Gatchalian vs. Urrutia

A city mayor may validly issue a formal charge and preventive suspension order against an employee of the sangguniang panlungsod for acts of sexual harassment when the misconduct constitutes an offense in the performance of official duties, because Section 455(b)(1)(x) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (and the corresponding city charter provision) expressly vests the mayor with the duty to institute administrative proceedings against any official or employee of the city, thereby creating a statutory exception to the doctrine that the power to remove is implied in the power to appoint.

On December 22, 2011, respondent Romeo V. Urrutia, a Records Officer IV in the Council Secretariat of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Valenzuela City and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the City Government of Valenzuela City Employees Cooperative, allegedly committed acts of sexual harassment against Elizabeth B. Laron, an on-the-job trainee assigned to the cooperative. The complaint reached the Office of the City Mayor, Sherwin T. Gatchalian, who subsequently created a Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI) to try the administrative case. The mayor eventually issued a formal charge for sexual harassment classified as a grave offense and placed Urrutia under preventive suspension. Urrutia challenged the mayor’s disciplinary authority, arguing that as a sanggunian employee he could be disciplined only by the vice-mayor, his appointing authority.

• Nature: Administrative complaint for sexual harassment filed by Elizabeth B. Laron, an on-the-job trainee assigned to the City Government of Valenzuela City Employees Cooperative, against respondent Romeo V. Urrutia, who served both as Chairman of the Cooperative’s Board of Directors and as Records Officer IV in the Council Secretariat of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Valenzuela City.

• The Complaint: On January 3, 2012, Laron lodged a complaint with the Women’s Desk of the City Human Resources and Management Office, alleging that Urrutia committed acts of sexual harassment against her on December 22, 2011. The complaint was indorsed to the Personnel Complaints and Ethics Board (PCEB), which had been constituted earlier as a Committee on Decorum and Investigation. Laron later amended the complaint on January 12, 2012 to include Urrutia’s full name, address, and position, as required by CSC Resolution No. 01-0940 (the Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases).

• PCEB Proceedings and Urrutia’s Objections: Urrutia, instead of filing a counter-affidavit, moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the PCEB was not validly constituted as a CODI under the Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases and that the original complaint failed to state the required details. The PCEB denied the motion in Resolution No. 2012-001 (January 26, 2012) and advised Urrutia to file a counter-affidavit. Urrutia’s motion for reconsideration, which accused the PCEB of losing impartiality and assailed the amended complaint as an afterthought, was also denied.

• Creation of the CODI: On February 15, 2012, Mayor Gatchalian issued Executive Order No. 2012-006, creating the City Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI) on Sexual Harassment Cases to implement Republic Act No. 7877 (the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) and the Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases. The CODI, by Resolution No. 2012-001 dated February 16, 2012, adopted the governing rules and divided itself into CODI-I for preliminary investigation and CODI-II for formal hearing.

• Preliminary Investigation and Recommendation: CODI-I denied Urrutia’s further motion to dismiss and, upon his repeated failure to submit a counter-affidavit, proceeded with preliminary investigation. Because the investigation exceeded the reglementary 15-day period, the members of CODI-I unanimously terminated it. On March 21, 2012, CODI-I submitted an Investigation Report and Recommendation finding a prima facie case of sexual harassment (classified as a grave offense) and recommending the filing of a formal charge and the issuance of a preventive suspension order.

• Formal Charge and Preventive Suspension: On March 23, 2012, the Office of the City Mayor issued a formal charge for sexual harassment (grave offense) and a 60-day preventive suspension order against Urrutia effective March 26, 2012. Urrutia was directed to file an answer under oath and state whether he elected formal investigation.

• Urrutia’s Jurisdictional Challenge: On March 26, 2012, Urrutia filed an urgent omnibus motion for reconsideration, to recall the preventive suspension, and to dissolve the formal charge. He argued that only the vice-mayor, as the appointing authority of sangguniang panlungsod employees under Section 456(a)(2) of the Local Government Code, could discipline him. The CODI denied the motion and proceeded with the formal investigation. Multiple motions by Urrutia to reset the proceedings were resolved by requiring the submission of position papers.

