Muring, Jr. vs. Gatcho

In administrative cases, substantial evidence — such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion — is required; mere allegation, hearsay, and testimony without personal knowledge do not meet this threshold. Reckless statements by a lawyer implying corruption in the judiciary constitute gross misconduct warranting disciplinary sanction. Government lawyers are absolutely prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law, and filing a petition for a notarial commission while in government service constitutes an attempt to evade that prohibition.

Court attorneys Atty. Muring, Atty. Gatcho, and Executive Assistant Calayag were co-employees in the office of Court of Appeals Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (now retired). Atty. Edna S. Paña, a practicing lawyer and former in-house counsel of the Tanchi Group of Companies, was a mutual acquaintance. In October 2002, during a social gathering at Cafe Breton in Malate, Manila, Atty. Paña allegedly disclosed to complainant Muring and Atty. Ma. Paz Besonaya, a court attorney from Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo’s office, that Gatcho and Calayag had demanded and received P450,000 from her or her employer to facilitate a favorable decision from Justice Roberto Barrios in a pending case, and later demanded P150,000 in connection with a Supreme Court case purportedly before Justice Jose A. R. Melo. The disclosures triggered internal conflict, alleged threats, complainant’s termination, and the filing of the administrative complaint.

• The Alleged Pay-Off: Atty. Paña, while employed as in-house counsel for the Tanchi Group of Companies, was handling CA-G.R. Sp. No. 49363 entitled Credito Asiatic, Inc., et al. v. DARAB, et al. before the Court of Appeals, assigned to the office of Justice Roberto Barrios. According to statements later attributed to Paña, respondents Gatcho and Calayag approached her and represented that they could facilitate a favorable decision for her client. Gatcho and Calayag allegedly demanded and received P450,000 in cash delivered by a Mr. Estrella, accompanied by Paña, at the Centennial Building office of Justice Abesamis one afternoon before the promulgation. The decision was allegedly promulgated on 15 March 2000. Subsequently, after the Supreme Court issued a Minute Resolution dismissing a petition for review in another case involving the Tanchi Group, Gatcho and Calayag purportedly demanded P150,000, claiming that Gatcho could go in and out of the office of Justice Jose A. R. Melo and was responsible for the favorable resolution.

• The Cafe Breton Disclosure: Sometime in October 2002, Atty. Paña, complainant Muring, and Atty. Besonaya met at Cafe Breton. Atty. Paña blurted out, “Humingi nga sa akin ng P450,000 yang dalawang yan sa kaso dati ni Tanchi kay Barrios!” referring to Gatcho and Calayag. She further recounted the demand for P150,000, the refusal to accept a P10,000 token, and that the incident caused her falling out with her employers. Atty. Besonaya reacted indignantly, threatening to inform Justice Barrios.

• Subsequent Events and Alleged Cover-Up: After the Cafe Breton meeting, Atty. Paña allegedly sent threatening text messages to complainant, pressuring him to prevent Atty. Besonaya from reporting the matter. Complainant claimed that Calayag separately admitted to him receipt of the P450,000. On 5 December 2002, complainant found Atty. Paña in the visitors’ room of Justice Abesamis’ office; she was there to show Justice Abesamis the transcript of stenographic notes in an adoption case where complainant had appeared as counsel while a court attorney. According to complainant, Justice Abesamis directed him not to divulge the pay-off story and to cooperate with Gatcho. On 19 February 2003, two days after complainant reported verbal abuse from Gatcho and Calayag, Justice Abesamis informed him that he was to be removed from the office.

• Complainant’s Report: Fearing termination and the loss of leave credits, complainant sought an audience with then Acting Presiding Justice Cancio Garcia, who prevailed upon him to expose the pay-off in the interest of the judiciary. This led to the filing of the administrative complaint.

• Testimonies of Supporting Witnesses: Atty. Pascual’s affidavit stated that Paña repeatedly asked her to dissuade Besonaya from reporting the pay-off. On cross-examination, however, Pascual testified that Paña only asked her to help patch up a friendship rift, not to suppress a report. Atty. Besonaya’s affidavit corroborated the Cafe Breton conversation and added that Paña later visited her home and disclosed that the P450,000 was delivered at Justice Abesamis’ office, that an advance copy of the Barrios decision was handed by Calayag on the day of promulgation, and that the P10,000 token was refused by Calayag one Sunday in September 2000 outside De La Salle University. Besonaya admitted she had no personal knowledge of the pay-off and only learned of the envelope’s contents from Paña.

