People vs. City Court of Manila, Branch VI

The constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is not violated when an accused is prosecuted under a special law and separately under the Revised Penal Code for acts arising from the same facts, provided each offense demands proof of an additional fact or element that the other does not. The exhibition of a motion picture without prior approval of the Board of Censors under Republic Act No. 3060 and the public exhibition of indecent or immoral motion pictures under Article 201(3) of the Revised Penal Code are distinct offenses; the former requires lack of board approval, the latter requires indecent or immoral content, and neither element is necessary to the other.

On 16 July 1971, in Room 309, De Leon Building, Raon corner Rizal Avenue, Manila, Agapito Gonzales y Veneracion and Roberto Pangilinan publicly exhibited 8mm color motion pictures. The film had never been submitted to the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures for preview and approval, and it showed scenes of naked male and female persons performing sexual acts in lewd positions. Two separate informations were filed with the City Court of Manila on 4 April 1972: Criminal Case No. F-147347 for violation of Section 7 in relation to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 3060, and Criminal Case No. F-147348 for violation of Article 201(3) of the Revised Penal Code.

• The Charges: Accused Agapito Gonzales and Roberto Pangilinan were indicted in two amended informations. Criminal Case No. F-147347 charged violation of Section 7, in relation to Section 11, of Republic Act No. 3060 for publicly exhibiting an 8mm color motion picture that had never been submitted to or passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures. Criminal Case No. F-147348 charged violation of Article 201(3) of the Revised Penal Code for publicly exhibiting indecent and immoral motion picture scenes depicting naked persons performing sexual acts in lewd positions. Both offenses were alleged to have been committed on 16 July 1971 at Room 309, De Leon Building, Raon corner Rizal Avenue, Manila.

• Proceedings on the Informations: Accused Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both charges on 31 May 1972. His initial motion to quash the two informations on the ground that they did not charge an offense was denied on 17 July 1972. Trial dates were repeatedly postponed. On 15 November 1972, the City Court granted Gonzales’ motion to withdraw his plea of “not guilty” in Criminal Case No. F-147348 without substituting another plea.

• Motion to Quash on Double Jeopardy: On 27 December 1972, Gonzales moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. F-147348, invoking double jeopardy. He contended that Criminal Case No. F-147347 for violation of Republic Act No. 3060 contained allegations identical to those in Criminal Case No. F-147348, thus exposing him to being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

• Dismissal and Subsequent Conviction: The City Court dismissed Criminal Case No. F-147348 in an order dated 20 January 1973, accepting the argument that the allegations in the two informations were identical and that the plea entered in one case exposed the accused to double jeopardy in the other. Shortly after, on 7 February 1973, Gonzales changed his plea to guilty in Criminal Case No. F-147347 and was sentenced to a fine of P600.00. The People’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal was denied, prompting this petition for review on certiorari.

• No Prior Termination: Petitioner maintained that double jeopardy could not be invoked because there had been no prior conviction, acquittal, dismissal, or termination of criminal proceedings in Criminal Case No. F-147347 when the motion to quash was filed. The constitutional guarantee requires a previous termination in another case for the same offense, which was absent.

• Waiver of Jeopardy: Petitioner argued that by initially pleading not guilty in both cases without moving to quash on double jeopardy grounds, the accused waived the defense. Even if the conviction in Criminal Case No. F-147347 later preceded the dismissal of Criminal Case No. F-147348, the waiver under the then applicable Rule 117, Section 10 barred the motion to quash. Moreover, the accused was arraigned in the same court and could not claim ignorance of the existence of the other charge.

• Improper Procedure: Petitioner further contended that the withdrawal of the plea of “not guilty” without entering a new plea was an irregular procedural tactic that should not have been permitted to serve as the vehicle for a belated double jeopardy claim.

• Jeopardy Attaches Upon Arraignment: Respondent countered that conviction, acquittal, dismissal, or termination of the first case was not a prerequisite; it sufficed that the accused had already been placed in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted in the first case for the same offense. Since the two informations rested on identical factual allegations, permitting prosecution in both cases placed him in double jeopardy.

• Identity of Offense: Whether the offense defined in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3060 (exhibiting a motion picture not passed by the Board of Censors) and the offense defined in Article 201(3) of the Revised Penal Code (exhibiting indecent or immoral motion pictures) constitute the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy.

• Waiver of Jeopardy Defense: Whether the accused waived the defense of double jeopardy by failing to raise it before pleading, and whether the withdrawal of his plea of “not guilty” allowed him to subsequently move to quash on that ground.

