Lim, Sr. vs. Felix

Under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, a judge must personally determine probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest; reliance solely on the prosecutor’s bare certification of probable cause, without the records of the preliminary investigation, fails to satisfy the constitutional mandate and constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The judge need not personally examine the complainant and witnesses, but must have before him the report and supporting documents behind the certification and evaluate them to the extent the circumstances require.

Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr., together with his security escorts, was attacked and killed at the Masbate Domestic Airport on March 17, 1989. The incident triggered a politically charged investigation. Criminal complaints for multiple murder and frustrated murder were filed against several individuals, including two Lim mayors, another mayor, and private persons. Preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate, which found probable cause and ordered the arrest of the accused. The records were then forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor, who affirmed the finding of probable cause but filed four separate informations for murder with the Regional Trial Court, recommending no bail. On motion of some accused, the Supreme Court ordered a change of venue from Masbate to Makati to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

• The Airport Ambush: On March 17, 1989, at the Masbate Domestic Airport, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts—Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes—were shot and killed by a lone assailant. Another escort, Dante Siblante, survived with a gunshot wound.

• Preliminary Investigation: After investigation, TSg Harry O. Tantiado of the PC Criminal Investigation Service filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate for multiple murder and frustrated murder against petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim, Mayor Antonio Kho, and several other accused. The MTC conducted a preliminary examination and, by Order dated July 31, 1989, found probable cause and ordered the arrest of the accused, recommending bail of ₱200,000 each. Some accused later secured bail reduction to ₱150,000.

• Prosecutor’s Review and Informations: The records were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane reviewed the case and, on September 22, 1989, affirmed the finding of probable cause but ruled that the accused should be charged with separate murders for each victim and physical injuries for the wounding of Siblante. He filed four informations for murder with a recommendation of no bail. A motion for reconsideration by Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim was denied.

• Change of Venue: On November 21, 1989, petitioners Lim filed with the Supreme Court a verified petition for change of venue. On December 14, 1989, the Court En Banc granted the petition and authorized transfer from the RTC of Masbate to the RTC of Makati to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The cases were raffled to Branch 56, presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.

• Proceedings Before Respondent Judge: Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed several motions and manifestations before Judge Felix, praying in substance for: (1) an order requiring transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary investigation from Masbate so the court could personally determine probable cause, (2) an opportunity to file a motion for preliminary investigation as a matter of right, and (3) permission to file a motion for reduction of bail or for admission to bail if probable cause was later found. They later reiterated their request for a hearing, presenting documents showing that some witnesses had recanted their earlier testimonies. The prosecution opposed all motions.

• Assailed Order: On July 5, 1990, Judge Felix denied the motions and manifestations for lack of merit. The order stated: “Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor’s certification in each information.” Warrants of arrest without bail were issued against petitioners. The records of the preliminary investigation were at all times in Masbate and had not been transmitted to the Makati court.

• Lack of Personal Determination: Petitioners argued that the constitutional mandate requiring the judge to personally determine probable cause was violated because respondent judge relied solely on the prosecutor’s bare certification, without the supporting records of the preliminary investigation, which remained in Masbate.

• Right to Preliminary Investigation and Hearing: Petitioners maintained that they were entitled, as a matter of right, to file a motion for preliminary investigation and to be heard on the existence of probable cause, especially in light of the recantations of key prosecution witnesses.

• Right to Bail: Petitioners contended that if the court later found probable cause, they should at least be given the opportunity to seek bail or its reduction, given the circumstances.

• Sufficiency of Prosecutor’s Certification: Respondent fiscal and judge maintained that the judge could properly rely on the prosecutor’s certification of probable cause, as both the MTC and the Provincial Prosecutor had declared its existence, and the informations were complete and regular on their face. This position was anchored on previous practice under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and early rulings.

• Personal Determination of Probable Cause: Whether a Regional Trial Court judge may issue a warrant of arrest without personally determining probable cause, relying solely on the prosecutor’s bare certification and recommendation, and without having before him the records of the preliminary investigation.

