Fule vs. Court of Appeals

A pre-trial stipulation of facts in a criminal case is inadmissible in evidence against the accused unless it is reduced to writing and signed by both the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by Section 4, Rule 118 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The requirement is absolute; omission of either signature cannot be cured by counsel’s unilateral post-hoc confirmation.

Manolo P. Fule was an agent of Towers Assurance Corporation. In that capacity, he issued a check to Roy Nadera in remittance of collections. The check was dishonored upon presentment because the account had been closed, leading to a criminal charge under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. During the pre-trial conference conducted under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the prosecution and defense entered into a Stipulation of Facts. The stipulation recited jurisdictional facts, the issuance and dishonor of the check, and the identity of the accused. Neither the accused nor his counsel signed the written stipulation.

• Nature of the Charge: Petitioner was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) in the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV.
• The Check Transaction: On January 21, 1981, petitioner, acting as an agent of Towers Assurance Corporation, issued check No. 26741 dated January 24, 1981, in the sum of P2,541.05, drawn in favor of complaining witness Roy Nadera, as remittance of collections. Presentment on January 24, 1981 resulted in dishonor because the checking account was already closed.
• Pre-Trial Stipulation: At the pre-trial conference on August 8, 1985, the prosecution and defense entered into a Stipulation of Facts reciting that the court had jurisdiction, petitioner was an agent of Towers Assurance Corporation, petitioner issued the check to Nadera, the check was dishonored due to a closed account, and petitioner was properly identified. The stipulation was reduced to writing but was not signed by petitioner or his counsel.
• Trial Proceedings: During the hearing on August 23, 1985, the prosecution presented documentary exhibits (Exhibits “A,” “B,” and “C”). At the next hearing on September 17, 1985, petitioner waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner solely on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts and the prosecution’s exhibits.
• Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the Stipulation of Facts was valid and sufficient to support the judgment.

• Inadmissibility of Unsigned Stipulation: Petitioner contended that the conviction was erroneous because it was based solely on a Stipulation of Facts made during pre-trial that was not signed by petitioner nor by his counsel, in violation of Section 4, Rule 118 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which requires such agreements to be signed by both the accused and counsel to be used in evidence.

• Cure by Subsequent Confirmation: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, maintained that the conviction was valid. The fact that the accused’s counsel subsequently confirmed the Stipulation of Facts in a Memorandum submitted to the trial court cured any defect in the lack of signatures, and the stipulation, together with the documentary exhibits, sufficiently established guilt.

• Admissibility of Unsigned Stipulation: Whether a pre-trial stipulation of facts that is not signed by the accused and his counsel, as required by Section 4, Rule 118 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is admissible in evidence to sustain a conviction.

• Admissibility of Unsigned Stipulation: The stipulation was inadmissible. Section 4, Rule 118 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that “[n]o agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel.” The rule is mandatory; the use of the negative phrase “no agreement … shall be used” and the auxiliary “shall” imposes an imperative duty, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused consistent with the rule on penal statutes. The omission of the signatures of both the accused and his counsel rendered the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence. The subsequent confirmation by defense counsel in the Memorandum did not cure the defect because the rule explicitly requires the signature of both the accused and counsel. Without independent evidence apart from the inadmissible stipulation, the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Mandatory Signature Requirement under Rule 118, Section 4 — In criminal cases, any pre-trial agreement or admission must be reduced to writing and signed by both the accused and his counsel before it can be used in evidence against the accused. The requirement is mandatory, and non-compliance renders the stipulation inadmissible. A memorandum by counsel confirming the unsigned stipulation cannot substitute for the joint signature.
• Strict Construction of Penal Provisions — Penal statutes, whether substantive, remedial, or procedural, are strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused.
• Consent Judgments by Counsel Without Authority — A judgment entered by consent of an attorney without special authority may be set aside or reopened (citing Natividad vs. Natividad).

• “No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel.” (Rule 118, Sec. 4, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure) — The textual anchor of the ruling.
• “The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.” — The Court’s definitive statement on the consequence of non-compliance.
• “The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts.” — Emphasizes the joint signature requirement.

• McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 (1954) — Followed: Established the rule of statutory construction that negative words and phrases are mandatory, while affirmative ones are merely directory.
• Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176 — Followed: Held that the term “shall” in a statute denotes an imperative, enforceable duty.
• People vs. Terrado, No. L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648 — Followed: Affirmed the rule that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused.
• Natividad vs. Natividad, 51 Phil. 613 (1928) — Relied upon: Recognized that a judgment entered by consent of an attorney without special authority may be set aside or reopened.

• Section 4, Rule 118, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Expressly requires that any pre-trial agreement or admission be reduced to writing and signed by the accused and his counsel before it can be used in evidence. Applied to exclude the unsigned Stipulation of Facts as the sole basis for conviction, resulting in remand for reception of proper evidence.

Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concurred. Justice Paras took no part. Justice Gutierrez, Jr. was on leave.

None.