Galindez vs. Salamanca-Guzman

In forcible entry cases governed by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, evidence submitted after the court has rendered judgment and not by order for clarification is inadmissible on appeal; additionally, a claimant must prove actual, physical possession of the disputed property — a mere assertion of ownership over an accretion as an incident of riparian rights under Article 457 of the Civil Code is insufficient to establish prior physical possession.

Respondents each owned parcels of titled land in Barangay Palestina, San Jose City, situated along a river. Over time, an area of approximately 9,535 square meters formed adjacent to their lots. Respondents classified this area as accretion belonging to them as riparian owners. In November 2013, petitioners Rolando Galindez and Daniel Liberato entered the land, built a fence, and planted onions. Respondents claimed the entry was effected through strategy and stealth and, after failed barangay conciliation, initiated five forcible entry complaints before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities.

• Nature of the Dispute: Five forcible entry complaints were consolidated. Respondents alleged that in November 2013, petitioners, by strategy and stealth, entered the titled lands and the adjoining accretion, erected a fence, and planted onions, thereby dispossessing respondents. The complaints sought recovery of possession.

• Respondents’ Claim of Ownership and Possession: Each respondent claimed ownership of a specific titled lot in Brgy. Palestina: Heirs of Flora under TCT No. 14996, Guzman under TCT No. (NT-32358) 4526, Collado under TCT No. 12595, Roldan under TCT No. (NT-32358) 4526, and Cariño under TCT No. 12615. They argued that the river’s gradual deposit created an accretion measuring 9,535 sq.m., which, under Article 457 of the Civil Code, belongs to the adjoining riparian owners. They claimed that they and their predecessors had farmed not only the titled lots but also the accretion, and were in continuous possession until dispossession.

• Petitioners’ Defense through Ganado: Petitioners denied that the contested strip was accretion. They traced possession to Vitaliano Ganado, who, in 1967, at the request of Liberato Locquiao, cleared and farmed Locquiao’s adjacent lot. Ganado noticed another area with dense soil, cleared it, and planted vegetables. Beginning in 1975, he hired Rolando Galindez as a farm worker, and later, in 1990, Daniel Liberato, to cultivate the land continuously. The area — the very property claimed by respondents — was sowed with onions and other crops. Petitioners asserted that the November 2013 entry was not a usurpation but a continuation of Ganado’s dominion; fences were erected only after a DENR survey in 2014 to protect the property, and were repeatedly destroyed.

• Barangay Intervention: After the incident, respondents brought the matter to the barangay. During conciliation, Brgy. Captain Rodrigo Mamaed told petitioners to vacate because the accretion belonged to the riparian owners. Galindez, outnumbered, accepted P800.00 from Roldan as payment for his labor, but petitioners did not leave. Certifications to File Action were issued. A blotter entry recorded a separate confrontation where Diosdado Soriano was reportedly threatened.

• Evidence Adduced Before the MTCC:

  • Respondents submitted TCTs, a Sketch Plan by Engr. Bienvenido Magtuto, demand letters, Patunay and Certifications from the Punong Barangay, and judicial affidavits of the respondents themselves, farmer Diosdado Soriano, resident Victoria Dupitas, Brgy. Captain Mamaed, BARC Chairperson Anastacio Santos, Engr. Magtuto, and Peter V. Santos.
  • Petitioners submitted TCT No. (NT-78186)-5252-A, a Sketch Plan by Engr. Alejandro Lazaro of the DENR, police blotter entries, a Patunay dated July 28, 2014, and the judicial affidavits of Galindez, Liberato, Ganado, former BARC Chairperson Vicente Tangonan, and incumbent BARC Chairperson Anastacio Santos (who also gave an affidavit for respondents).

  • The MTCC dismissed the complaints, finding that respondents failed to prove prior physical possession because they could not describe the area or extent of their alleged possession of the accretion; in contrast, the first Judicial Affidavits of Tangonan and Anastacio credibly corroborated Ganado’s continuous prior possession.

  • Post-Judgment Submissions: A day after respondents filed their notice of appeal, second Judicial Affidavits of Tangonan and Anastacio (both dated November 28, 2014) were filed with the MTCC. These affidavits stated, contrary to the first, that respondents — not Ganado — actually farmed the portions of the accretion adjacent to their respective lots, and that petitioners possessed only the strip beside Locquiao’s property. Handwritten notations indicated copies were furnished only to petitioners’ counsel. On appeal before the RTC, respondents submitted a Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Engr. Magtuto and his undated Certification, in which he identified, for the first time, the specific metes and bounds of the accretion allegedly belonging to each respondent.

