Manila Post Publishing Co. vs. Sanchez

A petition for certiorari will not be entertained unless the alleged error or irregularity was first brought to the attention of the lower court through a motion for reconsideration. This prerequisite, grounded in policy and courtesy rather than explicit statutory command, is firmly established in Philippine remedial law and applies even when questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion are raised.

The Manila Post Publishing Company operated a newspaper, “The Manila Post,” whose regular publication depended on the linotype machines in dispute. The company brought a replevin action against Emeterio Pascual and an unnamed defendant identified later as Eugenio Lopez to recover possession of these and other chattels. After the sheriff seized the chattels, the respondents sought their return by filing a redelivery bond, and the trial judge issued orders that effectively prevented the plaintiff from obtaining physical possession of the machines. Faced with a suspension of its newspaper operations, the company sought immediate relief from the Supreme Court without first asking the trial court to reconsider the contested orders.

• Nature of the action: Petitioner, The Manila Post Publishing Company, commenced a replevin suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 4112) against Emeterio Pascual and John Doe for the recovery of various pieces of personal property listed in an annex. Upon filing a bond of ₱94,000, a writ of replevin was issued, and the sheriff seized the properties. Respondent Eugenio Lopez later identified himself as the John Doe in possession of two linotype machines with accessories.
• Redelivery bond and service: On 2 December 1947, the last day of the five-day period prescribed by section 6 of Rule 62, respondent Lopez filed with the court a redelivery bond in the amount of ₱67,792.62, claiming he had purchased the two linotype machines from Pascual on 25 November 1947. A copy of the bond was served upon petitioner only on 4 December 1947, after the expiration of the statutory period.
• Contested orders of the trial court: On 1 December 1947, the respondent judge set a hearing and ordered the sheriff to desist from delivering the seized chattels to the plaintiff. On 4 December 1947, petitioner filed two urgent motions: one asking for delivery of all seized chattels because no redelivery bond had been timely filed and served, and a supplementary motion specifically addressing the two linotype machines, arguing that Lopez’s bond was served out of time. On 5 December 1947, after hearing argument, the judge issued an order: (a) directing petitioner to file an amended affidavit specifying the value of each item; (b) granting respondents Pascual and Lopez a three-day period to file the corresponding counter-bond for return of the seized items; (c) granting Lopez 15 days to file his answer; and (d) ordering the sheriff to continue withholding delivery to petitioner.
• Direct resort to the Supreme Court: Without filing any motion for reconsideration with the trial court regarding the orders of 1 December and 5 December 1947, petitioner immediately filed the present petition for certiorari, asserting that the orders were issued with excess of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion.

• Mandatory nature of Rule 62, Sections 5 and 6: Petitioner argued that the five-day period for filing and serving a redelivery bond is mandatory and jurisdictional. Because respondents failed to comply strictly with sections 5 and 6, petitioner contended it was entitled as a matter of right to the immediate delivery of the seized chattels, including the two linotype machines, and that the trial judge had no authority to extend the period.
• Grave abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction: Petitioner maintained that the orders of 1 December and 5 December 1947, which disregarded the mandatory statutory timeline and continued to withhold delivery, were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, warranting the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.

• The decision does not discuss the substantive counter-arguments of respondents on the merits because the petition was disposed of on the procedural issue of non-filing of a motion for reconsideration. In the proceedings below, respondent Lopez sought approval of the redelivery bond, substitution as defendant, and return of the machines, presumably asserting that the bond was timely filed and that the equities favored allowing its approval.

• Procedural prerequisite of a motion for reconsideration: Whether a petition for certiorari may be entertained when the petitioner failed to first file a motion for reconsideration with the lower court to bring the alleged errors to its attention.
• Merits of the replevin orders: Whether the lower court’s orders extending the time for a redelivery bond and suspending delivery of the seized property were issued in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. (This issue was not reached.)

