Magsino vs. Magsino

An objection to the qualification of an expert witness and to the admissibility of testimony must be raised as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent; a motion to strike made after the witness has completed direct examination, particularly when followed by cross-examination, results in waiver of the objection. An objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time of its formal offer, not at the stage of identification or marking; a motion to suppress filed before formal offer is premature but does not preclude a seasonable objection when the offer is actually made.

Petitioner Ma. Melissa Magsino and respondent Rolando Magsino married in 1997 and had two children. Beginning in 2005, petitioner suspected respondent of sexually molesting their young children after observing them playing with their genitalia and stating that “Papa” had taught them the activity. To protect the minors, she left the conjugal home and took the children to her parents’ residence. In July 2008, respondent filed a petition to fix the rights of the father pendente lite with prayers for a temporary protection order and a hold departure order. Petitioner filed an answer with her own prayer for a protection order. During the proceedings, respondent presented an expert witness to testify on his mental fitness. The witness employed clinical hypnosis to retrieve memories and opined that respondent had not molested the children. Petitioner’s belated objection to that testimony and her premature attempt to suppress a related psychological report gave rise to the procedural dispute resolved in this decision.

• Nature of the Action: Respondent Rolando Magsino filed a petition to fix the rights of the father pendente lite with ancillary prayers for a temporary protection order and a hold departure order. Petitioner Ma. Melissa Magsino opposed and sought her own protection order, alleging sexual abuse of their minor children.
• Allegations of Abuse and Separation: Sometime in 2005, petitioner observed her children, then aged three and two, playing with their genitalia. Upon inquiry, the children answered that “Papa” taught them. Suspecting respondent of sexual molestation, petitioner left the conjugal dwelling and took the children to her parents’ home.
• Presentation of the Expert Witness: During pre-trial, respondent manifested that he would present Dr. Cristina Gates to testify on his mental fitness to exercise parental authority. At the hearing, Gates confirmed her technical qualifications and detailed the methodology used in her psychological evaluation of respondent. She employed clinical hypnosis, a phenomenological-existential study, and a historical-contextual approach. Based on memories retrieved from respondent under hypnotic trance, she opined that respondent could not have molested the minors. She narrated that the children had accidentally witnessed their parents in the act of sexual intercourse on several occasions, an experience that caused them to develop sexual hyperactivity.
• Objection and Cross-Examination: After Gates completed her direct testimony, petitioner’s counsel moved in open court to strike the testimony. Counsel argued that Gates’ expertise had not been established and that any evidence derived from hypnotically-induced recollection was inadmissible. The RTC ruled to retain the testimony but allowed a continuing objection. Counsel then subjected Gates to cross-examination, probing her qualifications and the methodology employed in the hypnotic sessions.
• Motions to Expunge and Suppress: On June 5, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion to Expunge the testimony of Gates, reiterating doubts on her expertise, and a motion to suppress the psychological evaluation report, asserting the inadmissibility of hypnotically-induced evidence. The RTC denied the motion to expunge on the ground of waiver, finding that objection to the witness’s qualifications was not timely raised. The motion to suppress the report was denied as premature because the documentary evidence had not yet been formally offered. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
• Certiorari to the Court of Appeals: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, contending the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA dismissed the petition, holding that the RTC’s denial did not amount to grave abuse: the silence during direct testimony and subsequent cross-examination waived any objection to the expert’s qualifications, and the motion to suppress was improperly brought before the formal offer of the document. Petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court.

• Timeliness of Objection: Petitioner argued that the objection to the testimony was raised as soon as the grounds became reasonably apparent—after direct examination revealed that the expert’s opinions were based on hypnotically-induced recollection and that her expertise was doubtful. Requiring an objection during direct examination, before the full nature of the testimony became clear, was unreasonable.
• Waiver by Cross-Examination: Petitioner maintained that because the objection was made before cross-examination commenced, and the cross-examination only served to reinforce the inadmissibility of the testimony, no waiver occurred.
• Inadmissibility of Hypnotically-Induced Memory: Petitioner contended that testimony derived from hypnotically-induced recollection is inherently unreliable, violates due process and equal protection of law, and should be suppressed regardless of the timing of the objection.
• Motion to Suppress vs. Objection to Offer: Petitioner argued that a motion to suppress is a distinct procedural mechanism from an objection to a formal offer of evidence, and it may properly be filed before the evidence is formally offered; the denial of the motion on the ground of prematurity was therefore erroneous.

• Waiver of Objection: Respondent maintained that petitioner waived any objection to Dr. Gates’ testimony by failing to raise it during direct examination, when the witness detailed her qualifications and methodology, and by proceeding with extensive cross-examination.
• Prematurity of Motion to Suppress: Respondent argued that a motion to suppress documentary evidence cannot be granted before the document is formally offered, and the RTC correctly denied the motion as premature.

• Timeliness of Objection to Oral Testimony: Whether the CA erred in holding that petitioner waived the objection to the expert witness’s testimony by failing to object during direct examination and by cross-examining the witness.
• Prematurity of Motion to Suppress: Whether the denial of the motion to suppress the psychological evaluation report was proper on the ground that evidence may not be objected to before a formal offer.
• Admissibility of Hypnotically-Induced Recollection: Whether testimony derived from hypnotically-induced memory is inadmissible and violates due process and equal protection.