• Complainant’s Admissions: During cross-examination, complainant conceded that he was not present at any of the alleged pay-offs or demands; all information came from Paña. He did not know whether Justice Barrios actually rendered a favorable decision. He acknowledged fear of approaching the justices without proof.

• Existence of the Pay-Off Scheme: Complainant maintained that respondents Gatcho and Calayag demanded and received P450,000 from Atty. Paña or her employer to secure a favorable decision from Justice Barrios, and later demanded P150,000 under the representation that they could influence Justice Melo. He relied on the direct statements of Paña and the corroborating testimony of Atty. Besonaya.

• Admission by Calayag: Complainant argued that Calayag herself admitted to him the receipt of the P450,000 in their office on 29 October 2002.

• Intimidation and Retaliation: Complainant asserted that Atty. Paña sent text messages threatening to reveal his unauthorized court appearance unless he kept silent. He further claimed that Justice Abesamis instructed him to suppress the information and that his eventual removal was retaliatory.

• Gatcho’s Denials: Atty. Gatcho vehemently denied the accusations, characterizing them as a misunderstanding possibly stemming from complainant’s belief that Gatcho wanted him terminated. He explained that he merely helped Paña obtain a copy of a promulgated decision, an act he believed did not violate any rule. He attributed the office friction to complainant’s work habits and his own responsibility as Officer-in-Charge to maintain harmony.

• Calayag’s Hearsay and Personal Intrigue Defense: Calayag argued that complainant’s allegations were hearsay rooted in personal rumors complainant and Besonaya were spreading about her family. She claimed the 5 December 2002 meeting was a staff conference regarding official functions, not a confrontation about the pay-off.

• Paña’s Denial and Intrigue Theory: Atty. Paña denied the pay-off statements. While admitting closeness with complainant and Besonaya, she alleged that the relationship soured due to frequent bickering. She admitted sending text messages but only because complainant was “creating intrigues.” She submitted her defense through a Comment executed before the Philippine Consul-General in London.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the evidence adduced sufficiently established that Atty. Gatcho and Calayag demanded and received money to influence judicial decisions.
• Administrative Liability of Atty. Paña: Whether Atty. Paña’s unsubstantiated statements concerning a pay-off constituted gross misconduct warranting administrative sanction.
• Unauthorized Practice of Law by Complainant: Whether complainant Muring’s appearance as counsel in an adoption case while employed as a court attorney amounted to unauthorized private practice.
• Notarial Commission of Atty. Gatcho: Whether Atty. Gatcho’s filing of petitions for commission as a notary public during his government employment violated the prohibition on private practice by judiciary employees.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The complaint against Gatcho and Calayag was dismissed for lack of substantial evidence. The quantum of proof required in administrative cases is substantial evidence — such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Complainant admitted he had no personal knowledge of the alleged pay-offs; all his information came from Paña. His uncertainty about the outcome of the case and his fear of approaching the justices without proof underscored the hearsay nature of the charges. The testimonies of Atty. Pascual and Atty. Besonaya did not cure the defect: Pascual retracted her affidavit’s assertion that Paña asked her to dissuade Besonaya, and Besonaya likewise lacked personal knowledge, having merely heard the story from Paña. The text messages proved only a bitter disagreement, not blackmail. Thus, mere allegation and hearsay could not support a finding of guilt.

• Administrative Liability of Atty. Paña: Atty. Paña was found guilty of gross misconduct and suspended from the practice of law for three months. Complainant, Pascual, and Besonaya all pointed to Paña as the source of the pay-off story. Their consistent testimonies were difficult to ascribe to evil motive given their admitted long-term friendships. By making reckless and unverified statements implying corruption within the judiciary, Paña tarnished the image of the legal profession and public office, demonstrating a failure to meet the exacting standards of good moral character required of members of the Bar.

• Unauthorized Practice of Law by Complainant: Complainant Muring admitted appearing in court as counsel and receiving P2,000 in fees while a court attorney. Under Cayetano v. Monsod, appearing on behalf of a litigant constitutes the practice of law. This unauthorized private practice, classified as a light offense under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, warranted admonition. Resignation from office did not preclude a finding of administrative liability.

