Municipality of Makati vs. Municipality of Taguig

In a boundary dispute between local government units whose charters do not fix territory by metes and bounds, the preponderance of evidence is determined by historical survey plans recognized by the sovereign, official cadastral maps approved before the crystallization of the dispute, and contemporaneous legislative and executive acts; post-dispute cadastral surveys and census data are insufficient to establish political boundaries. Further, where the Supreme Court’s dispositive portion in a prior case imposed only fines on counsel for willful forum shopping and did not order dismissal of the action, the fallo controls over any contrary statement in the body, and the case cannot subsequently be dismissed on that ground.

The municipalities of Makati and Taguig, both originally pueblos of the Province of Manila during the Spanish period and later part of the Province of Rizal, were incorporated into Metropolitan Manila by Presidential Decree No. 824 and subsequently converted into highly urbanized cities. Since the early 20th century, a dispute simmered over the territorial jurisdiction of Fort Andres Bonifacio (formerly Fort William McKinley), a military reservation established by the United States Government on lands acquired from the Hacienda Maricaban, specifically the areas later known as the Enlisted Men’s Barangays (Cembo, South Cembo, Comembo, East Rembo, West Rembo, Pembo, and Pitogo) and the Inner Fort Barangays (Post Proper Northside and Post Proper Southside). Presidential Proclamation No. 2475 (1986) and No. 518 (1990) opened portions of the reservation for disposition and described them as situated in Makati, prompting Taguig to file a complaint for judicial confirmation of its territory and a declaration of unconstitutionality of those proclamations for allegedly altering its boundaries without a plebiscite.

• The Disputed Territory: The core of the controversy involves the Enlisted Men’s Barangays (Cembo, South Cembo, Comembo, East Rembo, West Rembo, Pembo, and Pitogo) and the Inner Fort Barangays (Post Proper Northside and Post Proper Southside) located within Fort Andres Bonifacio, formerly Fort William McKinley. The entire military reservation originated from Hacienda Maricaban, owned by Doña Dolores Vda. de Casal.
• Taguig’s Version: In 1902, the United States Government acquired the northern portion of Hacienda Maricaban for a military post, which included what would become Fort McKinley. In 1908, it purchased the remaining portion, which was titled under OCT No. 291 in Doña Casal’s name. The U.S. Government then had Survey Plan Psu-2031 prepared and approved in 1909, dividing Fort McKinley into four parcels located in Pasay, Parañaque, Taguig, and Pasig, but not in Makati. After independence, Fort McKinley was ceded to the Philippines. Proclamation No. 423 (1957) established Fort Bonifacio on Parcels 2, 3, and 4 of Psu-2031 and described the reservation as situated in Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, and Pasay. Taguig’s cadastral mapping (MCadm 590-D, approved in 1983) placed the entirety of Fort Bonifacio within Taguig, while the earlier Makati cadastral mapping (MCadm 571-D, approved in 1979) did not include the military barangays. Special Patent Nos. 3595 and 3596 issued by President Ramos in 1995 likewise identified the conveyed lands as in Taguig.
• Makati’s Version: The 1902 sale of the northern portion of Hacienda Maricaban to the U.S. Government covered land within San Pedro Macati (Makati), Pasig, and Pateros, and this portion became Fort McKinley. The 1908 acquisition covered the remaining portion, registered under OCT No. 291 and located in Taguig, Pasay, and Parañaque, but that area did not include Fort McKinley. A sketch map prepared by Makati’s expert, based on a Spanish registry book, the contract of sale, and a U.S. Army map, showed the disputed barangays within Makati. Census data from 1918, 1948, 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1990 listed the EMBOs and Inner Fort barangays under Makati. The COMELEC certified that residents of the Inner Fort Barangays voted in Makati from 1975 onward. The numerical cadastral survey of Makati approved in 1994 depicted the disputed barangays within its territory. The assailed Proclamations Nos. 2475 (1986) and 518 (1990) merely confirmed that status.
• The Assailed Proclamations: Proclamation No. 2475, issued by President Marcos on January 7, 1986, withdrew the EMBO areas from the military reservation and declared them open for disposition, identifying them as situated in Makati. Proclamation No. 518, issued by President Aquino on January 31, 1990, amended Proclamation No. 2475. Neither proclamation underwent a plebiscite.
• RTC Decision: The RTC ruled in favor of Taguig, confirming that Fort Bonifacio (Parcels 3 and 4, Psu-2031) is part of Taguig and declaring Proclamations Nos. 2475 and 518 unconstitutional for altering boundaries without a plebiscite. It issued a permanent injunction against Makati’s exercise of jurisdiction over the area.

