Estreller vs. Ysmael

A co-owner may file any kind of action for recovery of co-owned property — including accion publiciana — without impleading all other co-owners, as the suit is presumed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners, who are neither indispensable nor necessary parties. The protective mantle of Presidential Decree Nos. 1517 and 2016 against eviction extends only to landless urban families who are rightful occupants of the land; it does not cover those whose presence is merely tolerated and without contract, those who enter by force or deceit, or those whose possession is under litigation.

Respondents Luis Miguel Ysmael and Cristeta L. Santos-Alvarez claimed ownership of property located at E. Rodriguez Avenue and La Filonila Streets, Quezon City, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 41698 issued in 1958. In 1973, petitioners James Estreller and thirteen others entered various portions of the property through stealth and strategy and had since remained in occupation. Despite extrajudicial demands made in March 1993, petitioners refused to vacate, prompting respondents to file an action for recovery of possession before the Regional Trial Court.

Nature: Accion publiciana (recovery of possession) filed by respondents against petitioners over a parcel of land in Quezon City.

The Property and Title: Respondents predicated their claim on TCT No. 41698, issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on June 10, 1958, in the names of Juan Felipe Ysmael, Teresa Ysmael, Ramon Ysmael, and respondent Luis Miguel Ysmael, covering several lots under Subd. Plan Psd No. 33309, including Lot 2, Block 4; Lot 3, Block 4; and Lot 6, Block 4, each containing 1,000 square meters.

Entry of Petitioners: According to respondents, petitioners entered the property through stealth and strategy on various dates in 1973 and had since occupied the premises. Despite demands to vacate made in March 1993, petitioners refused to depart.

Alvarez’s Interest: Respondent Cristeta L. Santos-Alvarez acquired portions of the property through a series of conveyances, namely: (a) a Decision dated August 30, 1974 rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 9, in Civil Case No. Q-8426, based on a Compromise Agreement between Alvarez and the Magdalena Estate, which conferred on her 200 square meters of Lot 2, Block 4; 250 square meters of Lot 3, Block 4; and the full 1,000 square meters of Lot 6, Block 4; (b) an unnotarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 1985 between the Ysmael Heirs and Alvarez, covering only Lot 6, Block 4; and (c) a notarized Memorandum of Agreement dated May 2, 1991, wherein all three apportioned parcels allocated to Alvarez under the 1974 RTC Decision were finally sold, transferred, and conveyed to her. Thus, Alvarez became the beneficial or equitable owner of the portions, with the Ysmael Heirs remaining as naked legal owners.

Petitioners’ Defenses: Petitioners denied respondents’ allegations, asserting that respondent Ysmael lacked personality to sue because he owned only a small portion of the property, and that respondent Alvarez was not a registered owner. They claimed their occupation was lawful, having supposedly leased the property from the Magdalena Estate and later from Alvarez. Petitioners further contended that the property had been proclaimed an Area for Priority Development under P.D. Nos. 1517 and 2016, which prohibited the eviction of lawful tenants and the demolition of their homes. They also pointed to the existence of another TCT No. 41698 in the names of Victoria M. Panganiban and Teodoro M. Panganiban covering a different lot, suggesting a title duplication.

Registration Evidence: A Certification dated March 1, 1994 from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City explained that TCT No. 41698 in the name of the Ysmael Heirs and the other TCT No. 41698 in the name of the Panganibans were distinct titles covering different lots and plans; the similarity in title numbers resulted from the Quezon City Registry’s renumbering of titles starting from TCT No. 1 after a fire on June 11, 1988.

