Monroy vs. Court of Appeals and Del Rosario

The filing of a certificate of candidacy for an office other than the one an elective official is holding constitutes an automatic and irrevocable resignation from the moment of filing, and a subsequent withdrawal of the certificate does not restore the official to the former post. Furthermore, a de facto officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must account to the de jure officer for whatever amount of salary received during the period of his wrongful retention of the public office.

Roberto R. Monroy was the incumbent municipal mayor of Navotas, Rizal. His certificate of candidacy for the position of representative for the first district of Rizal in the November 1961 elections was filed with the Commission on Elections on September 15, 1961. On September 18, 1961, Monroy filed a letter withdrawing the certificate; the Commission approved the withdrawal. Thereupon respondent Felipe del Rosario, then the vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath as municipal mayor on September 21, 1961, asserting that Monroy had forfeited the mayoralty upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Monroy refused to vacate the office.

• The Filing and Withdrawal of the Certificate of Candidacy: Roberto R. Monroy was the incumbent mayor of Navotas, Rizal. On September 15, 1961, his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming elections was filed with the Commission on Elections. Three days later, on September 18, 1961, Monroy filed a letter withdrawing the certificate. The Commission on Elections approved the withdrawal by resolution.
• Del Rosario’s Assumption of Office: On September 21, 1961, respondent Felipe del Rosario, who was then the vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office as municipal mayor. Del Rosario proceeded on the theory that Monroy had forfeited the mayoralty upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for another office, by operation of Section 27 of the Revised Election Code.
• Petitioner’s Suit and Lower Court Findings: Monroy contested del Rosario’s assumption by filing a suit for injunction. The Court of First Instance of Rizal made the following findings: (a) Monroy had ceased to be mayor upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy on September 15, 1961; (b) del Rosario validly became municipal mayor upon assuming office on September 21, 1961; (c) Monroy must reimburse del Rosario for the salaries that the latter was entitled to receive as mayor from September 21, 1961 until Monroy vacated the office; and (d) Monroy was liable for P1,000.00 as moral damages. The trial court also expressly found, as a matter of fact, that the certificate of candidacy was filed with Monroy’s knowledge and consent. The Court of Appeals affirmed these findings, except that it eliminated the award of moral damages. Monroy’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and the Supreme Court’s review was confined to questions of law.

• Lack of Jurisdiction – COMELEC’s Exclusive Domain: Petitioner contended that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review the resolution of the Commission on Elections approving the withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy. He argued that this was an administrative election question over which the COMELEC had exclusive jurisdiction, subject only to direct review by the Supreme Court.
• Effect of Withdrawal of Certificate: Petitioner maintained that the withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy, duly approved by the COMELEC, rendered the certificate void ab initio and thus precluded any forfeiture of the mayoralty.
• Lack of Knowledge and Consent: Petitioner alleged that the certificate of candidacy was filed without his knowledge and consent, a circumstance that, together with the COMELEC’s approval of its withdrawal, invalidated the certificate for all legal purposes.
• Right to Salaries as De Facto Officer: Invoking Rodriguez v. Tan, petitioner argued that even if he had forfeited the office, he was a de facto officer during the period he continued to occupy the mayoralty after September 15, 1961, and was therefore entitled to retain the salaries and emoluments he had received.

• Jurisdiction of Ordinary Courts: Respondent del Rosario countered that the controversy did not involve an administrative election question but a purely legal dispute over whether the petitioner had forfeited his office. The matter bore no relationship to the conduct of elections and properly fell within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
• Automatic and Permanent Forfeiture: Respondent argued that under Section 27 of the Revised Election Code, the forfeiture of office operated automatically and permanently upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The subsequent withdrawal could not undo the legal effect of the filing.
• De Facto Officer’s Liability for Salaries: Respondent urged that the general rule applied: a de facto officer takes salaries at his risk and must reimburse the de jure officer. The precedent in Rodriguez v. Tan was distinguishable because it involved a proclaimed candidate subsequently ousted by an election protest, not a forfeiture by operation of law.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the ordinary courts had jurisdiction over the dispute, or whether the matter was within the exclusive cognizance of the Commission on Elections as an administrative election question.
• Effect of Withdrawal: Whether the withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy restored petitioner to the office of municipal mayor.
• Liability for Salaries: Whether petitioner, as a de facto officer, is entitled to retain the salaries received during the period he occupied the office after the forfeiture.

