People vs. Ang

A request for admission under Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is not available in criminal proceedings. The prosecution, as representative of the State, is a juridical entity incapable of making admissions based on personal knowledge; the procedure would compel an accused to give communicative testimony in violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination; and the material facts in a criminal case—the elements of the offense and the accused’s participation—are always disputed and must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, rendering the mode unsuitable. The pre-trial stipulation of facts under Rule 118 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure is the proper vehicle for narrowing issues.

In May 1999, the Development Bank of the Philippines discovered a cash shortage of P4,840,884.00 at its Lucena City Branch and conducted a special audit and fact-finding investigation. The investigation disclosed that branch officers Leila Ang and Rosalinda Driz, conspiring with private individuals Joey Ang, Anson Ang, and Vladimir Nieto, credited cash deposits to certain accounts without corresponding actual cash or with lesser amounts, and concealed the shortage by creating a fictitious journal entry. The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause and, in November 2005, three Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City for Falsification of Public Documents, Malversation of Public Funds, and Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

• The Charges: The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon indicted respondents Leila L. Ang (Document Analyst and authorized Branch General Ledger/Ticketing System User of DBP‑Lucena) and Rosalinda Driz (Branch Teller), together with Joey Ang, Anson Ang, and Vladimir Nieto (owners of JEA Construction and Supplies, Cocoland Concrete Products, and Unico Arte), for Falsification of Public Documents (Criminal Case No. 2005‑1046), Malversation of Public Funds (Criminal Case No. 2005‑1047), and Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 (Criminal Case No. 2005‑1048). The charges arose from the unlawful crediting of cash deposits to the accounts of the three business entities without actual cash or with a lesser amount deposited, and the creation of a fictitious journal entry to conceal a P4,840,884.00 cash shortage uncovered by a DBP special audit in May 1999.
• Leila Ang’s Request for Admission: In Criminal Case No. 2005‑1048, Leila Ang filed an “Amended Accused’s Formal Request for Admission by Plaintiff” dated December 29, 2009, invoking Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. The request sought to compel the People, through the City Prosecutor, to admit 60 enumerated matters. These included assertions that the DBP investigative team lacked personal knowledge of the transactions, that Leila Ang was never an accountable officer, that she did not receive the missing amount, that there was no evidence of her participation in the manipulation, and that the DBP cashier was solely liable. The request explicitly demanded sworn responses within fifteen days.
• Prosecution’s Opposition and Initial Denial: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Lucena moved to expunge the request, arguing that the matters sought were proper subjects of pre‑trial stipulation or trial evidence. On April 13, 2010, the RTC (Branch 53) denied the request and ordered it expunged.
• Reconsideration and RTC’s Declaration of Implied Admissions: After the presiding judge inhibited himself, the cases were re‑raffled to Branch 56. In a Joint Order dated February 12, 2015, Judge Pastrana granted Leila Ang’s motion for partial reconsideration, ruling that the prosecution failed to deny or oppose the request within the 15‑day period provided in Section 2, Rule 26; consequently, the facts stated in the request were deemed impliedly admitted.
• Motion for Clarification and Further Rulings: The prosecution filed a Motion for Clarification, contending that the request was served only on the prosecutor and not on the DBP personnel who had personal knowledge of the matters. In a Joint Order dated July 24, 2015, the RTC denied the motion as filed out of time and further declared that the implied admissions constituted “judicial admissions by the plaintiff under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,” reasoning that the People is represented by the City Prosecutor and service upon the prosecutor binds the plaintiff.
• Adoption in the Other Cases and Denial of the People’s Requests: Leila Ang filed a manifestation formally adopting the declared implied/judicial admissions in Criminal Case Nos. 2005‑1046 and 2005‑1047; the other accused filed similar manifestations. In response, the People filed its own Requests for Admission for each accused. By Joint Order dated March 10, 2016, the RTC denied the People’s requests, holding that the judicial admissions could no longer be varied or contradicted, and took judicial notice that the admissions applied to all three consolidated cases. The People’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated September 5, 2016, wherein the RTC maintained that consolidation extended the effect of the admissions and that evidence in each case effectively became evidence in all.
• Petition before the Sandiganbayan: The People filed a petition for certiorari (Rule 65) with the Sandiganbayan, which dismissed it on March 1, 2017. The Sandiganbayan found no palpable error by the RTC and characterized any mistakes as mere errors of judgment not correctible by certiorari. The SB also noted that the petition lacked proper verification and that the deputized special prosecutor’s authority to sign the certificate of non‑forum shopping was questionable. The People’s motion for reconsideration was denied on May 15, 2017.

