In re Severino Lozano and Anastasio Quevedo

The Supreme Court may punish as criminal contempt the publication of an inaccurate and partial account of a confidential administrative investigation concerning a judge, where the information is obtained surreptitiously in violation of a standing rule of confidentiality and the publication tends to obstruct, embarrass, or influence the pending proceeding. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press does not shield a person from liability when the publication constitutes an abuse or license that interferes with the orderly administration of justice.

An attorney filed a complaint against a Judge of First Instance. The Supreme Court referred the matter to the Attorney‑General for investigation, and the Solicitor‑General was designated to conduct the inquiry. The investigation was held in Capiz, Capiz, behind closed doors, consistent with the Court’s established practice and its Resolution of January 27, 1922, which declared all proceedings for the suspension or removal of judges of first instance confidential in nature until final disposition.

• Nature of the Underlying Proceeding: An administrative complaint was filed by ex‑attorney Jose Y. Torres against Judge Garduño. Pursuant to a resolution of the Supreme Court, the Attorney‑General was directed to investigate, and the Solicitor‑General personally conducted the inquiry in Capiz. The hearing was held behind closed doors, consistent with the Court’s practice and the Resolution of January 27, 1922.

• The Confidentiality Resolution: The Supreme Court’s Resolution of January 27, 1922, provided that “all proceedings looking to the suspension or disbarment of lawyers, and all proceedings looking to the suspension or removal of judges of first instance, shall be considered confidential in nature until the final disposition of the matter.” The resolution was grounded on Section 173 of the Administrative Code, which authorized the Court to adopt rules of procedure for inquiries into the conduct of judges, and was intended to shield respondent judges and lawyers from vindictive or malicious charges pending final outcome.

• The Newspaper Article: On April 29, 1930, the Iloilo‑based newspaper El Pueblo, edited by respondent Severino Lozano, published an article written by respondent Anastacio Quevedo, who was a correspondent and an employee in the office of the judge under investigation. The article, entitled “Notes from Capiz – Investigation of the Charges Against Judge Garduño,” acknowledged that the hearing was held behind closed doors and that the reporter was unable to attend. It further stated that the information was obtained “behind the screen which shut the door of the investigation room” and from “comments offered gratis et amore in social circles.”

• Falsity and Effect of the Publication: The complainant attorney alleged that the facts in the article were “false, malicious, and untrue,” that the report took sides with the respondent judge, and that it expressed an opinion on the merits with the object of influencing the investigator and the public, thereby obstructing or impeding the investigation. The Attorney‑General certified that the newspaper report did not contain a fair and true account of the facts disclosed at the investigation, creating a wrong impression in the mind of the public and tending to influence improperly the Court’s action in the pending matter. The Court accepted the Attorney‑General’s observations as true.

• False and Prejudicial Publication: The Attorney‑General maintained that the article gave a false and unfair account of the confidential investigation, created a wrong public impression, and was calculated to influence improperly the Supreme Court’s action on the pending administrative matter.
• Obstruction of Justice: The complainant attorney argued that the report was malicious, took sides with the respondent judge, and expressed an opinion on the merits with the object of obstructing, embarrassing, or impeding the course of the investigation.

• Good Faith and Ignorance: Editor Severino Lozano pleaded that he acted in good faith, implying a lack of willful intent to violate any rule or to obstruct justice.
• Multiple Defenses: Reporter Anastacio Quevedo raised several grounds, some described by the Court as material and some as puerile, principally relying on his lack of knowledge of the confidentiality resolution and the claimed right to report on matters of public interest.

• Contempt Power Over Confidential Proceedings: Whether the Supreme Court has the power to punish for contempt the editor and reporter of a newspaper who publish an inaccurate and surreptitiously obtained account of a confidential administrative investigation concerning a judge, conducted behind closed doors and covered by a standing rule of confidentiality.
• Scope of Press Freedom: Whether the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press precludes a finding of contempt for such a publication.