• Notarial Commission of Atty. Gatcho: Atty. Gatcho’s petitions for notarial commission in Mandaluyong and Makati while employed as a court attorney violated the prohibition against private practice by government lawyers under Administrative Circular No. 5, which declared that judiciary employees are absolutely barred from engaging in notarial or other private legal practice. Filing the petition, though not actual engagement, was an attempt to evade the prohibition. Gatcho was admonished for this infraction.

• Quantum of Proof in Administrative Cases — In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof is substantial evidence: such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Mere allegation is not evidence and does not equal proof. When the complainant relies entirely on hearsay without personal knowledge, the charges must fail.

• Prohibition on Private Practice by Judiciary Employees — Government lawyers and judiciary employees are strictly prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law, including notarial practice. Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Executive Department, which allows outside business, does not apply to court personnel; the express prohibition in the Rules of Court and the requirement of the highest degree of efficiency and responsibility to maintain public confidence in the Judiciary govern instead. Filing a petition for a notarial commission, though not actual practice, constitutes an attempt to evade the prohibition.

• Practice of Law Defined — Appearing in court on behalf of a party litigant falls within the definition of the “practice of law.” Under Cayetano v. Monsod, to engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts characteristic of the profession that require the use of legal knowledge or skill.

• Effect of Resignation or Removal on Administrative Liability — Cessation from office by resignation or retirement does not warrant dismissal of an administrative complaint filed while the respondent was still in the service, nor does it render the case moot and academic. The Court’s jurisdiction, once acquired, is retained until final resolution. Former employees who can no longer be suspended may instead be admonished.

• Gross Misconduct for Reckless Statements — A lawyer’s reckless and unsubstantiated statements alleging corruption in the judiciary constitute gross misconduct and betray a failure to meet the standards of good moral character required by the Bar warranting disciplinary sanction, even if the statements do not result in a conviction of the persons implicated.

• “We have repeatedly held that the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is substantial evidence, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.”

• “Complainant and Atty. Besonaya had no personal knowledge of the alleged pay-off. As noted in the Report, complainant himself admitted this lack of personal knowledge…”

• “If lawyers commit a misconduct that would put their moral character in serious doubt, then the court is justified in suspending or removing them from the office of attorney. The evidence in this case shows failure on the part of Atty. Paña to comply with the exacting standards of good moral character required of members of the Bar.”

• “Memorandum Circular No. 17 … [is] not applicable to officials or employees of the courts considering the express prohibition in the Rules of Court and the nature of their work which requires them to serve with the highest degree of efficiency and responsibility, in order to maintain public confidence in the Judiciary.”

• “Cessation from office of a respondent by resignation or retirement does not warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint filed while he or she was still in the service nor does it render the administrative case moot and academic.”

• Navarro v. Cerezo, A.M. No. P-05-1962, 17 February 2005 — Followed; reiterated the rule that substantial evidence is required in administrative cases and that mere allegation is not proof.
• Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991 — Applied; defined the practice of law to include appearing in court on behalf of a litigant, which was cited to hold that complainant’s appearance as counsel constituted unauthorized private practice.
• In re Sotto, 38 Phil. 532 (1918) — Relied upon for the principle that if a lawyer’s misconduct puts moral character in serious doubt, suspension or removal from the office of attorney is justified.
• Baquerfo v. Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974, 6 April 2005 — Applied; affirmed that resignation does not render an administrative case moot and that jurisdiction once acquired is retained until final resolution.

• Administrative Circular No. 5, 4 October 1988 (issued by Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan) — Declared that the Executive Department’s Memorandum Circular No. 17 allowing outside employment did not apply to judiciary employees; government lawyers are absolutely prohibited from notarial practice or any form of private legal practice. Applied to censure Atty. Gatcho’s petition for notarial commission.
• Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Section 52, Rule IV (Resolution No. 99-1936) — Classifies engaging in unauthorized private practice of profession as a light offense punishable by reprimand. Used as basis for admonishing complainant Muring.

Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, Associate Justices Reynato S. Puno, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., Adolfo S. Azcuna, Dante O. Tinga, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Cancio C. Garcia, and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. concurred.