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Gaerlan vs. Republic

The petition for review on certiorari was denied and the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the application for original registration of title was affirmed. Petitioner Minda S. Gaerlan sought registration of a 1,061-square-meter lot in Cagayan de Oro City under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, claiming ownership by purchase in 1989. The evidence revealed no reliable proof that the land had been classified as alienable and disposable — the belatedly submitted CENRO certification did not, by itself, satisfy the requirement, and no certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary was presented. Additionally, the earliest traceable possession dated only to 1975, and no competent evidence linked the petitioner to any earlier possession or to the alleged original claimant Potenciano Abragan. Thus, the requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect title were not met.

Primary Holding

An applicant for original registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 must establish, by clear, positive, and convincing evidence, that the land is alienable and disposable — which requires presentation of a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true by the legal custodian; a mere CENRO certification is insufficient. In addition, the applicant must prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Failure to satisfy either requirement defeats the application.

Background

In 1992, Minda S. Gaerlan applied for original registration of title over a 1,061-square-meter parcel (Lot 18793, Cad-237) in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, asserting ownership acquired from Mamerta Tan in 1989 by deed of absolute sale. The Republic opposed the application on the ground that the land remained part of the public domain, that neither the applicant nor her predecessors had possessed it in the manner and for the period required by law, and that the muniments of title submitted were insufficient.

History

  1. On April 10, 1992, petitioner Minda S. Gaerlan filed an application for original registration of title (LRC No. 92-05) before the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20.

  2. On November 20, 2001, the RTC rendered a Judgment granting the application and decreeing registration in fee simple in petitioner’s name.

  3. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 00319-MIN).

  4. On March 11, 2010, the CA reversed the RTC, dismissed the application, and held that petitioner failed to prove that the land was alienable and disposable or that she had possessed it since June 12, 1945.

  5. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on May 20, 2010, prompting her petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Facts

  • The Application: Petitioner Minda S. Gaerlan sought original registration of Lot 18793, Cad-237, with an area of 1,061 square meters, located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City. She alleged acquisition from Mamerta Tan in November 1989 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land. She declared the property for taxation under her name and was issued Tax Declaration Nos. 99893 and 058351.
  • Trial and Evidence: During the hearing, petitioner testified that she took possession of the land after the 1989 sale, caused its survey, and paid realty taxes. Mamerta Tan, the vendor, testified that she had acquired the property in 1975 from Teresita Tan and declared it under Tax Declaration No. 36942. Honesto Velez, the City Assessor, identified a Land History Card for Cadastral Lot 4342 showing successive tax declarations in the names of Potenciano Abragan (original claimant), Presentacion Eviota, and eventually portions under petitioner’s name. No direct evidence was offered to show how Teresita Tan acquired the lot, from whom, or when her possession began. The documentary exhibits consisted mainly of the deed of sale, tax declarations, tax receipts, the Land History Card, and tax declarations of Abragan and Eviota.
  • The RTC Judgment: The trial court granted the application on November 20, 2001, adjudging petitioner owner in fee simple, noting that no evidence was presented by the Republic.
  • The CA Reversal: On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that petitioner failed to present any proof that the subject land is alienable and disposable. The CA emphasized that the applicant must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and must present a certified true copy of the original classification. The appellate court also found no evidence establishing that petitioner or her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
  • Proceedings Before the Supreme Court: Petitioner sought to introduce additional evidence for the first time: a CENRO Certification dated July 16, 2010 stating that Lot 4342, Cad-237 falls within an alienable and disposable area under Project No. 8, Block I, and Land Classification Map No. 585 approved on December 31, 1925; and Bureau of Lands Form No. 700-2A showing a survey of Lot 4342 on November 28, 1929 with Potenciano Abragan as the cadastral survey claimant. Petitioner argued that these documents proved alienability as early as 1925 and possession by her predecessor since 1929. The Republic objected on the grounds that factual review and belated evidence were impermissible in a Rule 45 petition.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Alienable and Disposable Character: Petitioner maintained that the land had long been classified as alienable and disposable, as shown by the CENRO certification and LC Map No. 585 approved on December 31, 1925, and that this satisfied the legal requirement.
  • Possession Through Predecessors: Petitioner asserted that her predecessor-in-interest Potenciano Abragan possessed the property as early as 1929 and was the survey claimant for Lot 4342. She contended that her possession, together with that of her predecessors, had been open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious in the concept of owner, as evidenced by tax declarations and tax payments.
  • Sufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner argued that the testimony of her witnesses and the documents presented were sufficient to prove possession and alienability, and prayed that the additional documents be admitted to cure the deficiencies noted by the CA.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Procedural Bar and New Evidence: Respondent countered that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45, and that the belated submission of the CENRO certification and BL Form No. 700-2A — never offered before the trial court or the CA — required factual determination beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari.
  • Insufficiency of the CENRO Certification: Respondent argued that even if the certification were considered, it was inadequate to prove alienable and disposable character. Under prevailing jurisprudence, a mere CENRO certification does not satisfy the requirement; the applicant must present a certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary.
  • Failure to Prove Possession Since 1945: Respondent pointed out that the earliest evidence of possession traced only to 1975, when Mamerta Tan bought the land from Teresita Tan, and there was no evidence of how or when Teresita Tan acquired ownership or possession. The BL Form showing Abragan as a survey claimant did not establish that petitioner derived title from him or that Abragan’s alleged possession continued through the chain. Thus, petitioner failed to prove the requisite open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession since June 12, 1945.