• Consolidation Not a Merger of Evidence: Petitioner maintained that the consolidation of the three criminal cases was only for purposes of joint trial under Section 22, Rule 119, not an “actual consolidation” resulting in a merger of evidence under Section 1, Rule 31. Because the accused were not identical and the records did not reflect an intent to merge evidence, the RTC erred in applying the implied admissions in one case to all.
• Limited Effect of Admissions under Section 3, Rule 26: Petitioner argued that any implied admission obtained under Section 3, Rule 26 applies only to the pending action (Criminal Case No. 2005‑1048) and may not be used in any other proceeding; thus, the admissions could not be adopted in the falsification and malversation cases.
• Implied Admissions Are Not Judicial Admissions: Petitioner contended that admissions obtained through the failure to respond under Rule 26 are non‑verbal and unwritten, and therefore cannot be considered “judicial admissions” under Section 4, Rule 129.
• Improper Service of the Request: Petitioner asserted that the Request for Admission was served only on the public prosecutor and not on the DBP personnel whose personal knowledge was directly implicated; the prosecutor lacked personal knowledge of the facts sought to be admitted.
• Authority of the Deputized Counsel: Petitioner maintained that Atty. Michael Vernon De Gorio was duly deputized by the Office of the Ombudsman to represent the prosecution in all proceedings relative to the criminal cases until their termination, and therefore possessed the requisite authority to file the petition for certiorari before the Sandiganbayan.

• Finality of the RTC Orders: Leila Ang asserted that the Joint Orders dated February 12, 2015 and July 24, 2015, which declared the implied admissions and their character as judicial admissions, had become final, executory, and immutable; they could no longer be annulled, set aside, or varied.
• Applicability of Discovery Rules to Criminal Cases: Leila Ang argued that the modes of discovery, including requests for admission under Rule 26, apply to criminal proceedings by virtue of the suppletory character of the Rules of Civil Procedure under Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court.
• Implied Admissions as Judicial Admissions: Leila Ang contended that admissions obtained through requests for admission are properly treated as judicial admissions, and the RTC’s judicial notice of the People’s judicial admissions across the consolidated cases was legally permissible.
• Effect of Consolidation: Leila Ang maintained that while the consolidation was for joint trial, the logical and legal effect was to extend the application of the implied and judicial admissions to the other cases; the People could not avoid this consequence.
• Procedural Objections to the Petition: Leila Ang sought outright dismissal on grounds including the petition’s late filing (the 15‑day period should be counted from the Solicitor General’s receipt, not from indorsement to the Special Prosecutor) and lack of authority of Atty. De Gorio.

• Applicability of Rule 26 in Criminal Proceedings: Whether a request for admission under Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be availed of in a criminal case.
• Validity of the RTC Orders: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Joint Orders that treated the prosecution’s non‑response to the accused’s Request for Admission as implied admissions and further declared those admissions to be judicial admissions binding across all consolidated criminal cases.
• Authority of the Special Prosecutor: Whether the deputized special prosecutor, Atty. Michael Vernon De Gorio, had authority to file the petition for certiorari before the Sandiganbayan on behalf of the People.

