Menzon vs. Petilla

A public officer who assumes office under color of a known appointment, exercises the duties thereof, and is acclaimed as such by the public is a de facto officer entitled to compensation for services actually rendered, even if the appointment is subsequently declared invalid. Furthermore, where the Local Government Code is silent on succession to a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor, the President, through the Secretary of Local Government, may make a temporary designation to prevent an interregnum in local governance and ensure continuity of public service.

After the 1988 elections, no Governor had been proclaimed for the province of Leyte due to a pending electoral controversy. On February 16, 1988, the Secretary of Local Government designated Vice-Governor Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting Governor. On March 25, 1988, the same Secretary designated petitioner Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, to act as Vice-Governor. Menzon took his oath of office on March 29, 1988, and performed the duties of the Office of the Vice-Governor for over a year until the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, relying on an opinion from the Undersecretary of Local Government, passed Resolution No. 505 on July 7, 1989, declaring Menzon's designation invalid and withdrawing recognition. The provincial government thereafter refused to pay him the corresponding emoluments.

Designation and Assumption of Office: - On February 16, 1988, Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos designated Vice-Governor Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte because no Governor had yet been proclaimed following the 1988 elections. - On March 25, 1988, Secretary Santos designated petitioner Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior Sangguniang Panlalawigan member, to act as Vice-Governor. - Petitioner took his oath of office on March 29, 1988, before Senator Alberto Romulo and assumed the duties of the Office of the Vice-Governor. He was publicly acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte.

Challenge to the Designation: - On May 29, 1989, Provincial Administrator Tente U. Quintero inquired from Undersecretary of Local Government Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr. about the legality of petitioner's designation. - Undersecretary Rubillar replied on June 22, 1989, that the Local Government Code (B.P. 337) contained no provision on succession to a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor, and that the designation of a temporary Vice-Governor was unnecessary because the Vice-Governor acting as Governor could concurrently perform the functions of both offices. - Relying on this opinion, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution No. 505 on July 7, 1989, declaring petitioner's appointment invalid and withdrawing recognition of him as Acting Vice-Governor.

Efforts at Clarification and Non-Compliance: - Petitioner sought clarification of the June 22, 1989 opinion through his counsel on July 10, 1989. - Undersecretary Rubillar clarified on July 12, 1989, that his earlier opinion did not contradict the Secretary's designation; a designation merely imposes additional duties without constituting succession to office, and the peculiar situation in Leyte warranted the designation. - Regional Director Resurreccion Salvatierra of the Department of Local Government wrote to Acting Governor Petilla on July 17, 1989, and again on August 3, 1989, requesting correction of Resolution No. 505 and payment of petitioner's salary. - The Acting Governor and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan refused to comply with these requests.

Payment and Subsequent Events: - The electoral contest for Governor was eventually resolved, and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed Governor. - On May 16, 1990, Provincial Treasurer Florencio Luna paid petitioner P17,710.00 for actual services rendered as acting Vice-Governor. - Following the Supreme Court's August 28, 1990 resolution dismissing the petition, respondent Petilla requested Governor Larrazabal to direct petitioner to return all emoluments received.

• Entitlement to Emoluments under Good Faith and Equity: Petitioner argued that he was entitled to retain the salary and emoluments received for services actually rendered as acting Vice-Governor under principles of good faith, simple justice, and equity, even if his designation were ultimately held invalid.

• Non-Existence of a Vacancy: Respondents argued that no vacancy existed in the Office of the Vice-Governor because the duly elected Vice-Governor remained in office and could simultaneously perform the functions of both Governor and Vice-Governor.
• Lack of Appointing Authority: Respondents maintained that even if a vacancy existed, the power to appoint an acting Vice-Governor was not vested in the Secretary of Local Government. They claimed that, absent any provision in the Local Government Code on succession to a temporary vacancy, the matter constituted an internal problem of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for it to resolve exclusively.

• Vacancy: Whether a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor arose when the elected Vice-Governor assumed the acting Governorship for an extended period.
• Appointing Authority: Whether the Secretary of Local Government possessed authority to designate an acting Vice-Governor under the circumstances.
• Right to Compensation: Whether petitioner was entitled to retain the emoluments received for services rendered as acting Vice-Governor, even assuming the designation was invalid.

