People vs. Espanola

A mental retardate is not per se disqualified from being a witness; as long as the person can perceive facts and convey those perceptions intelligibly to the court, his testimony is admissible. A conviction may rest on the testimony of a discharged state witness who is mentally retarded, provided the witness’s testimony is substantially corroborated and all conditions for discharge under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court are satisfied. An extrajudicial confession that the accused refuses to sign and that is given without the assistance of competent and independent counsel of his own choice is inadmissible in evidence. A judge who did not preside over the trial may validly render a decision based on the transcript of stenographic notes.

On the evening of November 16, 1991, Jessette Tarroza, a 24-year-old medical technologist, finished her shift at the Mercy Community Clinic in Camague, Iligan City and began walking home. She declined a co-employee’s offer to escort her. She never reached her residence. Her body was discovered the following morning in a grassy area about fifty meters from her home, bearing multiple stab wounds, with her clothing torn and her panty removed. A green T-shirt with a “Midwifery” print was found near her shoes. The investigation initially yielded no suspects until an anonymous tip directed police to one “Wing-wing,” later identified as Joel Gonzales. Gonzales confessed to being present and identified his companions “Beroy,” “Langga,” and “Jimmy” as the perpetrators. The three were subsequently identified as Jeoffrey Abello, Christopher Espanola, and Jimmy Paquingan.

• The Victim’s Last Hours and Discovery of the Body: Jessette Tarroza worked as a medical technologist at the Mercy Community Clinic in Camague, Iligan City, from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. on November 16, 1991. After her shift, a co-employee, Claro Liquigan, accompanied her to the junction road leading to her house. At about 11:30 p.m., she declined his offer to escort her further, saying she knew the people in the area. Liquigan saw four persons in the pathway about 60 to 70 meters away but could not identify them. Jessette did not arrive home. Her father, Romeo Tarroza, found her body the next morning in a grassy area approximately 50 meters from their house and only 15 meters from the pathway. Her red blouse was torn with multiple holes, her pants and panty had been removed, and her bra was cut. A light green T-shirt with “Midwifery” at the back and “ICC” on the front, later identified as belonging to appellant Jeoffrey Abello, was recovered near her shoes.

• Medical Findings: Two medico-legal officers examined the cadaver. Dr. Chito Rey Gomez conducted the initial post-mortem and noted five stab wounds at the back, ten on the front, and incised wounds traversing the trachea, external jugular vein, and three-fourths of the esophagus. Death was due to cardiorespiratory arrest from pneumohemothorax. Vaginal examination revealed fresh complete hymenal lacerations at 3, 7, and 8 o’clock, consistent with sexual contact. Dr. Tomas P. Refe of the NBI later conducted an autopsy and found thirteen stab wounds and an incised wound on the neck cutting the trachea and partially the esophagus. The hymenal lacerations — at 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11 o’clock — displayed sharp, coaptable edges without vital reaction, indicating sexual intercourse occurred after death.

• Investigation and Identification: Police investigators traced an anonymous tip about “Wing-wing” (Joel Gonzales). Gonzales was brought to the police station on November 19, 1991, where he confessed to being present during the crime and identified “Beroy,” “Langga,” and “Jimmy” as the assailants who stabbed and raped Jessette. Romeo Tarroza identified these three as his neighbors: Jeoffrey Abello (“Beroy”), Christopher Espanola (“Langga” or “Cocoy”), and Jimmy Paquingan (“Jimmy”). On November 21, 1991, the three were brought to the station. A police line-up of twelve persons was conducted; Gonzales pointed to the three appellants. Physical examination of the appellants revealed recent injuries: Paquingan had scratch abrasions on the jaw, neck, and chest; Espanola had contusions on the right shoulder and hematoma; Abello had abrasion and contusion on the right deltoid area. Dr. Livey Villarin opined these injuries could have been caused by sharp objects or fingernails.

