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Mollaneda vs. Umacob

The petition for review was denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the Civil Service Commission’s resolution, was upheld. Respondent, a public school teacher, filed an administrative complaint for sexual harassment against petitioner, her superior, after he allegedly hugged, kissed, and groped her inside an office. The Civil Service Commission, after delegating the reception of evidence to a hearing officer, found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and imposed the penalty of dismissal. Petitioner challenged the proceedings on due process grounds, raised the hearsay character of certain corroborative testimonies, invoked a prior recommendatory resolution of the Department of Education, and later cited his acquittal in a criminal case for acts of lasciviousness. The Supreme Court ruled that the delegation of the hearing did not offend due process because the Commission itself independently weighed the evidence; the testimonies of respondent’s husband and a co‑employee were not hearsay as they were offered to establish that respondent had reported the incident, not to prove the truth of the report; the DECS resolution was merely recommendatory and did not exonerate petitioner; and the criminal acquittal based on reasonable doubt could not foreclose the administrative proceeding, which required only substantial evidence.

Primary Holding

An administrative agency may validly delegate the reception of evidence to a hearing officer, provided the agency itself independently evaluates the evidence and renders the final decision. The requirements of due process are satisfied so long as the respondent is given the opportunity to be heard, present evidence, and confront the evidence against him; he is not entitled to receive a copy of the hearing officer’s internal report or recommendation.

Background

Respondent Leonida Umacob, a public school teacher, sought a transfer to another district in Davao City. She went to the office of petitioner Arnold Mollaneda, the Schools Division Superintendent, to follow up her request armed with a recommendation from the DECS Regional Director. In the morning of 7 September 1994, inside an office at the Division Office Building, an encounter occurred that respondent later described as a sexual assault. She reported the incident to the police, filed an affidavit-complaint for sexual harassment with the Civil Service Commission Regional Office XI, and furnished a copy to the DECS Regional Office. The DECS formed an investigating committee, while the CSC independently pursued the administrative complaint.

History

  1. Respondent filed an affidavit-complaint for sexual harassment with the Civil Service Commission Regional Office XI in September 1994.

  2. On 5 June 1995, the CSC-RO XI issued a resolution finding a prima facie case and charging petitioner with grave misconduct, oppression, abuse of authority, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; it elevated the records to the Civil Service Commission.

  3. The Commission designated Atty. Anacleto Buena as hearing officer; formal hearings were conducted in Davao City with both parties assisted by counsel.

  4. On 7 July 1997, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 973277 finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and imposing the penalty of dismissal with all accessory penalties.

  5. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Commission in Resolution No. 981761.

  6. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48902.

  7. On 14 May 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the CSC resolution in toto. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on 26 August 1999.

  8. Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. During the pendency of the case, the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 5, Davao City, acquitted petitioner of acts of lasciviousness arising from the same incident.