• Identity of Offense: The two offenses were held distinct and separate, precluding a valid double jeopardy claim. The gravamen of the offense under Republic Act No. 3060 is the public exhibition of any motion picture that has not been previously passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures — a malum prohibitum where criminal intent is presumed and the film need not be indecent or immoral. The gravamen of Article 201(3) of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, is the public showing of indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts, or shows — a malum in se where criminal intent is an essential element. The elements differ: the special law requires proof of lack of board approval, while the Revised Penal Code requires proof of indecent or immoral content. Because each provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, they do not constitute the same offense. A single act may violate two unrelated provisions of law, and an acquittal, conviction, or dismissal under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Consequently, all three requisites for a valid double jeopardy defense — prior attachment, valid termination, and identity of offense — were not satisfied.

• Waiver of Jeopardy Defense: Although the accused initially pleaded without moving to quash on double jeopardy, the benefit of the favorable 1985 amendment to Rule 117, Section 8 — which now allows the defense of jeopardy to be raised even after arraignment — was extended to him. Nevertheless, this procedural benefit was rendered illusory because no double jeopardy existed in the first place; the dismissal was therefore erroneous. The prosecution’s appeal from the order of dismissal did not place the accused in second jeopardy, as the dismissal was upon his own motion, was not an acquittal on the merits, and raised a purely legal question.

• Elements of Double Jeopardy — Three requisites must concur to raise the defense of double jeopardy: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt or frustration thereof.

• Distinct Offenses – Additional Fact Test — Where two different legal provisions define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one is no obstacle to a prosecution for the other, even if both arise from the same facts, provided each crime involves some important act or element that is not an essential element of the other. If one provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal, conviction, or dismissal under one does not bar prosecution under the other.

• Malum Prohibitum vs. Malum In Se as Indicator of Distinctness — The classification of an offense as malum prohibitum (criminal intent presumed) under a special law and malum in se (criminal intent essential) under the Revised Penal Code underscores their essential difference and supports the conclusion that they do not constitute the same offense for double jeopardy.

• Prosecution Appeal from Dismissal Not Double Jeopardy — An appeal by the prosecution from an order of dismissal does not constitute double jeopardy when (1) the dismissal is made upon motion or with the express consent of the defendant, (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or merits, and (3) the question to be resolved by the appellate court is purely legal, so that a reversal merely remands the case for further proceedings to determine guilt or innocence.

• “It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or Identical offense. A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other.”

• “The gravamen of the offense defined in Rep. Act No. 3060 is the public exhibition of any motion picture which has not been previously passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures. The motion picture may not be indecent or immoral but if it has not been previously approved by the Board, its public showing constitutes a criminal offense. On the other hand, the offense punished in Article 201(3) of the Revised Penal Code is the public showing of indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts, or shows, not just motion pictures.”

• People v. Doriquez, G.R. No. L-24445-45, 29 July 1968, 24 SCRA 163 — Followed for the rule that where two different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one is no obstacle to prosecution of the other if each offense requires proof of an additional fact not required by the other.

• People v. Bacolod, 89 Phil. 621 and People v. Alvarez, 45 Phil. 472 — Cited as authority for the same “additional fact” rule distinguishing separate offenses.

• People v. Desalisa, G.R. No. L-15516, 17 December 1966, 125 Phil. 27 — Followed for the rule that an appeal by the prosecution from a dismissal upon the accused’s motion does not constitute double jeopardy when the dismissal is not an acquittal on the merits and the issue is purely legal.

• Barot v. Villamor, 105 Phil. 263 (1959) — Cited for the principle that an accused who pleads to the charge without moving to quash is deemed to have waived the defense of double jeopardy, except under specified circumstances.

• Article IV, Section 22, 1973 Constitution / Article III, Section 21, 1987 Constitution — The double jeopardy clause prohibiting twice putting a person in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. Applied to define the scope of the constitutional right but found inapplicable because the offenses were not identical.

• Section 7, Republic Act No. 3060 (Film Censorship Law) — Penalizes the exhibition of any motion picture not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures. Interpreted as establishing an offense malum prohibitum with the gravamen of lack of board approval.

• Section 11, Republic Act No. 3060 — Prescribes the penalty for violation of Section 7.

• Article 201(3), Revised Penal Code — Punishes those who exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts, or shows in places open to public view. Interpreted as a felony malum in se requiring proof of lascivious or obscene content and criminal intent.

• Section 10, Rule 117, Rules of Court (pre-1985) — Provided that failure to move to quash before pleading waived all objections except want of an offense and lack of jurisdiction, with a discretionary exception when the accused learns later that he has been in jeopardy. The 1985 amendment (Section 8, Rule 117) extended the non-waivable grounds to include jeopardy, which was given retroactive benefit but ultimately held inapplicable because no valid jeopardy existed.

Chief Justice Teehankee, Justices Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Cruz, and Gutierrez, Jr., all concurred. Justice Cruz, in a separate concurrence, reserved judgment on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3060 until its validity is squarely raised in an appropriate proceeding. Justice Gancayco was on leave.