• Extrajudicial Confession of Jimmy Paquingan: On November 25, 1991, after the Information for Rape with Homicide had already been filed, Jimmy Paquingan expressed a desire to confess. He was brought to the City Prosecutor’s Office. City Prosecutor Ulysses Lagcao provided him with Atty. Leo Cahanap (Legal Officer of the City Mayor’s Office) and Atty. Susan Echavez (IBP Legal Aid) as counsel. Paquingan then gave a statement narrating how Abello slashed the victim’s neck, after which she was taken to a bushy area and sexually abused by all four men in succession. However, Paquingan refused to sign the transcribed sworn statement.

• Discharge of Joel Gonzales as State Witness: The prosecution moved to discharge Joel Gonzales as a state witness on grounds of absolute necessity, his not being the most guilty, and the availability of substantial corroboration. The defense opposed, arguing that Gonzales alone had confessed and thus appeared most guilty. The trial court ordered his discharge on June 26, 1992. The trial court observed during his testimony that Gonzales appeared mentally retarded; he could not read or write.

• Testimony of State Witness Joel Gonzales: Gonzales testified that on the night of November 16, 1991, he went to a dance in Baybay, Camague with Beroy (Abello), Jimmy (Paquingan), and Cocoy/Langga (Espanola). They drank Tanduay and smoked marijuana. After the dance, they met a woman (not Tarroza) whom they brought to a nipa hut and slept beside. Later, they encountered Jessette Tarroza on the road, followed her to a dark place, and attacked her. Abello slashed her neck, Espanola slashed her breast, and Paquingan stabbed her back. The victim resisted by scratching her attackers. After she died, they carried her to a bushy area and all four sexually molested her. Gonzales identified the green “Midwifery” T-shirt as the one worn by Abello that night, bearing bloodstains.

• Defense of the Accused: All three appellants interposed alibis. Jimmy Paquingan claimed he watched a “beta” (movie) at a neighbor’s house and then slept at his grandmother’s house, corroborated by Emma Mingo. Christopher Espanola asserted he watched the same movie, then attended a disco until 1:00 a.m. Jeoffrey Abello also claimed he went to the disco with Carmencita Gatase from about 10:00 p.m. to 1:30 a.m., after which he slept at Gatase’s house. Gatase confirmed Abello’s account but could not account for Espanola’s whereabouts after they separated at the disco. The trial court found their alibis unnatural, inconsistent, and incapable of overcoming the positive identification by Gonzales.

• Validity of State Witness Discharge: The prosecution maintained that all requisites under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court were satisfied: Gonzales consented, his testimony was absolutely necessary due to the absence of other direct evidence, it was substantially corroborated by medical and physical evidence, he did not appear to be the most guilty (he was mentally retarded and did not inflict any fatal wounds), and he had no prior conviction for moral turpitude. The determination of who to discharge as a state witness was a matter of prosecutorial discretion entitled to great weight.

• Competency and Credibility of Gonzales: The prosecution’s position, adopted by the trial court, was that Gonzales, despite his mental retardation, was capable of perceiving facts and conveying them intelligibly; his testimony on material points was consistent and corroborated. Minor inconsistencies were attributable to his low intellect and did not impair credibility.

• Voluntariness and Validity of Paquingan’s Confession: At trial, the prosecution presented the confession as part of its evidence, but the defense’s challenge to its voluntariness and the independence of counsel was met with the prosecution’s assertion that Paquingan was asked whether he wanted counsel and was provided lawyers.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The prosecution argued that the positive identification by Gonzales, supported by the appellants’ injuries and the autopsy findings, established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The defense of alibi could not prevail over positive identification, particularly since the places where appellants claimed to be were within the vicinity of the crime scene.

• Validity of Decision by a Non-Trial Judge: The People contended that a judge who did not preside at trial may validly decide a case based on the transcripts of stenographic notes, and such practice does not violate due process.

• Discharge of State Witness and Witness Competency: Whether the trial court gravely erred in discharging Joel Gonzales as a state witness and in giving weight to his testimony despite his mental retardation, material inconsistencies in his account, and his being allegedly the most guilty.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Whether the trial court erred in not rejecting Jimmy Paquingan’s unsigned extrajudicial confession as involuntary and as obtained in violation of his constitutional right to competent and independent counsel of his own choice.

• Alibi: Whether the trial court erred in characterizing the defense evidence as alibi and in rejecting it despite alleged weakness in the prosecution’s case.

