Jaylo vs. Sandiganbayan

An accused who fails to appear without justifiable cause at the scheduled promulgation of a judgment of conviction loses the remedies available under the Rules of Court against that judgment, including the filing of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal, and the judgment becomes final. To recover standing, the accused must physically surrender and file a motion for leave of court stating the reasons for the absence within fifteen days from promulgation; failure to do so extinguishes the right to seek any relief from the court.

On 10 July 1990, a joint NBI‑US DEA buy-bust operation targeting an international heroin sale led to the shooting deaths of three persons who turned out to be Philippine military officers. The police operatives involved were charged with murder before the Sandiganbayan. The central factual dispute at trial was whether the officers acted in legitimate self-defense during a lawful arrest or executed the victims after the arrest was secured. After nearly seventeen years of trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a judgment of conviction for homicide. The promulgation of that judgment, and the accused’s absence from it, triggered the procedural controversy that reached the Supreme Court.

The Buy-Bust Operation and Shooting: In June 1990, the US DEA shared intelligence with the NBI regarding an impending large-scale heroin sale. NBI Director Alfredo Lim assigned petitioner Jaylo to lead the buy-bust team, which included US DEA undercover agent Philip Needham posing as a syndicate member. From 3 to 8 July 1990, Needham negotiated with Estella Arrastia, Franco Calanog, and Rolando De Guzman for ten kilos of heroin. The exchange was set for the evening of 10 July 1990 at the Magallanes Commercial Center parking lot.

Needham arrived in a taxicab with Arrastia and undercover NBI operative Philip Manila; the driver was another NBI operative, Romeo Noriega. At the parking lot, Calanog and Avelino Manguera alighted from a blue Volkswagen Beetle, and De Guzman from a brown Saab. Needham examined the heroin in the Volkswagen’s backseat, then returned to the taxicab while executing the prearranged signal—removing his handkerchief and blowing his nose.

The prosecution asserted that after the signal, Jaylo and his team rushed in, surrounded the victims, disarmed them, and forced Calanog and Manguera to lie face down. After another vehicle carrying Needham and US DEA country attaché Andrew Fenrich left safely, Jaylo and his men shot De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera, then waited fifteen minutes before loading them into vehicles under the pretense of bringing them to the hospital.

The defense version was that while the operatives moved in to arrest, a blue-green speeding car appeared with a burst of gunfire, and the three victims simultaneously drew their firearms, forcing Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona, and Habalo to shoot in self-defense. The victims were later identified as Colonel Rolando De Guzman, Major Franco Calanog, and Manguera (Major Calanog’s driver/security aide).

The Elma Committee and Charges: President Corazon Aquino created the Elma Committee under Administrative Order No. 182 to investigate the seizure and shooting. The committee recommended prosecution of Jaylo for the killing of De Guzman, Castro for Calanog, and Valenzona and Habalo for Manguera. Three separate Amended Informations were then filed before the Sandiganbayan, charging all four with conspiracy to commit murder, along with several John Does.

The Sandiganbayan Decision: After trial, the Sandiganbayan found Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona, and Habalo guilty of homicide in a Decision dated 17 April 2007. It held that the parties agreed the accused shot and killed the victims. Conspiracy, treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength were not proven. The defense of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right was rejected: the court found the existence of the distraction vehicle highly doubtful based on material inconsistencies among the testimonies of Manila, Noriega, and Needham, and on the absence of any mention of a speeding car in Jaylo’s incident report.

Promulgation and Post-Judgment Proceedings: Promulgation was scheduled on 17 April 2007. Jaylo was not served notice because he no longer resided at his given address; Valenzona and Habalo were duly notified; Castro had died. None of the accused appeared. The Sandiganbayan promulgated the decision in absentia, cancelled bail, and issued warrants of arrest. On 30 April 2007, counsel filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration solely on behalf of Jaylo, Valenzona, and Habalo. None surrendered, and the motion did not request leave of court to avail of remedies or state reasons for the absence. The Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolutions treating the remedies as forfeited.

• Right to Reconsideration under P.D. 1606 is a Substantive Right: Petitioners contended that Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, which provides for the filing of a motion for reconsideration within fifteen days from promulgation or notice, is a statutory grant of a substantive right. Consequently, Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court cannot operate to diminish, modify, or extinguish that right.

• Conditions of Section 6, Rule 120 Not Met: Petitioners argued that even if the rule applied, the conditions for losing the remedies were not established because Jaylo was not notified of the promulgation schedule, and the Sandiganbayan never determined whether their absence was without justifiable cause.

• Sandiganbayan Obligated to Inquire into the Cause of Absence: According to petitioners, the court was duty-bound to first ascertain that their absence was unjustified before deeming the remedies forfeited.

• Finality of Judgment: The Sandiganbayan maintained that the failure of petitioners to appear without justifiable cause and their subsequent failure to surrender and explain within fifteen days resulted in the loss of remedies, causing the judgment of conviction to become final and executory.

• Procedural Nature of Section 6, Rule 120: The rule does not take away the right to file a motion for reconsideration; it merely regulates the manner in which the right may be exercised following conviction and absence at promulgation. The right remains, but the accused’s standing to invoke it is lost through non-compliance.

