People vs. Dawaton
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Edgar Dawaton for the murder of Leonides Lavares but reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. Dawaton stabbed the victim while the latter lay unconscious and heavily intoxicated on a wooden bench, satisfying the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The trial court imposed the death penalty, but on appeal, the accused's claim of voluntary surrender was rejected and his offer to plead guilty to homicide was held not to constitute a mitigating circumstance. However, intoxication was appreciated as a mitigating circumstance because it was neither habitual nor intentional. With no aggravating circumstances present and one mitigating circumstance, the lesser indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code. The accused was also ordered to pay civil indemnity and moral damages.
Primary Holding
When the penalty prescribed by law is composed of two indivisible penalties (such as reclusion perpetua to death for murder) and the commission of the crime is attended by a mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. An offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense, rejected by the prosecution, does not constitute a mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty under Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated where the accused was arrested by authorities who came looking for him.
Background
On 20 September 1998, Edgar Dawaton and several companions, including his kumpadre Leonides Lavares, engaged in a prolonged drinking session in Sitio Garden, Brgy. Paltic, Dingalan, Aurora. After consuming multiple bottles of gin at two different houses, Lavares fell into a deep drunken sleep on a wooden bench. Without prior altercation or warning, Dawaton left momentarily, returned with a knife, and stabbed the sleeping Lavares repeatedly until he died. Dawaton fled but was subsequently arrested at his uncle's residence. The prosecution charged him with murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation.
History
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Information for murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation filed on 11 March 1999; accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
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During pre-trial on 7 May 1999, accused offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide; the prosecution rejected the offer, and trial proceeded.
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On 20 November 1999, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Baler, Aurora, convicted Edgar Dawaton of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced him to death, with civil indemnity of P50,000.00.
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Accused appealed the conviction and penalty to the Supreme Court.
Facts
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The Drinking Session and the Attack: On 20 September 1998, Esmeraldo Cortez hosted visitors at his house in Sitio Garden, Brgy. Paltic, Dingalan, Aurora. His brother-in-law Edgar Dawaton and kumpadre Leonides Lavares arrived around noon, followed by Domingo Reyes. The four consumed four bottles of gin at Esmeraldo's house before transferring to the balcony of Amado Dawaton's house, approximately twenty meters away, where they continued drinking another bottle. Lavares, already intoxicated, lay down on a wooden bench (papag) on his right side, using his right hand as a pillow, and fell into deep sleep. About twenty minutes later, at approximately 3:30 p.m., Dawaton left for his house and returned with a stainless knife bearing a blade two to three inches long. Without uttering a word, he approached the sleeping Lavares and stabbed him near the base of his neck.
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The Killing: Lavares awoke, surprised, and exclaimed, "Bakit Pare, bakit?" Dawaton did not reply but stabbed him again on the upper neck. Lavares attempted to flee, but Dawaton, who was physically larger, grabbed his shirt collar and prevented escape. Dawaton continued stabbing Lavares repeatedly. Despite being held, Lavares managed to move about twenty meters from Amado Dawaton's house before collapsing behind Esmeraldo's house. Dawaton continued stabbing him even after he fell, ceasing only when Lavares had expired. Dawaton then fled toward the house of his uncle, Carlito Baras, situated behind the cockpit. Domingo Reyes and Esmeraldo Cortez, positioned only a few meters away, witnessed the entire attack but were too shocked to intervene beyond pleading with Dawaton to stop.
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The Victim's Injuries: The medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Ernesto C. del Rosario on 24 September 1998 recorded one stab wound on the victim's back, ten stab wounds on the front of his body, slash wounds on his left hand, and a severed tongue. The immediate cause of death was "Hypovolemic Shock due to hemorrhage, multiple stabbed wounds."
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Arrest and Stipulations: Dawaton was arrested at the house of Carlito Baras in Sitio Aves, Brgy. Paltic. During trial, the parties stipulated to the veracity of the joint affidavit executed by the arresting officers, SPO2 Ramil D. Gamboa and PO3 Gerry M. Fabros, and to the genuineness of the medico-legal certificate and death certificate, thereby dispensing with the testimony of the arresting officers and the examining physician.
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The Accused's Version: Dawaton claimed that on the night prior to the stabbing, he drank from 7:00 p.m. until 3:00 a.m. with his uncle Armando Ramirez. He resumed drinking early the following morning. According to him, a drunk and angry Lavares arrived at about 2:30 p.m. demanding the return of candles and cursing him, threatening to hang a grenade on him. Dawaton alleged he attempted to calm Lavares, but the latter insisted on going home to retrieve a grenade. Fearing the threat because he knew Lavares possessed a grenade, Dawaton went home to find a longer blade. Upon returning, Lavares was still present and resumed his verbal tirade. When Lavares again moved to leave, Dawaton held him and stabbed him three times before his mind purportedly went blank. He claimed he regained awareness only at his uncle Carlito's house and intended to surrender, but police arrived while his uncle was bathing.