• Validity of Decision by a Non-Trial Judge: Whether the trial court’s decision was void because the judge who penned it did not personally hear the testimony of the witnesses.

• Damages: Whether the awards of actual, compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages, and the computation for loss of earning capacity, were proper.

• Discharge of State Witness and Witness Competency: The discharge of Joel Gonzales complied with all requisites of Section 9, Rule 119. Gonzales gave his consent, his testimony was absolutely necessary in the absence of other direct evidence, and it was substantially corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Villarin (injuries on appellants consistent with scratching), Dr. Gomez, and Dr. Refe (multiple stab wounds and post-mortem lacerations). He was not the most guilty; as a mentally retarded individual, he could not have been the leader, and he did not inflict any fatal wound. There was no record of prior conviction for moral turpitude. The determination of who should be discharged is a prosecutorial discretion accorded great weight. On witness competency, a mental retardate is not per se disqualified under Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130. As long as the witness can perceive facts and make his perceptions known, his testimony is admissible. Gonzales’s testimony, though marked by some repetitiousness and the need for leading questions, was coherent and unyielding on the identity of the killers. Minor inconsistencies between his sworn statement and open-court testimony — such as the omission of an earlier encounter with another woman — were explained by the limited questioning during the ex parte affidavit-taking and do not undermine credibility; sworn statements are not treasuries of absolute truth. The discrepancy in identifying the print on the T-shirt (“Mercy” instead of “Midwifery”) was reasonably attributed to Gonzales’s illiteracy.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: The extrajudicial confession of Jimmy Paquingan was inadmissible. The refusal to sign the sworn statement cast serious doubt on its voluntariness; an unsigned confession cannot be the basis for conviction. Moreover, although Paquingan was already charged and thus not under custodial interrogation, the taking of his statement after formal charge constituted a critical pretrial stage at which the right to counsel attached. The right to counsel requires competent and independent counsel preferably of the accused’s own choice. Atty. Cahanap, as Legal Officer of Iligan City, could not qualify as independent counsel because his office’s function of supporting peace and order created a conflict of interest akin to that of a prosecutor. The record showed the lawyers were not chosen by Paquingan but were supplied by the prosecutor. Therefore, the confession was excluded.

• Alibi: The trial court correctly treated the defense evidence as alibi. Positive identification by prosecution witness Gonzales prevailed over denial and alibi. Appellants failed to demonstrate that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene given the proximity of the places they claimed to be to the locus of the crime.

• Validity of Decision by a Non-Trial Judge: The decision was not void. The fact that the judge who penned the decision did not personally hear the case does not per se render the judgment invalid. A judge who did not preside at trial may validly rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes as the basis for a decision. This practice does not violate substantive or procedural due process.

• Damages: The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for death was proper. Actual damages of P50,000.00 for funeral and burial expenses were duly supported. The trial court’s award of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity was modified upward. Applying the formula: (2/3 x [80 – age of victim at time of death]) x a reasonable portion of net annual income, the victim’s annual gross income was P39,146.25, with reasonable living expenses of P15,600.00, yielding a net annual income of P23,546.25. The resulting loss of earning capacity was fixed at P659,294.50. Moral damages of P50,000.00 were proper given the parents’ mental anguish, and exemplary damages of P25,000.00 were warranted because the killing was attended by treachery and the corpse was outraged, which shocked the conscience.

• Discharge of an Accused as State Witness (Section 9, Rule 119, Rules of Court) — The requisites are: (1) consent of the accused to be discharged; (2) his testimony must be absolutely necessary; (3) there is no other direct evidence available; (4) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on material points; (5) he does not appear to be the most guilty; and (6) he has not been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude. The determination of who should be discharged rests within the sound discretion of the prosecution, and courts will accord it great weight unless done in violation of the Rules.

• Competency of a Mentally Retarded Witness — A mental retardate is not per se disqualified from testifying. Under Section 20, Rule 130, all persons who can perceive and, perceiving, can make known their perception to others may be witnesses. Mental incapacity under Section 21 disqualifies only those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, renders them incapable of intelligibly conveying their perceptions. If the witness can perceive facts and communicate them to the court, his testimony is admissible, with credibility being a matter for the trial court’s assessment.