• Jurisdiction: The courts properly exercised jurisdiction. The Commission on Elections’ adjudicatory power over administrative questions is confined to matters connected with the “conduct of elections,” i.e., the administrative process of preparing and operating the election machinery. The question of whether petitioner remained mayor after filing a certificate of candidacy—and the permanent legal effects of its subsequent withdrawal—was a purely legal dispute with no bearing on the conduct of the congressional elections. No administrative question or controversy was ever presented to, or resolved by, the Commission. Thus, the ordinary courts possessed cognizance.
• Effect of Withdrawal: The forfeiture of the mayoralty was automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section 27 of the Revised Election Code makes the resignation effective from the moment of filing; it does not make the forfeiture contingent on future events. Under Castro v. Gatuslao, only the date of filing is taken into account, and the withdrawal of the certificate—though approved by the COMELEC—does not render it void ab initio or revive the forfeited office. Furthermore, the lower courts’ factual finding that the certificate was filed with petitioner’s knowledge and consent was binding on the Supreme Court in a certiorari proceeding limited to questions of law.
• Liability for Salaries: The general rule—that a rightful incumbent may recover from a de facto officer the salary the latter received during his wrongful tenure—applied, and petitioner was required to reimburse del Rosario. Rodriguez v. Tan was distinguished: that case involved a proclaimed senator who assumed office and was later ousted by an election protest, a situation governed by a specific precedent allowing the de facto officer to retain compensation. Here, no proclamation or election contest was involved; the vacancy arose by operation of law under Section 27. A de facto officer holds salaries at his risk and must account to the de jure officer, as possession of title, not mere possession of the office, is decisive.

• Automatic Resignation Rule under Section 27, Revised Election Code — An elective provincial, municipal, or city official who files a certificate of candidacy for an office other than the one he is actually holding is considered resigned from the moment of filing. The forfeiture is automatic and permanent; nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. The withdrawal of the certificate does not nullify the resignation, because the law looks solely to the moment and act of filing, not to subsequent contingencies.
• De Facto Officer’s Liability for Salaries — A de facto officer, even one in good faith and acting under color of title, takes the salaries of the office at his risk. The de jure officer is entitled to recover the salary received by the de facto officer during the period of wrongful retention. The de facto doctrine exists primarily to protect the public and third parties who rely on the official acts of the person discharging the office, not to shield the de facto officer from accountability for compensation. Title, not mere possession of the office, determines the right to emoluments.

• “The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of candidacy should be taken into account. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable since the vacating is expressly made as of the moment of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.” (quoting Castro v. Gatuslao) — This passage underpins the irreversibility of the resignation once the certificate is filed.
• “A de facto officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention of the public office.” — This encapsulates the rule on the de facto officer’s financial liability.

• Castro v. Gatuslao, 98 Phil. 94 (1956) — Followed. Established that forfeiture under Section 27 is automatic from the moment of filing and is not negated by subsequent withdrawal of the certificate.
• Rodriguez v. Tan, 91 Phil. 724 (1952) — Distinguished. The rule allowing a proclaimed and later ousted senator to retain salaries received during his incumbency was held inapplicable to a forfeiture by operation of law without an election contest.
• Walker v. Hughes, 36 A.2d 47, 151 A.L.R. 946 — Persuasive American authority cited for the general principle that a de facto officer must account to the de jure officer for salaries received.

• Section 27, Revised Election Code — “Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” Applied to effect the automatic and permanent forfeiture of petitioner’s mayoralty upon the filing of his certificate for a congressional seat.
• Article X, Section 2, 1935 Philippine Constitution — Vests in the Commission on Elections the power to “decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections.” Construed to limit COMELEC’s adjudicatory jurisdiction to matters connected with the conduct of elections, thereby excluding the purely legal question of forfeiture of office.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, and Angeles, JJ., concurred. Arsenio, J., was on leave. Sanchez, Castro, and Fernando, JJ., took no part.