Mariano vs. De Vega

An action for partition by a co-owner does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is recognized; prescription runs only from an express or implied repudiation of the co-ownership that is clearly communicated to the other co-owners. The mere possession of the entire property by one co-owner and the declaration of ownership for tax purposes in the Assessor’s Office, without more, do not constitute such effective repudiation.

Spouses Urbano Panganiban and Roberta Espino owned 29 parcels of unregistered land with improvements in Pulilan, Bulacan, as conjugal property. Roberta died intestate in 1903, leaving Urbano and their two daughters, Mercedes and Gaudencia, as forced heirs. Urbano later contracted a second marriage with Atanacia Agustin and begot children. Urbano died intestate in 1952, survived by the children of Gaudencia (petitioners, the grandchildren from the first marriage) and his children with Atanacia (private respondents). All succeeded as forced heirs to the conjugal estate in undivided shares.

• The Common Ancestors: Urbano Panganiban and Roberta Espino were spouses who owned 29 parcels of unregistered agricultural land in Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan, as conjugal property. Roberta died intestate and without debts on 18 February 1903. She was survived by Urbano and their two legitimate daughters, Mercedes and Gaudencia.
• The Heirs: Urbano later contracted a second marriage with Atanacia Agustin. Mercedes and Gaudencia predeceased Urbano. Upon Urbano’s death on 18 September 1952, intestate and without debts, his compulsory heirs were the children of Gaudencia (petitioners) and his legitimate children with Atanacia (private respondents). Together, they succeeded to the 29 parcels of unregistered land as co-owners in undivided shares.
• Possession and Exclusion: After Urbano’s death, the private respondents (the second family) took possession of all 29 parcels, appropriated the fruits exclusively, and excluded petitioners from the enjoyment of the property. The parcels remained unregistered, but private respondents had placed the lands in their names in the Office of the Provincial Assessor.
• The Complaint: On 19 June 1981—28 years, 9 months and 1 day after Urbano’s death—petitioners filed Civil Case No. 6200-M for partition and delivery of possession. They alleged that they were being deprived of their hereditary shares.
• The Trial Court’s Dismissal: Respondent Judge De Vega, accepting the private respondents’ position, ruled that the action was one to enforce an implied or constructive trust and that, under the prevailing jurisprudence (citing Carontes v. CA and Dela Cerna v. Dela Cerna), the 10-year prescriptive period had already lapsed. The complaint was dismissed without trial on the merits.

• Inapplicability of Prescription Rules on Registered Land: Petitioners argued that the rulings invoked by private respondents involved registered lands, whereas the subject properties were unregistered lands, making the 10-year prescriptive period inapplicable.
• Absence of Repudiation: Petitioners maintained that even assuming a 10-year prescriptive period applied, prescription never commenced to run because private respondents never openly and effectively repudiated the co-ownership or constructive trust.
• Insufficiency of Assessor’s Records: Petitioners contended that the recording of the lands in the private respondents’ names in the Provincial Assessor’s Office did not constitute constructive notice of an adverse claim of ownership sufficient to trigger prescription.
• Timeliness of Action: Petitioners asserted that their partition action remained timely despite the lapse of nearly 29 years, given the nature of their rights as co-heirs.

• Finality of the Order: Respondents contended that the trial court’s order of dismissal had already become final and could no longer be appealed.
• Petitioners’ Theory of Constructive Trust: Respondents argued that petitioners themselves framed their action as one based on an implied or constructive trust, and therefore could not disavow that theory.
• Admissions in the Pleadings: Respondents maintained that petitioners were bound by their own admissions in the complaint, which allegedly confirmed the existence of a trust relationship and the lapse of the prescriptive period.
• Laches and Prescription: Respondents asserted that petitioners slept on their rights for nearly 29 years, and that the 10-year prescriptive period under Section 40 of Public Act No. 190 applied with equal force to unregistered lands.

