Fernandez vs. Fernandez

A co-owner who has conveyed full possessory rights to a usufructuary under an absolute usufruct may be ejected through unlawful detainer when his continued occupancy is by mere tolerance and that tolerance is validly terminated by a demand to vacate. The usufructuary’s right of possession is exclusive even if the word “exclusive” does not appear in the instruments; the grant of “full control and possession” and “unlimited use and access” necessarily imports exclusivity, precluding the co-owner from simultaneous possession adverse to the usufructuary’s will.

Ma. Dulce C. Fernandez (Dulce) and her late husband Jose B. Fernandez originally owned the property at 1381 Palm Avenue, Dasmariñas Village, Makati City, covered by TCT No. 217361. In 1993, Jose sold his 50% share to their four children—Enrique, Roberto, Jaime, and Ma. Elena—via a Deed of Absolute Sale. After Jose’s death in 1994, Enrique sought and obtained Dulce’s permission to move into the property with his family. In 2000, Dulce likewise transferred her remaining 50% share to all four children, rendering each a 25% co-owner. To protect Dulce, the siblings executed a Contract of Usufruct in 1999 granting her lifetime unlimited use and access, and a Memorandum of Agreement in 2000 ceding full control and possession during her lifetime, while prohibiting any co-owner from indefinite occupancy without majority written consent. Dulce tolerated Enrique’s family’s stay for years, but following her deteriorating health, alleged neglect, and violation of house rules, she demanded they vacate in 2018. When they refused, she filed an unlawful detainer complaint.

• Nature: Complaint for unlawful detainer filed by Dulce, through her attorneys-in-fact (Jaime, Roberto, and Ma. Elena Fernandez), against her son Enrique to recover possession of the family property located at 1381 Palm Avenue, Dasmariñas Village, Makati City.

• Ownership and Usufruct: Jose B. Fernandez sold his 50% share in the property to his four children in 1993. After Jose’s death in 1994, Enrique sought Dulce’s permission to stay in the property with his family; she acceded. In 2000, Dulce transferred her remaining 50% share to the same four children, making each a 25% co-owner. A Contract of Usufruct dated October 14, 1999 was executed by the siblings, granting Dulce lifetime unlimited use and access, with extinguishment only upon her death. A Memorandum of Agreement dated December 18, 2000 further granted Dulce “full control and possession” during her lifetime and prohibited any co-owner from staying indefinitely or longer than 24 months from the time Dulce left the property, unless consented to in writing by a majority of the co-owners and under specified conditions including payment of rent.

• Tolerance and Deterioration: Despite these instruments, Dulce tolerated Enrique and his family’s continued stay. Over time, Enrique allegedly contributed negligibly to household expenses, failed to maintain the property, and violated house rules drafted to address Dulce’s deteriorating health. By 2016, Dulce had suffered an undetected stroke and was found in poor condition by other siblings. Ma. Elena and Teresa Fernandez arranged deep cleaning and covered maintenance costs.

• Demand to Vacate: On April 12, 2018, Dulce executed an irrevocable special power of attorney in favor of Roberto, Jaime, and Ma. Elena for general administration of the property, including the authority to file cases. A formal demand to vacate dated May 21, 2018 was served on Enrique, and on June 2, 2018, Dulce personally wrote to all her children expressing her wish to be the sole occupant. Enrique refused to leave. Dulce eventually moved out on February 4, 2019.

• Enrique’s Defense: Enrique claimed jurisdiction was lacking because no dispossession occurred; his stay was not by tolerance but as a co-owner exercising his right. He argued he moved in at Dulce’s request in 1994 to accompany her, sold his other residences upon her insistence, and that the parties’ contemporaneous and subsequent acts showed an intent to allow him and his family to reside with Dulce concurrently. He pointed to the absence of the word “exclusive” in the usufruct documents and invoked Articles 226 and 227 of the Family Code and Moralidad v. Pernes.

• Exclusive Possession Ceded by Co-owners: Petitioner argued that the siblings, including Enrique, ceded exclusive possession of the property to Dulce through the Contract of Usufruct and Memorandum of Agreement, which superseded any alleged possessory right of a co-owner. The phrase “unlimited use and access” and the grant of “full control and possession” necessarily import exclusivity, even absent the word “exclusive.”

• Mere Tolerance and Termination: Petitioner maintained that Enrique’s initial entry in 1994 was by Dulce’s permission to assist him with his children, and his continued stay after the usufruct instruments was by mere tolerance. Tolerance terminated upon the demand to vacate on May 21, 2018, rendering his possession illegal. The parol evidence rule precluded Enrique from asserting any unwritten agreement for indefinite stay.

• Valid Demand and Authority: Petitioner asserted that the demand to vacate was validly made by her attorneys-in-fact under the irrevocable special power of attorney, and that the pending annulment case for the SPA was irrelevant to the unlawful detainer suit.

• Right of Co-owner and Absence of Exclusivity: Respondent countered that he was already in possession as a co-owner for several years before the usufruct instruments were executed, and that those instruments did not grant Dulce exclusive possession, as the terms “unlimited” and “full” referred to breadth rather than selectivity. Item II of the Memorandum of Agreement, which restricts occupancy, applied only among co-owners after Dulce left, not to Dulce’s own occupancy.

• Intent and Estoppel: Respondent argued that the surrounding circumstances and the parties’ contemporaneous and subsequent acts demonstrated an intent to allow concurrent possession. Dulce’s inaction and silence for 24 years created an estoppel, leading him to believe he and his family would not be ousted. He further contended the demand letter was issued by co-owners, not demonstrably by Dulce herself, who allegedly had no knowledge of the demand and instead discussed room arrangements.