• Vacancy: A vacancy was found to exist. The law on public officers provides that a vacancy occurs whenever there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise the duties of the office. When Vice-Governor Petilla was designated Acting Governor, the Office of the Vice-Governor was left without a legally qualified person to discharge its duties. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor demands a full-time occupant, particularly when the vacancy extends over a prolonged period. There was no satisfactory showing that Petilla simultaneously exercised the duties of both offices. The Secretary of Local Government's decision to appoint an acting Vice-Governor itself indicated the necessity of filling the position.
• Appointing Authority: The Secretary of Local Government possessed authority to make the temporary designation. Although the Local Government Code is silent on succession to a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor, this silence does not imply an absence of remedy. A two-year interregnum resulting from the respondents' interpretation would disrupt delivery of basic services and proper management of local affairs. The President, through the alter ego Secretary of Local Government, may remedy such a situation in the exigency of public service. Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which empower the President to make temporary appointments in case of vacancies, may be applied analogously. As between the President, who exercises supervisory authority over local governments, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan members, who are junior to the Vice-Governor, the power properly resides with the President until the law provides otherwise. Furthermore, the designation was consistent with the intent of Sections 49 and 52 of the Local Government Code to ensure continuity in the performance of the duties of the Vice-Governor. Petitioner, being the Sangguniang Panlalawigan member who obtained the highest number of votes, was the logical choice under the mode of succession prescribed for permanent vacancies.
• Right to Compensation: Petitioner was entitled to compensation as a de facto officer. He assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor under color of a known appointment issued by the alter ego of the President, took his oath of office, and exercised the duties of the office for a substantial period. The respondents themselves acknowledged his appointment and dealt with him as acting Vice-Governor until Resolution No. 505 was passed. Upon principles of public policy underlying the de facto doctrine and basic considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to deny him salary for services actually rendered. The compensation must, however, conform to the proscription against double compensation: petitioner may receive only such additional compensation as, together with his existing salary as Senior Board Member, does not exceed the salary authorized by law for the Office of the Vice-Governor.

• Definition of Vacancy in Public Office — A vacancy exists whenever there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office. Conversely, there is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. Applied here, the Office of the Vice-Governor became vacant when the incumbent assumed the acting Governorship and could not be shown to have simultaneously discharged the duties of both offices.
• De Facto Officer Doctrine — A person who assumes a public office under color of a known appointment, exercises the duties thereof, and is acclaimed as such by the public is a de facto officer. Such an officer is entitled to compensation for services actually rendered, upon principles of public policy and considerations of equity. Even if the appointment were subsequently declared invalid, the salary paid for actual services rendered may be retained. (See Cantillo v. Arrieta, 61 SCRA 55 [1974].)
• Presidential Power to Fill Temporary Vacancies in Local Offices — Where the Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession to a temporary vacancy in a local office, the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government, may make a temporary designation to prevent an interregnum in local governance, in the best interest of public service, and pursuant to the supervisory authority over local governments. Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, though applicable to appointive positions, may be applied by analogy.

• "There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office." — This passage articulates the controlling definition of vacancy in the law of public officers.
• "Upon the principle of public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based and basic considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to now deny him the salary due him for the services he actually rendered . . ." — This encapsulates the ratio decidendi for allowing petitioner to retain compensation.
• "Service to the public is the primary concern of those in the government. It is a continuous duty unbridled by any political considerations." — This passage supports the Court's functional approach to filling vacancies and ensuring continuity of governance.

• Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 326, cited in Mechem, A Treatise on the Law on Public Offices and Officers — Cited as persuasive authority for the definition of vacancy. The Court adopted the principle that a vacancy exists when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise the duties of the office.
• Cantillo v. Arrieta, 61 SCRA 55 (1974) — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that a de facto officer who renders actual service under color of title is entitled to compensation for services rendered.

• Sections 49 and 52, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code) — These provisions prescribe the mode of succession for permanent vacancies in the Office of the Vice-Governor (the Sangguniang Panlalawigan member with the highest number of votes shall assume the office). The Court applied these provisions by analogy to temporary vacancies, noting that the law's intent is to provide continuity in the performance of the Vice-Governor's duties.
• Commonwealth Act No. 588 — Empowers the President to make temporary appointments in certain public offices in case of vacancy. Applied by analogy to support the President's authority, through the Secretary of Local Government, to make temporary designations in local offices where the Local Government Code is silent.
• Revised Administrative Code of 1987 — Similarly cited as supporting presidential authority to make temporary appointments, applied by analogy to the filling of a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concurred.

N/A — The decision was unanimously concurred in by all sitting Justices.