Juana Juan Vda. de Molo vs. Luz, Gliceria and Cornelio Molo

A later will that is disallowed for non-compliance with statutory formalities cannot revoke an earlier will, because its revocatory clause is void. Further, where an earlier will is revoked or destroyed in the mistaken belief that a subsequent disposition is valid, and the later disposition fails, the revocation is conditional and ineffective under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation; the prior will remains in full force to give effect to the testator’s intent to die testate.

Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on 24 January 1941 without forced heirs in the ascending or descending line. He was survived by his widow, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by the legitimate children of his deceased brother — Luz, Gliceria, and Cornelio Molo, his niece and nephew. The testator left two wills: one executed on 17 August 1918, and another executed on 20 June 1939. Both instruments instituted the widow as universal heir.

• The Two Wills: Mariano Molo y Legaspi executed a will on 17 August 1918, and another on 20 June 1939. Both wills contained identical testamentary dispositions — the decedent’s wife, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, was instituted as sole and universal heir. No forced heirs survived him in either the ascending or descending line.

• Probate of the 1939 Will Fails: The widow first sought probate of the 1939 will. After an initial order allowing it, the order was set aside on motion of the testator’s niece and nephew, Luz, Gliceria, and Cornelio Molo, who contested its execution. Upon rehearing, the probate court denied probate for failure to prove that the will was executed in accordance with law.

• Petition for the 1918 Will: The widow then petitioned for probate of the 1918 will. Oppositors objected on three grounds: (a) the widow was estopped from seeking its probate after the prior proceeding; (b) the will was not executed with the formalities required by law; and (c) the will had been revoked — both by the revocatory clause in the 1939 will and by deliberate destruction of the original by the testator.

• Evidence of Execution: The will was attested by three witnesses: Lorenzo Morales, Rufino Enriquez, and Angel Cuenca. Morales and Enriquez predeceased the proceedings. The surviving instrumental witness, Angel Cuenca, testified. The notary public who prepared and notarized the will, Juan Salcedo, also testified at the delimited request of the testator. Both witnesses attested in detail to the due execution of the will.

• The Missing Original: The original of the 1918 will was not found among the testator’s papers after the 1939 will was disallowed. Petitioner produced only a duplicate copy. Oppositors maintained that the testator had deliberately destroyed the original, thus effecting revocation.

• Oppositors’ Allegation of Fraud: Appellants argued that the widow deliberately frustrated the probate of the 1939 will — pointing to the testimony of a subscribing witness, Canuto Perez, who left the room while Artemio Reyes signed — and that she failed to impeach that witness or produce Reyes, all to clear the path for the 1918 will.

• Absence of Fraud or Estoppel: Petitioner maintained that the record contained no evidence she had connived to defeat the 1939 will. She argued her failure to impeach Canuto Perez or present Artemio Reyes was explained — no impeaching witnesses could be found, and Reyes’ whereabouts were unknown. She contended that she filed the 1939 petition in good faith and that the reopening of the case, which led to the will’s disallowance, was done at the instance of and over her vigorous opposition to the oppositors.

• Validity of Revocation Governed by Samson vs. Naval: Petitioner invoked the ruling in Samson vs. Naval (41 Phil. 838) — that a subsequent will denied probate for defective execution cannot revoke a prior will because its revocatory clause is void. The facts were asserted to be “on all fours” and therefore controlling.

• Due Execution Proven: Petitioner presented the testimony of one surviving attesting witness, Angel Cuenca, and of the notary public Juan Salcedo, both of whom confirmed compliance with all formalities under the Code of Civil Procedure.

• Fraud and Deliberate Frustration: Oppositors argued that the widow intentionally sabotaged the probate of the 1939 will to secure allowance of the 1918 will, alleging connivance with witness Canuto Perez and withholding of available evidence, including the testimony of Artemio Reyes.

• Estoppel and Unclean Hands: Appellants contended that, having voluntarily prosecuted the 1939 probate to its unsuccessful conclusion, petitioner was estopped from subsequently offering another will. They argued she came to court with “unclean hands” and was not entitled to relief.

• Validity of Revocatory Clause Despite Disallowance: Appellants maintained that the express revocation in the 1939 will took effect immediately upon its execution and did not depend on probate. They urged the Court to abandon Samson vs. Naval and follow a line of American authorities holding that an express revocation in a later will is effective without probate.

• Revocation by Deliberate Destruction: Oppositors argued that the failure to produce the original 1918 will gave rise to a presumption that the testator had deliberately destroyed it with knowledge of the revocatory clause in his 1939 will, thereby revoking the earlier instrument.

• Lack of Due Execution: Appellants assigned as error the finding that the 1918 will had been executed with the formalities required by law.

• Fraud and Deliberate Frustration: Whether the lower court erred in not finding that petitioner deliberately frustrated the probate of the 1939 will to enable probate of the 1918 will.

