People vs. Abarri

An accused who does not personally commit rape and who lacks knowledge or awareness of its commission by a co-accused cannot be held liable for the special complex crime of robbery with rape; conspiracy to commit rape must be proved, and mere participation in the prior robbery and acts of lasciviousness does not suffice to infer such conspiracy. Where the charge of rape includes abusos deshonestos, a conviction for robbery with acts of lasciviousness may be rendered against those who committed the lascivious acts without participating in the rape.

On October 14, 1988, Gregoria Gan was walking along 4th Avenue in Kalookan City on her way home when two men accosted her at knifepoint. The incident escalated into a robbery and sexual assault involving five individuals, three of whom were former employees of Gan. All five were charged with the special complex crime of robbery with rape.

The Robbery and Abduction: At about 7:30 p.m. on October 14, 1988, while Gregoria Gan was walking home along 4th Avenue, Kalookan City, Ernesto Abarri and Ronnie Andales stopped her, each poking a knife at her neck. Abarri grabbed her bag and warned, “Kung gusto mong mabuhay, huwag kang sisigaw.” The two dragged Gan into a fenced, vacant lot overgrown with tall grass. Clemente Cawaling, Conrado Estrada, and Joselito Pajalago — all former employees of Gan — were already present or followed.

The Lascivious Acts: Inside the lot, Abarri used a balisong to tear the upper portion of Gan’s blouse. The other accused tore the rest of the blouse, pulled down her pants, and used the torn blouse to bind her mouth, hands, and feet. When she was completely naked, all the accused touched her private parts, pawed her, and bit her nipples.

The Robbery: Abarri opened Gan’s handbag and took a bunch of keys (including the key to her store in Binondo), a watch worth ₱2,000, a necklace worth ₱5,000, and a wallet containing ₱250.

The Rape: After the robbery, Cawaling told Andales, “Nognog, bahala ka na, sampung taon na rin na hindi nakakatikim ’yan, makatas pa ’yan.” The other four accused then left, while Andales stayed behind. He dragged Gan to a dark spot, loosened the binding on her legs, and raped her twice. He left thereafter.

Discovery and Arrest: Gan waited about twenty minutes, rolled toward the middle of the lot, loosened the gag, and shouted for help. Neighbors untied her. Around 8:30 p.m., Barangay Captain Anita Alejo was alerted that someone was opening Gan’s store. She found Abarri and Estrada there with the door partly opened; Abarri claimed Gan had instructed them to get her pants. They were taken to the barangay hall where, upon questioning, Abarri admitted forcibly bringing Gan to a vacant lot and binding her. The two were turned over to the police, who also arrested Andales. Gan positively identified Abarri and Andales as among the robbers.

Medical Findings: The NBI medico-legal officer found physical injuries on Gan’s body consistent with the alleged time of the incident; the hymen had old healed lacerations and an opening that could accommodate an average-sized adult male organ without new injury.

Defense of Alibi and Denial: All accused denied being at the crime scene. Abarri and Estrada claimed they were accosted by barangay tanods while walking home from work in Binondo and were forced by mauling at the police station to admit involvement. Cawaling, Pajalago, and Andales each asserted they were at their respective homes; Cawaling claimed police coercion, and Andales claimed he met his co-accused only in jail.

• Alibi and Denial: Appellants maintained they were not at the scene of the crime because each was elsewhere, and they claimed that their admissions were extracted through coercion and mauling at the police station. They argued that the prosecution failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

• Lack of Conspiracy: Appellants contended that no direct evidence established a conspiracy among them to commit the charged offense, and thus each should be held liable only for his individual acts, if any.

• Conspiracy and Collective Liability for Robbery with Rape: The prosecution maintained that all appellants conspired to rob the victim and that, on the occasion of the robbery, rape was committed; under Article 294(2) of the Revised Penal Code, every participant in the robbery is liable for the rape as a special complex crime regardless of who personally performed the sexual act.

• Alibi: Whether the defense of alibi should be given credence and operate as an acquittal.

• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy among all five accused to commit robbery with rape was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• Liability of Co-Accused for Rape: Whether the appellants other than Andales can be convicted of robbery with rape despite the absence of proof that they knew of or participated in the rape committed by Andales after they had left.

• Proper Crimes and Penalties: What crimes were committed by each of the accused and what penalties should be imposed.

• Alibi: The defense of alibi was rejected. Appellants failed to satisfy the requirement that it be physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission. Abarri and Estrada were apprehended at Gan’s store shortly after the incident, and the other accused’s claims of being at home did not preclude their presence at the nearby vacant lot.

• Conspiracy: A conspiracy to commit robbery and acts of lasciviousness was established through the coordinated conduct of all the accused, but the same evidence did not prove a conspiracy to commit rape. Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof; it may be inferred from the collective, synchronized actions of the parties indicating a common design. Here, Abarri and Andales jointly waylaid and dragged the victim, the others followed, and all participated in stripping, binding, and touching her — demonstrating a common intent to rob and commit lewd acts. No such common intent extended to the rape, as the other four left Andales alone with the victim, and there was no evidence they knew or were aware that Andales would rape her.