• Real Parties in Interest: Petitioners argued that respondent Ysmael lacked the personality to file the suit because he owned only a small portion of the property, and that respondent Alvarez was not a registered owner and therefore was not a real party in interest entitled to the avails of the suit.
• Validity of Alvarez’s Ownership: Petitioners contended that Alvarez failed to prove any right over the property because the Deed of Absolute Sale was not inscribed on TCT No. 41698, and that the property described in the Deed (Lot 6, Block 4) was different from the subject property (Lots 2 and 3). They also pointed to the existence of another TCT No. 41698 in the names of the Panganibans as evidence of a title conflict.
• Protection under Social Legislation: Petitioners maintained that they were lawful lessees of the property and that the area had already been proclaimed an Area for Priority Development, thus their eviction and the demolition of their homes were prohibited under P.D. Nos. 1517 and 2016 and R.A. No. 7279.
• Unresolved Issues on Appeal: Petitioners alleged that the Court of Appeals failed to consider and decide the other relevant questions and issues they raised in Roman numerals II, III, and IV of their appellants’ brief.

• Real Party in Interest: Respondents maintained that Ysmael, as a named co-owner under TCT No. 41698, and Alvarez, as a buyer who had acquired beneficial ownership through a series of conveyances, were real parties in interest with the right to sue for recovery of possession. Additionally, any co-owner may file such an action for the benefit of all.
• Validity of the Sale to Alvarez: Respondents asserted that the sale to Alvarez was valid and binding between the parties even without registration, and that the various documents — the 1974 RTC Decision, the 1985 Deed, and the 1991 Memorandum of Agreement — collectively established Alvarez’s ownership over the disputed portions.
• No Tenancy Protection: Respondents countered that petitioners were not lawful tenants but mere tolerated occupants whose presence had been terminated. Petitioners entered by stealth and their possession was under litigation, placing them outside the scope of P.D. Nos. 1517 and 2016 and R.A. No. 7279.

• Real Party in Interest: Whether respondent Ysmael, a co-owner, and respondent Alvarez, an unregistered buyer, were real parties in interest entitled to institute the action for recovery of possession.
• Ownership of Alvarez: Whether Alvarez established ownership of the disputed portions of the property despite the non-annotation of the sale on the certificate of title and the alleged discrepancy in lot numbers.
• Social Legislation Protection: Whether petitioners qualified as “tenants” or protected occupants under P.D. Nos. 1517 and 2016 and R.A. No. 7279 such that their eviction was prohibited.
• Appellate Review: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider and resolve other issues raised in petitioners’ appellants’ brief.

• Real Party in Interest: Ysmael, a named co-owner under TCT No. 41698, and Alvarez, the beneficial owner by virtue of the conveyances, were real parties in interest. Under Article 487 of the Civil Code, any one of the co-owners may bring any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned property, including forcible entry, unlawful detainer, accion publiciana, and accion reivindicatoria. The suit is presumed to be filed for the benefit of all co-owners; the other co-owners are not indispensable parties and are not even necessary parties, as complete relief can be afforded without their participation. Since Alvarez was the beneficial owner, she derived the right to the gains and possession of the property, and her lack of registered title did not negate her standing to sue.
• Ownership of Alvarez: The non-inscription of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the title did not invalidate the sale. A contract of sale has the force of law between the contracting parties; the requirement of a public instrument under Article 1358 of the Civil Code is only for convenience, and non-registration affects only third parties. The series of documents — the 1974 RTC Decision, the 1985 Deed, and the 1991 Memorandum of Agreement — proved that Alvarez had acquired the apportioned lots. The existence of another TCT No. 41698 in the names of the Panganibans was adequately explained by the Register of Deeds’ certification that the titles were distinct and covered different lots, the numbering similarity being a result of the post-fire renumbering of titles.
• Social Legislation Protection: Petitioners failed to prove any lease relationship or even identify with whom a lease contract had been entered. Their presence on the property was by mere tolerance, and such tolerance had been terminated by respondents. Under Section 3(f) of P.D. No. 1517, a “tenant” is a rightful occupant of land and its structures; the term excludes those whose presence is merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract, those who enter by force or deceit, or those whose possession is under litigation. The protective prohibition against eviction in Section 2 of P.D. No. 2016 therefore did not apply. Likewise, petitioners did not show that the local government had acquired the property for socialized housing under R.A. No. 7279, or that they had duly qualified as beneficiaries of that program.
• Appellate Review: The petition under Rule 45 merely reiterated the factual issues already resolved by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. Factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive and not reviewable by the Supreme Court. The CA did not err in dismissing the appeal.