• Estoppel and Unclean Hands: Whether petitioner was estopped or disqualified by unclean hands from seeking probate of the 1918 will.

• Revocation by Subsequent Invalid Will: Whether the revocatory clause in the disallowed 1939 will effectively revoked the 1918 will.

• Revocation by Destruction of Original: Whether the failure to produce the original 1918 will established that the testator had deliberately destroyed it, thus revoking the will.

• Due Execution: Whether the 1918 will was executed in the manner required by law.

• Fraud and Deliberate Frustration: No evidence supported the charge that petitioner connived to frustrate the 1939 probate. The unfavorable testimony of Canuto Perez and petitioner’s inability to impeach him or produce Artemio Reyes were incidents belonging to the former proceeding and were in any event adequately explained. The reopening and disallowance of the 1939 will occurred despite petitioner’s vigorous opposition; it was the oppositors who caused the reopening. The allegation of bad faith rested on conjecture and was improperly raised in the new and independent probate proceeding.

• Estoppel and Unclean Hands: Petitioner was not estopped from seeking probate of the 1918 will merely because the 1939 will — in which she was also instituted universal heir — was denied probate through no fault of her own. Her conduct reflected a consistent effort to prevent intestacy and protect the testamentary provisions made in her favor by the decedent. No unclean hands were shown.

• Revocation by Subsequent Invalid Will: A subsequent will that is disallowed for failure to comply with statutory formalities is void and cannot operate to revoke a prior will; its revocatory clause is likewise void. This rule, established in Samson vs. Naval (41 Phil. 838), was reaffirmed. The Court declined to abandon it, after examining American authorities in 57 American Jurisprudence and 123 A.L.R., which confirm that a defectively executed will cannot revoke an earlier one. Section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that a revoking “other writing” be executed with testamentary formalities; a will denied probate is not such a writing.

• Revocation by Destruction of Original (Dependent Relative Revocation): No direct evidence showed that the testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will; its absence could be due to misplacement over the twenty-one years that elapsed. Even assuming arguendo that the testator intentionally destroyed it, the destruction was predicated on the mistaken belief that the 1939 will was validly executed and would be effective. Under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, where a testator revokes an earlier will with the intent to substitute a new disposition, and the new disposition fails, the revocation is conditional and does not take effect; the prior will remains in full force. The testator’s consistent designation of his wife as universal heir in two wills left no doubt that he intended to die testate, not intestate.

• Due Execution: The 1918 will was attested by three witnesses as required by law. Although only one instrumental witness, Angel Cuenca, survived, his testimony, corroborated by that of the notary public Juan Salcedo, established that all formalities were observed. Their testimony was found credible and sufficient.

• Samson vs. Naval Rule on Revocation by a Disallowed Will — A subsequent will that is denied probate for non-compliance with statutory formalities is void, and its revocatory clause cannot annul a prior will. The revocatory clause is a testamentary act that lives or dies with the instrument; if the will itself lacks legal existence, the revocation is inoperative. This rule applies even when the later will contains an express revocation clause.

• Dependent Relative Revocation — Where a testator revokes or destroys a prior will with the present intention to substitute a new testamentary disposition, and the new disposition is not made or fails of effect for any reason, the revocation is considered conditional and does not take effect. The failure of the new disposition acts as the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition. The doctrine applies even when the prior will was destroyed under a mistake of law as to the validity of the later instrument. Its underlying rationale is to prevent intestacy and carry out the testator’s fundamental intent to die testate.

• “A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void. (41 Phil., 838.)”

• “The rule is established that where the act of destruction is connected with the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of a new disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remains in full force.”

• “A will which is invalid because of the incapacity of the testator, or of undue influence can have no effect whatever as a revoking will. … Moreover, a will is not revoked by a defectively executed will or codicil, even though the latter contains a clause expressly revoking the former will, in a jurisdiction where it is provided by a controlling statute that no writing other than a testamentary instrument is sufficient to revoke a will, for the simple reason that there is no revoking will.” (Quoting 57 Am. Jur. 328-329, relied upon by the Court.)

• Samson vs. Naval, 41 Phil. 838 — Applied and reaffirmed. The ruling that a will denied probate for defective execution cannot revoke a prior will was held squarely controlling, the facts being “on all fours” and the doctrine still consistent with prevailing American authority.

• Section 618, Code of Civil Procedure — Set forth the formalities required for the execution of wills. The 1939 will’s non-conformity with this section led to its disallowance and rendered it, and its revocatory clause, void.

• Section 623, Code of Civil Procedure — Provided that a will may be revoked by a subsequent will, codicil, or other writing executed as required in the case of wills. Because the 1939 will failed to satisfy Section 618, it did not qualify as a valid subsequent will or “other writing” capable of revoking the 1918 will, even if it contained an express revocation.

Chief Justice Paras, and Justices Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, and Jugo concurred.