Arguments of the Petitioners
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Plea of Guilty: Accused-appellant argued that his offer to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide during pre-trial entitled him to the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty under Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
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Voluntary Surrender: Accused-appellant maintained that he voluntarily surrendered because he went with the policemen willingly when they arrived and did not resist arrest.
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Outraged Feeling Analogous to Passion and Obfuscation: Accused-appellant claimed that the victim's threat to hang a grenade on him and the accompanying curses provoked him, constituting a mitigating circumstance akin to passion and obfuscation under Article 13, paragraphs 6 and 10, of the Revised Penal Code.
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Non-Recidivism: Accused-appellant contended that his status as a non-recidivist should be considered a factor warranting a reduction of the penalty imposed.
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Intoxication: While not explicitly framed as an argument in the digestible portions of the decision, the factual record demonstrated the accused's intoxicated state, which later became a central consideration in the Court's penalty modification.
Arguments of the Respondents
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Rejection of Plea to Lesser Offense: The prosecution rejected the offer to plead guilty to homicide, and under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, such consent was necessary for the plea to be accepted.
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Absence of Voluntary Surrender: The joint affidavit of the arresting officers, whose veracity was stipulated by the parties, stated that Dawaton was caught attempting to escape from the rear of the cockpit building when the police arrived, negating any claim of voluntary submission.
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No Factual Basis for Provocation: Prosecution witnesses Domingo Reyes and Esmeraldo Cortez testified that there was no prior altercation or disagreement between Dawaton and Lavares. On the contrary, the two were observed in a playful banter (lambingan) during the drinking session, indicating that the attack was entirely unexpected and unprovoked.
Issues
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Plea to Lesser Offense: Whether the accused's offer to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide, rejected by the prosecution, constituted the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.
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Voluntary Surrender: Whether the accused voluntarily surrendered to the authorities.
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Outraged Feeling: Whether the mitigating circumstance of outraged feeling analogous to passion and obfuscation attended the killing.
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Non-Recidivism: Whether the absence of recidivism constitutes a mitigating circumstance that reduces the penalty.
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Intoxication: Whether the alternative circumstance of intoxication should be appreciated in favor of the accused.
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Penalty: What is the proper penalty imposable on the accused given the existence or absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
Ruling
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Plea to Lesser Offense: The offer to plead guilty to homicide was not a mitigating circumstance. For a plea of guilty to be voluntary under Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, the plea must be to the offense charged. An offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense, particularly one rejected by the prosecution as required under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, does not satisfy this requirement.
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Voluntary Surrender: Voluntary surrender could not be appreciated. The requisites are: (a) the offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender was voluntary. The accused was arrested at his uncle's residence. The stipulated joint affidavit of the arresting officers revealed that they chanced upon Dawaton attempting to escape from the rear of the cockpit building. That he did not resist after being taken into custody did not constitute voluntary surrender, which requires spontaneity and an unconditional intent to submit to authorities, either from acknowledgment of guilt or to spare them the trouble of search and capture.
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Outraged Feeling: No factual basis supported the claim of having acted under an outraged feeling analogous to passion and obfuscation. Apart from the accused's self-serving testimony, no evidence corroborated the alleged death threat. Both prosecution witnesses testified that there was no prior altercation, and Esmeraldo Cortez recalled seeing the two in playful banter. The trial court's assessment of credibility, which gave greater weight to the prosecution's account, was accorded deference.
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Non-Recidivism: The absence of recidivism is not a mitigating circumstance. While recidivism is an aggravating circumstance that increases the penalty, its converse—non-recidivism—does not operate to reduce the penalty.
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Intoxication: Intoxication was appreciated as a mitigating circumstance. Under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, intoxication is mitigating when the felony is committed in a state of intoxication that is neither habitual nor subsequent to a plan to commit the crime. The prosecution witnesses corroborated that Dawaton and his companions had consumed four bottles of gin, with Dawaton drinking the most from a fifth bottle, and that he was already intoxicated upon arriving at Esmeraldo's house at noon. No evidence suggested habitual drunkenness or that the intoxication was intended to fortify his resolve.
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Penalty: The penalty of death was reduced to reclusion perpetua. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties. Under Article 63, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, when the crime is attended by a mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty must be applied. Since intoxication was appreciated as mitigating and no aggravating circumstance was present, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed. The civil indemnity of P50,000.00 was affirmed, and moral damages of P50,000.00 were additionally awarded.