• Contempt Power Over Confidential Proceedings: The Supreme Court’s inherent power to punish for contempt, previously affirmed in In re Kelly (35 Phil. 944), extends to administrative proceedings concerning the removal or suspension of judges. The publication of an inaccurate account of a confidential investigation — obtained by eavesdropping and hearsay, in deliberate disregard of the closed‑door nature of the hearing and the Court’s express resolution — tended to obstruct, embarrass, or influence the pending proceeding and therefore constituted criminal contempt. The resolution making the proceedings confidential was a valid exercise of the Court’s rule‑making authority under Section 173 of the Administrative Code, and its violation, whether the respondents knew of it or not, could not be excused when the very article acknowledged the secret character of the hearing.

• Scope of Press Freedom: Freedom of speech and of the press, while guaranteed by the Organic Act, must be protected in its fullest extent but does not extend to license or abuse that interferes with the orderly administration of justice. The publication here was not a fair and true report of a public trial; it was an inaccurate, partial account of a confidential proceeding, obtained through subterranean means, which reflected on the complainant’s disadvantage and attempted to influence the Court. In such a case, the interest in maintaining the integrity and impartiality of the Judiciary and the enforcement of its lawful rules outweighs the claim of press freedom.

• Inherent Contempt Power — The Supreme Court possesses inherent power to punish for contempt, which is indispensable to preserve its authority and the orderly administration of justice. This power extends to both judicial and administrative proceedings, including confidential investigations into the conduct of judges. (Reaffirming In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944.)
• Contempt by Publication of Confidential Proceedings — A newspaper publication that misrepresents testimony, is obtained in violation of a rule requiring confidentiality, and tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence a pending proceeding constitutes criminal contempt. The rule is especially applicable when the proceeding is lawfully conducted behind closed doors and the information is surreptitiously gathered.
• Liberty versus License of the Press — The constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press preserves the right of legitimate publicity but does not sanction license or abuse. A publication that obstructs the administration of justice, violates a valid court rule, and is not a fair and true report of a public proceeding falls outside the protection of the guarantee and may be punished as contempt.

• “The administration of Justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. … This court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self‑defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.” (Quoting U.S. v. Sullens, 36 F. [2d] 230, 238–239; adopted as the controlling principle.)
• “Judicial proceedings, in a case which the law requires to be conducted in secret for the proper administration of justice, should never be, while the case is on trial, given publicity by the press.” (Citing Burns v. State, 145 Wis. 373; applied to support the contempt finding.)
• “The liberty of the citizen must be preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as is the maintenance of a free press, is the maintenance of the Judiciary.”

• In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944 (1916) — Followed as controlling precedent establishing the Supreme Court’s inherent power to punish for contempt.
• Scott v. Scott, [1912] Am. Ann. Cas. 1912‑B, 540 — English case finding contempt for publishing a transcript of proceedings heard in camera; cited to illustrate the stricter English rule.
• State of Iowa v. Dunham, 6 Iowa 245 (1858) — Recognized that a willful violation of a rule prohibiting publication of testimony during an investigation could constitute contempt.
• Re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526 (1893); 21 L.R.A. 755 — Distinguished; contempt was annulled because the report was fair and true and the outcome was influenced by the phrasing of the state law.
• Ex parte Foster, 60 L.R.A. 631 (Tex. Crim. App.) — Distinguished; held that merely publishing a true statement of testimony from a public trial did not authorize contempt.
• Burns v. State, 145 Wis. 373 (1911); 140 Am. St. Rep. 1081 — Cited favorably for the pronouncement that secret judicial proceedings should not be given publicity by the press while pending.
• U.S. v. Sullens, 36 F. [2d] 230 (1929) — Quoted extensively to articulate the balance between freedom of the press and the court’s right to proceed free from obstructive outside interference.

• Section 173, Administrative Code of 1917 — Authorized the Supreme Court to conduct inquiries into the conduct of Judges of First Instance and to adopt such rules of procedure as it may deem proper. This provision supplied the statutory basis for the Resolution of January 27, 1922, declaring the proceedings confidential, and its violation supported the contempt finding.
• The Organic Act (Philippine Bill of 1902 / Jones Law of 1916) — Freedom of Speech and Press Clause — Guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press. The Court interpreted the clause as protecting liberty but not license, and held that the publication in question exceeded the constitutional protection.

Avanceña, C.J., Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa‑Real, JJ., concurred.