• CODI Decision and Appeal to the CSC: On July 4, 2012, CODI-II issued Resolution No. 2012-008, finding Urrutia liable for sexual harassment as a grave offense and imposing the penalty of dismissal from service. Urrutia’s motion for reconsideration was denied. However, on May 17, 2012, Urrutia had appealed the preventive suspension order to the CSC, questioning the CODI’s creation and jurisdiction. In a Decision dated July 26, 2012, the CSC granted the appeal, declared the formal charge and preventive suspension null and void, and ordered Urrutia’s immediate reinstatement with back salaries, reasoning that only the vice-mayor could discipline a sanggunian employee. The CSC denied the City Government’s motion for reconsideration on November 26, 2012.

• Proceedings before the Court of Appeals: Mayor Gatchalian filed a petition for review with the CA. In the interim, he wrote to the vice-mayor requesting confirmation and adoption of the CODI proceedings, asserting that the vice-mayor’s inaction constituted acquiescence. The CA affirmed the CSC’s ruling on December 11, 2015, holding that the mayor lacked the power to discipline a sanggunian employee. The motion for reconsideration was denied.

• Express Statutory Grant of Disciplinary Authority: Petitioner Gatchalian maintained that Section 455(b)(1)(x) of the Local Government Code expressly mandates the city mayor to cause the institution of administrative proceedings against “any” official or employee of the city who commits an offense in the performance of official duties. He argued that this provision, together with its counterpart in the Valenzuela City Charter (Section 8(b)(1)(jj) of R.A. No. 8526) and Section 87 of the Local Government Code, vests plenary disciplinary authority in the city mayor over all city personnel, including employees of the sangguniang panlungsod, regardless of who appointed them.

• Exception to the Doctrine of Implication: Petitioner contended that the doctrine of implication—whereby the power to appoint carries the power to discipline—applies only absent a contrary statutory provision. He asserted that the Local Government Code and the city charter provide such a contrary provision, thereby displacing any implied disciplinary power of the vice‑mayor over sanggunian employees.

• Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases: Petitioner argued that the CSC Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases designate the head of office or agency as the official responsible for creating the CODI and acting on its recommendation. As the head of the City Government of Valenzuela, he had both the duty and the authority to constitute the CODI and to issue the formal charge and preventive suspension order based on the CODI’s findings.

• Estoppel and Ratification: Petitioner further argued that Urrutia actively participated in the CODI proceedings without timely objection and that the vice-mayor, by failing to intervene or object, acquiesced to the mayor’s actions. Petitioner maintained that Urrutia was therefore estopped from questioning the disciplinary authority belatedly.

• Vice-Mayor’s Exclusive Disciplinary Power under the Doctrine of Implication: Respondent Urrutia countered that as an employee of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, he was appointed by the vice-mayor pursuant to Section 456(a)(2) of the Local Government Code. He invoked the settled principle that the power to remove or discipline is inherent in the power to appoint, arguing that only the vice-mayor could lawfully issue a formal charge and preventive suspension order against him. He insisted that the mayor’s acts constituted an encroachment on the vice-mayor’s appointing authority.

• Invalidity of the CODI and Proceedings: Respondent assailed the constitution and jurisdiction of the CODI created by the mayor, claiming that the Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases had not been complied with and that the entire administrative proceedings were void ab initio for want of disciplinary authority.

• Disciplinary Authority Over Sanggunian Employees in Sexual Harassment Cases: Whether the city mayor may validly issue a formal charge and preventive suspension order against an employee of the sangguniang panlungsod for acts of sexual harassment, in light of the vice-mayor’s power to appoint sanggunian employees under Section 456(a)(2) of the Local Government Code, the doctrine of implication, and the specific provisions of the Local Government Code, the Valenzuela City Charter, and the Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases.

• Disciplinary Authority Over Sanggunian Employees in Sexual Harassment Cases: The city mayor possessed the power to issue the formal charge and preventive suspension order against Urrutia. The general rule that the power to remove is impliedly included in the power to appoint admits of an exception: it applies only “absent any contrary statutory provision.” Here, a clear contrary provision existed. Section 455(b)(1)(x) of the Local Government Code of 1991 explicitly directs the city mayor to “ensure that all executive officials and employees of the city faithfully discharge their duties and functions … and cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the city who may have committed an offense in the performance of his official duties.” The identical duty is reiterated in Section 8(b)(1)(jj) of the Valenzuela City Charter (R.A. No. 8526). The phrase “any official or employee” embraces all city personnel, including those appointed by the vice-mayor, and Urrutia’s sexual harassment, committed while he acted as Chairman of the City Employees Cooperative, constituted an offense in the performance of his official duties. Moreover, Section 87 of the Local Government Code empowers the local chief executive to impose penalties on “subordinate officials and employees under his jurisdiction,” further supporting the mayor’s disciplinary authority. The Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases additionally require the head of office or agency—here, the city mayor—to create the CODI when none exists and to act on its recommendation. Thus, the CODI was properly constituted by the mayor, and the formal charge and preventive suspension order issued pursuant to its recommendation were valid. The CSC and the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying those acts. Because the principal issue of jurisdiction was resolved in the mayor’s favor, the ancillary arguments regarding estoppel and ratification need not be ruled upon.

