Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals

An action for partition among co-heirs is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches so long as the co-ownership has not been clearly, conclusively, and expressly repudiated by one co-owner and communicated to the others; prescription does not run against a co-owner until such repudiation is established. Further, legitimate filiation may be proved not only by the record of birth or a final judgment, but also by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, and a marriage may be presumed from a couple’s deportment as husband and wife when no contrary evidence is presented.

Lupo Mariategui died intestate on June 26, 1953, leaving properties acquired while he was unmarried. He had contracted three marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, he had four children: Baldomera (predeceased, survived by children surnamed Espina), Maria del Rosario, Urbana, and Ireneo (predeceased, survived by son Ruperto). With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he had one daughter, Cresenciana. With his third wife, Felipa Velasco, whom he married around 1930, he had three children: Jacinto, Julian, and Paulina. Felipa died in 1941. In 1967, the descendants from the first and second marriages executed an extrajudicial partition adjudicating to themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate, eventually obtaining an original certificate of title and later transfer certificates of title after subdivision. The children of the third marriage were excluded from that partition.

• Marriages and Children of Lupo Mariategui: Lupo Mariategui married three times: first to Eusebia Montellano (died 1904), with whom he had four children; second to Flaviana Montellano, producing one daughter; and third to Felipa Velasco around 1930, with whom he had three children—Jacinto (born 1929), Julian (born 1931), and Paulina (born 1938). Felipa died in 1941.
• Death and Estate: Lupo died intestate on June 26, 1953, leaving properties acquired while unmarried, including Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346, and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate.
• Extrajudicial Partition: On December 2, 1967, the descendants of the first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition adjudicating Lot No. 163 to themselves. Voluntary registration proceedings followed, resulting in the issuance of OCT No. 8828 on April 1, 1971, and subsequent subdivision and issuance of transfer certificates of title in their respective names. The children of the third marriage were neither included nor given any share.
• The Complaint: On April 23, 1973, the children of the third marriage filed an amended complaint asserting they were lawful children and heirs of Lupo, that they had been continuously recognized as such, and that they were entitled to inherit shares in the estate. They prayed for partition of all the lots and annulment of the extrajudicial partition. Cresenciana Mariategui Abas and two others were impleaded as unwilling defendants who acknowledged the plaintiffs’ status.
• Evidence of Filiation: No marriage certificate of Lupo and Felipa was presented, but Jacinto testified that his father mentioned their marriage before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal. The couple cohabited and were known in the community as husband and wife. Jacinto presented his birth certificate as a record of birth. Julian and Paulina did not present similar documents but, like Jacinto, continuously enjoyed the status of Lupo’s children. After Felipa’s death in 1941, the children continued to live with Lupo until his death in 1953. An affidavit executed by Cresenciana Mariategui Abas (one of the petitioners) admitted that Jacinto, Julian, and Paulina were “my siblings by our father.”
• Alleged Repudiation: Petitioners’ registration of Lot No. 163 in their names in 1971 was argued to constitute repudiation of co-ownership. However, private respondent Jacinto testified that since 1962 he had been inquiring with petitioner Maria del Rosario about their shares and was assured they would receive some. In 1969, Jacinto even built a house on Lot No. 163 without objection. The private respondents only learned of the registration in 1973 and filed suit approximately two months later.

• Prescription and Nature of Action: Petitioners contended that the complaint was one for recognition of natural children and that the action had prescribed under Article 285 of the Civil Code because it was filed more than four years after the plaintiffs reached majority. They maintained that the right to demand partition was barred by prescription and laches.
• Failure to Prove Filiation: Petitioners argued that private respondents failed to establish their successional rights, emphasizing that no marriage certificate was produced and that Jacinto’s testimony was inconsequential and lacking in substance concerning dates and relatives’ names.
• Repudiation of Co-ownership: Petitioners claimed that the execution of the extrajudicial partition, the subsequent registration of the properties, and the issuance of certificates of title in their names constituted a repudiation of any co-ownership, thereby commencing the prescriptive period against private respondents.

• Nature of Action as Partition: Private respondents argued that their complaint was primarily one for partition and annulment of the extrajudicial partition, with the allegation of filiation raised only as a collateral issue to establish their right to inherit. Thus, it was not an action for recognition subject to the prescriptive period under Article 285.
• Legitimate Filiation: They maintained that they were legitimate children of Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco, whose marriage could be presumed from their continuous cohabitation and public repute. Their filiation was established through Jacinto’s birth certificate and their open and continuous possession of the status of legitimate children.
• Imprescriptibility of Partition: Private respondents countered that an action for partition among co-heirs is imprescriptible and that prescription would run only from a clear and unequivocal repudiation of the co-ownership communicated to them, which had not occurred.

