People vs. Dalabajan

A recantation of trial testimony by a prosecution witness does not automatically vitiate the original testimony; such affidavits are looked upon with disfavor and must be scrutinized with caution, as they can easily be secured through intimidation or monetary consideration. An affidavit of desistance filed after trial cannot serve as a basis for acquittal, as it must be given before the filing of the criminal complaint to benefit the accused. Where a victim is attacked while in armpit‑deep water by assailants aboard a banca, the attackers consciously adopt a mode of attack that ensures execution without risk to themselves, constituting treachery and qualifying the killing to murder.

At a New Year’s Eve dance held at the Barangay Hall of Cayapas, Dumaran, Palawan on January 1, 1986, a confrontation erupted between Hernando Dalabajan and Amado Zabalo, Jr. The altercation began when Hernando kicked and stabbed Zabalo near the hall. A group composed mostly of the Dalabajan clan joined the assault. Zabalo fled towards the sea and waded into the water. Hernando, together with his brothers Dominador and Fernando, alone took a banca, pursued him about 30 to 40 meters from shore, and attacked him with bladed instruments, wooden clubs, and a paddle while he was in armpit‑deep water. The victim’s body was later found face down in the water. Many barangay residents were related to the Dalabajan clan, and the barangay tanods were kin of the accused, causing the lone prosecution eyewitness to hide during the incident. The three brothers were charged with murder.

• The Incident: At around 1:00 a.m. on January 1, 1986, during a New Year’s Eve dance at the Barangay Hall of Cayapas, Dumaran, Palawan, Hernando Dalabajan kicked Amado Zabalo, Jr. on the right thigh and stabbed him on the right abdomen as Zabalo was coming out of the hall. Other residents, mostly relatives of the Dalabajans, joined in mauling the victim. Zabalo fled toward the seashore and waded into the sea. Hernando, together with his brothers Dominador and Fernando, took a banca and pursued him. The rest of their relatives remained on the shore. The three brothers overtook Zabalo about 30 to 40 meters from shore and, helping one another, struck him with bladed instruments, wooden clubs, and a banca paddle on various parts of his body while he was in water up to his armpits. After the victim became motionless and lay face down in the water, the three returned to shore.

• Prosecution Eyewitness: Melencio dela Cruz, who was hiding behind bushes near the seashore, witnessed the entire attack from its inception at the Barangay Hall to the killing at sea. He stated that he could see clearly because it was a full moon night and the distance from his hiding place to the killing site was about 30 meters. He hid out of fear of the Dalabajan clan, which was known for clannishness, and because most Barangay Tanods were relatives of the accused. After the attackers returned to shore, Dela Cruz went to the victim’s house and informed the latter’s relatives. His trial testimony, given under oath and subject to cross‑examination, remained consistent and unshaken.

• Physical and Investigative Evidence: Amado Zabalo, Sr., the victim’s father, went to the scene shortly after being informed and saw his son’s cadaver. The body was brought to the Barangay Hall. Police officer Lolito Carceller, part of the investigating team, examined the body and prepared a sketch showing the wounds. The cadaver bore a wound on the upper head, stab wounds on the left eye, left ear, left portion of the mouth, right cheek, and stomach, beside dislocated fingers on the left hand. No autopsy was conducted due to the unavailability of a doctor; a death certificate was issued. Carceller’s observation that most wounds were located above the armpit area corroborated Dela Cruz’s account that the victim was attacked while in armpit‑deep water with the assailants aboard a banca.

• Defense Version: Hernando Dalabajan claimed that around midnight he had told the drunk Amado Zabalo, Jr. not to start dancing as the ladies were not yet in the hall. Later, when Hernando went downstairs, Zabalo suddenly hacked him with a bolo, hitting him on the right elbow and, after a chase, on the left head. Hernando managed to club Zabalo with a piece of wood before losing consciousness from blood loss. He surrendered to the police the next day, admitting he clubbed the victim. Co‑accused Dominador Dalabajan, a Barangay Tanod assigned to maintain peace at the dance, testified that he only learned of the victim’s death the following day and denied any participation. Fernando Dalabajan presented no evidence and did not testify.

