Nadyahan vs. People

Where unlawful aggression and lack of sufficient provocation are established but the means employed to repel the attack are not reasonably necessary, the accused is entitled only to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. The reasonable necessity of the means employed contemplates a rational equivalence between the aggression and the defense, assessed by factors such as the nature and extent of the injuries inflicted, the weapons used, the number of assailants, and the surrounding circumstances.

On the evening of 26 May 2004, petitioner Rafael Nadyahan was driving his motorcycle along a road in Banaue, Ifugao, with a back rider. He was flagged down by Marcial Acangan and three companions, one of whom was Mark Anthony Pagaddut. Acangan asked for a ride home and then for a treat of drinks. When petitioner refused to buy drinks, Acangan slapped him and kicked his foot. The encounter escalated: petitioner’s account was that Acangan’s group picked up pieces of wood, struck him from behind, and later Pagaddut hit him with a belt buckle, prompting petitioner to stab Pagaddut with a knife. The prosecution’s version presented petitioner as the aggressor who kicked Pagaddut and then stabbed him without lawful cause. The victim died from multiple stab wounds.

• The Defense Version: On the night of 26 May 2004, petitioner was driving his motorcycle with Mark Apilis as back rider. At the junction road to Bontoc, Marcial Acangan, joined by Elias Nabejet, Moreno Binwag, and Mark Pagaddut, flagged him down and asked for a ride home and a treat of drinks. Petitioner refused the treat, which angered Acangan. Acangan slapped petitioner on the forehead and kicked his foot. Petitioner stepped off the motorcycle, ready to fight, and saw Acangan’s companions pick up pieces of wood. He ran toward Apilis to start the motorcycle, but before he could leave, Nabejet struck him on the back with a piece of wood. Petitioner impulsively grabbed a knife from the motorcycle windshield and ran toward his house. The group chased him. At the KMS Line parking area, Binwag confronted him; Pagaddut then hit him with a belt buckle. As petitioner started to lose consciousness, he thrust the knife and stabbed Pagaddut before they both fell. Petitioner got up, wiped his face, and drove his motorcycle to the house of a congressman. He spent four days in Barangay O-ong, then went to San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, for treatment of his wounds, and later returned to Ifugao to surrender. Pedro Binwag, a bystander, saw a commotion in which a knife-wielding man was chased by two men, cornered by three, struck in the head with a club, and then bumped by a man swinging an object; Binwag left the scene fearing danger. A medical certificate attested that petitioner sustained a lacerated wound on the forehead.

• The Prosecution Version: Acangan testified that he and Pagaddut had been drinking at Viewer’s Live Band. As they were in a tricycle driven by Acangan, petitioner and Apilis approached on a motorcycle. Petitioner, claiming he had no problem with Pagaddut, suddenly wielded a knife. Acangan fled and petitioner chased him around the tricycle. Pagaddut alighted and attempted to start the motorcycle. Petitioner kicked Pagaddut in the chest, then stabbed him in the upper right buttock. When Nabejet tried to strike petitioner with a piece of wood but missed, petitioner chased Nabejet. Acangan followed and, upon reaching the KMS Line station, saw petitioner pull the knife from Pagaddut’s body. Pagaddut died at the hospital. Nabejet narrated that he was near Viewer’s Live Band when he saw petitioner, armed with a knife, standing near Pagaddut. He picked up a piece of wood, approached, and saw petitioner chase and stab Pagaddut in the back, then continue stabbing while Pagaddut attempted to parry. Nabejet’s attempt to hit petitioner with the wood missed, whereupon petitioner turned on Nabejet, who escaped.

• Medical Findings: The Certificate of Death recorded multiple stab wounds: a penetrating, perforating wound at the right infraclavicular area (7 cm), a penetrating, perforating wound at the right anterior axillary fold (5 cm), a penetrating stab wound at the base of the right neck (3 cm), and a stab wound at the lateral aspect of the upper arm (2 cm). Dr. Antonio Ligot testified that the three stab wounds were on the anterior chest wall, the base of the neck, and the upper arm.

• Trial Court’s Appraisal: The RTC gave more weight to the defense account, finding that petitioner was not the aggressor. The prosecution evidence was marred by inconsistencies: Acangan’s affidavit omitted the kicking and stabbing near Viewer’s Live Band; Nabejet did not mention any kicking; the wounds on the victim were frontal, not on the lower back, undermining Acangan’s testimony. Not one prosecution witness saw the actual exchange of blows, and Moreno Binwag, who was present during the attack, was not presented. The court concluded that the victim’s group were the aggressors and that petitioner did not provide sufficient provocation—his refusal to buy drinks was not enough. Nevertheless, based on the depth and location of the stab wounds, the means used were not reasonably necessary; thus, only incomplete self-defense was credited.

• Incomplete Self-Defense: Petitioner maintained that the means employed—a knife—was reasonably necessary because he was being ganged up on by four men, two of whom were armed with a belt buckle and a club, and he was losing consciousness after being struck. He argued that in such circumstances he could not control or calculate his blows or deliberately aim only at non-vital parts, and that a penalty lower by two degrees under Article 69 was proper.

• Penalty: Petitioner contended that the penalty imposed should be further lowered by considering circumstances favorable to him beyond what the trial court had already appreciated.

• Incomplete Self-Defense: The Office of the Solicitor-General defended the appellate court’s ruling that only incomplete self-defense was established, agreeing that the means employed were not reasonably necessary.

• Recommended Penalty: The OSG recommended modification of the penalty to arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional minimum, suggesting a more lenient range than that imposed by the trial and appellate courts.

• Incomplete Self-Defense: Whether the finding of incomplete self-defense, as opposed to complete self-defense, was proper—specifically, whether the knife used by petitioner was a reasonably necessary means to repel or prevent the aggression.