• Timeliness of Objection to Oral Testimony: The objection was not timely made and was therefore waived. Section 36, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires that an objection to a question propounded in oral examination be made as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent. Petitioner should have objected during direct examination, when Gates laid out her qualifications and explained the methodology of her psychological examination. Waiting until after the direct testimony to move to strike constituted an impermissible ambush, wasting judicial time in hearing testimony later claimed to be inadmissible. Furthermore, petitioner’s subsequent cross-examination of Gates reinforced the waiver. The RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to expunge.
• Prematurity of Motion to Suppress: The CA correctly sustained the denial of the motion to suppress. Under Sections 35 and 36, Rule 132, documentary evidence is formally offered after the presentation of testimonial evidence, and objections must be made at the time of that formal offer. The identification and marking of a document does not constitute a formal offer; consequently, a motion to suppress filed before the offer is premature. However, the premature filing did not effect a complete waiver—petitioner could still interpose a seasonable objection when the psychological report was formally offered. The RTC’s denial of the motion did not amount to grave abuse of discretion.
• Admissibility of Hypnotically-Induced Recollection: The Court did not reach the substantive question of whether hypnotically-induced memory is admissible, as the issue was pretermitted by the procedural finding of waiver. The decision emphasized that allowing the testimony does not bind the trial court to accept its probative value. Courts are not bound by expert testimony and may evaluate its weight based on the witness’s qualifications, methodology, possible bias, and other circumstances. No violation of due process was established in light of the procedural default.

• Timely Objection to Oral Evidence — Under Section 36, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, an objection to a question in oral examination must be raised as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent. The rule is designed to prevent a party from lying in ambush and to avoid wasting the court’s time. An objection raised only after the witness has completed direct testimony, especially when followed by cross-examination, is untimely and operates as a waiver of the objection.
• Formal Offer and Objection to Documentary Evidence — Documentary evidence must be formally offered after the presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence, specifying the purpose of the offer (Section 35, Rule 132). An objection to such evidence may be made only at the time of the formal offer, because only then is its purpose disclosed. The identification and marking of a document at an earlier stage do not constitute a formal offer. A motion to suppress filed before the formal offer is premature but does not waive the right to object when the evidence is actually offered.
• Admissibility Distinguished from Probative Value — Admissibility concerns whether evidence may be considered at all; probative value concerns whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Even if evidence is ruled admissible, the trial court is not bound to accept its probative weight. Expert testimony is subject to judicial evaluation, considering the witness’s ability, character, possible bias, methodology, and the reasoning supporting the opinion. The trial court’s appreciation of expert testimony is generally not reviewable absent an abuse of discretion.

• “Objection to oral evidence must be raised at the earliest possible time, that is after the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable issue becomes apparent only after the answer was given.” — This passage encapsulates the strict temporal requirement for objections to testimonial evidence.
• “Petitioner should not have waited in ambush after the expert witness had already finished testifying. By so doing, petitioner did not save the time of the court in hearing the testimony of the witness that after all according to her was inadmissible.” — The Court condemned the tactic of withholding objection until after the direct examination.
• “Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier. Because at that time the purpose of the offer has already been disclosed and ascertained.” — This clarifies the juncture at which opposition to documentary evidence becomes procedurally proper.
• “Admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue.” — The decision reaffirms a foundational distinction in the law of evidence.

• Spouses Tapayan v. Martinez, 804 Phil. 523 (2017) — Followed for the rule that grounds for objections not raised at the proper time are waived, and the proper time for objections to oral testimony is as soon as the grounds become apparent.
• Catuira v. Court of Appeals, 306 Phil. 424 (1994) — Cited for the principle that permitting a witness to testify without timely objection wastes court time and amounts to waiver.
• Westmont Investment Corp. v. Francia, Jr., 678 Phil. 180 (2011) — Applied for the rule requiring objections to oral evidence to be made at the earliest opportunity.
• People v. Lenantud, 405 Phil. 189 (2001) — Relied upon for the doctrine that objections to documentary evidence must be interposed at the time of formal offer, not earlier.
• Macasiray v. People, 353 Phil. 353 (1998) — Distinguished the identification and marking of a document from its formal offer, holding that an objection raised at identification is not equivalent to an objection at formal offer.
• Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 264 Phil. 753 (1990) — Cited to explain that a premature objection to documentary evidence does not foreclose a renewed, seasonable objection at the time of formal offer.
• People v. Basite, 459 Phil. 197 (2003) — Cited for the rule that courts are not bound by expert testimony and may assess its weight based on the circumstances of the case.
• W-Red Construction and Devt. Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 392 Phil. 888 (2000) — Relied upon to distinguish admissibility from probative value.

• Section 35, Rule 132, 1997 Rules of Court — Governs the time for making an offer of evidence: testimonial evidence is offered when the witness is called to testify; documentary and object evidence are offered after the presentation of testimonial evidence. Applied to hold that the psychological evaluation report had not yet been formally offered when the motion to suppress was filed, rendering the motion premature.
• Section 36, Rule 132, 1997 Rules of Court — Prescribes the time for objections: objection to an oral offer must be made immediately after the offer; objection to a question in oral examination must be made as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent. Applied to deem the objection to Dr. Gates’ testimony waived because it was raised only after direct examination, not during her testimony.

Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, and Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando (Additional Member per S.O. No. 2630).