• Loss of Remedies: Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly applied Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court in refusing to entertain petitioners’ motion for reconsideration after their failure to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction.
• Substantive vs. Procedural Right: Whether Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court unconstitutionally diminishes, modifies, or abrogates the statutory right to file a motion for reconsideration under Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606.
• Sufficiency of Notice and Determination of Cause: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred by not independently determining whether petitioners’ absence at the promulgation was without justifiable cause before ruling that they had lost their remedies.

• Loss of Remedies: The rules were correctly applied. Under Section 6, Rule 120, an accused who fails to appear at the scheduled promulgation of a judgment of conviction without justifiable cause loses the remedies available in the Rules against that judgment, including a motion for new trial or reconsideration and an appeal. The convicted accused must surrender and file a motion for leave to avail of these remedies within fifteen days from promulgation, stating the reasons for the absence. In Villena v. People, “surrender” was defined as the physical and voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction to suffer the consequences of the judgment. Petitioners neither surrendered nor sought leave of court within the period; the motion for partial reconsideration filed by counsel did not constitute surrender and contained no explanation for the absence. The Sandiganbayan’s decision therefore attained finality fifteen days after 17 April 2007, placing it beyond judicial review.

• Substantive vs. Procedural Right: The petition lacked merit. The right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory privilege, not an absolute guarantee, and must be exercised in accordance with the rules laid down by the Supreme Court. Applying the test in Fabian v. Desierto, a rule is substantive if it creates or takes away a vested right; it is procedural if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right. Section 6, Rule 120 regulates the procedure for invoking the right to reconsideration after conviction and does not abrogate the right itself. It advances the Supreme Court’s constitutional mandate to provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases.

• Sufficiency of Notice and Determination of Cause: The burden rests on the accused to show justifiable cause for their absence. Section 6, Rule 120 explicitly requires the accused to “state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies.” Because petitioners never surrendered or explained their absence within the prescribed period, the absence is presumed unjustified. Jaylo’s failure to receive notice did not constitute justifiable cause, as he had an obligation to file a notice of change of address with the court.

• Effect of Non-Appearance at Promulgation: An accused who fails to appear without justifiable cause at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction loses all remedies available under the Rules of Court against that judgment—specifically a motion for new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal (Rule 122). The judgment becomes final, and the court loses the power to review, modify, or reverse it.

• Surrender Requirement: To regain standing in court, the convicted accused must (1) physically and voluntarily surrender to the jurisdiction of the court, and (2) file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies, stating the reasons for the absence, within fifteen days from the date of promulgation. Filing a motion for reconsideration through counsel alone does not satisfy the surrender requirement.

• Procedural vs. Substantive Rule (Fabian v. Desierto Test): A rule is procedural if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right; it is substantive if it takes away a vested right or creates a right. Section 6, Rule 120 is procedural because it merely regulates the manner in which an accused may exercise the statutory privilege of seeking reconsideration after a conviction.

• Right to Reconsideration as a Statutory Privilege: The filing of a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant or privilege, not an absolute right. It must be exercised strictly in accordance with the conditions laid down in the Rules of Court.

• “When the accused on bail fail to present themselves at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction, they are considered to have lost their standing in court. Without any standing in court, the accused cannot invoke its jurisdiction to seek relief.”

• “Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment.”

• “Unless they surrender and prove their justifiable reason to the satisfaction of the court, their absence is presumed to be unjustified.”

• “The term ‘surrender’ contemplates the act by the convicted accused of physically and voluntarily submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court to suffer the consequences of the judgment against them.”

• Villena v. People, G.R. No. 184091, 31 January 2011 — Followed. Defined “surrender” for purposes of Section 6, Rule 120 and reiterated that the accused must personally submit to the court’s jurisdiction and move for leave to avail of remedies, stating the reasons for absence.

• Fabian v. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787 (1998) — Applied. Provided the test for distinguishing procedural and substantive rules: a rule is procedural if it implements an existing right, and substantive if it creates or removes a vested right.

• People v. Mapalao, 274 Phil. 354 (1991) — Cited. Established that accused who fail to appear at promulgation lose standing in court and cannot invoke its jurisdiction for relief.

• Social Security Commission v. Court of Appeals, 482 Phil. 449 (2004) — Cited. Enunciated that the word “may” in a statutory grant denotes a possibility or privilege that must be exercised in accordance with conditions.

• Section 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court — Governs the promulgation of judgment in criminal cases. It provides that when the accused fails to appear at promulgation without justifiable cause, the promulgation proceeds in absentia, and the accused loses the remedies available under the Rules. The provision also grants a window of fifteen days from promulgation within which the accused may surrender and explain the absence to regain standing.

• Section 7, Presidential Decree No. 1606 — States that a petition for reconsideration of a final order or decision of the Sandiganbayan may be filed within fifteen days from promulgation or notice. This provision was interpreted not as an unqualified substantive right but as a privilege subject to the procedural rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.

• Article VIII, Section 5(5), 1987 Constitution — Grants the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules of procedure for all courts, subject to the limitation that such rules shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The section was invoked to uphold Section 6, Rule 120 as a procedural rule that does not impair substantive rights.

Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Lucas P. Bersamin, Jose Portugal Perez, and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe concurred.

N/A — The decision was unanimous.