on appeal, the defendant is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. The appellate court shall then proceed to render judgment on the merits exclusively on the basis of the plaintiff’s evidence. This rule prevents prolonged litigation and multiple remands. (Citing Radiowealth Finance Company v. Spouses Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739, July 6, 2000; Generoso Villanueva Transit Co., Inc. v. Javellana, 33 SCRA 755 (1970)).
• Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet — A person cannot transfer or confer a better title than what they have. Where a deed is forged and void ab initio, the purported donee acquires no right over the property and cannot validly convey any interest to a third party. The subsequent sale is likewise void.

• “[I]f the matters in a request for admission have already been admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and, thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26.”
• “[A]dmissions by an adverse party as a mode of discovery contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in a pleading, and does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings; or else, it constitutes an utter redundancy and will be a useless, pointless process which petitioner should not be subjected to.”
• “In short, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiffs’ evidence retain the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if it agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations.”

• Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp. v. Toledo, G.R. No. 190818, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 425 — Followed as controlling precedent for the rule that a party need not respond to a request for admission that merely reiterates matters already alleged in a prior pleading.
• CIR v. Manila Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 153204, August 31, 2005 — Cited within Metro Manila Shopping for the rationale that a redundant request for admission is a useless, pointless process.
• Concrete Aggregates Corporation v. CA, 334 Phil. 77 (1997) — Source of the rationale on redundant request for admission as cited by the Court.
• Radiowealth Finance Company v. Spouses Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739, July 6, 2000, 335 SCRA 288 — Applied to explain the consequences of a reversed demurrer: the defendant loses the right to present evidence, and the appellate court decides on the plaintiff’s evidence alone.
• Generoso Villanueva Transit Co., Inc. v. Javellana, No. L-29467, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 755 — Foundational case on the demurrer rule, cited in Radiowealth Finance.
• Cavite Development Bank, et al. v. Spouses Lim, et al., G.R. No. 131679, February 1, 2000 — Cited for the maxim nemo dat quod non habet applied to a void contract.

• Rule 26, Sections 1 and 2, Rules of Court — Section 1 allows a party to request admission of the genuineness of material documents or the truth of material facts. Section 2 provides that failure to file a sworn statement of denial within the prescribed period (not less than 15 days) results in implied admission of the matters requested. The Court held that the exception — where matters have already been controverted in prior pleadings — prevents the implied admission from attaching.
• Rule 33, Section 1, Rules of Court — Governs demurrer to evidence. If a demurrer is granted and reversed on appeal, the movant is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence, and the appellate court decides the case on the merits solely on the basis of the plaintiff’s evidence.

Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin, Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Samuel R. Martires, and Alexander G. Gesmundo concurred. No separate or concurring opinions were registered.