• Transcendental Importance and Relaxation of Rules: Makati argued that the CA should have relaxed procedural rules and decided the appeal on the merits, given the transcendental public importance of the boundary dispute, and that the CA’s dismissal based exclusively on forum shopping deviated from settled jurisprudence favoring substantial justice over technicalities.
• Effect of Prior Supreme Court Ruling: Makati contended that the CA could not dismiss the appeal on the strength of the forum-shopping finding in G.R. No. 208393 because the dispositive portion of that decision merely fined counsel and did not order dismissal of the Territorial Dispute Case; had the Supreme Court intended dismissal, it would have expressly so ordered.
• Constitutionality of Proclamations: Makati maintained that Presidential Proclamations Nos. 2475 and 518 did not alter territorial boundaries but merely confirmed the existing jurisdiction of Makati over the disputed areas.
• Merits and Revival of CA Decision: Makati pressed for the revival of the CA Decision dated July 30, 2013, which had reversed the RTC on the merits, declared the proclamations constitutional, and confirmed Makati’s jurisdiction on the basis of historical documents, census records, and the numerical cadastral survey, asserting that Taguig’s evidence was insufficient and largely questionable.

• Procedural Bar – Questions of Fact: Taguig argued that Makati’s Petition raised factual issues, which are not proper in a Rule 45 petition, and should therefore be dismissed outright.
• Correctness of Dismissal for Forum Shopping: Taguig asserted that the CA correctly dismissed the appeal in strict accordance with the law and the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that Makati committed willful and deliberate forum shopping; the penalty of dismissal follows as a matter of course.
• Preponderance of Evidence on the Merits: Taguig claimed that, even if the appeal were reinstated, the evidence on record—particularly Psu-2031, the cadastral maps, and numerous presidential proclamations—sufficiently proved its entitlement to, and jurisdiction over, the disputed areas.

• Effect of Prior Forum-Shopping Ruling: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Makati’s appeal on the ground of forum shopping, considering that the Supreme Court’s final judgment in G.R. No. 208393 imposed only fines on counsel and did not expressly dismiss the appeal.
• Resolution on the Merits: Whether the boundary dispute should be resolved on its merits despite the procedural posture and the general rule that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45.
• Territorial Jurisdiction: Whether Taguig established by preponderance of evidence that the EMBO Barangays and Inner Fort Barangays within Fort Bonifacio (Parcels 3 and 4, Psu-2031) form part of its territorial jurisdiction.
• Constitutionality of Presidential Proclamations: Whether Presidential Proclamations Nos. 2475 (1986) and 518 (1990) are unconstitutional for substantially altering Taguig’s boundaries without a plebiscite.

