Gana-Carait vs. COMELEC

A natural-born Filipino who acquires foreign citizenship at birth through the circumstances of birth, and who does not undergo the process of naturalization, is a dual citizen by birth, not a dual citizen by naturalization; consequently, the requirements under Sections 3 and 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 — the taking of an oath of allegiance and the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship — do not apply, and non-compliance therewith cannot be the basis for cancelling a certificate of candidacy on the ground of false material representation.

Petitioner Mariz Lindsey Tan Gana-Carait was born on 25 June 1991 in Makati City to a Filipino father and an American mother. She acquired United States citizenship at birth, as evidenced by a Consular Report of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States of America issued on 23 August 2004. The CRBA expressly stated that she “acquired United States citizenship at birth.” She obtained a US passport in 2010 and used it for international travel until 2018. Before the 2019 elections, she had been elected Barangay Kagawad in 2013 and Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Biñan City, Laguna in 2016. On 17 October 2018, she filed her certificate of candidacy for the same Sangguniang Panlungsod position for the 13 May 2019 National and Local Elections, declaring herself eligible for the office.

• Nature: Petitioner Mariz Lindsey Tan Gana-Carait was born on 25 June 1991 in Makati City to a Filipino father and an American mother. She acquired United States citizenship at birth, as confirmed by a Consular Report of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States of America (CRBA) issued on 23 August 2004. The CRBA stated she “acquired United States citizenship at birth.” A US passport was issued to her in 2010, which she used for travel to and from the United States until 2018. She previously won elective office as Barangay Kagawad in 2013 and as Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Biñan City in 2016.
• Filing of CoC: On 17 October 2018, petitioner filed her CoC for Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Lone District of Biñan, Laguna for the 13 May 2019 National and Local Elections, declaring that she was eligible for the office.
• Petitions against petitioner: Respondent Lim filed a petition for disqualification on 22 October 2018, alleging petitioner acquired US citizenship and did not make a personal and sworn renunciation of any foreign citizenship before an authorized officer, and that her application for and use of a US passport negated her claim of being a Filipino citizen. Respondent Nuñez filed a petition to deny due course to or cancel the CoC on 6 November 2018, asserting that petitioner’s representation of eligibility was false because she is a dual citizen who uses a US passport and did not renounce her foreign citizenship.
• COMELEC First Division findings: The First Division found that petitioner is a dual citizen, being born to a Filipino father and having a CRBA and US passport. However, it ruled she is not a dual citizen at birth but a dual citizen by naturalization. It reasoned that a positive act was performed to acquire US citizenship — the presentation of documentary evidence to the US Consular Service on 23 August 2004. Citing Act 322 of the US Immigration and Nationality Act, it concluded that a parent’s application for naturalization on behalf of a child constitutes naturalization. The Division therefore held R.A. 9225 applicable, requiring petitioner to take an oath of allegiance and personally renounce her US citizenship to qualify as a candidate. Her failure to do so constituted material misrepresentation in her CoC. The petition for disqualification was denied, but the CoC was cancelled and votes cast in her favor were declared stray.
• COMELEC En Banc Resolution: The En Banc affirmed, holding that petitioner’s failure to comply with R.A. 9225 rendered her ineligible and thus she committed material misrepresentation.
• Post-resolution events: Despite the pendency of the petition before the Supreme Court, the COMELEC issued a Certificate of Finality, Entry of Judgment, and Writ of Execution, relying on its own rules deeming En Banc resolutions final after five days without a Supreme Court restraining order. Petitioner’s term of office ended at noon on 30 June 2022.

• Dual citizen by birth, not naturalization: Petitioner argued that she is a dual citizen by birth, having acquired US citizenship at birth without any voluntary positive act on her part. The mere fact that a natural-born Filipino subsequently acquires a foreign citizenship does not automatically bring her within the coverage of R.A. 9225, which contemplates only those who became foreign citizens through the formal process of naturalization. There was no evidence that she personally performed any act to acquire US citizenship.
• CRBA is confirmatory, not naturalization: The presentation of documents to obtain the CRBA is not tantamount to naturalization, which is a distinct, tedious legal process. The CRBA itself confirms she acquired citizenship at birth.
• No material misrepresentation: Because she is a dual citizen by birth, the twin requirements of R.A. 9225 do not apply; her CoC declaration of eligibility was therefore true and not false.

