Municipality of San Fernando, La Union vs. Firme

A municipal corporation is suable because its charter allows it to sue and be sued, but it is not liable for torts committed by its employees in the performance of governmental functions. Suability is distinct from liability; suability merely gives a claimant the opportunity to prove that the defendant is liable under the applicable law and established facts. When an employee acts in a governmental capacity, the municipality enjoys immunity from liability even if it has consented to be sued.

On December 16, 1965, a passenger jeepney, a gravel and sand truck, and a dump truck owned by the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union collided. Laureano Baniña Sr., a passenger on the jeepney, died from his injuries. His heirs initially sued the jeepney’s owner and driver. The defendants impleaded the municipality and its driver via a third-party complaint. After the case was transferred to a different branch, the heirs amended their complaint to directly implead the municipality and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig, as defendants.

• The Accident: At around 7:00 a.m. on December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez, and a dump truck owned by the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig. Laureano Baniña Sr., a passenger on the jeepney, died from injuries sustained in the collision.
• Initial Complaint: On December 11, 1966, the heirs of Laureano Baniña Sr. (private respondents) sued the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot for damages in Civil Case No. 2183 before the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I.
• Third-Party Complaint and Amendment: The original defendants filed a third-party complaint against the Municipality and its driver. The case was later transferred to Branch IV and re-docketed as Civil Case No. 107-Bg. Pursuant to a court order dated May 7, 1975, the complaint was amended to directly implead the Municipality and driver Alfredo Bislig as defendants. The Municipality raised affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription, and the negligence of the jeepney owner and driver as the proximate cause of the collision.
• Trial Court Proceedings: The trial judge deferred resolution of the non-suability defense, stating it would be resolved at trial. After trial, the judge failed to resolve the defense explicitly and rendered a decision on the merits.
• The Driver’s Task: The driver of the dump truck alleged that he was on his way to the Naguilian River to obtain sand and gravel for the repair of the Municipality’s streets.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Procedural Orders and Decision: Petitioner maintained that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing the challenged interlocutory orders (which deferred and later failed to resolve the defense of non-suability), and in rendering a decision that held the municipality liable despite the defense of state immunity.
• Inadequacy of Appeal: Petitioner asserted that although appeal was available, it was not a speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, justifying the direct resort to certiorari.

• Petition Devoid of Merit and Good Faith: Private respondents countered that the petition lacked merit and was filed without the good faith required for certiorari and prohibition.
• Inherent Power of the Court: Private respondents argued that the trial court had the inherent power to amend and control its processes and orders to conform to law and justice, and thus did not gravely abuse its discretion.

• Defense of Non-Suability: Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he deferred resolution of the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction, failed to resolve it at trial, and subsequently rendered a decision finding the municipality liable.
• Liability of the Municipality: Whether the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union may be held liable for the quasi-delict committed by its driver when the act was performed in the discharge of governmental functions.

• Defense of Non-Suability: The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in deferring the resolution of the non-suability defense; however, the judge acted in excess of jurisdiction by holding the municipality liable in the decision. The defense of state non-suability, when raised, must be resolved squarely. The failure to rule on it, combined with a judgment imposing liability, constituted an act in excess of jurisdiction.
• Liability of the Municipality: The municipality could not be held liable for the tort because its driver was performing governmental functions. Suability is distinguished from liability: a municipal corporation is suable because its charter permits it to sue and be sued, but this merely provides the claimant an opportunity to prove liability. Liability itself is determined by the nature of the function being performed. The test of liability depends on whether the employee was acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity. The repair and maintenance of municipal streets is a governmental activity, as squarely ruled in Palafox, et al. v. Province of Ilocos Norte. Consequently, the municipality was immune from liability for the acts of its driver performed in the discharge of a governmental duty.

• Distinction Between Suability and Liability — Suability depends on the consent of the State to be sued; liability depends on the applicable law and established facts. Consent to be sued does not automatically imply liability. It merely allows the claimant to demonstrate, if possible, that the defendant is liable under the law.
• Doctrine of Governmental Immunity for Municipal Torts — Municipal corporations exercise a dual capacity: governmental and proprietary. When performing governmental functions, their acts are political and governmental, and they enjoy immunity from suit for torts committed in that capacity, unless a statute expressly provides otherwise or the case falls under recognized exceptions. The test of liability is whether the injury occurred while the employee was engaged in a governmental or a proprietary function.
• Governmental Function — Road Repair — The construction or maintenance of public roads by a municipality is a governmental activity. Injuries caused by municipal employees in the course of such work do not give rise to a cause of action for damages against the municipality.

• "The general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied consent."
• "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable."
• "In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover."

• Torio v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978, 85 SCRA 599 — Followed for the test distinguishing governmental from proprietary functions, which determines the liability of a municipality for the tortious acts of its agents.
• Palafox, et al. v. Province of Ilocos Norte, et al., 102 Phil. 1186 — Followed for the specific ruling that the construction or maintenance of roads, in which the truck and driver worked at the time of the accident, are admittedly governmental activities.
• United States of America v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 644 — Cited to explain the distinction between suability and liability, and the forms of consent to be sued.
• Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil. 311 — Cited as an example of a special law allowing suit against the government for an alleged quasi-delict.
• City of Kokomo v. Loy, 112 N.E. 994 (Indiana, 1916) — Cited to illustrate the dual capacity of municipal corporations and the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions.

• Article XVI, Section 3, 1987 Constitution — “The State may not be sued without its consent.” Applied as the foundational rule on state immunity from suit, from which a municipality’s immunity in governmental functions is derived.
• Act No. 3083 — Defines the standing consent of the Philippine State to be sued in cases of money claims arising from contracts. Cited to contrast express consent to sue for contractual claims with the absence of such consent for tort claims arising from governmental functions.
• Section 3(m), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court — Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. Applied to the driver’s claim that he was procuring gravel and sand for road repair; in the absence of contrary evidence, the act was presumed to be part of his official duties.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concurred.