• Effect of Prior Forum-Shopping Ruling: The CA erred in dismissing the appeal. Under the doctrine that the dispositive portion (fallo) controls over the body of a decision, the fallo in G.R. No. 208393 limited the sanction to a fine on counsel and did not order the dismissal of the Territorial Dispute Case. The matter of dismissal was passed upon sub silentio—it was within the issues raised and the Court decided against it. As the fallo is the final order that invests rights and imposes duties, the CA overstepped its bounds by reading a consequence into the judgment that the Supreme Court itself did not decree.
• Resolution on the Merits: The Supreme Court resolved the territorial dispute on the merits in the interest of judicial economy and substantial justice. The controversy had spanned nearly two decades, both parties had fully presented their evidence, and a dismissal on procedural grounds would only invite relitigation. Boundary disputes involve transcendental public interest; Congress itself, in the charters of both Makati and Taguig, reserved the resolution of existing boundary controversies to the courts. The general rule confining Rule 45 to questions of law was relaxed, as the factual findings of the trial court and the CA were diametrically opposed, and the need to write finis to the dispute outweighed procedural strictness.
• Territorial Jurisdiction: Taguig proved its claim by the requisite preponderance of evidence.
• Psu-2031: The survey plan was properly identified, authenticated, and admitted. Its authenticity as a map of Fort McKinley prepared at the instance of the U.S. Government was corroborated by Land Registration Authority and DENR records, and it was repeatedly referenced in official presidential proclamations. Between Psu-2031—a survey recognized by sovereign authorities—and Makati’s privately commissioned sketch map based on proprietary Spanish-era documents, Psu-2031 carries greater weight. Psu-2031 shows Parcel 4, the location of the disputed areas, within Taguig.
• Cadastral Surveys: Makati’s own cadastral mapping (MCadm 571-D, approved in 1979) and Taguig’s cadastral mapping (MCadm 590-D, approved in 1983) both exclude the disputed areas from Makati’s territory. The numerical cadastral survey of Makati approved in 1994 was prepared after the critical date of January 31, 1990 (issuance of Proclamation No. 518) and after the filing of the complaint; as a post-dispute act intended to improve Makati’s litigating position, it is accorded negligible probative value.
• Contemporaneous Acts of Lawful Authorities: Presidential proclamations and legislative acts prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution—when boundaries could be fixed without a plebiscite—consistently described Fort McKinley/Fort Bonifacio as situated in Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, and Pasay, and not in Makati. Section 503 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 stated that Fort McKinley was “near Macati,” indicating it lay outside Makati’s territory. Census data, COMELEC certifications of voter participation, and other post-1973 acts do not determine or fix political boundaries and cannot overcome the superior official acts of the legislative and executive branches. Preponderance thus favors Taguig.
• Constitutionality of Presidential Proclamations: The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Proclamations Nos. 2475 and 518, applying the principle of constitutional avoidance. The proclamations did not expressly alter Taguig’s boundaries; they merely erroneously stated the situs of the areas opened for disposition. The territorial dispute could be completely resolved on evidentiary grounds without striking down the executive issuances. Moreover, the Office of the Solicitor General had not entered its appearance on behalf of the Republic, and the State was entitled to due process on the constitutional question. The proclamations are to be read consistently with the Court’s ruling that the disputed areas lie within Taguig’s jurisdiction.

• Preponderance of evidence in boundary disputes — Where municipal charters do not define territory by metes and bounds, the boundaries of a local government unit are determined by the preponderance of evidence, with primacy given to historical survey plans recognized by sovereign authorities, official cadastral maps approved before the critical date, and contemporaneous legislative and executive acts. Privately commissioned surveys, post-dispute cadastral maps, and census data carry little to no probative value for establishing political boundaries.
• Critical date doctrine — In territorial disputes, the critical date is the point at which the controversy crystallized; after that date, acts of a party undertaken to improve its legal position are accorded scant evidentiary weight. Here, the critical date was January 31, 1990, the issuance of Proclamation No. 518.
• Falló controls over the body of the decision — Where a conflict exists between the dispositive portion of a judgment and the opinion in the body, the fallo prevails. The body may not add to, amend, or contradict the clear terms of the final order. Applied to the prior forum-shopping decision, the fallo imposing only fines superseded any implication of dismissal.
• Doctrine of sub silentio — Under Rule 131, Section 3(o) of the Rules of Court, it is presumed that all matters within an issue raised were laid before the court and passed upon by it, even if the decision is silent on that point. The dismissal of Makati’s appeal was considered and rejected sub silentio in G.R. No. 208393.
• Constitutional avoidance — Courts will not decide a constitutional question if the case can be resolved on other grounds. The proclamation’s misstatement of situs did not constitute an express alteration of boundaries, so the dispute was settled without passing upon constitutionality.
• Relaxation of procedural rules in boundary cases — When a territorial dispute between local government units involves transcendental public interest and both sides have fully ventilated their evidence, the Supreme Court may suspend procedural rules—including the limitation of Rule 45 to questions of law—to render a complete adjudication on the merits, consistent with the primacy of substantial justice over technicalities.