• Prescription of Partition Action Among Co-owners: Whether the action for partition and delivery of possession filed by petitioners was barred by prescription or laches.
• Nature of the Relationship — Co-ownership vs. Constructive Trust: Whether the parties’ relationship was properly characterized as one of constructive trust (subject to 10-year prescription) or one of co-ownership (to which the rules on imprescriptibility apply absent repudiation).
• Sufficiency of Repudiation: Whether the private respondents’ exclusive possession and the registration of the properties in their names for tax purposes in the Assessor’s Office constituted an effective repudiation of the co-ownership.
• Timeliness of Appeal: Whether the appeal to the Supreme Court was filed out of time.

• Prescription of Partition Action Among Co-owners: The action for partition did not prescribe. Both petitioners and private respondents inherited undivided shares from a common ancestor, making them co-owners. Under Article 494 of the Civil Code, prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against the others so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized. Because no clear repudiation had been communicated by private respondents to petitioners, prescription could not commence.
• Nature of the Relationship — Co-ownership vs. Constructive Trust: The relationship was one of co-ownership, not implied trust. Possession by a co-owner is not exercised on behalf of the others under a trust but in his own behalf as a co-owner. Consequently, the lower court erred in applying the 10-year prescriptive period for enforcement of constructive trusts under Section 40 of Public Act No. 190, and the jurisprudential authorities it cited (Carontes v. CA and Dela Cerna v. Dela Cerna) were inapposite.
• Sufficiency of Repudiation: Neither the exclusive possession of the premises by private respondents nor the record in the Office of the Provincial Assessor sufficed as an express or implied repudiation duly communicated to the petitioners. Co-owners are entitled to possess the premises, and tax declarations standing alone do not constitute clear notice of an adverse claim adverse to the other co-owners.
• Timeliness of Appeal: The appeal was filed on time. The petition was lodged on 5 April 1982, well within the extended period granted by the Supreme Court, which was to expire on 28 April 1982. The trial court’s order had not therefore become final and executory.

• Imprescriptibility of Action for Partition Among Co-owners — An action for partition by a co-owner is imprescriptible so long as the co-ownership subsists. Under Article 494 of the Civil Code, prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs unless there is an express or implied repudiation of the co-ownership clearly communicated to the other co-owners. The requisites for prescription to lie are: (1) an unequivocal act of repudiation of the co-ownership; (2) communication of such repudiation to the other co-owners; and (3) the lapse of the statutory prescriptive period. In this case, the private respondents’ exclusive possession and tax declarations were held insufficient to meet the first two requisites, thus the partition action remained viable despite the lapse of 29 years.
• Distinction Between Co-ownership and Constructive Trust — Where the parties trace their claims to a common ancestor and inherit in undivided shares, the juridical relation is one of co-ownership, not implied or constructive trust. The rule on prescription of actions to enforce a constructive trust in ten years does not apply; instead, the rules on co-ownership govern, rendering the action for partition imprescriptible under the conditions set forth in Article 494.

• "No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership." — This is the controlling provision of Article 494 of the Civil Code, upon which the reversal was anchored.
• "The record in the Office of the Assessor is not the sufficient repudiation and communication contemplated by the law. Neither may the private respondents’ possession of the premises militate against petitioners’ claim. After all, co-owners are entitled to be in possession of the premises." — The passage clarifies the insufficiency of administrative tax records and possession to effect repudiation.
• "The existence of the co-ownership here argues against the theory of implied trust, for then a co-owner possesses co-owned property not in behalf of the other co-owners but in his own behalf." — This distinction was central to rejecting the prescription defense based on constructive trust.

• Carontes v. Court of Appeals, 76 SCRA 514 — Cited by the trial court as authority for the proposition that actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribe in ten years. The Supreme Court found this case inapplicable because the relationship here was one of co-ownership, not constructive trust.
• Dela Cerna v. Dela Cerna, 72 SCRA 514 — Also invoked by the trial court for the same prescriptive rule on constructive trusts. Similarly distinguished on the ground that the case at bar involved a direct co-ownership between co-heirs.

• Article 494, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against fellow co-owners or co-heirs while the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized. Applied to bar the private respondents’ defense of prescription absent clear and communicated repudiation.
• Section 40, Public Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) — Prescribes a 10-year period for actions to enforce an implied or constructive trust. The trial court had relied on this provision in dismissing the complaint, a reliance the Supreme Court held to be erroneous because the case was governed by co-ownership rules, not trust principles.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concurred. Alampay, J., was on leave.