Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Briones

A final and executory labor judgment cannot be lawfully altered or modified in any material respect, except to correct clerical errors; any amendatory order issued after finality is void for want of jurisdiction, and execution must conform strictly to the original decree, unless supervening events rendering execution impossible or unjust are clearly and seasonably established—a claim the courts will reject if predicated on a belated, self-serving afterthought.

Liwanag Paras Briones was initially hired by Marcopper Mining Corporation as a probationary warehouse clerk in 1980, became permanent, and was reclassified as a department secretary. Citing severe financial losses from a global recession, Marcopper implemented a two-stage retrenchment program. Briones did not accept early retirement and was forcibly retrenched. Her position was taken by another secretary whose own position had been abolished, despite that other employee having volunteered to retire. Briones protested and refused the separation pay.

• Employment and Retrenchment: Private respondent Liwanag Briones was hired by petitioner Marcopper Mining Corporation as a probationary warehouse clerk on April 28, 1980, became a permanent employee on July 28, 1980, and was reclassified as a department secretary assigned to the warehouse manager on July 1, 1981. Due to a worldwide recession and protracted slump in metal prices, Marcopper incurred debilitating losses and implemented a two-stage retrenchment program. The first stage encouraged senior employees to apply for early retirement with enhanced benefits; the second stage involved forced retrenchment with separation pay of one-half month salary per year of service.
• The Ouster: Briones did not avail of early retirement and was retrenched. Her position was filled by Dalisay Arenas, a former secretary of the resident manager whose own position had been abolished. Arenas had expressed willingness to retire under the program, but Marcopper disapproved her retirement and instead retrenched Briones. Briones refused the tendered separation pay and filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
• Final and Executory Judgment: Labor Arbiter Manzano ruled on October 7, 1983 that there was no valid basis for retrenchment; the selective retention of Arenas over Briones was discriminatory. Reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full backwages, allowances, and monetary benefits from February 5, 1983 until actual reinstatement were ordered. The NLRC affirmed, and the Supreme Court dismissed Marcopper’s first certiorari petition (G.R. No. 71740) for lack of merit on September 2, 1985. The dismissal became final on October 7, 1985.
• Execution and Motion for Recomputation: A writ of execution issued on November 12, 1985, commanding reinstatement and payment of P53,732.25, computed up to October 31, 1985. Marcopper received the writ on December 9, 1985, and three days later filed a motion for recomputation, asserting that reinstatement was impossible because Briones’ position had been abolished during a second retrenchment in February 1985, and that she had secured employment in the office of an assemblywoman. Briones disputed both claims: her position was still held by one Zenaida Echinigue; she had never been employed by the assemblywoman.
• Amendatory Order: Pending the motion, the labor arbiter stayed execution and received evidence. Marcopper submitted a certification from its personnel manager attesting to the abolition. Briones failed to file a position paper. On March 7, 1986, Labor Arbiter Manzano issued an order reconsidering the final decision and directing payment of P66,749.25 as separation pay, allowances, backwages, and 13th month pay in lieu of reinstatement, effectively imposing a cut-off date of December 15, 1985 for backwages.
• NLRC Reversal: Both parties appealed. The NLRC dismissed Marcopper’s partial appeal as late, but sustained Briones’ contention that the amendatory order substantially altered the final and executory decision, in violation of the rule on immutability of judgments. The NLRC vacated the March 7, 1986 order and directed enforcement of the original October 7, 1983 decision in toto.

• Power to Amend on Supervening Facts: Petitioner maintained that a labor arbiter has the power to amend a final order to harmonize it with supervening facts, and that enforcement of the reinstatement directive despite the alleged abolition of Briones’ position and her subsequent employment would result in injustice. It invoked the exception that final judgments may be modified where execution becomes impossible or unjust.
• Validity of Separation Pay Award: Petitioner argued that the labor arbiter correctly ordered separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and limited the economic benefits, in accordance with Section 4, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code and applicable jurisprudence.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner contended that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the labor arbiter’s amendatory order, which was supported by evidence of supervening events.

• Private Respondent (Briones):
  • Immutability of Final Judgments: Briones argued that the amendatory order had no validity because it substantially altered a final and executory judgment, in direct contravention of the well-settled rule on the immutability of final judgments, and effectively constituted deprivation of property without due process of law.
  • Disputed Abolition: She disputed the alleged abolition of her position, asserting that the same position was still being held by one Zenaida Echinigue, and denied having obtained employment in the office of an assemblywoman.
• Public Respondent (NLRC/Solicitor General):
  • Void for Lack of Jurisdiction: The NLRC held, and the Office of the Solicitor General maintained, that the March 7, 1986 order was reversible error because it decreed, on mere motion, the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and a cut-off for backwages, thereby substantially altering the final decision; the amendatory order was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
  • Afterthought and Bad Faith: The Solicitor General stressed that even assuming abolition, Marcopper, being one of the country’s top corporations, could provide a substantially equivalent position. The late invocation of the abolition, coupled with Marcopper’s earlier admission of non-abolition in G.R. No. 71740, demonstrated that the claim was an orchestrated afterthought to defeat Briones’ security of tenure.