  • RTC Ruling: The RTC affirmed the MTCC in toto, holding that the testimonies of respondents and their witnesses were biased, while BARC Chairpersons Tangonan and Anastacio were neutral and more credible. The RTC found it improbable that respondents would have tolerated the large-scale occupation of a 9,535‑sq.m. parcel without immediate protest, and concluded that respondents failed to preponderantly prove prior physical possession.

  • CA Reversal: The Court of Appeals considered all evidence, including the late-filed second Judicial Affidavits and Engr. Magtuto’s Supplemental Affidavit/Certification. The CA held that respondents proved prior physical possession through the barangay certifications (clothed with presumption of regularity), the Sketch Plan, the supplemental engineer’s evidence, and the “clarified” testimonies of the BARC Chairpersons. The CA ordered petitioners to vacate.

• Admissibility of Evidence Submitted After Judgment: Petitioners argued that the second Judicial Affidavits of Tangonan and Anastacio, filed after the MTCC had already decided the case and without a court order for clarification, were inadmissible under Sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Their surreptitious filing — with copies furnished only to petitioners’ counsel — demonstrated an illicit scheme to infect the record.

• Recantation Unworthy of Credence: Petitioners maintained that the second affidavits effectively retracted the affiants’ earlier sworn testimony. Since recantations are viewed with suspicion and easily procured through improper means, the original, uncontradicted testimonies of the BARC Chairpersons should prevail, especially because the MTCC was deprived of the opportunity to assess the retractions’ credibility.

• Respondents’ Failure to Prove Prior Physical Possession: Petitioners contended that respondents’ evidence merely established title to adjacent lots and a claim of accretion under Article 457, but not actual, prior physical possession. Respondents never detailed when they discovered the accretion, how they took possession, or the exact boundaries they occupied. In contrast, Ganado, Galindez, and Liberato gave a coherent, detailed account of clearing, cultivating, and fencing the land from 1967 onward.

• Impermissible Piecemeal Evidence: Petitioners argued that Engr. Magtuto’s Supplemental Affidavit and Certification, offered for the first time on appeal to remedy the MTCC’s finding of lack of specificity, was a piecemeal submission that should have been disregarded.

• Clarificatory Value of the Subsequent Affidavits: Respondents countered that the second Judicial Affidavits of Tangonan and Anastacio were mere clarifications of earlier imprecise statements and properly formed part of the records on appeal; the CA thus committed no error in considering them.

• Presumption of Regularity of Barangay Issuances: Respondents argued that the Patunay and certifications issued by Brgy. Captain Mamaed in the regular performance of his duties enjoyed the presumption of regularity and were more credible than petitioners’ bare denial of possession.

• Possession as Riparian Owners: Respondents insisted that, as titled riparian owners, the accretion belonged to them by operation of law, and their farming activities, as testified to by their witnesses, constituted prior physical possession. The payment of P800.00 by Galindez was an acknowledgment of respondents’ superior right.

• Witness Credibility: Respondents maintained that the trial courts erred in branding their witnesses as biased and in disregarding the consistent account of their actual cultivation; the CA correctly reappreciated the evidence and gave full weight to the barangay captain’s certifications and the geodetic engineer’s findings.

• Admissibility of Late Evidence: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in considering the second Judicial Affidavits of BARC Chairpersons Tangonan and Anastacio and the Supplemental Judicial Affidavit and undated Certification of Engr. Magtuto, all of which were submitted after the MTCC had already rendered its decision and without a clarificatory order.

• Prior Physical Possession: Whether respondents proved, by preponderance of evidence, that they had prior physical possession of the contested 9,535‑square‑meter accretion.

• Admissibility of Late Evidence: The second Judicial Affidavits and Engr. Magtuto’s belated submissions were improperly considered and should have been excluded. Under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the parties must submit all affidavits and evidence together with their position papers within ten days from receipt of the preliminary conference order; additional evidence may be presented only upon court order to clarify material facts. The MTCC had already rendered judgment when these documents were filed, and no clarificatory order was issued. The filing was “highly irregular if not malicious,” lacking any identifying pleading and bearing annotations that copies were furnished only to petitioners’ counsel — suggesting improper collusion. The affidavits effectively retracted earlier testimony; recantations are inherently suspect, and the MTCC was denied any chance to scrutinize the contradictory statements. Engr. Magtuto’s Certification, offered for the first time on appeal to patch a deficiency pointed out by the MTCC, was an impermissible piecemeal submission. All these documents were stripped of probative value.

