Festejo vs. Fernando

A public officer who, without legal authority or the owner’s consent, takes private property for a public purpose acts outside the scope of his official duties and may be sued personally for damages; such an action is not a suit against the State and does not require its consent.

Carmen Festejo owned three parcels of sugar land in Ilocos Sur totalling approximately 9.5 hectares. In February 1951, the Bureau of Public Works, under the direction of defendant Isaias Fernando, entered portions of that land and constructed an irrigation canal, allegedly without judicial authorization, without securing a right of way, and without the plaintiff’s knowledge or consent.

• The Parties: Plaintiff Carmen Festejo was the owner of three parcels of sugar land in Ilocos Sur with a combined area of about 9.5 hectares. Defendant Isaias Fernando was the Director of the Bureau of Public Works, in charge of irrigation projects and systems.
• The Alleged Unauthorized Taking: In or about February 1951, without prior authority from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without first obtaining a right of way, without the plaintiff’s knowledge or consent, and against her express objection, the defendant took possession of portions of the three parcels aggregating 24,179 square metres and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on those portions.
• Relief Sought: The complaint prayed for the return of possession of the occupied land and its restoration to its former condition at the defendant’s expense. Should restoration prove impossible, plaintiff prayed for payment of the land’s value in the amount of ₱19,343.20, plus ₱9,756.19 in damages, ₱5,000 in attorney’s fees, and costs.
• Motion to Dismiss: The Solicitor General, appearing for the defendant, moved to dismiss on the sole ground that the action was effectively against the Republic of the Philippines, which had not granted its consent to be sued.

• Personal Capacity of the Defendant: Petitioner maintained that the suit was directed personally against Isaias Fernando for acts he performed in his official capacity but which exceeded the lawful scope of his authority. She argued that a public officer who commits a tortious act is personally liable and may be sued like any private citizen.
• Absence of State Immunity: Petitioner contended that an officer who acts without or beyond the authority conferred by law cannot shelter under the plea of being a public agent. She invoked Article 32 of the Civil Code, which expressly makes public officers liable for violating the right against deprivation of property without due process, and cited prior Philippine jurisprudence recognizing the personal liability of public officers for ultra vires acts.

• Suit Against the State: Respondent countered that the allegations made it clear the defendant was being sued in his official capacity as Director of the Bureau of Public Works. The irrigation system was constructed with public funds and belonged to the Government; the relief sought—return of possession and restoration of the land to its former condition—would require divesting the Government of its property. Thus, the real party in interest was the Republic, which could not be sued without its consent.

• Suit Against the State: Whether the complaint against the Director of Public Works for the unauthorized taking of private land for an irrigation canal was a suit against the State requiring its consent.

• Suit Against the State: The action was not against the State but against the officer personally for acts outside the scope of his authority. A public officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot invoke state immunity; his acts are without authority, and he is personally answerable for the resulting injury. The taking of private property without first acquiring a right of way and without the owner’s consent constituted a tortious act beyond the lawful bounds of official duty. Consistent with prevailing doctrine, the officer who commits such a trespass—or who ratifies the acts of his subordinates—may be sued as any other citizen. Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal on the ground of state immunity was erroneous, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

• Personal Liability of Public Officers for Ultra Vires Acts — A public officer, whether executive, administrative, quasi-judicial, or ministerial, who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law renders himself personally liable in a civil suit. He cannot shelter under the plea that he acted as a public agent. Ratification of subordinates’ tortious acts is equivalent to a personal command and exposes the superior to personal liability.
• No State Immunity for Unauthorized Acts — An action for damages against a public officer in his personal capacity for acts done without or in excess of authority is not a suit against the State, even if the acts were performed under color of office. The State’s consent is not required because the officer, not the government, is the real party defendant.
• Article 32 of the Civil Code — This provision imposes liability on any public officer or employee who, directly or indirectly, obstructs, defeats, violates, or impairs the right against deprivation of property without due process of law. Such civil action proceeds independently of any criminal prosecution and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence; moral and exemplary damages may also be awarded.

• “La mocion contra ‘Isaias Fernando, Director de Obras Publicas, encargado y responsable de la construccion de los sistemas de irrigacion en Filipinas’ es una dirigida personalmente contra el, por actos que asumio ejecutar en su concepto oficial. La ley no le exime de responsabilidad por las extralimitaciones que cometa o haga cometer en el desempeño de sus funciones oficiales.” [“The action against ‘Isaias Fernando, Director of Public Works, in charge of and responsible for the construction of irrigation systems in the Philippines’ is one directed personally against him, for acts he undertook to execute in his official capacity. The law does not exempt him from liability for the excesses he commits or causes to be committed in the performance of his official functions.”]
• “Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and may be sued as any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortious act.” (Quoting 49 Am. Jur. 289)
• “If an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under the plea that he is a public agent.” (Quoting 43 Am. Jur. 86)
• “It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise—who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit.” (Quoting 43 Am. Jur. 89-90)

• Nelson v. Bobcock, 188 Minn. 584, 90 A.L.R. 1472 (1933) — Followed as persuasive authority; a highway commissioner who appropriated private land beyond the right of way was held personally liable, and ratification of subordinates’ acts was equivalent to a command.
• Lung v. Aldanese, 45 Phil. 784 — Cited for the principle of personal liability of public officers.
• Syquia v. Almeda, G.R. No. L-1648, 17 August 1947 — Cited for the rule on personal liability of public officers.
• Marquez v. Nelson, G.R. No. L-2412, September 1950 — Cited for the same rule.
• Syquia v. Lopez, 47 O.G. 665 — Distinguished in the dissent as support for the view that the State was the real party in interest.

• Article 32, Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) — Applied to support the personal liability of a public officer who violates the right against deprivation of property without due process. The provision authorized the aggrieved party to institute an independent civil action for damages, including moral and exemplary damages, regardless of any criminal prosecution.

Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concurred.

• Justice Concepcion (with Justice Bengzon concurring): The dissent maintained that the complaint unmistakably named the defendant in his official capacity as Director of the Bureau of Public Works and emphasized that the acts complained of were performed “as Director of the Bureau of Public Works.” The prayer for return of possession and restoration of the land to its former condition would necessarily affect the irrigation canal—government property constructed with public funds—making the Republic the real party in interest. Under Syquia v. Lopez, the suit was thus a suit against the State that could not proceed without its consent.