• Finality and Modification: Whether a final and executory decision of the NLRC may be materially altered or modified before execution.
• Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter: Whether the labor arbiter had jurisdiction to issue an order awarding separation pay in lieu of reinstatement after the original judgment had become final and executory.
• Supervening Impossibility: Whether the alleged abolition of Briones’ position constituted a supervening event that rendered execution unjust or impossible, so as to justify a deviation from the final judgment.
• Entitlement to Reinstatement: Whether private respondent Briones remained entitled to reinstatement and backwages despite the claim of position abolition.

• Finality and Modification: A judgment that has become final and executory can no longer be amended or corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes. Any material or substantial alteration made after finality is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, and the entire proceedings held for that purpose are void. The amendatory order of March 7, 1986 substituted separation pay for reinstatement and imposed a cut-off for backwages—modifications that were undeniably substantial and therefore void.
• Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter: Once the decision attained finality, the labor arbiter lost jurisdiction over the case except to execute the final judgment. The order of March 7, 1986 was issued without jurisdiction.
• Supervening Impossibility: The alleged abolition of Briones’ position, even if assumed to have occurred in February 1985, was highly questionable. Marcopper brought the matter to the labor arbiter’s attention only in December 1985, nearly ten months later, and had earlier, in its petition in G.R. No. 71740 filed in August 1985, effectively admitted that the position had not been abolished. The claim was a mere afterthought, orchestrated to oust Briones. Consequently, there was no supervening impossibility or injustice that could justify modifying the final judgment.
• Entitlement to Reinstatement: The original finding of illegal dismissal and discrimination, having been affirmed by the Supreme Court, was immutable. Briones’ right to security of tenure could not be defeated by the belated and dubious claim of abolition. Even assuming the position was abolished, Marcopper, as one of the country’s largest corporations, could reinstate her to a substantially equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and privileges. The claim that no equivalent position existed was unmeritorious. Backwages, however, were limited to three years without qualification or deduction, with legal interest, consistent with then-prevailing jurisprudential policy.

• Immutability of Final Judgments — A decision that has become final and executory cannot be amended or corrected in any material or substantial respect, even by the court or tribunal that rendered it. The only permissible alteration is the correction of clerical errors or mistakes. Any material amendment after finality is void for want of jurisdiction, and the entire subsequent proceedings are null and void.
• Loss of Jurisdiction upon Finality — Upon the finality of a judgment, the trial court or labor arbiter loses jurisdiction over the case except for purposes of execution. It may not entertain motions that seek to modify the substance of the final decree.
• Exception: Supervening Events — A final judgment may be modified if facts exist which render execution impossible or unjust; however, the claimed supervening event must be timely raised and clearly established. The assertion will be rejected when it is demonstrably an afterthought, inconsistent with the proponent’s prior representations, or orchestrated to defeat the other party’s rights.
• Three-Year Limit on Backwages — In illegal dismissal cases, backwages may be limited to three years without qualification or deduction, to be computed from the date of dismissal until actual payment, with legal interest. (Applied here as a doctrinal modification of the original award of backwages until actual reinstatement.)

• “Well-settled is the rule that the court has the power to alter or modify or even set aside its own decisions … at anytime before the decision becomes final. A judgment which has become final and executory can no longer be amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes.” — Affirming the bedrock principle of immutability.
• “Once again, We would like to emphasize that a decision which has become final and executory cannot be lawfully altered or modified even by the court which rendered the same especially where the alteration or modification is material or substantial as in this case.”
• “Any amendment or alteration made which substantially affects the final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.”
• “With these facts at hand, the only conclusion is that if ever, the alleged abolition was done only as an afterthought due to petitioner’s determined move to oust respondent Briones.”

• People v. Villanueva, 17 SCRA 272 (1966) — Cited for the principle that a court may alter or modify its decisions at any time before finality.
• Maramba v. Lozano, 20 SCRA 474 — Followed for the rule that after finality, only clerical errors may be corrected.
• Samar v. Montejo, 9 SCRA 419; Dela Cruz v. Plaridel Surety & Insurance Co., 10 SCRA 727; Ocampo v. Caluag, 19 SCRA 971 — Cited seriatim to reinforce that a trial court cannot materially alter a final and executory judgment.
• Macantos v. Guino, 13 SCRA 685 (1965) — Relied upon for the proposition that after finality, the trial court loses jurisdiction except to execute the judgment.

• Section 4, Rule I, Book VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code — Cited by the labor arbiter as basis for ordering separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The Supreme Court did not apply this provision, as the amendatory order itself was void for lack of jurisdiction; the final judgment ordering reinstatement remained controlling.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concurred.