Fernando vs. Vasquez

Certiorari corrects only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment; it is not available where appeal was the proper remedy and was lost through the petitioner’s own negligence; and a judicial compromise between the parties renders the underlying dispute moot and academic, leaving nothing for the court to adjudicate.

Following a dispute over ownership of a market-stall property known as Folgueras Remnants Center in Tondo, Manila, certain lessees filed an interpleader suit against Valentin A. Fernando and his children, including respondent Pelagia Fernando Santos. The interpleader judgment of October 10, 1961 declared Valentin A. Fernando the lawful owner entitled to receive rents. That judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court’s final resolution terminated the interpleader case in December 1965. During the pendency of the interpleader litigation, respondents Pelagia Fernando Santos and her husband Pablo G. Santos had been occupying the second floor of the building on the property. After the ownership issue was settled, Valentin Fernando demanded that they vacate; they refused, prompting him to file an unlawful detainer suit in the City Court of Manila.

• The Interpleader Case: Lessees of market stalls on the Folgueras Remnants Center property filed an interpleader suit against Valentin A. Fernando and his daughters, Pelagia Fernando Santos and Urbana Fernando Cruz, to determine the lawful owner entitled to rents. The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment on October 10, 1961 declaring Valentin Fernando the owner. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court finally denied a second motion for reconsideration on December 21, 1965, terminating the case.

• Occupation and Demand to Vacate: Throughout the interpleader litigation, respondent spouses Pelagia Fernando Santos and Pablo G. Santos occupied the second floor of the building on the property. After the ownership issue was resolved, petitioner Valentin Fernando demanded that they vacate, first orally in early 1965, then in writing in April and May 1965. The spouses refused.

• The Unlawful Detainer Case: On May 24, 1965, petitioner filed an unlawful detainer complaint in the City Court of Manila, alleging that the spouses’ occupation was by mere sufferance. The city court ruled in his favor on November 11, 1965, ordering the spouses to vacate, to pay ₱1,000 monthly from January 1965 as reasonable compensation, ₱500 as attorney’s fees, and costs. A writ of execution issued.

• The Prohibition Case: On November 12, 1965, respondent spouses filed a petition for prohibition in the Court of First Instance of Manila, assailing the city court’s jurisdiction. They contended that their possession had been adverse for more than one year before the complaint was filed, making accion publiciana the proper remedy. The CFI issued a restraining order. On March 25, 1966, respondent Judge Conrado M. Vasquez ruled that the spouses had been unlawfully withholding possession for more than one year, declared the city court without jurisdiction, and nullified the entire unlawful detainer proceeding including the writ of execution.

• The Amicable Settlement: On September 20, 1966, while this petition for certiorari was pending and in the course of a related case in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 38033-R), the parties entered into an amicable settlement. Before the appellate court, Pablo G. Santos and counsel for respondents declared that (1) petitioners therein (respondent spouses) agreed to withdraw their petition; (2) they agreed to vacate the premises that very day, September 20, 1966; and (3) respondents therein (Valentin Fernando) agreed to retain the tenants who had followed the spouses, the tenants to pay rentals to respondents as of that date. The Court of Appeals dissolved the preliminary injunction and terminated the case. Respondent spouses subsequently informed the Supreme Court that they had vacated the premises and that the controversy had become moot and academic.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion / Error of Jurisdiction: Petitioner maintained that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that the city court had no jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case and in nullifying its proceedings. He contended that the error was jurisdictional and thus correctible by certiorari.

• Non-Mootness: Petitioner urged the Supreme Court not to dismiss the petition despite the amicable settlement, asserting that dismissal would cause the CFI decision under review to become final and permanent.

• Mootness: Respondents countered that the amicable settlement had rendered the case moot and academic, as the spouses had already vacated the premises and the parties had resolved their differences, leaving no live controversy for the Court to adjudicate. They brought this supervening event to the Court’s attention and moved for dismissal on that ground.

• Error of Judgment vs. Error of Jurisdiction: Whether the respondent judge’s determination that the city court lacked jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case constituted an error of jurisdiction reviewable by certiorari, or a mere error of judgment correctible only by appeal.

• Availability of Certiorari After Lost Appeal: Whether certiorari may lie where the petitioner possessed and in fact attempted the remedy of appeal but lost it through his own fault in failing to timely pay the docket fee.

• Mootness: Whether the amicable settlement subsequently entered into by the parties rendered the petition moot and academic, thereby warranting its dismissal.

• Error of Judgment vs. Error of Jurisdiction: The error ascribed to respondent judge was one of judgment, not of jurisdiction. The judge had jurisdiction to render the decision under review; any mistake in his appreciation of the facts and law—specifically, his conclusion that the spouses’ possession had been adverse for more than one year—was committed in the exercise of that jurisdiction. No grave abuse of discretion was shown that would elevate the error to a jurisdictional defect. Certiorari serves to correct defects of jurisdiction solely; an error in the evaluation of the character and duration of possession is a proper subject of appeal, not the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.

