People vs. Bercadez

An Information charging violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 must allege two elements: (1) the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool or implement for livelihood; and (2) that the act of carrying the weapon was in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. B.P. Blg. 6 did not dispense with the second element but merely amended the penalty, modified the examples of prohibited weapons, and added "or in pursuit of a lawful activity" as an exception. Failure to allege the second element renders the Information fatally defective for not charging an offense.

On March 18, 2019, in Makati City, Ronnel Buenafe Bercadez was arrested after bystanders reported an alleged attempted robbery. During the arrest, an officer felt and saw a knife tucked in Bercadez's waist. Bercadez was subsequently charged with violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 6, which amended Paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 9 — a decree originally issued pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines under martial law in 1972. The Information alleged only that Bercadez carried a bladed weapon outside his residence not used as a necessary tool for livelihood, omitting any reference to subversion, rebellion, or public disorder.

• The Arrest and Charge: On March 18, 2019, in Makati City, bystanders approached police officers and reported an alleged attempted robbery by Ronnel Buenafe Bercadez. During the arrest, one officer felt and then saw a knife tucked in Bercadez's waist. An Information was filed charging Bercadez with violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 for "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry[ing] outside of his residence, a bladed weapon (knife) not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn a livelihood, nor used in connection therewith."

• Motion to Quash: Bercadez moved to quash the Information before entering his plea. He argued: (1) the Information failed to allege that the crime was committed in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder; and (2) P.D. No. 9, as amended by B.P. Blg. 6, had ceased to have legal force since the martial law rationale underlying the law had ended.

• MeTC Resolutions: The MeTC granted the motion to quash, ruling that B.P. Blg. 6 must be read in conjunction with P.D. No. 9. The offense carries two elements — the second being the connection to subversion, rebellion, or public disorder — and the Information's failure to allege this second element rendered it defective. The quashal was without prejudice to the filing of the correct Information.

• RTC Decision: On certiorari, the RTC set aside the MeTC Resolutions. The RTC held that B.P. Blg. 6 is a separate and distinct law from P.D. No. 9; that Purisima and Lasanas were not on all fours; and that the legislative intent was to make possession of bladed weapons outside one's residence a malum prohibitum offense, requiring only the first element.

• CA Decision: The CA reversed the RTC and reinstated the MeTC Resolutions. The CA emphasized that B.P. Blg. 6's title — "An Act Reducing the Penalty for Illegal Possession of Bladed, Pointed or Blunt Weapons, and For Other Purposes, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree Numbered Nine" — reveals a legislative intent merely to reduce the penalty, not to eliminate an essential element. Otherwise, B.P. Blg. 6 would violate the single-subject rule under the Constitution.

• B.P. Blg. 6 as a Separate Offense: The OSG argued that B.P. Blg. 6 eliminated the second element identified in Purisima, making the mere carrying of a bladed weapon outside one's residence — without connection to subversion or public disorder — a punishable offense. B.P. Blg. 6 should be treated as creating a distinct crime rather than merely amending P.D. No. 9.

• Opportunity to Amend: The prosecution contended that the MeTC should have ordered an amendment to the Information instead of quashing it outright, pursuant to Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.

• Defective Information: Bercadez maintained that the Information was fatally defective because it did not allege the second essential element — that the carrying of the knife was in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder — as required under P.D. No. 9 and the doctrines in Purisima and Lasanas.

• Cessation of Legal Force: Bercadez argued that P.D. No. 9, as amended, had lost legal effect because the martial law conditions that justified its enactment had long ceased to exist.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Whether an Information charging violation of B.P. Blg. 6 must allege that the carrying of the bladed weapon was in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.

• Nature of B.P. Blg. 6: Whether B.P. Blg. 6 eliminated the second element of the offense under P.D. No. 9, thereby penalizing the mere carrying of a bladed weapon outside one's residence as a malum prohibitum offense.

• Amendment of the Information: Whether the MeTC erred in quashing the Information without first ordering or allowing the prosecution to amend it.

• Sufficiency of the Information: The Information was fatally defective for failure to allege facts constituting the second element. Under Purisima and Lasanas, the offense punished under P.D. No. 9, as amended by B.P. Blg. 6, requires two elements: (1) carrying outside one's residence a bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool for livelihood; and (2) that the act was in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. The second element removes the act from the ambit of ordinary local ordinances. Without alleging this motivation, the Information did not charge an offense.

• Nature of B.P. Blg. 6: B.P. Blg. 6 did not eliminate the second element or create a new crime. The amendatory law's title and text reveal that it merely: (1) changed the examples of prohibited weapons; (2) reduced the penalty from imprisonment of five to ten years to one month to one year, or a fine of PHP 200 to PHP 2,000, or both; and (3) added "or in pursuit of a lawful activity" as an additional exception. As an amendatory law, B.P. Blg. 6 must be read in conjunction with P.D. No. 9. The legislative intent was solely to reduce the penalty — not to redefine the offense. The footnote in Lasanas observing that B.P. Blg. 6 "may have sought to undo the effects of Purisima" was dictum that did not alter the binding doctrine. To hold otherwise would render B.P. Blg. 6 unconstitutional for violating the single-subject rule, as its title states only a reduction of penalty and cannot support the creation of an entirely new offense.