• Personal Determination of Probable Cause: The issuance of the warrants solely on the strength of the prosecutor’s certification, without the records of the preliminary investigation, was a grave abuse of discretion and rendered the warrants void. Under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, the determination of probable cause is a function exclusively and personally vested in the judge. The addition of “personally” and the removal of the authority to delegate the determination to “other responsible officers” underscore that no other person may make the determination. The judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and witnesses in every case; the prosecutor may act as a commissioner for the taking of evidence. However, the judge must have before him the report and supporting documents—affidavits, transcripts, and other evidence—behind the prosecutor’s certification, and must personally evaluate them to satisfy himself that probable cause exists. A bare certification is legally ineffectual. The extent of the examination is within the judge’s sound discretion and may be as cursory or detailed as circumstances demand. In these cases, because the entire records remained in Masbate, the respondent judge had no basis for his personal determination, and consequently committed a grave error. Moreover, the recantations presented by petitioners, which cast doubt on the credibility of prosecution witnesses, should have prompted the judge to go beyond the certification and examine the records to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

• Personal Determination of Probable Cause by the Judge (Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution) — The 1987 Constitution requires that probable cause for a warrant of arrest be determined personally by the judge. The judge no longer has the option to delegate this function to other responsible officers, as was permitted under the 1973 Constitution. To satisfy the requirement: (1) the judge must personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor; (2) if no probable cause is found on that basis, the judge may disregard the prosecutor’s recommendation and require submission of affidavits of witnesses; and (3) the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and witnesses, as the prosecutor’s submission serves a function akin to that of a commissioner. The prosecutor’s bare certification, without the underlying records, is insufficient to support a judicial finding of probable cause.

• Distinction Between Preliminary Investigation and Preliminary Examination — Preliminary investigation proper (to determine whether there is reasonable ground to believe the accused is guilty and should be held for trial) is an executive function belonging to the prosecutor. Preliminary examination (to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest) is a judicial function vested exclusively in the judge. The judge retains the authority to conduct the latter even though RTC judges no longer conduct preliminary investigations under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended.

• Reliance on Prosecutor’s Investigation Records — The judge may rely on evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers, but reliance presupposes that the records have been submitted to and examined by the judge. The warrant issues not on the strength of the certification alone, but because the records sustain the recommendation.

• “Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination. … The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. … By itself, the Prosecutor’s certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor’s certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.”

• “If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.”

• “The extent of the Judge’s personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge’s examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution.”

• Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988) — Followed. The Court reaffirmed that the 1987 Constitution’s addition of “personally” did not require the judge to personally examine the complainant and witnesses; the judge may rely on the prosecutor’s report and supporting documents. The certification is not binding; the judge must personally evaluate the evidence.

• People v. Inting, G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990 — Followed. Reiterated that the determination of probable cause is exclusively for the judge; the prosecutor’s certification alone is ineffectual; only the supporting documents provide a basis for personal determination.

• Castillo v. Villaluz, 171 SCRA 39 (1989) — Followed. Distinguished between preliminary examination (judicial, for warrant issuance) and preliminary investigation proper (executive, for determining whether to file information). The RTC judge retains the former function even after losing the authority to conduct preliminary investigations.

• Placer v. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463 (1983) — Explained. Decided under the 1973 Constitution, it allowed the judge to rely on the fiscal’s certification but emphasized that the judge must still satisfy himself of probable cause and could disregard the certification if unsupported.

• People v. Delgado, G.R. Nos. 93419-32, September 18, 1990 — Followed. Reiterated that reliance on the prosecutor’s certification presupposes that the records of the investigation have been submitted to and examined by the judge.

• Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures and the requirement that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Applied to invalidate the warrants because the judge did not personally determine probable cause, having relied solely on the prosecutor’s bare certification without the supporting records.

• Section 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court — Provides that the judge must issue a warrant of arrest if satisfied from the preliminary examination that the offense has been committed and there is reasonable ground to believe the accused committed it. Read in harmony with the constitutional mandate to require the judge’s personal satisfaction based on evidence, not merely on a certification.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, JJ., concurred. Sarmiento, J., took no part.

None.