• Availability of Certiorari After Lost Appeal: Certiorari was not available because petitioner had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law—appeal. He in fact attempted to appeal the CFI decision, but the appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court for failure to pay the docket fee on time. Certiorari cannot be used to revive an appeal lost through the party’s own negligence or as a substitute for the lost remedy. The general rule under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court applies, and none of the recognized exceptions—public welfare, broader interests of justice, orders found completely null and void, or instances where appeal is not the appropriate remedy—was present.

• Mootness: The supervening amicable settlement, which was submitted to and acted upon by the Court of Appeals in a case between the same parties, had the effect and authority of res judicata pursuant to Article 2039 of the Civil Code. The settlement extinguished the controversy: respondent spouses agreed to vacate (and had in fact vacated), and petitioner agreed to retain the tenants. Nullifying the CFI decision would be an idle ceremony aimed at reviving a city court ejectment judgment that had become useless because the premises were already surrendered. No claim for damages for use and occupation survived the compromise. Accordingly, the entire dispute—including the ejectment case, the prohibition case, and the instant certiorari proceedings—had become moot and academic, leaving no actual controversy for the Court to adjudicate.

• Error of Judgment vs. Error of Jurisdiction — An error of judgment is one the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction; it is correctible by appeal. An error of jurisdiction renders an order or judgment void or voidable; it is reviewable by certiorari. The writ of certiorari will not issue to correct a mere mistake in the court’s appreciation of facts and law, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion.

• Certiorari as an Extraordinary Remedy; Not a Substitute for Lost Appeal — Certiorari is available only where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Where appeal is the proper remedy and the party either failed to appeal or lost the right to appeal through his own fault, certiorari will not lie to supply the deficiency. The exceptions (public welfare, broader interests of justice, orders that are completely null and void, or where appeal is not the appropriate remedy) must be clearly present.

• Judicial Compromise as Res Judicata; Mootness — A judicial amicable settlement has the effect and authority of res judicata (Article 2039, Civil Code). Once the parties have compromised their dispute and the compromise has been judicially approved, the underlying case becomes moot and academic. Courts will not decide moot questions or issue advisory opinions; a supervening settlement that extinguishes the controversy mandates dismissal.

• “The office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other purpose. It is truly an extraordinary remedy and, in this jurisdiction, its use is restricted to truly extraordinary cases — cases in which the action of the inferior court is wholly void; where any further steps in the case would result in a waste of time and money and would produce no result whatever; where the parties, or their privies, would be utterly deceived; where a final judgment or decree would be nought but a snare and a delusion, deciding nothing, protecting nobody, a judicial pretension, a recorded falsehood a standing menace.” (Quoting Herrera vs. Barretto, 25 Phil. 245, 251; emphasis in original). This passage defines the narrow office of certiorari and is frequently cited in Philippine remedial law.

• “Plainly written in Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court, is the familiar general rule that certiorari is available where ‘there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.’ Conversely, where another such remedy like an appeal may be taken, certiorari does not lie.”

• “Certiorari may not be utilized to offset the adverse effect of failure to appeal. … He cannot revive his appeal. He had lost it through his own fault. Certiorari is no substitute for appeal.”

• Herrera vs. Barretto, 25 Phil. 245 (1913) — The seminal case defining the restricted function of certiorari; quoted at length and followed as controlling doctrine.

• Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, 28 SCRA 890 (1969) — Cited for the proposition that certiorari keeps an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or prevents grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

• Tirona vs. Nañawa, 21 SCRA 395 (1967) — Cited for the rule that certiorari will not lie where appeal is available, and for the exception where the broader interests of justice so require.

• Perlas vs. Concepcion, 34 Phil. 559 (1916); Director of Lands vs. Santamaria, 44 Phil. 594 (1923); Director of Lands vs. Gutierrez David, 50 Phil. 797 (1927); Clemente vs. Lukban, 53 Phil. 931 (1928) — Cited as examples where certiorari was entertained despite the availability of appeal because the orders complained of were found completely null and void.

• Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385 (1925) — Cited for the exception that certiorari may lie where public welfare and the advancement of public policy so dictate.

• Tolentino vs. Escalona, 26 SCRA 613 (1969) — Cited for the rule that certiorari cannot be used to offset the adverse effect of a failure to appeal.

• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the petition for certiorari. Applied to bar the remedy because petitioner had the plain and adequate remedy of appeal, which he lost through his own neglect.

• Article 2039, Civil Code — Provides that a judicial compromise has the effect and authority of res judicata. Applied to hold that the amicable settlement between the parties extinguished the controversy and rendered the certiorari petition moot.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concurred.