• Post‑Trial Developments: After the case was submitted for decision, Amado Zabalo, Sr. executed an Affidavit of Desistance on February 26, 1990, asserting that Dominador and Fernando were innocent and that Hernando had merely acted in self‑defense. On July 31, 1990, Melencio dela Cruz executed an Affidavit of Recantation, claiming he did not witness the incident and had been coerced by the victim’s father to testify falsely. These affidavits, along with a later Sinumpaang Salaysay from Kagawad Manuela Gabinete‑Dacuan alleging Dela Cruz was not present at the scene, were attached to an Urgent Motion for Release on Bail filed only after the promulgation of the judgment of conviction on July 26, 1991. The recantation was thus presented nearly a year after its execution and almost four years after Dela Cruz’s last in‑court testimony.

• Recantation and Affidavit of Desistance as Ground for Acquittal: Accused‑appellants argued that the recantation of the sole eyewitness and the desistance of the victim’s father constituted newly discovered evidence that should lead to a new trial or acquittal, asserting that the original testimony was fabricated.

• Tumultuous Affray: Accused‑appellants maintained that the death resulted from a tumultuous affray, thus no single individual could be held criminally liable for murder.

• Incredibility of the Prosecution Eyewitness: The testimony of Melencio dela Cruz was assailed as inconsistent, uncorroborated, and physically impossible because the witness could not have identified assailants from 30 to 40 meters away at night.

• Denial of Presumption of Innocence: Accused‑appellants contended that the trial court violated their constitutional right to be presumed innocent and to an impartial tribunal by relying on allegedly fabricated evidence.

• Recantation Unreliable: The Office of the Solicitor General argued that the affidavits of recantation and desistance were mere afterthoughts, executed long after trial, and were not credible because Dela Cruz’s claim of coercion took more than four years to surface. The sworn statements constituted neither newly discovered evidence nor grounds that would probably change the judgment.

• Treachery Properly Appreciated: Treachery attended the killing because the victim was in armpit‑deep water, severely restricting his ability to defend himself, while the three accused attacked from a banca using weapons, consciously adopting a mode of attack that insured execution without risk to themselves.

• Tumultuous Affray Inapplicable: The elements of death caused in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code were absent; there was only one group of assailants attacking a single victim, and the persons who killed the deceased were clearly identified.

• Credibility of Recanted Testimony: Whether the trial court erred in relying on the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Melencio dela Cruz despite his subsequent recantation.

• Effect of Post‑Trial Affidavit of Desistance: Whether the affidavit of desistance executed by the victim’s father after trial could serve as a ground for acquittal.

• Existence of Tumultuous Affray: Whether the death occurred in the course of a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code, thereby exculpating the accused from individual liability for murder.

• Presence of Treachery: Whether the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery was properly appreciated.

• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be credited in favor of Hernando Dalabajan.

• Credibility of Recanted Testimony: No error was committed. A recantation does not necessarily nullify an earlier in‑court declaration. Declarations given under oath in open court, subjected to cross‑examination and observed by the trial judge, carry greater weight than an affidavit secured after trial. The recantation was executed almost four years after Dela Cruz’s last testimony and was presented to the trial court only after promulgation of the conviction; its belated introduction indicated a mere afterthought. The original testimony was detailed, consistent, and corroborated by the location of the wounds, which matched the circumstances of an attack on a wading victim by assailants in a banca.

• Effect of Post‑Trial Affidavit of Desistance: The desistance affidavit was given no probative weight. An affidavit of desistance must be executed before the filing of the criminal complaint to benefit the accused. Having been filed long after trial, it could not serve as a basis for acquittal. Moreover, its sudden execution cast serious doubt on its veracity.

• Existence of Tumultuous Affray: The death was not caused in a tumultuous affray. The elements of Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code were not present because there were no groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting each other reciprocally. The evidence showed only one group of persons — the three accused — attacking a single victim. The perpetrators were clearly identified, thus the first and fifth requisites of the provision were lacking.

