Jandayan vs. Ruiz

A decision prepared and signed by a judge before retirement but promulgated after the judge’s retirement is null and void; a judge who has retired ceases to have legal authority to render or promulgate decisions, and any promulgation made thereafter is of no binding effect.

On May 10, 1973 petitioner Dulcisimo Tongco Jandayan was convicted by the Municipal Court of Loay, Bohol of Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and sentenced to three months of arresto mayor. He appealed to the Court of First Instance of Bohol, where the case was raffled to Branch I presided by Judge Paulino Marquez. After trial, Judge Marquez prepared and signed a decision dated June 22, 1973. Meanwhile, Judge Marquez reached the mandatory retirement age and retired from the bench on June 27, 1973. The decision was promulgated not by Judge Marquez but by respondent Executive Judge Fernando S. Ruiz on July 16, 1973, leading to petitioner’s confinement in the provincial jail.

• Criminal Case and Appeal: On May 10, 1973 petitioner Dulcisimo Tongco Jandayan was convicted by the Municipal Court of Loay, Bohol of Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and sentenced to three months of arresto mayor. He appealed to the Court of First Instance of Bohol. The appeal was docketed as Criminal Case No. 706 and raffled to Branch I, presided by Judge Paulino Marquez.

• Decision and Retirement of Judge Marquez: Judge Marquez heard the case and prepared a written decision dated June 22, 1973. The petitioner was notified on June 26, 1973 that the promulgation of the decision would take place on July 6, 1973. Judge Marquez retired from the service on June 27, 1973, having reached the mandatory retirement age.

• Postponement and Promulgation: On motion of petitioner’s counsel, the promulgation was postponed from July 6 to July 12, 1973. On July 16, 1973, respondent Executive Judge Fernando S. Ruiz promulgated the decision dated June 22, 1973 as prepared and signed by Judge Marquez. Petitioner was thereafter confined in the Bohol provincial jail.

• Habeas Corpus and Subsequent Release: Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a combined petition for habeas corpus, certiorari, and mandamus, alleging that his detention was illegal in view of the void promulgation. The Solicitor General, in his comment, agreed that the promulgation was null and void and recommended petitioner’s release. Subsequently, the Chief of Police of Anda, Bohol informed the Court that petitioner had been released on October 5, 1973 after fully serving his sentence. The habeas corpus aspect thus became moot and academic.

• Void Promulgation: Petitioner maintained that the promulgation on July 16, 1973 of the decision signed by Judge Marquez, who had retired on June 27, 1973, was null and void and could not serve as a valid basis for his confinement.

• Illegal Detention: Petitioner argued that his consequent detention was without legal authority, entitling him to the writ of habeas corpus, and further sought certiorari and mandamus to annul the proceedings and compel his release.

• Solicitor General’s Position: The Solicitor General, representing the public respondents, concurred with petitioner that the promulgation by respondent judge of the decision of a retired judge was null and void under settled Supreme Court rulings, and that petitioner should be released.

• Chief of Police: The respondent Chief of Police informed the Court that petitioner had already fully served his sentence and had been released, rendering the habeas corpus petition moot.

• Respondent Judge: The decision does not set forth any detailed argument advanced by respondent Judge Ruiz, although his act of promulgating the decision implied a claim of authority to do so.

• Validity of Promulgation After Judge’s Retirement: Whether the promulgation of a decision by a judge after the retirement of the judge who prepared and signed it is valid and of binding effect.

• Mootness: Whether the petition for habeas corpus had become moot and academic by reason of petitioner’s release after serving his sentence.

• Validity of Promulgation After Judge’s Retirement: The promulgation made by respondent Judge Ruiz on July 16, 1973 of the decision dated June 22, 1973, which was prepared and signed by Judge Marquez who had already retired on June 27, 1973, was null and void. The doctrine traces back to Lino Luna v. Rodriguez, 37 Phil. 186 (1917), and was consistently applied in People v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil. 787 (1956), and Jimenez v. Republic, L-24529, 22 SCRA 622 (1968). Under this doctrine, a judge who has left the bench before promulgation has no legal authority to render a binding decision; the decision acquires no binding effect because the judge was functus officio upon retirement. Consequently, the promulgation could not produce any legal consequence to justify petitioner’s confinement.

• Mootness: The habeas corpus aspect of the petition had been rendered moot and academic by petitioner’s release on October 5, 1973 after fully serving his sentence. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. Despite the mootness, the opinion was issued to remove any doubt that the Supreme Court adheres to the well-settled doctrine on the matter.

• Promulgation After Judge’s Retirement Is Void — A decision signed by a judge cannot be validly promulgated after that judge has retired. The judge ceases to exercise judicial authority upon retirement, and any judgment not yet promulgated before retirement has no binding effect. The act of promulgation after retirement is a nullity. This doctrine, first established in Lino Luna v. Rodriguez (1917), was reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals (1956) and Jimenez v. Republic (1968), and was recognized as controlling in Vera v. People (1970) (though not applied there because of a procedural bar). The rule is anchored on the principle that judicial power terminates upon retirement; a retired judge is functus officio and cannot perform any judicial act that would give life to a decision.

• “We have then that, legally, the decisions of Judge Mañalac were promulgated on July 3, 1954. Wherefore, because he had left the Bench before that date, his decisions have no binding effect.” — People v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil. 787, 790 (1956), quoted with approval to underscore that a retired judge’s decision cannot be given effect.

• “We hold that the decision rendered by the retired Judge Eulogio Mencias cannot be validly promulgated and acquire a binding effect for the same has become null and void under the circumstances.” — Jimenez v. Republic, L-24529, February 17, 1968, 22 SCRA 622, 627, directly applying the rule to facts analogous to the present case.

• “That is all then that this case presents, and it is quite obvious that there was no justification not even a plausible explanation, for the unwarranted action taken by respondent Judge in the face of such compelling juristic norm.” — The Court’s concluding observation emphasizing the clarity of the legal norm.

• Lino Luna v. Rodriguez, 37 Phil. 186 (1917) — The foundational Philippine case establishing that a judge who has left the bench cannot render a valid decision; cited with approval and followed.

• People v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil. 787 (1956) — Applied the Luna doctrine, stating that the decisions of a judge who had retired before promulgation have “no binding effect”; directly controlling.

• Jimenez v. Republic, L-24529, 22 SCRA 622 (1968) — Applied the same rule to facts almost identical to those of the present case, holding that a decision rendered by a retired judge is null and void.

• Vera v. People, L-31218, 31 SCRA 711 (1970) — Recognized the controlling doctrine but held it inapplicable because the petitioners had failed to raise the objection at the trial and appellate levels; cited only to underscore that the Court had no intention of deviating from the principle.

• Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch 241 (1808); Hickey v. Stewart, 3 Howard 750 (1845); United States v. Ferreira, 13 Howard 40 (1851); Ex parte Zellner, 9 Wallace 244 (1869); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); In re Sanborn, 148 U.S. 222 (1892); Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34 (1893) — American Supreme Court decisions cited in support of the Luna doctrine.

• N/A — The decision does not cite or apply a specific statute, rule, or constitutional provision; it rests on established jurisprudential doctrine.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

• None.