• Liability of Co-Accused for Rape: Only Andales was held liable for robbery with rape. The remarks of Cawaling — “Nognog, bahala ka na…” — did not amount to inducement because the decision to rape had already been made by Andales, who purposely stayed behind. No moral ascendancy of Cawaling over Andales was shown, and the utterance was not the determining cause of the crime. Absent knowledge or conspiracy, the other four accused could not be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape. However, because the charge of rape includes the lesser offense of abusos deshonestos, the four could be convicted of robbery with acts of lasciviousness for the lewd acts they personally committed during the robbery.

• Proper Crimes and Penalties: For the crime of acts of lasciviousness, each of the four (Abarri, Cawaling, Estrada, Pajalago) was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to six years of prision correccional as maximum, with joint and several moral damages of ₱10,000. For the robbery, they were sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four years and two months of prision correccional as minimum to ten years of prision mayor as maximum, with joint and several actual damages of ₱7,250. Ronnie Andales was sentenced to reclusion perpetua for robbery with rape, with moral damages of ₱30,000 and share in the ₱7,250 actual damages.

• Alibi — For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was absent from the crime scene at the time of its commission, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be there. The requirements of time and place must be strictly met. Here, appellants failed to demonstrate physical impossibility.

• Proof of Conspiracy — A conspiracy exists when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. The agreement may be inferred from the conduct of the parties disclosing a common understanding regarding the offense. The concerted actions of the five accused in abducting, robbing, and stripping the victim sufficed to prove conspiracy for robbery and lascivious acts, but not for rape.

• Robbery with Rape as a Special Complex Crime — Under Article 294(2) of the Revised Penal Code, all persons who participate in the robbery are liable for rape committed on the occasion thereof only when the rape was part of the common design or when the other participants had knowledge of its commission. Where rape is committed by one accused after the others have left and without their knowledge, only the actual rapist is guilty of robbery with rape; the others are liable for robbery and any other offenses they personally committed (applying People v. Hamiana, 89 Phil. 225 [1951]).

• Principal by Inducement — For a remark to constitute inducement making the speaker a principal, it must be the determining cause of the crime and must be uttered under circumstances that show the speaker’s overpowering moral ascendancy over the actor, amounting to a command from a superior to a subordinate (People v. Canial, 46 SCRA 634 [1972]; People v. Balderama, 226 SCRA 537 [1993]). Cawaling’s statement did not meet this standard because Andales had already decided to rape the victim before the remark was made, and no moral ascendancy was shown.

• Conviction for a Lesser Offense Included in the Charge — When rape is charged, the accused may be convicted of acts of lasciviousness if the evidence does not prove rape but establishes lascivious conduct. Thus, the four appellants who did not commit rape were properly convicted of robbery with acts of lasciviousness.

• “A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the agreement itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties disclosing a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense.” This excerpt articulates the standard for inferring conspiracy and was central to the finding of a common design for robbery and lasciviousness but insufficient for rape.

• “Before a remark can produce such an effect [of inducement], the same must be of a nature and uttered in such a manner as to become the determining cause of the crime. The inducer must have such an overpowering moral ascendency over the actor, as to make the utterance a command from a superior to a subordinate.” This passage defines the strict requisites for principal by inducement and justified the exoneration of Cawaling from liability for the rape.

• People v. Gaguban, G.R. No. 96287, April 25, 1994 — Reiterated the dual requirement for alibi; followed to reject the appellants’ alibi defense.
• People v. Empleo, 226 SCRA 454 (1993) — Stressed strict compliance with requirements of time and place for alibi; applied.
• People v. Uy, 206 SCRA 270 (1992) and People v. Dela Cruz, 190 SCRA 328 (1990) — Held that conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the parties; relied upon to find conspiracy for robbery and lascivious acts.
• People v. Hamiana, 89 Phil. 225 (1951) — Established that when rape is committed by one accused without the knowledge of the others, only the actual rapist is liable for robbery with rape; controlling precedent for modifying the conviction of the four other appellants.
• People v. Canial, 46 SCRA 634 (1972) and People v. Balderama, 226 SCRA 537 (1993) — Set the stringent test for principal by inducement; applied to hold that Cawaling’s remark did not make him liable for the rape.

• Article 294, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes robbery with rape as a special complex crime. The Court applied it solely to Andales, who was proved to have committed rape on the occasion of the robbery, and did not apply it to the other four for want of conspiracy or knowledge regarding the rape.
• Article 336, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes acts of lasciviousness. The four appellants were convicted under this provision for the lewd acts they performed upon the victim, the charge of rape being deemed to include the lesser offense of abusos deshonestos.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concurred.