• Penalty: Whether the penalty of four years and two months of prision correccional medium as minimum to eight years of prision mayor minimum as maximum was correctly imposed under the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• Incomplete Self-Defense: The conviction based on incomplete self-defense was affirmed. Unlawful aggression by the victim’s group and lack of sufficient provocation on petitioner’s part had been established, shifting the onus probandi to the defense. However, the means employed were not reasonably necessary. The rule of rational equivalence requires that the defensive act be commensurate with the aggression. The disproportion between a knife and a belt buckle, while not conclusive, was significant in light of the factual findings: petitioner sustained only a lacerated wound on the forehead and could not have been a defender reeling from successive heavy blows; the victim and his companions were intoxicated, which impaired the potency of the belt buckle and wood club; and most critically, the knife wounds were all inflicted on vital parts—two penetrating and perforating wounds 7 cm and 5 cm deep on the right chest, one 5 cm deep at the base of the neck, and one on the upper arm—evidencing a force and location aimed to kill rather than merely disable. The absence of reasonable necessity thus reduced self-defense to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.

• Penalty: The penalty was correctly computed and was affirmed. Homicide under Article 249 carries a penalty of reclusion temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20 years). Incomplete self-defense under Article 69 is a privileged mitigating circumstance that reduces the penalty by one or two degrees. Given that only the element of reasonable necessity was missing, the reduction by one degree to prision mayor was appropriate. With the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and no aggravating circumstance, Article 64(2) mandates the imposition of the penalty in its minimum period, i.e., prision mayor minimum (6 years and 1 day to 8 years). The maximum term of 8 years falls within that range. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term is taken from the penalty next lower in degree, prision correccional (6 months and 1 day to 6 years), and the trial court fixed it at 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional medium, which is also proper. The OSG’s recommendation of a lower penalty was not adopted because the reduction of one degree and the period were correctly applied.

• Elements of Self-Defense (Complete or Incomplete) — To prove self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, the accused bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Where unlawful aggression and lack of sufficient provocation are present but the means employed are not reasonably necessary, the result is incomplete self-defense, a privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 69.

• Reasonable Necessity of Means Employed — The means employed must bear a rational equivalence to the nature and severity of the attack. The assessment is not mechanical but takes into account the totality of circumstances, including: the nature of the weapons used by both sides; the extent and location of the injuries inflicted; the number of assailants; the physical condition of the combatants (such as intoxication); and whether the defender was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm. The defensive act must be proportionate to repel the aggression, not to exact vengeance or kill.

• Incomplete Self-Defense as a Privileged Mitigating Circumstance — Under Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, when not all the requisites of a justifying circumstance are present, the penalty prescribed by law shall be reduced by one or two degrees. The extent of reduction depends on the degree to which the requisites are wanting. In homicide, the absence of only the reasonable necessity of means normally warrants a reduction of one degree.

• Penalty Computation for Homicide with Incomplete Self-Defense and Voluntary Surrender — Homicide is penalized by reclusion temporal. A one-degree reduction yields prision mayor. With one ordinary mitigating circumstance (voluntary surrender) and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty is imposed in its minimum period (prision mayor minimum, 6 years and 1 day to 8 years) as the maximum term. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term is taken from the penalty next lower in degree (prision correccional), and may be fixed at any period within that range.

• “The means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense.”

• “First, there is intrinsic disproportion between a knife and a belt buckle. ... Second, physical evidence shows that the accused-appellant suffered only a lacerated wound on the forehead. Contrary to what the accused-appellant wishes to imply, he could not have been a defender reeling from successive blows inflicted by the victim and Binwag. Third, the victim Pagaddut and his companions were already drunk before the fatal fight. This state of intoxication, while not critically material to the stabbing that transpired, is still material for purposes of defining its surrounding circumstances, particularly the fact that a belt buckle and a piece of wood might not have been a potent weapon in the hands of a drunk wielder. Fourth, ... the knife wounds were all aimed at vital parts of the body, thus pointing a conclusion that the accused-appellant was simply warding off belt buckle thrusts and used his knife as a means commensurate to the thrusts he avoided. ... The depth of these wounds shows the force exerted ... while the locations are indicative that the thrusts were all meant to kill, not merely disable the victim, and thereby avoid his drunken thrusts.”

• People v. Tabuelog, 566 Phil. 297, 304 (2008) — Reiterated the settled rule that the burden of proving self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, shifts to the accused, who must establish the three elements by clear and convincing evidence. The Court applied this burden-shifting framework in assessing the defense.

• Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 189405, 19 November 2014 — Affirmed the principle of rational equivalence between the means of attack and defense, which serves as the measure for determining the reasonable necessity of the means employed. The Court relied on this principle to evaluate the disproportionality in the present case.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Fixes the penalty for homicide at reclusion temporal. The Court started from this penalty and applied the privileged mitigating circumstance.

• Article 69, Revised Penal Code — Provides that a penalty lower by one or two degrees shall be imposed when a felony is committed with the attendance of a privileged mitigating circumstance, such as incomplete self-defense. The penalty was reduced by one degree from reclusion temporal to prision mayor.

• Article 64(2), Revised Penal Code — When only a mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance is present, the lesser penalty shall be applied in its minimum period. The Court used this to place the maximum term within the minimum period of prision mayor.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103) — Requires that the maximum term be within the proper period of the imposable penalty and the minimum term be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree. The Court upheld the minimum of four years and two months of prision correccional medium as lawful.

Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Diosdado M. Peralta, Bienvenido L. Reyes, and Francis H. Jardeleza, concurred.

N/A — The decision was unanimous.