• Amendment of the Information: The MeTC did not err. Under Rule 110, Section 14, the prosecution may amend an Information in form or substance without leave of court at any time before the accused enters a plea. Because Bercadez filed his motion to quash before arraignment, the prosecution was at liberty to amend the Information on its own; no court order was necessary. The requirement in Rule 117, Section 4 that the court "shall order that an amendment be made" applies only when leave of court is required — that is, after a plea has been entered. The prosecution's failure to amend was its own omission, not the court's error. The MeTC correctly quashed the Information without prejudice to the filing of a proper one.

• Elements of Violation of P.D. No. 9, as amended by B.P. Blg. 6 — As established in People v. Purisima (176 Phil. 186) and reiterated in People v. Lasanas (236 Phil. 27), and now affirmed for the guidance of the bench, bar, and public, the crime has two elements: (1) the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool or implement for livelihood; and (2) that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. The second element is what distinguishes the offense from a mere violation of a local ordinance; without it, the Information fails to charge an offense.

• Amendment of Information Before Plea — Under Rule 110, Section 14, a complaint or information may be amended in form or substance without leave of court at any time before the accused enters a plea. The prosecution bears the burden of making necessary amendments during this period. The court-ordered amendment provision under Rule 117, Section 4 applies only after plea, when leave of court becomes necessary. If the prosecution fails to amend before plea, the court may properly quash the Information without prejudice.

• Amendatory Laws Must Be Read with the Original Statute — An amendatory act must be read in conjunction with the law it amends. It does not create a separate and independent offense unless the legislative intent to do so is clear and unambiguous. Where the amendatory law's title states only a reduction of penalty, construing it to eliminate an essential element of the original offense would violate the single-subject rule under the Constitution.

• "We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is the motivation behind it." — The controlling doctrine from Purisima, now expressly reaffirmed for all courts.

• "Verily, a cursory review of B.P. Blg. 6 reveals that it merely amended P.D. No. 9 through the following: (1) changing the examples of weapons whose possession outside one's residence is prohibited; (2) lowering the period of penalty of imprisonment or providing as an alternative the imposition of a fine; and (3) adding the exception to the prohibition or in pursuit of a lawful activity. Contrary to what the prosecution posits, B.P. Blg. 6 did not intend to define a new crime that is separate from that of P.D. No. 9."

• "It bears emphasis that an order to amend an information is necessary only after plea and during trial. In this situation, leave of court is necessary, which could only be granted when the amendment can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused." — Clarifying the interplay between Rule 110, Section 14 and Rule 117, Section 4.

• People v. Purisima, 176 Phil. 186 (1978) — Controlling precedent. The Supreme Court En Banc, speaking through Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma, established the two-element test for violation of P.D. No. 9. The second element — connection to subversion, rebellion, or public disorder — is what distinguishes the offense from ordinary local ordinances. The trial courts' dismissal of Informations lacking this allegation was affirmed.

• People v. Lasanas, 236 Phil. 27 (1987) — Followed and applied. The Court En Banc, through Justice Florentino Feliciano, applied Purisima and held an Information fatally defective for omitting the second element. Notably, Lasanas was decided after B.P. Blg. 6's enactment. A footnote observed that B.P. Blg. 6 "may have sought to undo the effects of Purisima" by penalizing the act as malum prohibitum, but the Court did not apply B.P. Blg. 6 because it was not more favorable to the accused than P.D. No. 9 as construed in Purisima.

• Paragraph 3, Presidential Decree No. 9 — Originally penalized carrying bladed, pointed, or blunt weapons outside one's residence with imprisonment of five to ten years, enacted pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines under martial law. The "whereas" clauses expressly link the prohibition to subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, and public disorder.

• Section 1, Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 — Amended Paragraph 3 of P.D. No. 9 by (a) modifying the list of prohibited weapons; (b) reducing the penalty to imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than one year or a fine of not less than PHP 200 nor more than PHP 2,000, or both; and (c) adding "or in pursuit of a lawful activity" as an exception. The Court held this did not eliminate the second element from P.D. No. 9.

• Rule 110, Section 14, Rules of Court — Governs amendment or substitution of an information. Before plea, amendment may be made without leave of court. After plea, formal amendment requires leave of court and must not prejudice the accused.

• Rule 117, Sections 1, 4, and 9, Rules of Court — Section 1 requires a motion to quash to be filed before plea. Section 4 provides that if the ground is a defect curable by amendment, the court shall order amendment; this applies when leave of court is necessary (after plea). Section 9 provides that failure to move to quash before plea waives all objections except those based on grounds including that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, Mario V. Lopez, and Antonio T. Kho, Jr. concurred. Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Chairperson) concurred with a separate opinion.

• N/A — The decision was unanimous; no dissenting opinions were noted.