• Applicability of Rule 26 in Criminal Proceedings: A request for admission under Rule 26 cannot be applied in criminal proceedings. The State, as the real party‑in‑interest, is a juridical entity incapable of acquiring personal knowledge of perceivable facts or being privy to the execution of documents, and therefore cannot be an “adverse party” required to make admissions of fact. Moreover, if requests for admission were permitted, allowing the prosecution to serve such a request on the accused would violate the constitutional right against self‑incrimination: the accused’s failure to answer would be deemed an admission of material facts bearing on guilt, effectively compelling communicative testimony under penalty of adverse inference and potential perjury. Additionally, the material and relevant facts in a criminal case—the elements of the offense and the accused’s complicity—are necessarily disputed; the procedure is thus incompatible with the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The pre‑trial stipulation of facts under Rule 118 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure adequately serves the purpose of narrowing issues without implicating fundamental rights. The fact that the request was initiated by the accused herself did not cure these infirmities because the matters set forth were essentially defenses and elements of the crimes that only the prosecution could prove; granting the request would have had the effect of closing the prosecution’s case before trial.
• Validity of the RTC Orders: The series of Joint Orders issued by the RTC were rendered with grave abuse of discretion contrary to law and jurisprudence, and are void. Allowing a request for admission under Rule 26 in a criminal case constitutes a patent violation of the Rules of Court and established principles. A void judgment produces no legal effect, cannot attain finality, and is regarded as a legal nullity; the situation is as if no judgment existed. The argument that the Joint Orders had become final and immutable was therefore rejected.
• Authority of the Special Prosecutor: The Sandiganbayan’s doubt as to Atty. De Gorio’s authority was unfounded. The Deputization/Authority to Prosecute issued by the Office of the Ombudsman expressly provided that the deputized counsel’s authority would “continue to be in force and effect until the termination of the proceedings with the trial courts.” A petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s interlocutory orders is part of the proceedings in the trial court; thus, the deputization remained effective when the petition was filed before the Sandiganbayan.

• Inapplicability of Requests for Admission to Criminal Proceedings — Requests for admission under Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure are unavailable in criminal cases for three cumulative reasons: (1) The State, as the real party‑in‑interest, is a juridical entity inherently incapable of having personal knowledge of the facts sought to be admitted or of being “privy” to documents, and therefore cannot serve as an adverse party for purposes of the rule. (2) Serving a request for admission on the accused violates the constitutional right against self‑incrimination because the rule deems a failure to respond as an admission; this compels the accused to make a communicative response—either a sworn denial or an admission—under the threat of an adverse inference, which is a form of compulsion prohibited by the Constitution. (3) In criminal prosecutions, the elements of the offense and the accused’s participation are necessarily disputed and must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt; a procedure that would resolve such disputed facts through the mere failure to file a timely denial is incompatible with the prosecutorial burden and the nature of criminal trials. The proper procedural device for narrowing factual issues in criminal cases is the stipulation of facts at pre‑trial under Section 1(b), Rule 118 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which operates without compulsion.
• Void Judgment Due to Grave Abuse of Discretion — A judicial order or judgment issued with grave abuse of discretion—i.e., an act done contrary to the Constitution, law, or jurisprudence, or executed whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily—is void and produces no legal or binding effect. A void judgment is a nullity; it cannot attain finality, and the situation is the same as if no judgment had been rendered. This doctrine was applied to declare all the impugned RTC orders void and to reject the argument that they had become immutable.
• The State as Party in Criminal Actions — In criminal proceedings, the State (the People of the Philippines) is the real party‑in‑interest; the private offended party is merely a witness. Because the State is not a natural person, it cannot acquire “personal knowledge” of perceptible facts within the meaning of the rules of evidence, nor can it be “privy” to the execution of documents. Thus, it is inherently incompetent to make admissions of fact in response to a request under Rule 26.

• “The Court answers in the negative for the following reasons: I. A Request for Admission Cannot be Served on the Prosecution Because it is Answerable Only by an Adverse Party to Whom such Request was Served. … [T]he State, being a juridical entity unlike the offended party, cannot be privy to the execution of any document or acquire personal knowledge of past factual events. … Such lack of sensory perception reasonably operates as an inherent inability and incompetence on the part of the State to make an admission of fact.” — Establishes the fundamental incapacity of the State to respond to requests for admission, grounding the first reason for the inapplicability of Rule 26 in criminal cases.
• “If requests for admission are allowed to be utilized in criminal proceedings, ‘any material and relevant matter of fact’ requested by the prosecution from the accused for admission is tantamount to compelling the latter to testify against himself. This is because failure to answer a request for admission will be deemed as an admission of the fact requested to be admitted. … Such requirements unduly pressure the accused in making an admission or denial, which is in itself a form of compulsion.” — Articulates the constitutional barrier rooted in the right against self‑incrimination.
• “Besides, the facilities of a pre‑trial – especially that provided for in Section 1(b), Rule 118 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure regarding stipulation of facts – are most likely serve the same purpose without falling into the danger of violating fundamental rights such as the right against self‑incrimination.” — Identifies the proper, non‑coercive alternative for narrowing issues in criminal trials.
• “A void judgment is no judgment at all in legal contemplation. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. … In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there was no judgment.” — Justifies the conclusion that the RTC orders, having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, did not attain finality and were legally non‑existent.