• Procedural prerequisite of a motion for reconsideration: The petition was denied because petitioner did not move for reconsideration of the assailed orders in the court below. The consistent practice of the Supreme Court requires that parties give the lower court an opportunity to review and correct its orders before resorting to certiorari. This requirement is grounded on “powerful reasons of policy and courtesy, if not of strict law,” and applies even to alleged irregularities involving questions of law that may affect the validity of the proceedings. The Court invoked its prior rulings in Herrera v. Barretto, Uy Chu v. Imperial, Amante v. Sison, and Bongon v. CFI of Batangas, holding that without a prior motion for reconsideration, a writ of certiorari may not issue.
• Merits of the replevin orders: The Court expressly declined to discuss or resolve the legal grounds invoked by counsel, declaring it unnecessary to do so in light of the procedural bar.

• Motion for reconsideration as prerequisite to certiorari — Before a petition for certiorari may be entertained, the error or irregularity complained of must first be presented to the lower court through a motion for reconsideration, so that the court is afforded an opportunity to correct itself. This doctrine, while not based on an express statutory provision in the Rules of Court, is firmly anchored on considerations of policy and courtesy and has been consistently applied as a condition for the availability of the extraordinary writ. Failure to file such a motion renders the petition premature and subject to outright dismissal.

• “Sin discutir ni resolver los fundamentos legales invocados por los abogados de las partes, por considerarlo innecesario, declaramos que la peticion no puede prosperar por no haberse dado oportunidad al Juez recurrido a que examinara de nuevo el aspecto legal del asunto mediante la presentacion de una mocion de reconsideracion.” (Without discussing or resolving the legal grounds invoked by the parties, deeming it unnecessary, the Court declared that the petition could not prosper because the respondent judge had not been given an opportunity to re-examine the legal aspect of the matter through the filing of a motion for reconsideration.) — This passage constitutes the ratio decidendi.
• “Las mas poderosas razones de politica y de cortesia, si no de derecho estricto, requieren semejante modo de proceder; y no prestamos aliciente a todo intento de acudir a esta Corte sobre cuestiones que el Juez inferior tiene derecho a decidir.” (The most powerful reasons of policy and courtesy, if not of strict law, require such a mode of proceeding; and the Court discourages any attempt to come directly upon questions that the inferior judge has a right to decide.) — Quoted from Herrera v. Barretto, this articulates the policy foundation of the requirement.

• Herrera contra Barretto y Joaquin, 25 Jur. Fil., 253 (1913) — Followed; the foundational case establishing that considerations of policy and courtesy require the lower court to be given an opportunity to reconsider before certiorari will lie.
• Uy Chu contra Imperial y Uy Du, 44 Jur. Fil., 29 (1922) — Followed; reaffirmed the general rule that a writ of certiorari will not issue unless the error was raised in a motion for reconsideration.
• Amante contra Sison y Manzanero, 60 Jur. Fil., 1027 (1934) — Followed; cited in support of the established rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration.
• Bongon contra Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Batangas, 61 Jur. Fil., 912 (1934) — Followed; applied the same rule where questions of law affecting the validity of proceedings were involved, underscoring the necessity of first calling the lower court’s attention to the alleged error.

• Sections 5 and 6, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court (1940) — These provisions govern the return of property seized under a writ of replevin. Section 5 allows the defendant to require return by filing a redelivery bond; Section 6 provides that if within five days after taking the property the defendant does not object to the plaintiff’s bond or require return, or if the defendant’s bond is found insufficient and not replaced, the property shall be delivered to the plaintiff. The Court did not apply or interpret these provisions, as the petition was dismissed on procedural grounds, but they constituted the substantive law underlying the replevin controversy.

• Bengzon and Briones, JJ., conformed.
• Paras and Feria, JJ., concurred in the result.
• Tuason, J., concurred in the result, expressing the view that upon the facts stated in the order appealed from, the petition should be dismissed, indicating that dismissal could also be grounded on the merits.

• Perfecto, J.: Dissented, arguing that the requirement of a prior motion for reconsideration before filing a petition for certiorari is a mere technicality not supported by any provision of the Rules of Court. He emphasized that under Rule 67, the requisites for certiorari are only that the lower tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and that there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. He denounced the compelled motion for reconsideration as an empty ritual incompatible with the injunction to construe the Rules liberally to achieve a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination. He stressed the mandatory character of sections 5 and 6 of Rule 62, the urgent nature of replevin involving chattels easily lost or destroyed, and the severe harm suffered by petitioner — a newspaper forced to cease publication for months because the linotype machines were not returned. He would have granted the petition and ordered the sheriff to deliver the machines to the plaintiff.