• Nature of Action: Whether the complaint filed by private respondents was an action for recognition of natural children subject to prescription under Article 285 of the Civil Code, or an action for partition of the estate in which filiation was merely a collateral matter.
• Proof of Legitimate Filiation: Whether private respondents sufficiently established their status as legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui, given the absence of a marriage certificate but the presence of a birth certificate and evidence of continuous possession of the status of legitimate children.
• Prescription of Partition Action: Whether the action for partition was barred by prescription or laches, considering the execution of the extrajudicial partition, registration of properties, and the passage of time.

• Nature of Action: The complaint was principally for partition. The allegation of filiation was raised only collaterally to assert successional rights. The relief demanded does not exclusively determine the nature of an action; rather, the facts alleged in the complaint and the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled based on those facts control. Hence, the prescriptive period for actions for recognition of natural children under Article 285 of the Civil Code did not apply.
• Proof of Legitimate Filiation: The legitimate filiation of the private respondents was sufficiently established. The law presumes that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful marriage; no countervailing evidence was adduced to rebut that presumption. Under Article 172 of the Family Code, legitimate filiation may be proved by the record of birth in the civil register or by open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Jacinto’s birth certificate satisfied the first mode, while all three private respondents demonstrated continuous enjoyment of the status of Lupo’s children from birth until his death. A sister’s affidavit acknowledging them as siblings by the same father further corroborated their claim.
• Prescription of Partition Action: The action for partition was not barred. An action for partition among co-heirs is imprescriptible and cannot be defeated by laches unless the co-ownership has been clearly and conclusively repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other co-owners. The registration of the property under the Torrens system, while constructive notice of title, did not ipso facto operate as a valid repudiation of co-ownership. The conditions for effective repudiation—clear repudiation, notice to co-owners, conclusive evidence, and adverse possession for the statutory period—were not met. Moreover, registration was accomplished in fraud of the private respondents, who had been assured of their shares. Prescription could commence only from the discovery of the fraud, and the action was filed barely two months after that discovery.

• Imprescriptibility of Action for Partition — An action to demand partition of a co-owned property is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches. A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the shares of other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership duly communicated to them. An action for partition may also serve as an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion.
• Requisites for Repudiation of Co-ownership — For prescription to terminate co-ownership, the repudiation must be (1) clearly made by a co-owner; (2) clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) proved by clear and conclusive evidence; and (4) accompanied by open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession for the period required by law. Registration under the Torrens system, by itself, does not constitute such repudiation, especially when done in fraud of co-owners. The prescriptive period commences only upon the defrauded co-owner’s discovery of the fraudulent act.
• Presumption of Marriage — A man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful marriage. Courts favor this presumption because marriage is the foundation of society. In the absence of any counter-presumption or contradictory evidence, the presumption must be admitted as a fact.
• Proof of Legitimate Filiation under the Family Code — Under Article 172 of the Family Code, which eliminated the prior fine distinctions among types of illegitimate children, the filiation of legitimate children may be established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register; (2) a final judgment; or (3) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. The presentation of a birth certificate satisfies the first mode, and continuous possession of status independently suffices even without documentation.

• “Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law. … It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud.” — This passage from Adille v. Court of Appeals, quoted with approval, encapsulates the strict standard for repudiation and the limitation on the effect of registration.
• “The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. … Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married.” — This passage from Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, reaffirmed in Alavado, articulates the strong public policy underpinning the presumption of marriage.
• “The relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action.” — This rule, drawn from Baguioro v. Barrios, was used to recharacterize the complaint as one for partition despite allegations touching on filiation.

• Adille v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 455 (1988) — Applied as controlling authority on the requisites for valid repudiation of co-ownership and the commencement of prescription only upon discovery of fraud; the quoted standard was directly adopted.
• Del Banco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 (1987) — Followed for the rule that an action for partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches, and that prescription does not run unless co-ownership is properly repudiated.
• Alavado v. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 (1985) — Followed for the doctrine that courts favor the presumption of marriage and that once a couple has lived as husband and wife unchallenged, the presumption must be admitted as a fact.
• Ceniza v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 552 (1990) — Cited for the proposition that even assuming registration in 1971 constituted repudiation, prescription had not yet set in by the time the partition suit was filed in 1973.
• Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 (1988) — Cited for the rule that the nature of an action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint constituting the cause of action.
• Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989 — Noted for the principle that the case must be decided under the Family Code because the parties were overtaken by events, eliminating distinctions among illegitimate children.

• Article 172, Family Code of the Philippines — Applied as the governing provision for proof of legitimate filiation, allowing proof by the record of birth or by open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
• Section 5(z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court — Invoked as the statutory basis for the presumptions that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful marriage, that a child born in lawful wedlock is legitimate, and that the ordinary course of nature and ordinary habits of life have been followed.
• Article 285, Civil Code of the Philippines — Invoked by petitioners; held inapplicable because the action was not one for recognition but for partition, and because the private respondents were legitimate children, not natural children subject to the prescriptive period therein.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concurred.