• Action by a Co-owner under Article 487, Civil Code — Any one of the co-owners may bring any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties. The suit is deemed instituted for the benefit of all co-owners; the other co-owners are neither indispensable nor necessary parties, as complete relief can be afforded even without their participation. This rule applies to all actions for recovery of possession: forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion reivindicatoria). The Court applied this doctrine to hold that respondent Ysmael, a registered co-owner, had standing to file the complaint despite not being joined by the other registered co-owners, and Alvarez, as beneficial owner, likewise possessed a protectable interest.
• Definition of “Tenant” under Section 3(f) of P.D. No. 1517 — The term “tenant” for purposes of the urban land reform law means the rightful occupant of land and its structures. It expressly excludes (1) those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract, (2) those who enter the land by force or deceit, and (3) those whose possession is under litigation. Occupants whose lease has expired or been terminated, or whose presence is otherwise devoid of legal authority, are not covered. The Court classified petitioners as tolerated occupants whose presence was under litigation and who had entered through stealth, thereby disqualifying them from the protection of P.D. Nos. 1517 and 2016.
• Effect of Non-Registration of a Sale between the Parties — Non-compliance with Article 1358 of the Civil Code, which requires certain contracts to be embodied in a public instrument, is only for convenience. Non-registration of the instrument of sale affects only third parties; it does not affect the validity of the contract or the contractual rights and obligations of the parties thereunder. The Court invoked this principle in upholding the validity of the transfer to Alvarez even though the sale had not been annotated on the certificate of title.

• “In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.” (Embodies the controlling rule on standing of a co-owner in recovery suits.)
• “Section 3(f) of P.D. No. No. 1517 defines the term 'tenant' covered by the said decree as the 'rightful occupant of land and its structures, but does not include those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose possession is under litigation.'” (The statutory text used to exclude petitioners from coverage.)
• “While there is a Certification that the area… is included in the list of Areas for Priority Development under Presidential Proclamation No. 1967, there is no showing that the property has already been acquired by the local government for this purpose; or that petitioners have duly qualified as beneficiaries.” (Explains why R.A. No. 7279 did not bar eviction.)

• Wee v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176405, August 20, 2008 — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule under Article 487 that one co-owner may bring any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned property without joining the other co-owners, who are not indispensable parties.
• Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman — Referred to within Wee for the proposition that a co-owner is not even a necessary party to an action for ejectment because complete relief can be afforded in his absence.
• Dimaculangan v. Casalla, G.R. No. 156689, June 8, 2007 — Applied to enumerate the qualifications of landless urban families protected by P.D. Nos. 1517 and 2016 and to emphasize that the term “tenant” excludes tolerated occupants, those who entered by force or deceit, and those under litigation.
• Agasen v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115508, February 15, 2000 — Followed for the doctrine that non-registration of a deed of sale does not affect the validity of the contract between the parties.

• Article 487, Civil Code — Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. Applied to sustain the standing of respondent Ysmael, a co-owner, to file the recovery suit without impleading the other registered co-owners.
• Section 3(f) of Presidential Decree No. 1517 (Urban Land Reform Law) — Defines “tenant” as the rightful occupant of land and its structures, excluding those whose presence is merely tolerated and without contract, those who enter by force or deceit, and those under litigation. Employed to exclude petitioners from the law’s protection.
• Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 2016 — Prohibits the eviction of qualified tenants/occupants from land identified and proclaimed as Areas for Priority Development or Urban Land Reform Zones. Held inapplicable because petitioners did not meet the definition of tenant.
• Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) — Requires a process of inventory, identification, acquisition, and disposition of lands for socialized housing. Petitioners failed to prove that the property had been acquired or that they had been qualified as beneficiaries, rendering the act unavailable as a defense.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, and Diosdado M. Peralta.