Funa vs. Civil Service Commission

The designation of a member of a Constitutional Commission to a board of a government-owned or controlled corporation under the Executive Branch, even in an ex officio capacity, violates the constitutional prohibition against holding multiple offices (Section 2, Article IX-A) and impairs the independence of the Commission (Section 1, Article IX-A) where the position entitles the member to additional compensation and subjects him to the control of the President over executive agencies.

On January 11, 2010, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Francisco T. Duque III as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission; the Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment on February 3, 2010. On February 22, 2010, President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 864, designating the CSC Chairman as an ex officio member of the Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), and the Board of Directors of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth). The designation was premised on Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987), which mandates that the CSC Chairman shall be a member of the governing bodies of government entities whose functions affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees. On April 8, 2010, petitioner Dennis A.B. Funa, in his capacities as taxpayer, concerned citizen, and lawyer, filed the instant petition assailing the constitutionality of EO 864 and Section 14 of EO 292, as well as Duque’s designation, for allegedly violating the independence of the CSC and the constitutional prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices.

• Appointment and Designation: Duque was appointed CSC Chairman on January 11, 2010, and assumed office upon confirmation on February 3, 2010. On February 22, 2010, President Arroyo issued EO 864 designating him as an ex officio member of the governing boards of GSIS, PhilHealth, ECC, and HDMF.
• Statutory Basis: EO 864 cited Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, which provides that the CSC Chairman shall be a member of the boards of government entities whose functions affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees.
• Nature of the GOCCs: GSIS and HDMF are attached to the Office of the President; PhilHealth is attached to the Department of Health; and ECC is attached to the Department of Labor and Employment. All are government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
• Compensation: The board positions entitled Duque to receive per diems and other emoluments, constituting additional compensation beyond his salary as CSC Chairman.
• Functions of the GOCCs: While the GOCCs perform functions affecting government employees (such as insurance, health benefits, compensation, and housing), they also exercise broad corporate powers including investment of funds, borrowing, acquisition of property, and promulgation of rules on matters not strictly personnel-related.
• Supervening Legislation: During the pendency of the petition, Congress enacted RA 10149, which restructured the governance of GOCCs and effectively removed ex officio members from their boards, terminating Duque’s memberships.

• Impairment of Independence: Petitioner maintained that the designation violated Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution, which mandates the independence of the CSC. Because the CSC is not part of the Executive Branch while the GOCCs are executive instrumentalities subject to presidential control, the designation subjected the CSC Chairman to the President’s power of control, thereby compromising the Commission’s independence.
• Prohibition on Multiple Offices: Petitioner argued that the designation violated Section 2, Article IX-A, which prohibits members of constitutional commissions from holding any other office or employment during their tenure. He posited that the prohibition is absolute and admits no exception for ex officio positions.
• Conflict of Interest: Petitioner asserted that a conflict of interest would arise if decisions of the GOCC boards concerning personnel matters were elevated to the CSC for review, given that the CSC has jurisdiction over government employees in corporations with original charters.
• Ultra Vires Presidential Action: Petitioner contended that the President could not amend the charters of the GOCCs (which are legislative enactments) by mere executive order to create board memberships not provided for in said charters.
• Expansion of Powers: Petitioner argued that Section 14 of EO 292 unconstitutionally expanded the CSC’s role from personnel management to include insurance, health, and housing matters.

• Locus Standi: Respondents challenged petitioner’s standing to sue, arguing that he failed to demonstrate a direct personal injury.
• Ex Officio Exception: Respondents countered that Section 2, Article IX-A does not prohibit positions held in an ex officio capacity without additional compensation, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary. They argued that the 1987 Constitution allows Cabinet members to hold ex officio positions, and by analogy, the same rule applies to CSC members.
• Primary Functions: Respondents argued that the designation was valid under Section 7, Article IX-B, which allows appointive officials to hold other offices if allowed by law or by the primary functions of their position. They maintained that the GOCCs’ functions regarding employee welfare fall within the CSC’s primary concerns.
• No Conflict of Interest: Respondents argued that since Duque was only one member of the CSC and of the respective boards, decisions could be made without his participation, negating any conflict.
• No Implied Repeal: Respondents insisted that EO 864 did not impliedly amend the GOCC charters because the Administrative Code and the GOCC charters address different subject matters.

• Locus Standi: Whether petitioner Funa possesses the legal standing to institute the action.
• Mootness: Whether the case has become moot and academic by virtue of the enactment of RA 10149.
• Constitutionality of the Statutory Basis: Whether Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is constitutional.
• Constitutionality of the Designation: Whether EO 864 and the designation of the CSC Chairman as an ex officio board member of the GSIS, PhilHealth, ECC, and HDMF violate Sections 1 and 2, Article IX-A of the Constitution.