• Inapplicability of Unlawful Detainer: Respondent argued that no tolerance existed at the inception of possession, and his stay as co-owner was never illegal. Because possession was not originally by tolerance, the action for unlawful detainer must fail. Even assuming an unlawful detainer lay, Dulce could not claim reasonable rentals as there was no lease, and he did not occupy the property to her exclusion.

• Exclusive Possession: Whether the Contract of Usufruct and Memorandum of Agreement granted the usufructuary exclusive possession of the property such that a co-owner’s simultaneous occupancy was by mere tolerance.
• Unlawful Detainer: Whether the complaint sufficiently alleged and the evidence established the requisites of unlawful detainer—specifically, initial possession by tolerance, termination by demand, and continued unlawful withholding.
• Application of Moralidad and Family Code: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Moralidad v. Pernes and Articles 226 and 227 of the Family Code to find that a co-owner and usufructuary could concurrently possess the property.
• Monetary Awards: Whether the usufructuary was entitled to reasonable rent, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

• Exclusive Possession: The usufruct constituted in favor of Dulce was absolute, granting lifetime unlimited use and access and full control and possession. The instruments carried no reservation clause for the co-owners. The grant of “full” control and possession inherently connotes exclusivity, as possession cannot be “full” if shared with another. The absence of the word “exclusive” did not negate exclusivity. Neither the Family Code provisions nor Moralidad applied, as Moralidad involved a limited usufruct with mere permissive language (“may”), while this case involved an absolute usufruct. Enrique’s continued stay was therefore by Dulce’s sheer tolerance.

• Unlawful Detainer: The complaint sufficiently alleged all jurisdictional facts: Enrique’s initial entry was with Dulce’s permission in 1994; after the usufruct instruments, his stay continued by tolerance; tolerance was terminated by the written demand to vacate on May 21, 2018; he refused to vacate; and the complaint was filed on October 22, 2018, within one year. Upon termination of tolerance, Enrique’s possession became illegal.

• Application of Moralidad and Family Code: Moralidad was distinguished. That case involved a resolutory condition requiring harmonious living and a mere privilege to stay, not a grant of full control and possession. The usufruct here was absolute and extinguished only by death. Articles 226 and 227 of the Family Code were irrelevant as no unemancipated child was involved.

• Monetary Awards: Because Enrique’s occupancy was by tolerance and he continued to occupy even after demand, he became liable for reasonable rent from May 21, 2018. The RTC’s determination of PHP 325,000.00 per month was affirmed based on the appraiser’s report as adjusted for property condition and non-exclusive occupancy. Attorney’s fees of PHP 100,000.00 and costs of PHP 74,374.50 were reinstated under Article 2208 of the Civil Code because Dulce was compelled to litigate. All monetary awards earn 6% interest per annum from finality until full payment.

• Unlawful Detainer Requisites — For an unlawful detainer action to lie, the complaint must allege: (1) initial possession by contract or tolerance; (2) termination of the right to possess by notice; (3) continued possession depriving the plaintiff of enjoyment; and (4) filing within one year from the last demand to vacate. These are jurisdictional facts.

• Absolute Usufruct and Co-owner’s Possession — A co-owner who grants an absolute usufruct over the property in favor of another parts with the right to possess and enjoy the property for the duration of the usufruct, retaining only jus disponendi. The usufructuary’s right of possession is exclusive where the grant is of “full control and possession” and “unlimited use and access,” even without the word “exclusive.” Any simultaneous occupation by the co-owner is by mere tolerance and may be terminated by demand, giving rise to unlawful detainer.

• Tolerance in Unlawful Detainer — Tolerance means permission or acquiescence, not a juridical right. Once tolerance is withdrawn by a valid demand to vacate, the occupant’s continued possession becomes illegal, even if the occupant is a co-owner whose possessory rights have been ceded by an absolute usufruct.

• Distinguishing Moralidad v. Pernes — Moralidad involved a limited usufruct where the grantor merely declared that certain persons “may” build a house and stay; it did not cede full control and possession. The ruling does not apply where the usufruct is absolute and the usufructuary is vested with full possessory authority, leaving no concurrent possessory right in the owner.

• “That the word ‘exclusive’ is not mentioned in the contract of usufruct nor in the memorandum of agreement does not mean it is not exclusive. For one, these documents do not carry any reservation clause in favor of the co-owners or any of them. For another, the grant of full control and possession to Dulce effective through her lifetime speaks of exclusivity. As aptly observed by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Dulce’s possession and control can never be ‘full’ if the intention was to share the same with Enrique or someone else.”

• “Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who unlawfully withholds its possession after the termination of his or her right of possession under any contract, express or implied. The defendant’s possession in unlawful detainer was originally legal but became illegal due to termination of the right to possess.”

• Chansuyco v. Spouses Paltep, 860 Phil. 13 (2019) — Cited for the definition and elements of unlawful detainer; followed as controlling authority on the jurisdictional requirements.
• Moralidad v. Sps. Pernes, 529 Phil. 523 (2006) — Distinguished; involved a limited usufruct with permissive language rather than an outright grant of full control and possession.
• Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) — Applied to impose 6% interest per annum on monetary awards from finality of the decision.

• Article 562, Civil Code — Defines usufruct as giving the usufructuary the right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless otherwise provided. Applied to confirm that Dulce, as usufructuary, held all rights of enjoyment during her lifetime, to the exclusion of the co-owners’ possessory rights.
• Article 2208, Civil Code — Allows recovery of attorney’s fees in actions where the claimant is compelled to litigate to protect rights. Applied to reinstate attorney’s fees in favor of Dulce.
• Articles 226 and 227, Family Code — Pertaining to property of unemancipated children and parental administration; held inapplicable because no unemancipated child was a party.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), M. Lopez, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concurred.