Issues

  • Alienable Classification: Whether petitioner sufficiently proved that the subject land was alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
  • Possession Requirement: Whether petitioner established open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Ruling

  • Alienable Classification: The CENRO certification — even if it had been properly offered in evidence — was insufficient to prove that the land was alienable and disposable. Under the Regalian doctrine, the applicant bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land belongs to the State. To do so, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true by the legal custodian of the official records. A CENRO certification alone does not satisfy this requirement; the CENRO is not the official repository of the DENR Secretary’s issuances, and its certification is not a public document within the contemplation of Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence. Moreover, the certification was submitted only on appeal and was never authenticated, depriving it of any probative value. Thus, alienable and disposable character was not established.
  • Possession Requirement: Petitioner failed to prove the second and third requisites. The earliest evidence of possession traced was Mamerta Tan’s purchase in 1975, with no proof of Teresita Tan’s mode of acquisition or the date when her possession began. The testimony of the City Assessor merely referred to tax declarations and did not constitute proof of actual, adverse, and continuous possession. The BL Form No. 700-2A, even if admitted, only showed that Potenciano Abragan requested a survey in 1929; it did not demonstrate that petitioner derived title from him or that there was uninterrupted possession from 1929 onward. Without clear, positive, and convincing evidence of possession since June 12, 1945, the application could not be granted.

Doctrines

  • Regalian doctrine and burden of proof — All lands of the public domain belong to the State. The applicant for registration has the burden to overcome this presumption by incontrovertible evidence that the land is alienable and disposable.
  • Requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 14(1), P.D. No. 1529, in relation to Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 — The applicant must prove by clear, positive, and convincing evidence: (a) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (b) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession has been under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
  • Proof of alienable and disposable character — The applicant must present: (1) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records; and (2) evidence that the land subject of the application falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. A mere certification by the CENRO or PENRO, standing alone, is insufficient.
  • CENRO certification not a public document under Rule 132 — A CENRO or PENRO certification does not constitute a public document within the meaning of Section 19(a) of Rule 132, nor does it fall under the first sentence of Section 23 as an entry in public records. The CENRO is not the legal custodian of the DENR Secretary’s issuances, and its certification is not a certified reproduction of an original record.
  • Belated submission of evidence on appeal — Evidence not formally offered and admitted during trial, and submitted for the first time on appeal without justification, is excluded and cannot be given evidentiary weight.

Key Excerpts

  • “[I]t is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.” — This passage, quoting Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., encapsulates the strict proof required for alienability.
  • “The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.” — This explains why a CENRO certification, without the underlying approved classification, fails to satisfy the quantum of proof.

Precedents Cited

  • Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008 — Followed: held that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land; the applicant must prove the DENR Secretary’s approval and present a certified true copy of the original classification.
  • Republic v. Medida, G.R. No. 195097, August 13, 2012 — Followed: further elaborated why CENRO/PENRO certifications are not public documents under Rule 132 and cannot be considered prima facie evidence of alienability.
  • Republic v. Vega, G.R. No. 177790, January 17, 2011 — Cited for the distinction between questions of law and questions of fact in a petition under Rule 45.
  • Republic v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010 — Cited for the requirement that possession must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, and that general statements of possession are insufficient.
  • Republic v. Gomez, G.R. No. 189021, February 22, 2012 — Cited for the rule that evidence not presented in the trial court cannot be considered on appeal.

Provisions

  • Section 14(1), Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Defines who may apply for registration of title, requiring open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
  • Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as amended by P.D. No. 1073 — Parallel provision on judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, imposing the same June 12, 1945 cut-off for possession.
  • Sections 19, 23, and 24, Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence — Govern the definition and admissibility of public documents; used to explain why a CENRO certification does not qualify as a public document or as prima facie evidence of its contents.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno and Justices Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Bienvenido L. Reyes concurred.