Facts

  • The Complaint: Respondent Leonida Umacob was a public school teacher seeking transfer. On 7 September 1994, she went to the office of petitioner Arnold Mollaneda, the Schools Division Superintendent, to follow up her request. According to respondent, petitioner was seated at the desk of an administrative officer whose office was adjacent to his own, as petitioner’s office was being cleaned. Respondent alleged that after discussing her transfer and receiving a handwritten note for the personnel clerk, petitioner suddenly hugged and embraced her, kissed her nose and lips in a torrid manner, held her neck when she resisted, mashed her left breast several times, and warned her not to tell anyone. She reported the incident to the police the following day and filed an affidavit-complaint with the Civil Service Commission Regional Office XI, furnishing a copy to the DECS Regional Office.
  • Petitioner’s Version: Petitioner denied any act of sexual harassment. He claimed the interview took place entirely inside his own office, which had a glass panel visible from the anteroom. He stated that respondent became angry when he informed her that there were no immediate vacancies and that she would have to wait; she allegedly left muttering that petitioner would regret his discriminatory act. Petitioner presented affidavits of witnesses, who were his subordinates, asserting that they saw no harassment.
  • Administrative Proceedings: The DECS investigating committee recommended the dropping of the case for lack of merit, but the CSC-RO XI found a prima facie case and charged petitioner with grave misconduct, oppression, abuse of authority, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Civil Service Commission designated Atty. Anacleto Buena to receive evidence. During the formal hearing, respondent and her witnesses—her husband Melencio Umacob, and Venus Mariano, a DECS employee—testified. The husband and Mariano recounted what respondent had told them about the incident. Petitioner’s witnesses were also presented and cross‑examined. Subsequently, the Commission found respondent’s testimony “natural, straightforward, spontaneous and convincing” and petitioner’s denial uncorroborated, and it imposed the penalty of dismissal.
  • Criminal Case: Separately, petitioner was charged with acts of lasciviousness. After the Court of Appeals had ruled, the Municipal Trial Court of Davao City acquitted him. Petitioner sought to introduce the acquittal as a supervening event that should exonerate him administratively.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Due Process and Delegation of Hearing: Petitioner maintained that the CSC Commissioners did not personally observe the demeanor of the witnesses and relied solely on the hearing officer’s notes and recommendation; thus, the rule according weight to administrative findings was misapplied. He further contended that he was deprived of due process because he was not furnished a copy of Atty. Buena’s notes and recommendation.
  • Forum-Shopping and the DECS Resolution: Petitioner argued that respondent engaged in forum shopping by filing complaints with both the DECS and the CSC. He insisted that the Court of Appeals should have given exculpatory effect to the DECS committee resolution that recommended dropping the case.
  • Hearsay Testimony: Petitioner asserted that the testimonies of respondent’s husband and Venus Mariano were hearsay, as they merely repeated respondent’s out‑of‑court narration, and should have been excluded.
  • Effect of Criminal Acquittal: Petitioner cited his subsequent acquittal in the criminal case for acts of lasciviousness as a ground to reverse the administrative finding of guilt, arguing that the facts in both cases were identical.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Deference to Administrative Findings: Respondent countered that the Court of Appeals correctly adhered to the principle that factual findings of an administrative agency are entitled to respect, the CSC having been in a better position to assess credibility.
  • No Forum-Shopping: Respondent maintained that she merely furnished a copy of her affidavit-complaint to the DECS for information and sought redress before both the CSC and the courts because she believed they were the proper fora for administrative and criminal complaints, respectively.
  • Probative Value of Witnesses: Respondent argued that her witnesses’ testimonies were not hearsay and that petitioner’s witnesses were biased, being his subordinates in the Division Office.
  • Quantum of Evidence: Respondent implicitly relied on the rule that administrative liability requires only substantial evidence, which the CSC had found to exist.

Issues

  • Due Process: Whether the Civil Service Commission violated petitioner’s right to due process by delegating the reception of evidence to a hearing officer and by not furnishing petitioner with the hearing officer’s notes and recommendation.
  • Forum-Shopping and DECS Resolution: Whether respondent’s act of filing a complaint with the CSC while furnishing a copy to the DECS constituted forum shopping, and whether the DECS recommendatory resolution had the effect of dismissing the administrative charge.
  • Hearsay: Whether the testimonies of respondent’s husband and Venus Mariano, recounting respondent’s narration of the incident, were hearsay and thus inadmissible.
  • Effect of Criminal Acquittal: Whether the subsequent acquittal of petitioner in the criminal case for acts of lasciviousness should result in the dismissal of the administrative case.

Ruling

  • Due Process: The delegation of the reception of evidence to Atty. Buena did not violate due process. An administrative agency may, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, utilize subordinates to receive evidence and submit reports, provided the agency itself makes an independent evaluation of the evidence and renders the final decision. Section 47, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 expressly authorizes the CSC to deputize officials to conduct investigations. The Commission’s resolution contained detailed references to the testimonial and documentary evidence, demonstrating that it personally weighed the evidence rather than merely adopting the hearing officer’s recommendation. Petitioner was not entitled to a copy of the hearing officer’s internal notes and recommendation; the requirements of due process in administrative proceedings are satisfied when the respondent is informed of the charges, given the opportunity to present evidence and confront the evidence against him, and the decision is based on substantial evidence of record. The hearing officer’s report remains an internal and confidential communication between the hearing officer and the deciding authority.
  • Forum-Shopping and DECS Resolution: No forum shopping occurred. Respondent merely furnished the DECS a copy of her complaint; she did not deliberately split her causes of action or seek conflicting relief from different tribunals. Moreover, the DECS committee’s resolution was a mere recommendation to the Regional Director and did not constitute an actual dismissal of the administrative case. A recommendatory resolution advises the disciplining authority but does not bind it and has no dispositive effect.
  • Hearsay: The testimonies of Melencio Umacob and Venus Mariano were not hearsay. They were offered not to prove the truth of the sexual harassment, but to establish the fact that respondent had narrated the incident to them soon after it occurred. When the making of a statement is itself a relevant fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, and the testimony is considered primary evidence. Additionally, the witnesses were present in court and were cross‑examined by petitioner, thereby satisfying the core concern of the hearsay rule.
  • Effect of Criminal Acquittal: The criminal acquittal did not extinguish administrative liability. The dismissal of the criminal case was grounded on the prosecution’s failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Administrative proceedings, by contrast, require only substantial evidence—such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The CSC’s finding that respondent’s testimony was credible and convincing constituted substantial evidence sufficient to uphold petitioner’s administrative culpability, independent of the criminal case’s outcome.