• People v. Webb, 371 Phil. 491 (1999) — Referenced for the separate opinions of Justices Davide and Puno that recognized the possibility of suppletorily applying civil discovery procedures in criminal cases. The Court acknowledged these expressions of view but distinguished the case because Webb involved depositions, not requests for admission, and the majority ultimately denied the discovery request on other grounds.
• Cuenco Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos, 585 Phil. 490 (2008) — The Court refused to apply Rule 23 (Depositions Pending Action) suppletorily in criminal proceedings since Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure adequately governed the conditional examination of an infirm witness. This authority was invoked to support the primacy of criminal procedure rules and the reluctance to import civil discovery devices without compelling justification.
• Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 678 Phil. 358 (2011) — An En Banc decision holding that depositions are not meant as substitutes for actual testimony and that testimonial evidence must generally be presented in open court. The ruling reinforced the principle that the constitutional right to confrontation limits the use of civil discovery methods in criminal cases.
• Go v. People, 691 Phil. 440 (2012) — The Court disallowed the taking of an oral deposition abroad for a material prosecution witness, applying Section 15, Rule 119 and emphasizing the accused’s rights to public trial and confrontation. Cited to demonstrate the consistent judicial reluctance to permit civil discovery that would undermine criminal procedural safeguards.
• People v. Sergio, G.R. No. 240053, October 9, 2019 — Distinguished as a rare instance where Rule 23 was suppletorily applied in a criminal case due to exceptional circumstances (a death-row detainee in Indonesia whose testimony was indispensable). The Court contrasted those unique, compelling circumstances with the present case, where no comparable justification existed for applying Rule 26.
• Air Transportation Office v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 686 (1998) — Applied for its definition of grave abuse of discretion as an act done contrary to the Constitution, law, or jurisprudence, or performed whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily. This standard was used to void the RTC orders.

• Sections 1, 2, and 3, Rule 26 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Govern the request for admission, implied admission upon failure to respond, and the limited effect of admissions. The provisions were parsed to demonstrate that they contemplate an adversarial civil context with parties capable of personal knowledge, and that their mechanism of deeming silence as admission is constitutionally impermissible in criminal proceedings.
• Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court — Provides for the suppletory application of the rules of civil procedure to criminal actions. This was interpreted as not authorizing the adoption of discovery modes that conflict with the fundamental nature of criminal procedure and constitutional rights.
• Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs the conditional examination of a prosecution witness before the court where the case is pending; cited to illustrate that criminal procedure contains specific, adequate rules for preserving testimony, undercutting the need to borrow civil discovery provisions.
• Section 1(b), Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Allows stipulation of facts at pre‑trial. Identified as the lawful mechanism for narrowing issues in criminal cases without compulsion or infringement of the right against self‑incrimination.
• Article III, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution (Right against self‑incrimination) — Although not expressly cited by section number, the Court’s core reasoning rested on this provision, holding that any procedure deeming an accused’s silence as an admission of guilt‑related facts constitutes compulsion to give testimonial evidence in violation of this constitutional guarantee.

Peralta, C.J., Gesmundo, Lazaro-Javier, Lopez, Delos Santos, and Gaerlan, JJ., concurred. Perlas-Bernabe, J., filed a concurring opinion; Leonen, J., filed a separate concurring opinion; Inting, J., filed a concurring opinion; Zalameda, J., filed a separate concurring opinion. Baltazar-Padilla, J., was on leave.

• Caguioa, J., joined by Hernando, J. — Filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. The decision text records the notation of the separate opinion but does not detail its content; thus, the specific points of partial dissent are not reproduced in the reported decision.