• Acquisition through positive act: The COMELEC contended that petitioner acquired her dual citizenship through a positive act — the application for and approval of her US citizenship and the issuance of the CRBA on 23 August 2004 — and thus she is a naturalized US citizen covered by Section 3 of R.A. 9225.
• Any positive act suffices: Even if petitioner did not personally undergo naturalization proceedings, the voluntariness involved in obtaining the CRBA is a positive act sufficient to place her within the ambit of R.A. 9225, which covers any acquisition of foreign citizenship through a positive act, regardless of who performed it.
• Grave abuse of discretion not present: The COMELEC correctly found material misrepresentation because petitioner declared eligibility without having complied with the oath of allegiance and renunciation required of dual citizens seeking public office, and its ruling was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

• Finality: Whether the COMELEC En Banc Resolution had attained finality, given the timely filing of the petition under the constitutional 30-day period, despite the COMELEC’s own rules deeming it final after five days without a restraining order.
• Mootness: Whether the expiration of petitioner’s term of office rendered the case moot, and if so, whether an exception to the mootness doctrine applies.
• Nature of Dual Citizenship: Whether petitioner is a dual citizen by birth or a dual citizen by naturalization, which determines the applicability of R.A. 9225.
• Application of R.A. 9225: Whether the twin requirements under Sections 3 and 5(2) of R.A. 9225 apply to a natural-born Filipino who acquired foreign citizenship at birth and whose CRBA was issued after the effectivity of the law.
• Material Misrepresentation: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling petitioner’s CoC on the ground of false material representation, given her citizenship status and the requirements of R.A. 9225.

• Finality: The COMELEC En Banc Resolution had not attained finality. The petition was filed within 30 days from notice, as mandated by Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure, particularly Section 8, Rule 23, which purports to make En Banc resolutions final and executory after five days absent a restraining order, cannot override the clear constitutional period. As mere procedural rules, they must yield to substantive law. The proper harmonization is to interpret the COMELEC rule as rendering decisions merely executory — but not final — within that five-day window, allowing a timely Rule 64 petition to prevent finality.
• Mootness: The expiration of petitioner’s term of office rendered the case moot and academic. However, the case falls under the established exception of “capable of repetition yet evading review.” The question of petitioner’s citizenship classification and eligibility for public office will recur should she run again, and the need to clarify the distinction between dual citizens by birth and by naturalization under R.A. 9225 involves a matter of public importance requiring controlling doctrinal guidance.
• Nature of Dual Citizenship: Petitioner is a dual citizen by birth, not by naturalization. The COMELEC’s conclusion to the contrary is manifestly erroneous. First, foreign laws, such as the US Immigration and Nationality Act, cannot be judicially noticed; they must be pleaded and proved as facts under the rules of evidence. Second, even if a positive act was performed in connection with the CRBA, the record shows it was her American parent, not petitioner herself, who undertook it; no evidence indicated petitioner personally petitioned for naturalization. Third, naturalization is the act of adopting a foreigner and clothing an alien with the privileges of a native citizen. It is superfluous and legally absurd for one already a citizen at birth. The CRBA’s plain language states petitioner “acquired United States Citizenship at birth,” and the documentary evidence was presented only to establish that fact. The situation squarely falls under Cordora v. COMELEC, where the Court held that the INS petition process merely confirmed American citizenship acquired at birth, and did not constitute naturalization.
• Application of R.A. 9225: Because petitioner is a dual citizen by birth, the twin requirements of Sections 3 and 5(2) of R.A. 9225 do not apply to her. R.A. 9225 governs exclusively natural-born Filipinos who lost or will lose their Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. Jurisprudence — De Guzman v. COMELEC, Maquiling v. COMELEC, Jacot v. Dal — uniformly holds that the law’s oath of allegiance and renunciation requirements are imposed only on dual citizens by naturalization. Dual citizenship acquired involuntarily by birth is outside the coverage of R.A. 9225; the filing of a CoC itself carries an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship for such individuals.
• Material Misrepresentation: The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner did not commit false material representation in her CoC, because R.A. 9225’s twin requirements did not apply to her, and her declaration of eligibility was therefore not false. Even assuming arguendo that she were covered by R.A. 9225 and failed to renounce her US citizenship, such failure does not affect her status as a Filipino citizen or render her ineligible under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. The renunciation requirement is a condition imposed on the exercise of the political right to seek elective office by naturalized dual citizens; non-compliance does not strip one of Philippine citizenship. It may constitute a ground for disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code (disqualification of those with dual citizenship), but it cannot support a petition to cancel a CoC for false material representation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The petition for disqualification against petitioner was dismissed and not appealed, reinforcing that cancellation was improper.

• Coverage of R.A. 9225 — Dual Citizens by Naturalization Only — Republic Act No. 9225 applies solely to natural-born Filipinos who have lost or will lose their Philippine citizenship by naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. It does not apply to dual citizens by birth, who acquire foreign citizenship involuntarily through the circumstances of birth. Consequently, the twin requirements under Sections 3 and 5(2) — taking an oath of allegiance and making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship — are required only of dual citizens by naturalization who seek elective public office. Dual citizens by birth need not comply; the filing of a certificate of candidacy itself operates as an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. The doctrine reaffirms Cordora v. COMELEC, De Guzman v. COMELEC, and Maquiling v. COMELEC.
• Harmonization of COMELEC Rules on Finality with the Constitution — Section 8, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which treats En Banc resolutions as final and executory if no restraining order is issued by the Supreme Court within five days from receipt, must be harmonized with Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which grant aggrieved parties thirty days from notice to file a petition for certiorari. The proper construction is that the five-day rule renders the COMELEC decision executory but not final; the constitutional 30-day period for seeking judicial review prevails, as procedural rules cannot abridge a substantive right granted by the Constitution.
• Mootness Exception — Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review — A case that has become moot by supervening events, such as the expiration of the term of office, may nonetheless be adjudicated on the merits when the legal issue raised is of paramount public interest and is capable of repetition yet evading review, so as to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public.
• Non-Compliance with R.A. 9225 Renunciation as Disqualification, Not Ineligibility or Material Misrepresentation — A candidate’s failure to renounce foreign citizenship under Section 5(2) of R.A. 9225 does not affect her status as a Filipino citizen or render her ineligible for the office sought under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. The renunciation requirement is a condition on the exercise of the right to seek elective office by naturalized dual citizens, not an element of citizenship. Non-compliance may be a ground for disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code (persons with dual citizenship), but it does not constitute false material representation in the certificate of candidacy that would justify cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