Doctrines

  • Delegation of Hearing in Administrative Proceedings — An administrative agency may delegate the taking of testimony and reception of evidence to subordinate officers or hearing examiners, provided the agency itself independently evaluates the evidence and exercises its own judgment in rendering the decision. The hearing officer’s report is an internal, confidential document; the respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to its disclosure. (Section 47, Book V, E.O. 292; American Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents, 67 SCRA 287; Ruiz v. Drilon, 209 SCRA 695; Pefianco v. Moral, 322 SCRA 439)
  • Independently Relevant Statements Exception to the Hearsay Rule — Testimony recounting an out‑of‑court statement is not hearsay when offered merely to prove that the statement was made, rather than to establish the truth of the matter asserted. The fact of utterance may itself constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant. (People v. Cusi, Jr., 14 SCRA 944; Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 607)
  • Quantum of Proof in Administrative Cases and Independence from Criminal Acquittal — Administrative liability is determined by substantial evidence; an acquittal in a criminal case based on reasonable doubt does not bar a finding of administrative guilt arising from the same facts. (Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, 218 SCRA 1; Vedaña v. Valencia, 295 SCRA 1; Moreno v. Bragat, 293 SCRA 581)
  • Effect of Recommendatory Resolutions — A recommendatory resolution of an investigating committee does not dispose of an administrative case; it merely advises the disciplining authority and is not binding.

Key Excerpts

  • “It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case.” — encapsulating the principle on delegation of hearing.
  • “While it is true that the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made.” — framing the independently‑relevant‑statement rule.
  • “The dismissal of a criminal case against an accused who is a respondent in an administrative case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence does not foreclose the administrative proceeding against him or give him a clean bill of health in all respects.” — affirming the different standards of proof.
  • “A recommendatory resolution does not have the effect of actually disposing of a case. Its function is merely to advise the disciplining authority of what action should be taken… It is not controlling and the disciplining authority may or may not conform with the recommended action.”

Precedents Cited

  • American Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents, 67 SCRA 287 (1975) — Followed; established that the power to decide resides in the agency even if a hearing officer is appointed to receive evidence.
  • Ruiz v. Drilon, 209 SCRA 695 (1992) — Relied upon; held that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of an investigating committee’s findings and recommendation.
  • Pefianco v. Moral, 322 SCRA 439 (2000) — Cited; reaffirmed that an investigating committee’s report is an internal, confidential communication until the deciding authority acts on it.
  • People v. Cusi, Jr., 14 SCRA 944 (1965) — Applied; articulated the hearsay rule exception when testimony is offered to prove the fact of the statement.
  • Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 607 (1997) — Cited; amplified the rule that evidence of the making of a statement is primary and not hearsay when the statement itself is circumstantially relevant.
  • Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, 218 SCRA 1 (1993) — Cited; underscored that an acquittal in a criminal case based on insufficiency of evidence does not preclude administrative liability.
  • Vedaña v. Valencia, 295 SCRA 1 (1998) — Cited; reiterated that administrative proceedings require only substantial evidence.

Provisions

  • Section 47, Book V, Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) — Authorized the Civil Service Commission to deputize any department, agency, or official to conduct an investigation and submit a report with recommendation on the complaint filed against a government official or employee. The provision was the statutory basis for the Commission’s delegation of the hearing to Atty. Buena.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concurred.