Doctrines
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Treachery — Attack on an Unconscious Victim — Treachery exists when the attack is mounted on an unconscious victim who could not have put up any defense, or on a person dead drunk and sleeping on a bench with no chance to defend himself. The attack must be sudden and deliberately adopted to ensure execution without risk to the offender. Here, the victim was in deep slumber from excessive alcohol consumption and had no inkling of the impending assault, the two having been on friendly terms as kumpadres.
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Mitigating Circumstance of Intoxication — Under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, intoxication is a mitigating circumstance when: (a) the offender commits the felony in a state of intoxication, and (b) such intoxication is not habitual or subsequent to a plan to commit the felony. If habitual or intentional, it becomes an aggravating circumstance. The burden is on the accused to show that intoxication is not habitual or intentional once intoxication is established.
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Voluntary Surrender — Requisites — For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, three elements must concur: (a) the offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary, meaning spontaneous and demonstrating an unconditional intent to submit to the authorities. Surrender cannot be appreciated where evidence shows that the authorities came looking for the accused and arrested him, even if no resistance was offered after apprehension.
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Plea of Guilty to a Lesser Offense as Mitigating Circumstance — An offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense, when rejected by the prosecution, does not qualify as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. The plea must be to the offense charged to be voluntary. Furthermore, Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the consent of both the offended party and the prosecutor before a plea to a lesser included offense may be accepted.
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Penalty with Two Indivisible Penalties and One Mitigating Circumstance — Under Article 63, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and the commission of the crime is attended by a mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
Key Excerpts
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"There is treachery when the attack is upon an unconscious victim who could not have put up any defense whatsoever, or a person who was dead drunk and sleeping on a bench and had no chance to defend himself." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine of treachery as applied to a sleeping or unconscious victim, forming the ratio for the murder qualification.
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"A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily included in his search and capture." — This defines the standard for voluntary surrender and explains why arrest by authorities who seek out the accused negates the circumstance.
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"An offer to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense cannot be considered as an attenuating circumstance under the provisions of Art. 13 of The Revised Penal Code because to be voluntary the plea of guilty must be to the offense charged." — This excerpt states the holding on why the accused's pre-trial offer did not mitigate his liability.
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"Since no aggravating circumstance attended the killing but there existed the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, the accused should be sentenced only to the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua." — This passage encapsulates the dispositive reasoning for the penalty reduction under Article 63, paragraph 3.
Precedents Cited
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People v. Flores, G.R. No. 116524, 18 January 1996, 252 SCRA 31 — Cited as controlling authority for the principle that treachery exists when the attack is upon an unconscious victim unable to offer any defense.
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People v. de Guia, G.R. No. 123172, 2 October 1997, 280 SCRA 141 — Followed to support that a victim dead drunk and sleeping on a bench had no chance to defend himself, satisfying treachery.
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People v. Noble, 77 Phil. 93 (1946) — Relied upon for the rule that an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not a mitigating circumstance because the plea must be to the offense charged.
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People v. Nanas, G.R. No. 137299, 21 August 2001 — Cited for the elements of voluntary surrender.
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People v. Sumalpong, G.R. No. 124705, 20 January 1998, 284 SCRA 464 — Followed for the rule that voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated where the authorities came looking for the accused.
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People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 135666, 20 July 2001 — Cited for the principle that civil indemnity of P50,000.00 is awarded without need of proof other than the fact of death and the accused's responsibility.
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People v. Hapa, G.R. No. 125698, 19 July 2001 — Cited in support of awarding moral damages of P50,000.00 as reasonable.
Provisions
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Article 13, Revised Penal Code (Mitigating Circumstances) — Paragraphs 6 (passion and obfuscation), 7 (voluntary surrender), and 10 (analogous circumstances) were invoked by the accused and analyzed. The proffered mitigating circumstances were rejected for lack of factual basis or non-compliance with requisites.
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Article 15, Revised Penal Code (Alternative Circumstances — Intoxication) — Applied to appreciate intoxication as mitigating. The provision states that intoxication is mitigating if not habitual or subsequent to a plan to commit the felony; otherwise, it is aggravating.
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Article 63, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code (Rules for Application of Indivisible Penalties) — Applied to impose reclusion perpetua instead of death because one mitigating circumstance (intoxication) existed without any aggravating circumstance, mandating the lesser of the two indivisible penalties.
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Section 2, Rule 116, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Plea of Guilty to a Lesser Offense) — Referenced in holding that the prosecution's consent is required before an accused may plead guilty to a lesser included offense, and rejection of the offer negates any mitigating effect.
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Article 2206, New Civil Code — Applied to justify the award of moral damages to the heirs of the victim for the mental anguish suffered.
Notable Concurring Opinions
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concurred.