• Presence of Treachery: Treachery was correctly appreciated. At the time of the fatal attack, the victim was in armpit‑deep water, which severely restricted his freedom of movement and ability to defend himself. The three assailants were aboard a banca, using bladed instruments, clubs, and a paddle to strike the victim simultaneously, a mode of attack consciously adopted to ensure its success without risk to their own personal safety. Although treachery may not have been present at the very inception of the attack, it existed at the moment of consummation, qualifying the killing to murder.

• Voluntary Surrender: Hernando Dalabajan’s voluntary surrender was appreciated as a mitigating circumstance. However, it was offset by the presence of the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. The penalty remained reclusion perpetua as correctly imposed by the trial court.

• Recantation of Testimony Rule — A mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not automatically vitiate the original testimony if the latter is credible. Affidavits of recantation are viewed with disfavor because they can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses through intimidation or for a monetary consideration, making them exceedingly unreliable. The testimony given in open court under oath, with the opportunity for cross‑examination and the trial judge’s observation of demeanor, is entitled to greater weight than a subsequently executed affidavit of retraction. A recantation presented after a delay of years and only after conviction is an afterthought unworthy of probative value.

• Affidavit of Desistance after Trial — To benefit an accused, a desistance must be made before the filing of the criminal complaint. An affidavit of desistance executed after trial has concluded cannot serve as a ground for acquittal or as newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial.

• Elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray (Article 251, Revised Penal Code) — The requisites are: (1) there be several persons; (2) they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or used violence can be identified. Where only one group attacks a single victim and the killers are clearly identified, death in a tumultuous affray is not established.

• Treachery in a Water‑Based Attack — Treachery is appreciated where the victim is wading in armpit‑deep water while the assailants attack from a banca, using weapons. The victim’s mobility is severely restricted, and the mode of attack ensures the crime’s consummation without risk to the attackers. Even if treachery is not present at the initial stage of aggression, it exists if the attack is continuous and treachery is evident at the moment of the killing.

• “Affidavits of recantation can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always the probability that it will later be repudiated. A testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside lightly, least of all by a mere affidavit executed after the lapse of considerable time.”

• “In general, motions for new trial based on affidavits of this kind are entitled to but scant consideration. The mere fact that after a solemn trial in a court of justice has been terminated, one of the witnesses, in conversation with friends or under pressure from interested parties, may tell a different story as to the incidents testified to by him, does not necessarily destroy the probative testimony when on the witness stand.”

• “Treachery may not be present at the inception of the attack, but if the attack is continuous and treachery existed at the time of the consummation of the killing the crime committed is not homicide but murder.”

• People vs. Davatos, 229 SCRA 647 (1994) — Cited for the principle that a recantation does not necessarily cancel an earlier declaration and is subject to the test of credibility, and that it should be received with caution to avoid making a solemn trial a mockery.

• People vs. Dulay, 217 SCRA 103 (1993) — Cited for the rule that mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony if credible.

• U.S. vs. Dacir, 26 Phil. 503 (1913) — The foundational precedent explaining why motions for new trial based on affidavits of recantation are entitled to scant consideration; it elaborated on the superior evidentiary value of in‑court testimony over post‑trial statements.

• People vs. Bigcas, 211 SCRA 630 — Cited for the rule that a motion for new trial will not be granted if based on an affidavit of recantation whose effect is to free the appellant from participation, lest trial become a mockery.

• Arroyo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 750 (1991) — Cited for the doctrine that an affidavit of desistance must be given prior to the filing of a criminal complaint to benefit the accused.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (Murder) — Applied to the killing of Amado Zabalo, Jr. because treachery qualified the offense. The penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed.

• Article 251, Revised Penal Code (Death caused in a tumultuous affray) — Clarified and distinguished; its elements were held to be absent because the perpetrators were identified and only one group attacked a single victim.

• Article 13(7), Revised Penal Code (Mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender) — Appreciated in favor of Hernando Dalabajan but offset by aggravating circumstances.

• Article 14, Revised Penal Code (Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength) — Present and offset the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

• Rule 121, Section 2, Rules of Court (Grounds for new trial) — Cited to explain that the affidavits of recantation and desistance did not constitute newly discovered evidence that would probably change the judgment.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.