• "The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires." (quoting Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections) — Articulating why boundary disputes demand definitive resolution.
• "The dispositive portion or the fallo of Our decision … limited Makati’s sanction to a fine. That fallo is Our decisive resolution of the case. … where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision and the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body of the decision." — Central to overturning the CA’s dismissal.
• "Judicial economy mandates that litigation be ‘with the least cost to the parties and to the courts’ time, effort, and resources.’ … It would be a disservice to all and an unsatisfactory conclusion to a decades-long lawsuit to insist on its technical dismissal." — Justifying the relaxation of procedural rules.
• "The census results cannot supplant the declarations of the two government branches that controlled the boundaries of local government units pre-1973 Constitution." — Explaining why census data do not fix territorial jurisdiction.

• City of Taguig v. City of Makati, G.R. No. 208393, 787 Phil. 367 (2018) — The prior Supreme Court decision finding Makati guilty of forum shopping; its fallo, imposing only fines, was held to have passed upon the dismissal sub silentio.
• BBB vs. People, G.R. No. 249307, August 27, 2020 — Reiterated the rule that the fallo is the final order and controls over the body of the decision.
• Florentino v. Rivera, 515 Phil. 494 (2006) — Explained the distinction between the opinion and the judgment, with the dispositive part as the decisive resolution.
• Municipality of Pateros v. Court of Appeals, 607 Phil. 104 (2009) — Applied to justify the relaxation of procedural rules in a boundary dispute in order to serve substantial justice.
• Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 312 Phil. 259 (1995) — Authority for the significance of clear territorial boundaries and for Congress’s intentional deferral of the Makati-Taguig boundary issue to the courts.
• Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz, G.R. No. 105746, December 2, 1996 — Established that boundary dispute settlement merely carries into effect the law creating the municipality and cannot amend that law.
• Ceniza v. Commission on Elections, 184 Phil. 597 (1980) — Held that the plebiscite requirement for boundary alterations was introduced by the 1973 Constitution and has prospective application only.
• Miranda v. Aguirre, G.R. No. L-17803, June 30, 1962 — Discussed the plebiscite as an exercise of direct democracy to check arbitrary alterations of local government boundaries.
• Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003) — Enumerated the requisites of judicial review, including the principle of constitutional avoidance.
• Curammeng vs. People, 799 Phil. 575 (2016) — Cited for the principle that rigid application of procedural rules must yield when broader interests of justice so require.

• Article X, Section 10, 1987 Constitution — Mandates a plebiscite for any substantial alteration of local government boundaries; invoked by Taguig but not applied to strike down the proclamations.
• Article XI, Section 3, 1973 Constitution — Introduced the plebiscite requirement for boundary changes; changes before its effectivity did not require popular approval.
• Section 2, Republic Act No. 7854 (Charter of Makati City) — Provides that the City comprises the present territory of the Municipality of Makati, without prejudice to judicial resolution of existing boundary disputes.
• Section 2, Republic Act No. 8487 (Charter of Taguig City) — Contains an identical proviso reserving boundary disputes to the appropriate agency or forum.
• Sections 68 and 503, Revised Administrative Code of 1917 — Section 68 delegated boundary-fixing authority to the Governor-General; Section 503’s description of Fort McKinley as “near Macati” showed it was not within Makati.
• Act No. 82 (Municipal Code of 1901) — Recognized pre-existing pueblos as municipal corporations with their historical boundaries.
• Rule 131, Section 3(o), Revised Rules of Court — Provides the disputable presumption that all matters within an issue raised were laid before the court and passed upon by it, grounding the sub silentio doctrine.
• Rule 129, Section 1, Rules of Court — Allows courts to take judicial notice of official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments.

Leonen (Chairperson), Carandang, Zalameda, and Marquez, JJ., concur.