• “R.A. 9225 is applicable only to dual citizens by naturalization and not to dual citizens by birth.” — This statement succinctly captures the ratio decidendi.
• “Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office. Dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.” — Quoting Maquiling, the Court reinforced the operative distinction between the two categories of dual citizenship.
• “Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth.” — From Cordora, applied by analogy to the CRBA’s role in confirming, not conferring, US citizenship.
• “The failure to renounce foreign citizenship as required by Section 5(2), R.A. 9225 does not affect even a naturalized person's status as a Filipino citizen, which is retained or reacquired upon the taking of the oath of allegiance under R.A. 9225—the same oath contained in the CoC. The requirement to renounce foreign citizenship … is merely a condition imposed upon the exercise by a naturalized dual citizen of his political right to seek elective public office, but not upon his status as a Filipino citizen.” — This passage delineates the legal effect of non-renunciation and explains why it does not constitute material misrepresentation.

• Cordora v. COMELEC, 599 Phil. 168 (2009) — Applied as controlling precedent. A candidate born to a Filipino mother and American father who obtained a US passport through a parent’s petition was held to be a dual citizen by birth, not by naturalization; the INS process merely confirmed citizenship acquired at birth. The Court relied on Cordora to hold that petitioner’s CRBA served the same confirmatory function.
• Maquiling v. COMELEC, 709 Phil. 408 (2013) — Cited to distinguish dual citizens by naturalization, who must personally renounce foreign citizenship, from dual citizens by birth, who need not; its formulation of the rule was central to the ruling.
• De Guzman v. COMELEC, 607 Phil. 810 (2009) — Referred to for the two categories of individuals under R.A. 9225, both of whom are natural-born Filipinos who lost or will lose Philippine citizenship by naturalization abroad, confirming that the law does not cover involuntary dual citizens.
• Gunsi, Sr. v. COMELEC, 599 Phil. 223 (2009) — Followed for the rule that expiration of the term renders a case moot, but recognized exceptions; used to frame the mootness analysis.
• Treyes v. Larlar, G.R. No. 232579, 8 September 2020 — Cited to support the principle that rules of procedure must yield to substantive law, applied in harmonizing the COMELEC Rules with the Constitution.

• Sections 3 and 5(2), Republic Act No. 9225 — Section 3 allows retention or reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by natural-born citizens who lost it through naturalization abroad upon taking an oath of allegiance; Section 5(2) requires those seeking elective public office to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the CoC. Applied: these provisions apply only to dual citizens by naturalization, not to petitioner as a dual citizen by birth.
• Section 7, Article IX, 1987 Constitution — States that any decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari within thirty days from receipt. Applied to override the COMELEC’s five-day rule, holding that the constitutional period governs and the assailed resolution had not become final.
• Section 39, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Sets the qualifications for elective local officials, including that the candidate must be a citizen of the Philippines. Applied to hold that petitioner’s non-renunciation of US citizenship did not affect her status as a Filipino citizen, and thus she remained qualified.
• Section 40(d), Local Government Code — Disqualifies persons with dual citizenship from running for elective local positions. Referred to as the proper ground for challenging a dual citizen’s candidacy, not a petition to cancel a CoC for material misrepresentation.

Gesmundo, C.J., Hernando, Zalameda, Gaerlan, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Singh, JJ., concurred. Leonen, SAJ., filed a separate concurring opinion, joined the majority’s interpretation of the rules, and emphasized that the issues, though moot, were proper for resolution due to their recurring nature and public importance. Caguioa, J., filed a separate concurring opinion elaborating on the absence of finality of the COMELEC resolution, the propriety of resolving the merits despite technicalities, and the non-applicability of R.A. 9225 to dual citizens by birth, while also detailing why petitioner’s non-renunciation did not constitute material misrepresentation. Lazaro-Javier, J., filed a concurrence focusing on the definition of naturalization and the absurdity of requiring naturalization for one already a citizen at birth, and on the confirmatory nature of the CRBA. Inting and Kho, Jr., JJ., took no part; M. Lopez, J., was on official leave.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were registered. The separate opinions of Justices Leonen, Caguioa, and Lazaro-Javier reinforced the majority’s core reasoning on the applicability of R.A. 9225 and the procedural harmonization.