• Doctrine of Implication (Power to Appoint Includes Power to Remove/Discipline) — The general principle is that the power to remove is impliedly included in the power to appoint. However, this doctrine is not absolute; it yields when a statute expressly vests the power to discipline or remove in an office or authority other than the appointing power. In this case, Section 455(b)(1)(x) of the Local Government Code and the identical provision in the Valenzuela City Charter vest the mayor with the express authority to institute administrative proceedings against “any” city official or employee for offenses committed in the performance of official duties, thereby creating a statutory exception that overrides the vice-mayor’s implied disciplinary power over sanggunian employees.

• Scope of the Exception to the Doctrine of Implication — The exception applies whenever “the power to remove is expressly vested by law in an office or authority other than the appointing power.” The Court recognized that the Local Government Code’s mandate to the mayor to proceed against “any official or employee” is unqualified and extends to employees of the sangguniang panlungsod, regardless of who appointed them, provided the offense occurred in the performance of official duties. The phrase “in the performance of his official duties” was interpreted to include acts connected to the employee’s official functions, such as those performed as chairman of a city employees cooperative.

• “The power to remove is impliedly included in the power to appoint except when such power to remove is expressly vested by law in an office or authority other than the appointing power.” — This passage establishes the governing exception to the doctrine of implication and was central to the Court’s reversal.

• “The law is clear and explicit. In this case, Gatchalian, as the city mayor, had the express power to discipline Urrutia, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the City Employees Cooperative, when he committed Sexual Harassment acts against Laron, in accordance with the Local Government Code and the Charter of Valenzuela City.” — The Court’s unequivocal statement that the mayor’s authority is rooted in express statutory text, not implication, defines the ratio decidendi.

• “The Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases is categorical. The head office or agency is the entity tasked to create the CODI when none is existing or has been constituted. In this case, the head office or agency responsible for creating a CODI is the office of the city mayor, headed by the mayor himself, Gatchalian, which he did.” — This excerpt clarifies the convergence of the local chief executive’s general disciplinary authority with the specific mandate under the Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases.

• Gonzales III v. Office of the President, 694 Phil. 52 (2012) — Cited as authority for the rule that the power to remove is implied in the power to appoint unless a contrary statutory provision exists. The Court used this case to frame the exception that governed the resolution of the petition.

• Section 455(b)(1)(x), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Expressly vests in the city mayor the duty to “cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the city who may have committed an offense in the performance of his official duties.” The Court held that this provision overrides the vice-mayor’s implied disciplinary power and covers all city employees, including those of the sanggunian.

• Section 456(a)(2), Local Government Code of 1991 — Grants the vice-mayor the power to appoint officials and employees of the sangguniang panlungsod. The Court recognized this as the source of Urrutia’s argument but held that the disciplinary power it implies is displaced by the mayor’s express statutory mandate.

• Section 87, Local Government Code of 1991 — Confers on the local chief executive the authority to impose disciplinary penalties on subordinate officials and employees “under his jurisdiction.” The provision reinforced the mayor’s disciplinary power over city employees generally.

• Section 8(b)(1)(jj), Republic Act No. 8526 (Charter of the City of Valenzuela) — Mirrors Section 455(b)(1)(x) of the Local Government Code and confirms the mayor’s duty to ensure faithful discharge of duties and to institute proceedings against any city official or employee who commits an offense in the performance of official duties.

• CSC Resolution No. 01-0940 (Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases), Sections 7 and 12(a) — Require the creation of a Committee on Decorum and Investigation in all government offices and provide that, in the absence of a CODI, the head of office or agency shall immediately cause its creation. The Court used these provisions to affirm that the mayor, as head of the city government, had the obligation and authority to constitute the CODI and to act on its recommendation.

Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J. (Chairperson), Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.