• Prior Physical Possession: Respondents did not prove prior physical possession. Their evidence established ownership of the titled lots, and they invoked Article 457 as the basis for claiming the accretion, but they failed to adduce proof of actual physical control over the specific contested area. None of the respondents narrated when they discovered the accretion or what specific acts of possession they exercised. They could not identify the metes and bounds of the portions they allegedly occupied. Their possession was asserted only as an incident of title — not as a matter of historical fact. Meanwhile, petitioners, through Ganado’s settled account and the first Judicial Affidavits of Tangonan and Anastacio, demonstrated that Ganado had cleared, cultivated, and maintained the area since 1967, later enlisting Galindez and Liberato as farmhands. The barangay captain’s certifications referred to legal possession as an attribute of ownership, not prior physical possession, and the payment made by Galindez occurred under pressure at the barangay, not as a voluntary acknowledgment. The evidence preponderated in favor of petitioners’ prior de facto possession.

• Strict Application of the Summary Procedure Rules on Evidence — In ejectment cases governed by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the parties must submit the affidavits of all witnesses and all other evidence with their position papers within the prescribed period after the preliminary conference. Additional affidavits or evidence may be admitted only upon order of the court when it finds a need to clarify material facts. Evidence filed after judgment without such order is inadmissible and may not be considered on appeal. The rule prohibits piecemeal presentation of evidence.

• Recantation Viewed with Suspicion — Affidavits of retraction are exceedingly unreliable and are viewed with suspicion; they can easily be secured through intimidation or monetary consideration. Mere retraction does not vitiate the original testimony. A court may consider a recantation only if special circumstances exist, and both the original and subsequent testimonies are carefully compared under the general rules of evidence. Where the retraction is filed after judgment and deprives the trial court of the opportunity to assess credibility, it carries little weight.

• Prior Physical Possession as the Sole Issue in Forcible Entry — In forcible entry, the only issue is prior physical possession de facto. The plaintiff must allege and prove: (a) prior physical possession; (b) deprivation through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and (c) filing of the action within one year from knowledge of dispossession. Ownership or constructive possession, including a claim of accretion under Article 457 of the Civil Code, is neither constitutive of nor a substitute for actual prior possession.

• Preponderance of Evidence Standard — Preponderance of evidence means that the aggregate evidence on one side is superior in weight, credit, and value to that of the other. In determining where preponderance lies, the court may consider all facts and circumstances, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and their personal credibility. A party must rely on the strength of its own evidence, not on the weakness of the opponent’s.

• “[T]he belated submission of the second Judicial Affidavits deprived the MTCC of the opportunity to scrutinize these second Judicial Affidavits vis-à-vis the first Judicial Affidavits, as well as the affiants thereto, in order to test and determine which testimony was more credible and worthy of belief. Therefore, this Court remains reluctant to give weight and credence to the recantation of BARC Chairpersons Tangonan and Anastacio in their second Judicial Affidavits.”

• “Engr. Magtuto’s Certification tends to prove ownership, whereas, the only issue in a case for forcible entry is prior physical possession.”

• “In examining respondents’ judicial affidavits, it becomes very obvious that they referred to the contested property, which they call the ‘accretion,’ always in relation to their respective titled properties. … However, this Court finds it highly significant, if not curious, that none of the respondents were able to narrate how they discovered said ‘accretion’ to their respective properties, or what acts they performed to actually take possession of it.”

• “[T]he only issue in forcible entry cases is the physical or material possession of real property—prior physical possession and not title.”

• Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr., 269 Phil. 225 (1990) — Applied as authority for the exception to the rule that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45; when the factual findings of the CA and the trial courts conflict, the Supreme Court may review the evidence.

• Gajudo v. Traders Royal Bank, 519 Phil. 791 (2006) — Cited for the principle that parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not on the weakness of the opponent’s defense.

• Cansino v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 686 (2003) — Invoked to support the prohibition against piecemeal presentation of evidence.

• People v. P/Supt. Lamsen, 721 Phil. 256 (2013) — Relied upon for the rule that recantations are viewed with suspicion and that mere retraction does not automatically nullify original testimony.

• Mangaser v. Ugay, 749 Phil. 372 (2014) — Enumerated the three requisites of forcible entry and reiterated that the sole issue is prior physical possession.

• Esperal v. Trompeta-Esperal, G.R. No. 229076, September 16, 2020 — Reaffirmed that the only question in a forcible entry case is prior physical possession, not title.

• Article 457, Civil Code — Provides that accretion belongs to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers. The Court acknowledged the provision but held that it does not dispense with the requirement to prove actual prior physical possession in a forcible entry action.

• Sections 8, 9, and 10, Revised Rules on Summary Procedure — These provisions require the submission of all affidavits and evidence with the position papers within ten days from receipt of the preliminary conference order, and allow additional evidence only upon court order to clarify material facts. The Court applied these provisions to exclude post-judgment submissions as inadmissible.

• Section 1, Rule 133, Revised Rules on Evidence — Defines preponderance of evidence and lists factors for determining where the superior weight of evidence lies. The Court applied this standard in concluding that petitioners’ evidence preponderated.

Caguioa (Chairperson), Inting, Dimaampao, and Singh, JJ., concurred.