• Inadmissibility of Extrajudicial Confession — Voluntariness and Right to Counsel — A confession to be admissible must be: (1) voluntary; (2) made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) express; and (4) in writing. The refusal of the accused to sign the sworn statement raises serious doubt as to voluntariness and renders it inadmissible. The right to counsel applies not only during custodial investigation but also during critical pretrial stages after formal charge. Counsel provided must be competent, independent, and preferably of the accused’s own choice. A city legal officer, whose functions are akin to those of a prosecutor, cannot serve as independent counsel for an accused due to an inherent conflict of interest.

• Alibi and Denial vis-à-vis Positive Identification — Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and cannot prevail over positive identification by a credible prosecution witness. To prosper, alibi must demonstrate not merely that the accused was elsewhere, but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of commission.

• Validity of a Decision Rendered by a Judge Who Did Not Hear the Trial — A decision prepared and signed by a judge who did not preside over the trial is not per se void. The judge may rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes, and such reliance does not violate due process.

• Formula for Loss of Earning Capacity — The award is computed as: (2/3 x [80 – age at death]) x a reasonable portion of the net annual income that would have been received by the heirs. Net annual income is derived by deducting reasonable living expenses from gross annual income.

• “A mental retardate is not therefore, per se, disqualified from being a witness. As long as his senses can perceive facts and if he can convey his perceptions in court, he can be a witness.”

• “We do not agree that Gonzales is the most guilty of the accused. From the evidence, it appears that Gonzales is mentally retarded. He could not have been a leader of the group for he was intellectually wanting. He did not inflict any of the fatal wounds that led to the death of the victim.”

• “Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing. The fact that appellant Paquingan did not sign his sworn statement casts serious doubt as to the voluntariness of its execution. It is inadmissible evidence.”

• “An independent counsel cannot be burdened by any task antithetical to the interest of an accused. As a legal officer of the city, Atty. Cahanap provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the city in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. His office is akin to a prosecutor who undoubtedly cannot represent the accused during custodial investigation due to conflict of interest.”

• “While it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision. For a judge who was not present during the trial can rely on the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial as basis of his decision.”

• People v. Salomon, 229 SCRA 403 (1994) — Cited for the principle that a mental retardate is not per se disqualified as a witness if he can perceive and convey his perceptions.

• People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566 (1994) — Applied for the rule that an extrajudicial confession must be rejected where there is doubt as to its voluntariness.

• People v. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626 (1995) — Relied upon for the four requisites of an admissible extrajudicial confession under Republic Act No. 7438.

• People v. Rayray, 241 SCRA 1 (1995) — Followed for the ruling that a decision penned by a judge who did not hear the case is not void and may rest on the transcript of stenographic notes.

• People v. Pacapac, 248 SCRA 77 (1995) — Cited in support of the rule that minor inconsistencies do not impair credibility and that a non-trial judge may validly decide a case.

• People v. Teehankee, 249 SCRA 54 (1995) — Cited regarding the proper award of civil indemnity for death under Article 2206 of the New Civil Code.

• Section 9, Rule 119, 1985 Rules of Court (now Section 17, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure) — Enumerated the requisites for discharging an accused as a state witness; all conditions were satisfied with respect to Joel Gonzales.

• Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Section 20 provides that all persons who can perceive and make known their perception may be witnesses; Section 21 disqualifies those of unsound mind only when incapable of intelligibly conveying perceptions. Gonzales was found capable under these provisions.

• Section 12, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right to competent and independent counsel preferably of the accused’s own choice. The provision was violated in the taking of Paquingan’s confession because the lawyers provided were not of his own choosing and Atty. Cahanap was not independent.

• Republic Act No. 7438 — Codifies the rights of persons under custodial investigation; referenced in the requisites for admissibility of confessions.

• Article 2206, New Civil Code — Applied to support the award of P50,000.00 as indemnity for death without need of proof, and as foundation for the loss of earning capacity formula.

Regalado, Romero, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concurred.