• Locus Standi: Petitioner possesses standing as a taxpayer, concerned citizen, and lawyer given the transcendental importance of the issues raised, which have far-reaching implications and require the formulation of controlling principles.
• Mootness: Although the enactment of RA 10149 rendered the specific controversy moot, the Court exercised judicial review under recognized exceptions: the case involves a grave violation of the Constitution, is of paramount public interest, requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench and bar, and is capable of repetition yet evading review.
• Constitutionality of Section 14, EO 292: Section 14 is constitutional. It validly authorizes the CSC Chairman to sit as a member of governing bodies whose functions affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government employees, as these matters fall within the primary functions of the CSC.
• Constitutionality of EO 864 and the Designation: EO 864 and the designation of Duque are unconstitutional. First, the GOCCs exercise corporate powers (investment, insurance, health, housing) that are not strictly personnel-related, and thus their board memberships are not covered by Section 14. Second, the positions entitled Duque to per diems, constituting additional compensation prohibited by Section 2, Article IX-A; an ex officio position, by definition, is part of the principal office and carries no right to additional compensation. Third, because the GOCCs are under the control of the President (being part of the Executive Branch), subjecting the CSC Chairman to their governance impairs the independence of the CSC as a constitutional commission.

• Independence of Constitutional Commissions — The Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit are expressly described by the Constitution as "independent." Although their functions are essentially executive, they are not under the control of the President in the discharge of such functions. Their independence is safeguarded by constitutional prohibitions on their members holding other offices, engaging in certain professions, or being financially interested in government contracts.
• Prohibition on Holding Multiple Offices (Constitutional Commissions) — Section 2, Article IX-A imposes a strict prohibition on members of constitutional commissions from holding any other office or employment during their tenure. This is stricter than the general rule under Section 7, Article IX-B applicable to other appointive officials. The prohibition admits of no exception for positions with additional compensation.
• Ex Officio Positions — An ex officio position is one held by virtue of the principal office, without further warrant or appointment, and without additional compensation. The services rendered in an ex officio capacity are deemed covered by the compensation attached to the principal office. Receipt of per diems or other emoluments for such service contravenes the concept of an ex officio position and violates constitutional prohibitions against additional compensation.
• Presidential Control over the Executive Branch — Under Section 17, Article VII, the President exercises control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. Any office performing executive functions that is not placed under any specific department falls under the Office of the President. There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive Branch is outside the control of the President.
• De Facto Officer Doctrine — A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is appointive, and whose appointment is valid on its face. The acts of a de facto officer are valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer insofar as the public or third persons are concerned. A de facto officer who has discharged duties in good faith is entitled to retain emoluments received for actual services rendered.

• "Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as 'independent.' Although their respective functions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of such functions."
• "The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office."
• "Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a form of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution."
• "The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members of their respective governing Boards are under the control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the control of the President without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution."

• Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 and 83815, February 22, 1991 — Cited for the definition of "ex officio" positions and the distinction between the strict prohibition on multiple offices for Cabinet members under Section 13, Article VII and the general rule for other appointive officials under Section 7, Article IX-B; also cited for the de facto officer doctrine.
• Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013 — Followed for the recognition of petitioner’s locus standi as a taxpayer, concerned citizen, and lawyer in cases involving transcendental importance.
• Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010 — Cited for the ruling on standing and the interpretation of constitutional provisions on dual office holding.
• Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 & 139565, July 21, 2006 — Cited for the principle that the President exercises control over all executive offices and that no office in the Executive Branch is outside presidential control.
• Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac, G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990 — Cited for the independence of constitutional commissions.

• Section 1, Article IX-A, 1987 Constitution — Declares the Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit as independent constitutional commissions.
• Section 2, Article IX-A, 1987 Constitution — Prohibits members of constitutional commissions from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, engaging in the practice of any profession, or being financially interested in government contracts.
• Section 7, Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution — Provides the general rule that unless allowed by law or the primary functions of their position, appointive officials shall not hold any other office or employment in the government.
• Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V, Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) — Mandates that the CSC Chairman shall be a member of the board of directors or governing bodies of government entities whose functions affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees.
• Section 17, Article VII, 1987 Constitution — Vests the President with control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices.

Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice), Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro (On Leave), Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Jose Catral Mendoza, Bienvenido L. Reyes (On Official Leave), Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Francis H. Jardeleza.